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A HISTORY  OF 

ITALIAN  UNITY 


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MAP  OF  ITALY  AT  BKGINNING  OF  1848. 


A HISTORY  OF 


ITALIAN  UNITY 


BEING 

A POLITICAL  HISTORY  OF  ITALY 

FROM  1814  TO  1871 


BY 

BOLTON  KING,  M.A. 


Now  all  these  things  happened  unto  them  for  ensamples" 


VOL.  I 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 

153-157  FIFTH  AVENUE 
1899 


Printed  by 

Ballanttne,  Hanson  6*  Co. 
Edinbxirgh 


l<  58  K 


TO 

MT  MOTHER 

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PREFACE 


This  book  is,  as  its  title  indicates,  a political  history  only ; 
of  social  and  religious  life,  of  literature  and  art  and  science 
it  only  treats,  when  they  border  on  the  field  of  politics. 
Incomplete  as  such  a work  must  be,  the  specialization  is 
necessary,  before  a wider  synthesis  can  picture  the  full 
national  life. 

A foreigner,  writing  the  history  of  a country  not  his 
own,  has  his  loss  and  gain.  He  cannot  wholly  grasp  the 
subtle  essence  that  makes  the  spirit  of  its  life  and  insti- 
tutions; he  cannot  penetrate  the  side-lights,  that  often 
mean  more  than  the  patent  facts,  or  understand  each  deli- 
cate inflection  of  the  nation’s  voice.  But  what  he  loses 
in  intimacy  and  colour,  he  may  gain  in  perspective  and 
impartiality.  He  is  better  able  to  see  the  problems  in 
their  true  proportions,  and  neglect  the  noisy  controversies  of 
the  moment  for  more  abiding  issues.  His  detachment  from 
party  makes  him  less  likely  to  be  biassed ; and  though  the 
world  is  small  and  its  dividing-lines  much  the  same  every- 
where, it  is  easier  for  him  than  for  the  native  critic  to  be 
Pair.  I have  done  my  best  to  do  justice  to  all  sides,  though 
r have  not  attempted  to  conceal  my  sympathies.  I make  no 
5-pology,  if  I have  said  hard  things  of  the  Papacy.  For 
Catholicism  as  a religion  I trust  I have  shown  all  respect ; 
:he  Papacy  qud  political  institution  is  subject  to  political 
3riticism,  and  I have  said  less  than  the  truth  rather  than 
nore. 

My  object  in  writing  this  book  has  been  a twofold  one. 
First,  I have  endeavoured  to  give  a trustworthy  account  of  a 


viii  PREFACE'- 

chapter  of  modern  history  which  has  been  most  inadequately 
dealt  with  both  at  home  and  abroad.  Outside  a few  limited 
studies,  there  is  hardly  an  English  or  even  a French  writer  who 
has  treated  the  Italian  history  of  the  century  with  much  pre- 
tence to  accuracy  or  research ; and  bulky  as  is  the  material 
published  in  Italy,  Italian  historians  have  not  been  success- 
ful in  weaving  the  material  into  any  very  well-proportioned 
or  readable  whole.  My  second  aim  has  been  to  make  the 
re-birth  of  a noble  and  friendly  nation  better  understood  in 
a country  which  knows  little  really  of  Italy.  The  English- 
man’s knowledge  of  the  Italian  Revolution  is  summed,  it 
has  been  said,  in  the  belief  that  it  had  something  to  do  with 
Garibaldi  and  a red  shirt.  A leading  London  newspaper 
recently  urged  the  Italians  in  all  seriousness  to  take  some 
steps  in  the  direction  of  Cavour’s  Free  Church,  forgetting 
that  this  was  done  a quarter  of  a century  ago ; and  many  a 
lecture  on  their  recent  troubles  would  have  been  spoilt  by  a 
rudimentary  knowledge  of  their  history  ol  the  last  forty 
years.  The  tie,  that  united  so  closely  the  English  and 
Italians  of  the  last  generation,  seems  slackening,  and  it  needs 
more  mutual  knowledge  to  cement  the  sympathy  again. 

For  the  materials  of  the  book  I have  had  recourse  to 
almost  all  the  published  matter  of  any  importance  (nearly 
900  works  in  all),  except  (a)  contemporary  journals  as  a 
rule,  and  (h)  some  literature  out  of  print  and  not  to  be  seen 
in  England.  I hope  that  these  pages  do  not  suffer  seriously 
from  either  omission.  From  such  small  acquaintance  as  I 
have  with  the  Italian  press  of  the  Revolution,  I have  found  it 
of  no  great  value,  and  it  is  remarkable  how  little  such  a book 
as  Gori’s  Storia  della  rivoluzione  italianay  based  on  a careful 
study  of  the  newspapers  of  the  time,  adds  to  our  knowledge. 
The  second  omission  has  been  due  to  an  inability  to  consult 
any  library  outside  England.  The  splendid  collection  of 
modern  Italian  books  at  the  British  Museum  has  few  gaps, 
but  it  has  some,  and  it  is  singularly  deficient  in  the  govern- 


/ 


PREFACE  ix 

mental  publications  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.  Hence  I have 
only  been  able  to  study  the  proceedings  of  parliament  after 
1859  in  isolated  collections  of  speeches,  and  I have  not  seen 
all  the  Green  Books,  which  were  first  published  in  1865. 
It  is  easy,  however,  to  exaggerate  the  value  of  official  publi- 
cations. Foreign  Offices  have  so  carefully  bowdlerized  their 
“ books  ” — blue,  yellow,  green, — that  they  generally  conceal 
Iwhat  the  historian  most  wants  to  know.  They  are,  says 
Signor  Bonghi,  “ only  the  stuff  in  the  shop- window.”  “ In- 
discretions,” he  adds,  “supply  the  true  materials;”  and  to 
discover  the  springs  of  diplomacy,  the  writer  finds  that  his 
safest  reliance  is  in  memoirs,  letters,  reported  conversations. 

Down  to  i860  the  Italian  historian  is  choked  with  the 
abundance  of  these.  The  eagerness  of  the  Italians  to  pub- 
lish everything,  however  trivial,  that  bears  on  the  Kevolution, 
reaches  almost  to  a literary  mania.  But  the  student,  who 
wades  through  the  dismal  morasses  of  correspondence,  can 
pick  up  gems.  Even  of  “ documents,”  as  to  whose  talismanic 
i7irtue  I own  to  something  of  a heterodox  scepticism,  there  is 
iao  small  wealth.  Historians  owe  much  to  the  Kevolution 
|;or  publishing  the  records  of  the  governments,  which  it  upset 
n 1848  and  1859*  Italian  statesmen  have  allowed  papers  to 
oe  published,  which  by  diplomatic  canons  should  have  been 
lidden  in  the  most  secret  recesses  of  the  Foreign  Ministry ; 
juiminating  of  course  in  that  masterpiece  of  “ indiscretion,” 
ua  Marmora  s Un  pd  piu  di  luce.  Even  the  Archives,  down 
it  least  to  i860,  have  been  to  a certain  extent  opened  to  a 
ew  historians,  such  as  N.  Bianchi,  Nisco,  Sansone.  None 
he  less  it  is  true  that  all  recent  history  must  be  more  or 
ess  provisional,  till  the  cupboards  of  government  offices  give 
ip  their  secrets,  and  letters  and  memoirs,  now  withheld,  see 
he  light  of  day.  This  applies  in  Italian  history  especially 
o the  period  since  1 860.  Here,  though  we  have  the  great 
iollection  of  Kicasoli  papers  and  many  records  of  considerable 
hough  less  importance,  we  wait  for  the  papers  of  Minghetti 


X 


PREFACE 


and  Rattazzi,  Crispi  and  Visconti-Venosta,  before  the  his- 
torian can  tread  safe  ground.  Still,  in  spite  of  this  caution, 
I doubt  whether  future  research  will  seriously  modify  the 
conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from  existing  material. 

Of  the  defects  of  this  book  no  one  can  be  more  conscious 
than  the  author.  In  spite  of  every  care,  it  has  no  doubt  its 
misjudgments  and  its  inaccuracies.  I shall  value  the  kindly 
offices  of  any  whose  criticisms  may  enable  me  to  correct 
these. 

I wish,  in  conclusion,  to  acknowledge  my  indebtedness 
to  my  friend  Mr.  Okey  for  very  valuable  assistance ; to  the 
authorities  at  the  British  Museum;  to  M.  Pierre  Armmjon; 
to  M.  Claparede ; and  to  Messrs.  Dent  for  their  permission 
to  reprint  a portion  of  my  Introduction  to  Mr.  Okey  s 
translation  of  Mazzini. 

BOLTON  KING. 


Gaydon,  Warwick, 
November  1898. 


I 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 

PREPARING  FOR  REVOLUTION 


CHAPTER  I 
NAPOLEON 

taly  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  i.  Napoleon  and  Italy,  2.  Eesults 
of  the  French  Rule,  2.  Eugene  Beauharnais,  3 ; parties  at  Milan,  4 ; 
the  Austrians  occupy  Lombardy,  6.  Napoleon  at  Elba,  6.  Murat  : 
his  campaign,  7,  and  death,  8.  The  Congress  of  Vienna,  9 ; and 
the  Pope,  9 ; Piedmont  and  Austria,  10 ; annexation  of  Genoa,  10. 
Position  of  Austria  in  Italy,  ii.  The  national  opposition,  12. 


CHAPTER  II 
TBE  CARBONARI 

I he  Restoration  in  Piedmont,  14,  Lombardy- Venetia,  14,  Tuscany,  15, 
the  Papal  States,  15,  Naples,  16,  Sicily,  16.  Its  character,  17  ; Francis 
of  Modena,  18.  Discontent,  18.  The  Carbonari,  19.  The  Co7icili. 
atore,  22.  Revolution  of  Naples  : Naples,  1815-20,  22  ; revolution 
breaks  out,  23 ; constitution  granted,  23 ; Murattists  and  Carbonari, 
24;  Sicily,  1815-20,  24;  revolution  of  Palermo,  25;  Naples  and 
Sicily,  26  ; Florestano  Pepe  attacks  Palermo,  27  ; Austria  and  Naples, 
28 ; Parliament  repudiates  FI.  Pepe’s  treaty,  28 ; the  king  goes  to 
[ Laybach,  29 ; the  Austrian  invasion,  30.  Revolution  of  Piedmont  : 

the  Carbonari  in  Piedmont,  31  ; Charles  Albert,  31  ; the  army 
: rises,  33 ; Charles  Albert  Regent,  33  ; the  revolution  collapses,  34. 

j Character  of  the  revolution,  35  ; weakness  of  feeling  of  Unity,  37. 

Ferdinand’s  revenge,  38,  and  death,  39.  Charles  Felix,  39. 

xi 


XU 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  III 

SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY 

Piedmont  : its  growth,  41,  and  character,  42 ; the  House  of  Savoy,  42  ; ^ 
government,  42  ; nobles,  43  ; clergy,  43  ; army,  45  ; the  class  system, 
45  ; justice,  46  ; education,  47  ; trade,  47  ; Genoa,  48  ; peasants,  49  ; 
Piedmontese  hegemony,  50. 

Lombardy- Venetia  : the  Austrian  rule,  51  ; Milan  under  the  Kingdom 
of  Italy,  52  ; the  bureaucracy,  52  ; taxation,  53  ; justice,  54 ; clergy, 
54;  education,  54;  censorship,  55  ; local  government,  56;  the  Con- 
gregations, 57  ; state-trials,  58  ; police,  58  ; Lombard  character,  59 ; 
nobles,  59 ; middle  classes,  60 ; peasants,  60 ; nationalist  sentiment,  61. 


CHAPTER  IV 

SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY— {Continued) 

Modena,  63.  Parma,  64.  Lucca,  65.  Tuscany  : Eossombroni,  66 ; 
Leopold  II.,  66 ; Tuscan  government,  67 ; the  Tuscans,  68 ; the 
Georgofils,  69  ; clergy,  69  ; education,  70  ; peasants,  70  ; Tuscan  life, 
71.  Papal  States  : the  theocracy,  72  ; the  Curia,  72  ; administra- 
tion, 74 ; trade,  74 ; local  government,  75  ; law,  76 ; justice,  77 ; 
police,  78  ; the  Inquisition,  79  ; the  Jews,  79  ; education,  79  ; religion 
and  morality,  81  ; condition  of  the  people,  82;  Romagna  and  the 
Marches,  82 ; separatist  movement  in  Romagna,  83 ; Umbria,  83 ; 
Agro  Romano,  84  ; Rome,  84. 


CHAPTER  V 

SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY— {Continued) 

Naples  ; the  new  land  system,  87  ; theory  and  practice,  87  ; justice,  87  ; 
local  government,  88  ; education,  88  ; corruption  of  government,  89  ; 
nobles,  89 ; clergy,  90 ; educated  classes,  90 ; trade,  91  ; city  of 
Naples,  91 ; peasants,  92  ; political  indifference,  94.  Sicily:  character, 
94  ; Home  Rule,  95  ; land  system,  96  ; peasants,  96  ; malendrinaggia^ 
98  ; want  of  education,  99. 

The  Elements  of  the  Italian  Nation,  99  ; church,  loi  ; nobles,  102  ; 
middle  classes,  103  ; universities,  104  ; artisans  and  town  labourers, 
105  ; peasants,  106.  The  oppression,  107  ; absence  of  political  life, 
108  ; dawn  of  patriotism,  109. 


CONTENTS 


Xlll 


CHAPTER  YI 

THE  LATER  CARBONARI 

poMANTiciSM,  no;  in  Italy,  in;  Manzoni,  112;  the  Antologia,  113; 
; Mazzini,  114.  The  Later  Carbonari,  114.  Position  of  Austria^ 
115.  The  Concistorio,  116.  The  Papal  States,  1820-30:  Leo  XII.’ 
117;  the  Zelanti  Cardinals,  117;  the  Liberals  in  Romagna,  ns! 
Revolution  of  Central  Italy  : Francis  IV.’s  plots,  118  ; revolution 
at  Bologna,  119;  the  Temporal  Power,  119;  Non-intervention,  120; 
collapse  of  the  first  revolution,  121  ; the  “new  era,”  122  ; the  Memo- 
randum of  the  Powers,  122  ; second  revolution  of  Romagna,  123  ; the 
French  at  Ancona,  124  ; character  of  the  Revolution,  124. 


CHAPTER  YII 

YOUNG  ITAL  Y 

leaction  against  the  Carbonari,  126;  Mazzini,  126;  Young  Italy,  127. 
Piedmont,  1824-30,  132  ; Charles  Albert,  133  ; becomes  King,’  135  • 
Mazzini’s  plot,  136;  Savoy  Expedition,  136.  Naples,  1824-34! 
, Francis  I.,  137  ; Ferdinand  II.,  137.  Tuscany,  1830-40,  139.  Modena, 
1831-40,140.  Papal  States,  1832-40:  Gregory  XVL,  140  ; Bernetti 
and  the  Centurions,  141  ; Lambruschini,  142.  The  Depression, 
1833-37,  143.  The  literary  revival,  144  ; Giusti,  145.  Revolutionary 
: movements,  145  ; Sicilian  rising  of  1837,  146 ; Muratori  rising,  147  • 

the  Bandieras,  147.  ’ 


CHAPTER  YIII 

THE  MODERATES 

eaction  against  Young  Italy,  149.  The  social  reformers,  150;  Scien- 
' tific  Congresses,  150;  railways,  150.  The  Moderates:  (i.)  The 
New  Guelfs,  152  ; Gioberti’s  Primato,  153 ; (ii.)  The  Piedmontese 
School,  156;  Balbo’s  Speranze  dPtalia,  157;  D’Azeglio,  158;  his 
' Ultimi  Gasi  di  Romagna,  160  ; the  Albertists,  161.  Charles  Albert’s 
' Reign,  162  ; his  reforms,  164  ; railway  schemes,  165  ; the  King  and 
I Austria,  166  ; growth  of  Liberalism,  167  ; tariff- war  with  Austria, 

' 167  ; the  King  and  the  Moderates,  168 


XIV 


CONTENTS 


PART  II 

THE  REVOLUTION 


CHAPTER  IX 


PIO  MONO 


Pros  IX.,  170 ; the  amnesty,  172  ; the  cult  of  Pius,  173.  Charles  Albert 
and  Pius,  174;  the  Scientific  Congress  at  Genoa,  174.  The  Austro- 
Jesuit  opposition,  174-  The  Liberals  in  the  Curia,  175  ; theModerates 
in  Romagna,  176 ; the  Radicals,  I77-  Tuscany : Pisa  and  the  Jesuits, 
,77 ; the  secret  press,  178 ; the  Florentine  Liberals  and  the  censor- 
ship 179.  The  Romans,  179;  the  “Great  Conspiracy,”  181.  Metter- 

nich  182  ; Occupation  op  Ferrara,  183  ; Charles  Albert  promises 
to  help  the  Pope,  184.  The  Citizen  Guard  at  Lucca,  185,  and 
Florence,  186  ; the  Feasts  of  Federation,  186.  The  three  progressive 
states,  186  ; the  Commercial  League,  187  ; Charles  Albert  in  October, 
188.  The  Lunigiana  question,  189. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  1 848, 191-  Schemes  of  war  in  Italy,  I92-  The 
Lombard  revival,  193 ; the  railway  question,  194 ; Lombardy  in 
1847,  195 ; the  Romilli  demonstration,  195  ; Nazaris  peUtion,  196; 
Manin  at  Venice,  196 ; Radetzky,  196 ; the  Tobacco  Riots,  197- 
The  constitutional  question,  197  ; the  economic  question,  19  , 
bread  riots,  199 ; revolt  of  Leghorn,  199-  The  Constitutionalists  2ot  ; 
in  Tuscany,  200 ; in  Piedmont,  200  ; Cavour,  201.  Naples  and  Sicily, 
203  • the  rising  in  Calabria,  203  ; Moderates  and  Radicals  at  Naples, 
203  ; Sicilian  Revolution,  204.  The  Constitution  in  Naples  205 ; 
in  Piedmont,  206  ; in  Tuscany,  207  ; at  Rome,  207  ; the  Statutes, 
210  ; theocracy  and  constitution  at  Rome,  21 1. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  NATIONAL  RISING 


The  French  Revolution  of  1848,  213.  The  Jesuits,  213. 

in  Lombardy,  214.  Preparations  for  war  in  Piedmont  216.  Thb 
Five  Days  op  Milan,  216.  The  National  Rising  at  Venice,  220 


CONTENTS  XV 

in  the  Lombard  cities,  222  ; in  the  Duchies,  223,  Tuscany,  223, 
Papal  States,  223,  Naples,  223  ; character  of  the  rising,  223.  Pied- 
mont and  the  rising,  224  ; Charles  Albert  declares  war,  226. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  WAR 

Radetzky’s  retreat,  227  ; the  Milanese  after  the  Five  Days,  227  ; Piedmon- 
tese advance,  228  ; the  two  armies,  229  ; the  Volunteers,  229  ; Santa 
Lucia,  232.  Beginnings  of  division,  232  ; Albertism,  233  ; Piedmont 
and  the  League,  234.  The  Pope  and  the  war,  234  ; the  Allocution 
OF  April  29,  236.  Naples  : Ferdinand  and  Bozzelli,  236  ; the  Troya 
ministry,  237  j the  Counter-Revolution,  239.  Charles  Albert  and 
the  national  movement,  240.  Lombardy  : the  question  of  Fusion,  241 ; 
Lombards  and  Piedmontese,  242  ; the  Provisional  Government,  242  ; 
the  plebiscite,  244. 


; CHAPTER  XIII  ^ 

j THE  WAR — {Continued) 

Iusion  in  Venetia,  245,  and  at  Venice,  246 ; Piedmont  and  fusion,  247  ; 
results  of  fusion,  248.  The  war  in  Venetia  : Nugent’s  advance,  248  ; 
Cornuda,  249  ; Thurn’s  attacks  on  Vicenza,  250.  Piedmontese  in- 
action, 250;  Curtatone,  251;  second  battle  of  Goito,  251;  loss  of 
Vicenza,  252,  and  of  Venetia,  252.  Palmerston’s  negotiations,  253. 
Piedmont  and  the  war,  255.  Sommacampagna,  257  ; Custozza,  257  ; 
Volta,  258 ; the  retreat,  258  ; the  defence  of  Milan,  259 ; the  Sur- 
render OF  Milan,  260. 


' CHAPTER  XIV 

MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS 

The  Salasco  armistice,  261.  France  and  Italy,  262.  “ The  People’s  War  ” 

263  ; the  Austrians  at  Bologna,  264.  Moderates  and  Democrats, 
265.  Piedmont  : Pinelli  ministry,  266  ; negotiations  for  peace,  266  ; 
; the  war  party,  267  ; fall  of  the  ministry,  269.  Tuscany  : Ridolfi 
ministry,  269  ; the  Democrats,  269  ; Capponi  ministry,  270  ; Leghorn 
j revolt,  270  ; Montanelli-Guerrazzi  ministry,  272.  Papal  States  : 

i Mamiani  ministry,  273  ; Fabbri  ministry,  277  ; Rossi  ministry,  277  ' 

VOL.  I.  h 


XVI 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER 

Rossi’s  Death,  280 ; the  Pope  flies,  282.  The  Papal  Question  : the 
Pope  at  Gaeta,  282  ; Antonelli,  283  ; Gioberti  and  the  Catholic  Powers^ 
284  ; France  and  the  Papacy,  285.  The  League,  286  ; the  Federative 
Congress,  287  ; the  Constituent,  288.  Rome  in  November,  289  ; 
demand  for  a Constituent,  290  ; Muzzarelli  ministry,  291  ; the 
Moderates  in  Romagna,  291  ; the  Roman  Constituent,  291  ; The 
Republic  Proclaimed,  292.  Tuscany  : Montanelli  and  Guerrazzi, 
293  ; the  Tuscan  Constituent,  294  ; the  Grand  Duke’s  flight,  294  : 
the  Provisional  Government,  295  ; the  Grand  Duke  goes  to  Gaeta,  296. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
NOVARA 


Piedmont  under  Gioberti,  297  ; the  Democratic  opposition,  299  ; Gioberti 
and  Tuscany,  300  ; he  resigns,  300.  The  Austrians  in  Lombardy,  300. 
Italy  and  war,  301  ; the  war-fever  in  Piedmont,  303.  The  truce 
denounced,  304  ; La  Cava,  305  ; Mortara,  305  ; Novara,  306  ; Charles 


Albert  abdicates,  306. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

NAPLES  AND  SICILY 


Naples  ; Bozzelli  ministry,  307  ; Calabrian  revolt,  308  ; parliamentar; 
opposition,  309  ; the  reaction  unmasks,  309  ; Ferdinand  at  Gaeta,  310 
parliament  dissolved,  310.  Sicily:  Sicilian  independence,  3^1 
- ' • forfeiture  of  the  throne,  312  ; royalisfl’ 


King,  315  , - - 

the  national  guard,  318  ; Ultimatum  of  Gaeta,  318  ; the  war,  319  : 

the  last  struggle  at  Palermo,  320. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS 

Tuscany  : Guerrazzi,  321  ; the  republicans  and  the  government,  322  ; 
question  of  union  with  Rome,  323  ; the  reaction,  324  ; Guerrazzi 
dictator  325  • THE  Counter-Revolution,  326.  Rome:  the  Executive 


CONTENTS  xvii 

Committee,  326  ; Mazzini,  327 ; the  Triumvirate,  327  ; the  Eepublic 
and  the  Church,  328  ; tolerance  of  the  government,  329  ; its  weakness, 
330;  outrages  at  Eome,  331,  and  Ancona,  331  ; the  people  and  the 
republic,  331.  Policy  of  Gaeta,  332  ; French  policy,  333  ; Oudinot’s 
Expedition,  334;  fight  of  April  30,  335;  De  Lesseps’ negotiations, 

336  ; Austrian  invasion  of  Eomagna,  336  ; negotiations  broken  off, 

337  ; siege,  338  ; fall  of  the  city,  340  ; Garibaldi’s  retreat,  340. 


CHAPTEE  XIX 

VENICE  UNDER  MANIN 

Venice:  fusion  repealed,  341  ; Venice  and  France,  342;  the  blockade, 
342  ; Manin’s  government,  343  ; the  bombardment,  344  ; the  surrender, 
I 345.  Manin,  345. 

j The  Causes  of  Failure,  347  ; provincial  jealousies,  347  ; political 
- divisions,  348  ; want  of  statesmen,  349  ; defects  in  national  character, 
350.  The  spirit  of  the  movement,  351 ; Ugo  Bassi,  351. 


PART  III 

THE  TEN  YEARS’  WAITING 
\ CHAPTER  XX 

I 

I PIEDMONT  AFTER  NOVARA,  THE  REACTION 

I 

Piedmont  : after  Xovara,  353  ; revolt  of  Genoa,  354  ; question  of  prolong- 
' ing  the  war,  354  ; The  Constitution  saved,  355  ; D’Azeglio  premier, 
356  ; the  terms  of  peace,  356  ; the  Proclamation  of  Moncalieri,  359. 
The  Hegemony  of  Piedmont,  359  ; the  refugees,  360  ; Turin,  360. 

I Papal  States  : the  people  and  the  Eestoration,  362  ; the  French  at  Eome, 
362  ; the  Eed  Triumvirate,  363  ; Napoleon’s  letter  to  Edgar  Ney, 
I 364  ; the  Motu-Proprio  of  Portici,  364  ; the  Pope  returns  to  Eome, 
365  ; Ultramontanism,  365. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  REACTION— {Continued) 

Naples  : Ferdinand’s  absolutism,  367  ; the  constitution  suspended,  368  ; 
the  political  trials,  368  ; Gladstone’s  Letters,  369.  Tuscany  : the 


i CONTENTS 

counter-revolutionists,  370 ; the  Grand  Duke,  371  ; the  Austrian 
occupation,  371  ; the  Grand  Duke’s  return,  372  ; the  constitution 
suspended,  373.  Lombardy-Venetia  ; military  rule,  374  ; Karl  von 
Schwarzenberg,  375  ; Kadetzky  uncontrolled,  375.  The  Austrians  in 
Romagna,  376 ; Modena,  377.  Parma,  378.  League  and  Concordats  : 
position  of  Austria,  379;  paternal  government,  379;  the  Catholic 
school,  380 ; the  Austrian  League,  381 ; the  Concordats,  382.  Strength 
and  weakness  of  the  reaction,  383. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

CAVOUR 

Difficulties  of  Piedmont,  385  ; the  Conservative  reaction,  387  ; parties  in 
the  Chamber,  387;  Rattazzi,  389.  D’Azeglio’s  policy,  390;  the 
struggle  with  Rome,  392  ; The  Siccardi  Laws,  394  ; Fransoni’s 
defiance,  395  ; more  anti-clerical  measures,  396.  Cavour,  397  ; be- 
comes minister,  399  ; his  financial  policy,  400  ; Free  Trade,  401. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 

The  Hegemony  of  Piedmont,  402  ; Victor  Emmanuel  II.,  403  ; Piedmont 
and  Austria,  405.  Louis  Napoleon,  406  ; the  couf  d'dat,  407  ; tl.e 
Deforesta  Press  Law,  408.  The  connuhio,  409  ; Cavour  leaves  the 
ministry,  410;  Civil  Marriage  bill,  410;  D’Azeglio  resigns,  41 1 ; 
Cavour  premier,  41 1.  The  Republicans,  412  ; Mazzini,  412;  L>  n- 
bardy,  1850-52,  413  ; the  republican  conspiracy,  413  ; the  Milan  pmt, 
414  ; the  sequestrations,  415  ; Cavour’s  protest,  416. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


CHAPTER  I 

NAPOLEON 

1814-1815 

Italy  in  the  Eighteenth  Century.  Napoleon  and  Italy.  Results  of  the 
French  Rule.  Eugene  Beauharnais  ; Parties  at  Milan  ; the  Austrians 
occupy  Lombardy.  Napoleon  at  Elba.  Murat  ; his  campaign  and 
death.  The  Congress  of  Vienna,  and  the  Pope ; Piedmont  and 
Austria ; Annexation  of  Genoa.  Position  of  Austria  in  Italy.  The 
national  opposition. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  there  was  little 
consciousness  in  Italy  of  any  national  existence.  The 
memory,  indeed,  of  days  when  Rome  gave  her  laws  to  the 
western  world  had  never  been  forgotten.  The  policy  of 
the  Guelfs  was  at  bottom  a half-understood  struggle  to 
free  Italy  from  foreign  rule.  But  even  when  the  eighteenth 
century  saw  the  practical  extinction  of  the  Spanish  domina- 
tion, saw  Austria  confined  to  the  north  and  Piedmont 
advancing  in  its  slow,  patient  march,  Italians  were  still 
content  with  the  loose  concourse  of  petty  states  that  took 
the  place  of  a nation.  The  latter  half  of  the  century  was 
an  age  of  peace  and  reform,  the  age  of  Joseph  II.  and 
Leopold  I.,  of  Tannucci  and  Beccaria.  It  left  Italy  fairly 
prosperous,  fairly  advanced  in  social  legislation,  but  a 
country  whose  life  was  in  its  memories  and  its  arts,  the 
beautiful  woman-land  of  poetry,  to  be  sung  and  caressed 
and  coveted,  but  debarred  from  liberty  and  independence. 
The  French  Revolution  broke  roughly  in  on  this,  on  the 
soft  luxuriousness,  the  polished  immorality,  the  show  of 
VOL.  I.  A 


2 A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

religion.  The  invasions  of  1796  and  1801  tumbled  the 
princelings;  and  the  creation  of  the  Napoleonic  republics 
and  kingdoms  roughly  swept  away  for  ever  the  old  political  1 
and  social  order. 

Italy  was  the  only  country  where  Napoleon  intentionally 
encouraged  the  spirit  of  nationality.  Contemptuous  as  he 
was  of  the  men  who  helped  to  fight  his  battles  and  fill  his 
treasury,  he  foresaw  that  unity  of  manners  and  language 
and  literature  was  bound  sooner  or  later  to  make  a single 
nation  of  Italy.^  Pride  in  his  Italian  descent,  sympathy 
for  the  historic  home  of  Csesarism,  the  traditional  policy 
of  France  which  bade  him  erect  here  a barrier  against 
Austria,  made  his  Italian  schemes  dear  to  him.  In  more 
senses  than  one  Napoleon  is  the  founder  of  modern  Italy. 
Materially  and  socially  she  gained  much  from  the  French 
rule.  It  abolished  feudalism,  where  it  still  survived,  gave 
her  uniform  and  enlightened  laws,  opened  a career  to  talent, 
stimulated  industry  into  new  life.  The  dissolution  of  the 
monasteries  helped  to  redeem  the  national  debt  and  revo- 
lutionised the  land  system.  Primary  schools  covered  all  , 
Lombardy  and  Naples.  Italian  soldiers  brought  back  from 
Napoleon’s  campaigns  a proud  name  for  bravery  and 
endurance,  and  the  whole  nation  braced  itself  to  a more 
strenuous  life.  Politically  the  results  of  Napoleons  system 
were  as  far-reaching.  The  prestige  of  the  princes  was 
shaken  for  ever.  The  ten  states  of  the  peninsula  had 
vanished;  the  east — Piedmont,  the  Genovesate,  Parma, 
Tuscany,  and  the  Papal  States  up  to  the  Apennines  rhad 
been  annexed  to  France;  Lombardy,  Venetia,  Modena, 
Romagna,  and  the  Marches  formed  the  kingdom  of  Italy 
under  the  emperor’s  stepson,  Eugene  Beauharnais,  as 
viceroy;  Naples  was  a dependant  kingdom  under  Muiat. 
The  three  states  had  many  mutual  connections,  and  even 
something  of  a common  administration.  Thought  and 
speech,  though  not  yet  free,  were  less  stifled  than  under 
the  old  order.  The  middle  landed  and  professional  classes 
had  a share  in  the  government ; and  though  in  the  annexed 

1 Memoires  de  Napoleon,  III.  ii8,  119;  Louis  Napoleon,  hides  Napoldon- ^ 
iennes,  150. 


NAPOLEON  3 

i provinces  the  civil  service  was  filled  with  Frenchmen,  in 
( the  kingdom  of  Italy  every  official  save  the  viceroy  was 
^ a native. 

But  Napoleon  fell,  and  with  him  his  Italian  creation. 

I His  work,  in  spite  of  the  good  it  wrought,  had  clashed  too 
[ much  with  national  sentiment  and  prejudices.  Over  60,000 
: Italians  had  perished  in  Spain  and  Russia  for  a cause  that 
was  not  their  own ; the  financial  burdens  were  heavy ; the 
: political  police  and  censorship  betrayed  that  the  Empire 
land  liberty  could  not  live  together;  the  cities  resented  the 
plunder  of  their  art-galleries;  Napoleons  affronts  to  the 
Pope,  offended  the  religion  and  patriotism  of  the  mass  ef 
Italians.  But  his  work  survived  his  rule,  and  the  memory 
•of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  remained  enshrined  with  the 
[patriots,  a glorified  ideal,  its  tyranny  and  its  burdens 
forgotten,  “ an  augury  and  an  incitement  to  greater  things.’’ 
His  enemies  were  forced  to  recognise  the  national  life,  to 
Iwhich  he  had  given  birth;  and  in  the  last  great  struggle 
j against  him,  the  Allies  had  tried  to  rouse  the  country  with 
I the  cry  of  Italian  Independence. 

In  1814  the  Napoleonic  system  was  crumbling  fast  in 
[Italy  as  elsewhere.  When  the  emperor  fell  back  across  the 
[Rhine  in  the  preceding  autumn,  he  ordered  Eugene  to 
evacuate  Italy  and  join  him  with  his  forces.  The  viceroy 
refused ; he  was  not  altogether  disloyal,  and  he  indignantly 
refused  to  share  in  the  treachery  that  Murat  was  contem- 
plating ; but  in  his  half-hearted  way  he  loved  his  adopted 
3ountry,  and  hoped  in  the  Empire’s  impending  wreck  to 
match  the  crown  of  Northern  Italy  for  his  own  head.  To 
^eep  his  fortune  independent  of  Napoleon’s  was  indeed  his 
mly  hope  of  success,  for  the  French  rule  had  become  hateful, 
lince  the  disasters  of  the  Russian  campaign  had  thrown  its 
ailings  into  blacker  prominence.  The  army  and  much  of 
he  civil  service  were  faithful  to  him ; and  a few  others,  who 
aw  in  his  crown  the  fairest  hope  of  Italian  independence, 
:ave  him  a lukewarm  backing.  But  he  was  too  closely 
)Ound  up  with  the  order  that  was  passing;  Italian  patriot 
l-s  in  a way  he  was,  he  was  still  a Frenchman ; the  im- 
[norality  of  his  court,  the  dishonesty  of  many  of  his  officials. 


4 A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  ■ 

his  refusal  to  turn  against  the  emperor,  all  helped  to  destroy 
his  remaining  shreds  of  popularity.  At  Milan  the  mass  of 
opinion  was  divided  between  the  partisans  of  Austria  and 
the  so-called  Italian  Party.  All  who  cared  only  for  peace, 
all  who  still  regarded  France  as  the  greater  danger,  all  who, 
in  Foscolo’s  phrase,  “ were  willing  to  bow  to  any  foreigner 
who  promised  them  the  thousandth  part  of  what  he  robbed 
them  of,”  were  preparing  the  road  for  Austria  s return. 
They  remembered  the  mild  semi-independence  of  Maria 
Theresa’s  and  Joseph’s  reigns;  during  the  past  year  the 
Viennese  statesmen  had  been  profuse  in  promises  to  respect 
liberty  and  nationality ; and  there  were  honest  patriots,  who 
hoped  to  win  from  them  Home  Rule  and  something  of 
constitutional  liberty.  But  the  majority  of  the  Milanese 
nobles  were  as  opposed  to  Austria  as  to  Eugene,  and  under 
the  lead  of  Federigo  Gonfalonier!  they  organised  the  “ Italian 
Liberal  Party.”  Their  policy  belied  their  name;  so  long 
as  they  secured  the  independence  of  the  existing  Kingdom 
of  Italy  they  cared  little  whether  it  were  under  an  Austrian 
or  an  English  or  an  Italian  prince.  Few  had  any  thought 
of  a bigger  national  life.  Gonfalonier!  himself  perhaps  had 
some  conception  of  an  united  Italy  under  the  House  of 
Savoy ; ^ but  the  majority  thought  more  of  preserving  for 
Milan  its  metropolitan  rank  and  court,  of  ivinnmg  hack  for 
the  Lombard  nobles  the  privileges  that  the  French  had 
destroyed ; none  would  accept  the  one  man  who  might  have 
saved  Italian  freedom.  Eugene,  deserted  by  the  nobles,  saw 
that  his  only  chance  lay  in  summoning  the  electoral  colleges 
(the  pseudo-representative  element  in  Napoleon’s  constitution) 
and  appealing  to  the  people.  But  he  shrank  from  a step 
which  seemed  to  stamp  him  as  disloyal  to  Napoleon.  He 
took  a cowardly  middle  course,  and  asked  the  Milanese 
Senate  to  take  the  responsibility  he  himself  declmed,  and 
beo-  his  crown  from  the  Allies.  The  senate  substituted 
a "pale  eulogy  of  the  viceroy,  which  showed  too  plainly 
that  it  was  weary  of  him.  It  was  itself,  however,  hardly 


■ Casati,  Confalonieri,  I.  84,  261  ; Bonfadini,  Mezzosaolo  78.  157; 

Eianchi,  Diplomazia,  I.  79,  448;  Botta,  Storm,  1\.  531-532-  For  the  full 


Ijianczu,  X.  I'y,  J . Tr  1 TT 

titles  of  works  referred  to  in  the  footnotes,  see  Bibliography  in  ^ ol.  II. 


NAPOLEON 


5 

5 more  popular  than  Eugene,  and  the  rival  parties  outside 
; combined  to  overthrow  senate  and  viceroy  together.  As 
soon  as  the  news  of  Napoleon’s  abdication  arrived,  the 
: Italian  Party  seized  the  weapon  that  Eugene  had  refused, 
■ and  demanded  the  convocation  of  the  electoral  colleges. 

The  mob  was  set  in  motion  to  frighten  the  senate  into 
: acquiescence  (April  20,  1814),  and  when  it  had  sacked  the 
• senate-house,  it  hurried  off  to  find  a victim  in  Prina,  the 
s hated  Minister  of  Finance.  Half- murdering  him,  they 
; dragged  his  still  living  body  through  the  streets  till  it  was 
mangled  past  recognition.  With  whom  lay  the  responsi- 
' bility  of  the  crime  is  a problem  still  unsolved.  Some  of 
the  Austrian  party  doubtless  wished  to  furnish  a pretext 
' for  occupation ; Confalonieri  was  charged  with  playing  a 
! more  or  less  guilty  part,  and  probably  he  helped  to  raise 
a storm,  which  escaped  his  control,  and  went  to  excesses 
; he  did  not  foresee.^  Pino,  the  commander  of  the  garrison, 

: hoping  perhaps  to  win  a crown,  as  his  brother-generals, 
i Bernadotte  and  Murat,  had  done  before  him,  had  neglected 
I to  send  the  troops  that  might  have  saved  Prina’s  life.  But 
i whatever  share  of  guilt  lay  with  each  party,  the  advantage 
rested  with  the  friends  of  Austria.  Eugene’s  army  indeed 
iwas  eager  to  march  on  Milan  and  avenge  Prina’s  death,  but 
I the  viceroy  shrank  from  civil  war.  The  senate  quietly 
disappeared,  and  the  municipal  council  appointed  a pro- 
visional regency,  composed  almost  solely  of  the  men,  whose 
interests  stopped  short  at  the  old  Duchy  of  Milan,  and  who 
were  willing  to  see  it  parted  from  the  destinies  of  Italy  and 
under  Austrian  rule.  The  electoral  colleges  were  summoned, 
but  only  from  the  small  fraction  of  the  kingdom,  that  ‘‘  spoke 
the  pure  Lombard  dialect.”  To  satisfy  public  opinion,  the 
regency  sent  Confalonieri  to  the  Allies  to  ask  for  indepen- 
dence and  a constitution ; but  consciously  or  unconsciously 
they  were  playing  the  Austrian  game.  When  Confalonieri 
arrived  at  Paris,  he  found  that  the  fate  of  Lombardy  was 
sealed.  Eugene  had  already  tamely  surrendered  to  Belle- 

1 Casati,  op.  cit.,1.  81-85,  267-270;  Botta,  op.  cit.,TV.  533;  Maroncelli, 
Addizioni,  ii;  Bonfadini,  op.  cit.,  ii3)  14?  j Gualterio,  Rivolgimenti,  I.  385— 
386  ; Lezat  de  Pons,  ^]tudes,  63-64  ; D’Ancona,  Confalonieri,  210-21 


6 A HISTOEY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

garde,  the  Austrian  general,  and  abdicated  (April  26);  and 
Bellegarde,  using  gentle  words,  arrived  late  in  May  at  Milan, 
where  he  threw  off  the  mask,  and  proclaimed  the  annexation 
of  Lombardy  to  the  Austrian  Empire.  But  his  position  was 
still  not  secure.  An  edict  dissolving  the  Freemason  Lodges 
showed  how  much  he  feared  the  secret  societies,  which  the 
French  had  left  behind.  The  army  was  prepared  to  support 
Murat,  and  only  the  cowardice  of  its  generals  and  Pino’s 
treachery  delayed  the  plot,  till  Bellegarde  could  take  his  pre- 
cautions and  send  the  generals  to  the  prison  of  the  Spielberg. 

Even  then  the  Italian  patriots  did  not  despair.  So 
long  as  Napoleon  was  at  Elba,  he  might  return  to  power, 
and  the  triumph  of  the  reaction  had  identified  his  cause 
with  the  people’s.  Negotiations  ran  briskly  between  him 
and  the  patriots,  who  hoped  that  he  might  yet  lead  the 
Italians  to  victory,  and  make  their  national  unity  his  last 
great  work.^  Another  man  was  trying^  to  attach  the 
Nationalist  and  Napoleonic  parties  to  himself.  Joachim 
Murat  had  risen  from  humble  origins  to  be  one^  of 
Napoleon’s  greatest  generals,  his  brother-in-law,  and  King 
of  Naples,  a fearless  soldier,  a good-natured  ruler,  but 
luxurious,  capricious,  unprincipled,  with  little  real  affection 
for  his  people,  and  an  overweening  belief  in  his  own  state- 
craft. His  position  had  long  been  a dangerous  one.  His 
independent  policy  had  drawn  down  on  him^  Napoleon’s 
anger,  and  the  emperor  was  prepared  to  sacrifice  him  to 
the  Neapolitan  Bourbons,  if  it  served  his  designs.  On  the 
other  hand  if  Napoleon  fell,  the  Allies  were  little  likely  to 
spare  his  lieutenant.  Between  the  two  dangers  he  saw  his 
safest  course  in  winning  Italian  affection.  As  early  as  1 8 1 1 
he  had  been  ready  to  pose  as  the  champion  of  Italian 
autonomy  against  France.  But  he  was  equally  leady  to 
trim  to  the  Allies;  he  had  intrigued  with  them ^ in  1813, 
before  he  went  to  Dresden  to  command  Napoleons  cavahy, 
and  early  in  the  next  year  (January  ii)  he  concluded  a 

1 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  I.  78,  quoting  from  La  verite  sur  les  cmt  jours ; Cantu, 
Cronistoria,  II.  33-35  ; Castlereagh  Correspondence,  series  II  21 1 See 

Napoleon’s  curious  remarks  in  Wellington,  Supp.  Despatches,  IX.  269.  >v  len 
he  escaped  from  Elba,  Talleyrand  thought  that  he  would  go  to  Italy  and 
raise  the  flag  of  Italian  Independence. 


NAPOLEON 


7 

secret  treaty  with  Austria  (to  which  England  was  a party), 
by  which  she  promised  him  Naples  and  a slice  of  Papal 
territory  in  return  for  his  recognition  of  her  claims  to 
Lombardy/  But  neither  side  was  sincere ; Austria  was  in- 
triguing to  depose  him,  and  he  was  negotiating  with  Eugene 
for  a common  defence  of  Italy.  Eugene’s  comparative 
loyalty  to  Napoleon  prevented  an  understanding  with  one 
whom  he  regarded  as  a traitor;  and  with  the  emperor’s 
fall  and  the  entry  of  the  Austrians  into  Lombardy,  Murat’s 
position  became  daily  more  critical.  It  was  the  maxim  of 
the  Allies,  that,  except  where  it  was  inconvenient  to  their 
own  ambitions,  the  “legitimate”  governments  should  be 
everywhere  restored,  and  in  their  eyes  Murat  could  only 
count  as  an  usurper.  Still  they  would  probably  have  left 
him  in  possession,  for  at  present  they  had  no  actual  proof 
of  his  duplicity,  and  failing  proof.  Lord  Liverpool  urged 
that  honour  and  prudence  alike  forbade  any  attempt  to 
oust  him.^  But  while  pleading  his  cause  to  the  Allies,  and 
protesting  his  especial  devotion  to  Austria,  Murat  was 
corresponding  with  Napoleon,  and  again  making  overtures 
to  the  Italian  patriots.  He  hurried  on  reforms  at  Naples 
long-delayed.  The  purchasers  of  church  lands,  fearing  that 
a restoration  would  confiscate  their  properties,  were  united 
in  his  support ; and  his  generals,  who  were  the  real  power 
in  the  country,  were  prepared  to  back  his  designs,  if  he 
would  grant  a constitution. 

Napoleon’s  escape  from  Elba  decided  him  to  make  a 
bold  bid  for  Italian  favour.  Parrying  his  generals’  demands, 
he  marched  his  army  northwards,  and,  raising  the  cry  of 
Italian  Independence,  declared  war  against  Austria  (March 
30,  1815).  The  Pope,  though  he  had  professed  his  sym- 
pathy,^ fled  from  Borne,  and  Murat  overran  the  Marches 
and  Umbria.  Defeating  the  Austrians  at  Cesena,  he  ad- 
vanced to  Bologna  ^ and  Modena ; and  had  he  gone  on 

^ Pepe,  Memoirs,  I.  2^6  ; Colletta,  Storia,  II,  181  ; contra  Poffffi,  Storia, 

1.  18. 

2 WelliDgton,  op.  cit.,  IX.  212,  399,  486-492,  496-497  ; Castlereagh,  op.  cit., 
I.  432  ; II.  3,  243  ; Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  I.  4-5. 

^ Maroncelli,  op.  cit.,  18, 

^ Where  Kossini  composed  a Hymn  of  Independence  for  him. 


8 A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

boldly  to  Milan,  be  might  have  rallied  the  veterans  of  Pied- 
mont and  Lombardy  to  bis  flag,  and  for  tbe  moment  at 
least  bave  crushed  tbe  Austrians.  But  Bentinck’s  treacher- 
ous advice  ^ dissuaded  him ; and  when  be  learned  that 
England’s  professed  friendliness  was  only  a cloak,  and  found 
little  enthusiasm  for  bis  cause  outside  Bologna,  be  fell  back 
by  slow  stages.  He  was  still  successful  in  several  skirmishes, 
and  a pitched  battle  at  Macerata  (May  3)  was  undecided. 
But  tbe  same  night  tbe  news  came  that  tbe  Austrians  bad 
captured  Ac^uila,  and  were  cutting  off  bis  retreat.  Tbe 
loyalty  of  bis  generals  was  doubtful;  tbe  retiring  troops 
were  more  or  less  demoralised.  He  still  hoped  to  rouse  tbe 
Neapolitans  by  granting  a constitution,  and  prolong  tbe 
defence  behind  tbe  Volturno.  But  bis  fleet  surrendered  to 
tbe  English,  tbe  Anglo -Sicilian  forces  were  advancing  from 
tbe  south,  tbe  Neapolitans  themselves  were  paralysed  by 
panic ; and  Murat,  recognising  that  bis  case  was  desperate, 
gave  up  bis  sword  to  tbe  English  admiral.  Tbe  last  hope 
of  Italian  freedom  bad  vanished,  but  tbe  restless  indomitable 
man  made  one  more  bid  for  power.  Obliged  after  Waterloo 
to  fly  from  tbe  White  Terror  in  Provence,  be  retbed  to 
Corsica,  where  be  found  himself  still  strong  in  tbe  lustie  of 
Napoleon’s  memory.  Encouraged  to  try  what  bis  prestige 
could  win  in  Italy be  started  in  September  for  tbe  Neapo- 
litan shore.  But  bis  ships  were  scattered  by  a storm,  and 
be  landed  with  a handful  of  men  at  Pizzo  m Calabria.  His 
appeals  to  tbe  people  found  no  response,  and  be  was  easily 
captured.  In  vain  tbe  English  tried  to  save  bis  bfe,  in 
vain  be  claimed  to  be  tried  by  bis  peers,  tbe  sovereigns  of 
Europe.  Tbe  Bourbons  were  resolved  upon  bis  doom,  and 
tbe  bold  adventurer  who,  from  whatever  motive,  bad  been 
tbe  first  champion  of  Italian  independence,  bad  a mock 
trial,  and  was  shot  in  cold  blood. 

Now  that  Napoleon  was  crushed,  tbe  Allies  made  baste 
to  bury  their  pledges.  Tbe  Congress  of  Vienna  bad  abeady 


^ Bianchi,  op.  cit,  I.  169 ; see  Wellington,  op.  cit.,  IX.  593* 

2 The  rumours  that  he  was  decoyed  by  the  Bourbon  government  were 
probably  unfounded.  See  Riv.  stor.  del  risorg.,  I.  987,  in  review  of  De  Sasse- 
nay’s  Les  demurs  mots  de  Murat. 


NAPOLEON 


9 

sealed  the  fate  of  Italy.  England  and  Austria  repudiated 
with  small  compunction  the  promises  their  generals  had 
made  in  their  name.  The  sovereigns  had  had  their  use 
of  the  national  spirit,  and  threw  it  over  when  it  claimed 
its  pay ; all  but  the  Czar  Alexander  put  off  the  mask  of 
liberalism,  and  Castlereagh  told  the  Lombard  deputies  that 
constitutions  were  ‘‘  expensive  experiments.”  To  the  states- 
men at  Vienna  the  Italian  question  was  merely  one  of 
political  equilibrium,  and  De  Maistre  in  vain  protested  that 
nations  are  something  in  the  world.”  ^ Besides,  Italy  was 
a convenient  spoil,  where  portions  might  be  carved  for  im- 
portunate claimants  of  thrones.  But  though  the  Allies  were 
at  one  in  ignoring  Italian  aspirations,  each  had  its  theory  as 
to  the  methods  of  partition.  England  amL-Bussia  could 
not  allow  the  peninsula  to  become  an  appanage  of  Austria. 
They  would  perhaps  have  preferred  her  entire  exclusion  ; 
but  Russia  was  greedy  to  swallow  new  territory  in  Poland, 
and  to  smooth  her  way  to  this  was  ready  to  compromise  in 
Italian  questions.  Austria  was  confirmed  in  her  earlier 
possession  of  Lombardyrand^^^  Venetia  (already  held  for 
the  eight  years  between  Campoformio  and  Presburg)  and 
the  Valtelline.  But  neither  Metternich’s  proposal  to  abolish 
the  Temporal  Power  in  her  favour,^  nor  his  more  modest 
attempt  to  secure  a slice  of  Romagna,  found  any  encour- 
agement from  the  Allies.  Still,  in  the  early  days  of  the 
Congress,  there  was  no  thought  of  restoring  the  northern 
Legations  to  the  Pope ; Pi^ussia  wanted  them  for  the  King 
of  Saxony,  Alexander  for  his  new  client  Eugene  Beauharnais, 
Francis  of  Modena  for  himself.  It  was  not  till  Napoleon 
had  landed  from  Elba  and  bid  for  the  Pope’s  support 
by  offering  to  guarantee  his  dominions  in  their  entirety, 
that  the  adroit  diplomacy  of  Cardinal  Consalvi  won  back 
Romagna.  Even  now  the  Allies  wished  to  grant  it  Home 
Rule,^  and  it  needed  all  Consalvi’s  strategy  to  secure  full 
rights  of  sovereignty  for  his  master. 


^ De  Maistre,  Correspondence,  II.  8 ; La  Maison  de  Savoie,  21  ; see  Cantu, 
op.  cit.,  II.  89-90.  De  Maistre  at  this  time  was  Piedmontese  ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg.  2 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  I.  7. 

^ This  was  the  Aldini  scheme  of  Home  Rule,  see  below,  Vol.  II,,  p.  17. 


lo  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Foiled  in  Central  Italy,  Austria  turned  for  compensation 
to  the  north,  and  found  a yet  stiffer  foe  in  Piedmont.  Either 
state  recognised  that  there  was  no  lasting  room  in  Italy  for 
both.  Early  in  the  Congress  Piedmont  made  a bid  for 
Lombardy;  but  though  five  years  before  the  Allies  had 
arranged  to  give  it  to  her,  she  now  found  herself  unsup- 
ported.^ Austria  retaliated  by  a long  and  persistent  effort  to 
gain  the  Upper  Novarese,  which  gave  the  command  of  the 
Simplon.  But  though  the  Powers  were  willing  to  let  her 
take  Lombardy,  they  had  no  desire  to  see  her  too  powerful, 
and  in  spite  of  English  support,  she  had  to  content  herself 
with  the  Ticino  frontier.  In  its  early  days  the  Congress 
had  intended  to  give  Savoy  to  France  ; but  the  Piedmon- 
tese played  a helpful  part  in  the  Hundred  Hays,  and  the 
Allies,  anxious  after  Waterloo  to  weaken  France  by  every 
possible  means,  were  glad,  in  spite  of  Austria  s protest,  to 
reward  them  with  the  ancient  patrimony  of  their  kings. 
Austria,  baulked  again,  was  probably  intriguing  to  bar  from 
the  succession  the  Carignano  branch  of  the  Savoy  House, 
and  thus,  as  King  Victor  Emmanuel  had  no  children,  to 
eventually  secure  the  throne  of  Piedmont  through  the 
female  line  for  the  Austrian  Duke  of  Modena.^  But  Victor 
Emmanuel  would  have  no  dictation  from  the  Austrians ; 
and  when  they  seemed  indisposed  to  withdraw  their  troops 
from  Alessandria,  the  king  was  prepared  to  fight  rather  than 
suffer  their  lengthened  presence  in  his  territory.  In  vain 
Austria  spread  before  him  offers  of  favourable  alliance,  and 
schemes  of  an  Italian  league  under  her  own  presidency.  To 
escape  her  special  tutelage,  he  was  willing,  at  He  Maistre  s 
advice,  to  join  the  Holy  Alliance. 

It  was  from  no  good  will  towards  her  that  Piedmont 
came  from  the  Congress  with  a territorial  gain.  The  Allies 
had  decreed  the  doom  of  Genoa.  “ Republics  were  no  longer 
fashionable,”  as  the  Czar  told  the  Genoese  deputation ; the 
Congress,  always  possessed  by  dread  of  French  aggression, 
wished  to  see  a military  state  in  possession  of  the  Riviera, 

1 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  I.  51,  57,  58.  I can  find  no  support  for  the  statement  in 
Gualterio,  op.  cit.,  I.  500,  and  Pinelli,  Storia,  II.  393,  that  England  offered 
Lombardy  to  Victor  Emmanuel  on  condition  of  his  granting  a constitution. 

^ Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  I.  108-114. 


NAPOLEON 


1 1 

and  Castlereagh,  who  thought  less  of  English  honour  than 
of  crippling  France,  was  quick  to  repudiate  Bentinck’s  pledges 
to  the  Genoese  that  their  independence  should  be  respected/ 
Their  country  was  consigned  to  its  old  rival,  Piedmont. 
In  vain  they  protested  against  a “ foreign  domination  ” ; in 
vain  they  offered  to  sacrifice  the  republic,  if  only  they  might 
keep  their  independence,  or  at  least  Home  Rule.  They 
pleaded  to  deaf  ears,  and  Genoa  was  tossed  a few  poor 
crumbs  of  local  government  for  her  solace.  At  the  time, 
however,  it  seemed  doubtful  whether  the  annexation  would 
add  to  the  strength  of  Piedmont.  The  old  enmity  between 
the  two  states,  the  incompatibility  of  a semi-feudal  despotism 
and  a commercial  democracy,  made  men  despair  of  any 
real  fusion.  But  the  pressure  of  a common  despotism  and 
common  commercial  interests  were  too  strong  for  ancient 
grudges,  and  the  removal  of  one  more  boundary  helped  on 
the  unity  of  Italy. 

But  while  Piedmont  alone  among  Italian  states  came 
out  stronger  from  the  Congress,  Austria,  in  spite  of  her  re- 
buffs, had  won  for  herself  a commanding  power  in  Italy. 
Indirectly  her  strength  reached  far  beyond  the  limits  of  her 
own  provinces.  Austrian  princes  ruled  in  Tuscany,  and 
Modena,  and  Parma.  She  garrisoned  by  treaty  rights 
Piacenza,  and  Ferrara,  and  Comacchio ; some  day  she 
hoped  to  have  the  whole  of  Romagna.^  She  had  almost 
unlimited  control  over  the  duchies  of  the  Po  valley.  Tus- 
cany, though  it  stood  out  against  her  larger  claims  of 
suzerainty,  bound  itself  to  make  neither  peace  nor  war 
without  her  consent.  Ferdinand  of  Naples  had  concluded 
a secret  treaty,  pledging  himself  to  make  no  separate 
alliances,  and  grant  no  liberties  to  his  subjects  beyond  those 
which  obtained  in  Lombardy  and  Venetia. 

But  strong  as  Austria  was,  the  very  fact  of  her  pre- 
dominance roused  more  or  less  suspicion  in  almost  every 

It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  Bentinck  had  any  authority  from  the 
English  Government  for  his  promises.  Castlereagh  denied  it  ; Wellington, 
op.  ciL,  IX.  64  ; Castlereagh,  op.  cit.,  I.  434.  But  from  ih.  II.  18,  221,  it  would 
appear  that  Bentinck  made  his  promise  with  Castlereagh’s  knowledge. 

Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  I.  222  ; Gualterio,  op.  cit.,  III.  338  ; Gouvernement  Temporel, 
109 ; contra  Metternich,  Memoires,  III.  82  ; see  Riv.  stor.  del  risorg.  I.  340. 


12  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Italian  Court.  Piedmont,  fronted  by  the  unbroken  stretch 
of  the  empire  from  the  Ticino  to  the  Carpathians,  feared  for 
her  very  existence.  The  Pope,  knowing  well  that  Austria  s 
designs  on  the  Legations  only  slumbered,  could  not  but  be 
suspicious  of  her  every  move.  Tuscany  was  ruled  by  patriotic 
statesmen,  who  struggled  long  and  successfully  to  free  their 
country  from  her  tutelage.  Already  there  were  signs  of  open 
opposition.  Piedmont  had  killed  the  schemes  of  an  Austrian 
league;  Rome  refused  with  coolness  the  alliance,  which 
Metternich  offered  her  as  the  best  protection  against  the 
gates  of  hell”  ; the  two  states  joined  with  Tuscany  to  reject 
proposals,  which  would  have  given  him  control  of  the  postal 
communications  of  the  peninsula.  The  princes  might  fall 
back  on  her  in  a struggle  with  their  subjects,  but  they 
would  never  willingly  become  her  vassals.  The  spirit  of 
Italian  independence  had  reached  even  to  the  Courts. 

And  vague  and  disorganised  though  it  was,  the  sense  of 
a common  nationality  was  making  quick  strides  among  the 
people.  Genoa,  it  is  true,  was  as  yet  irreconcilable  to 
Turin ; the  Milanese  had  tried  to  sever  their  lot  from  that 
of  North  Italy  ; Venice  wanted  her  old  independence  ; Sicily 
and  Naples  were  at  bitter  feud.  But  in  spite  of  all,  com- 
munity of  memories  and  wrongs  was  consolidating  a national 
sense,  and  the  contrast  of  the  Restoration  with  the  enlighten- 
ment of  the  French  rule  was  creating  a movement  hostile 
alike  to  native  oppression  and  Austrian  domination.  For  a 
moment  patriots  had  hoped  that  Murat  would  free,  perhaps 
unite,  all  Italy.^  Now  they  were  beginning  to  look  to  the 
House  of  Savoy  as  the  “ one  Italian  race  of  princes,”  and 
though  Piedmont  was  reluctant  to  sink  herself  in  a wider 
state,  Lombards'  and  Romagnuols  were  looking  for  the 
day  when  she  must  expand  into  a North  Italian  king- 
dom. And  though  they  were  very  few”  who  as  yet  dared 
hope  in  an  united  Italy,  there  were  plans  abroad  among  the 
thinkers  to  reorganise  the  peninsula  in  a federation  of  three 
constitutional  states,  which  would  leave  no  room  for  either 
Austria  or  the  Temporal  Power. 

^ Gouvernement  Temporcl,  97* 


CHAPTEE  II 


THE  CARBONARI 
1815-1824 


The  Eestoration  in  Piedmont,  Lombardy- Venetia,  Tuscany,  the  Papal 
States,  Naples,  Sicily.  Its  character;  Francis  of  Modena.  Dis- 
content. The  Carbonari.  The  Conciliatore.  Revolution  of 
Naples:  Naples,  1815-1820;  revolution  breaks  out;  constitution 
granted;  Murattists  and  Carbonari;  Sicily,  1815—1820;  revolution 
of  Pakrmo  ; Naples  and  Sicily  ; Florestano  Pepe  attacks  Palermo  ; 
Austria  and  Naples  ; Parliament  repudiates  FI.  Pepe’s  treaty ; the 
king  goes  to  Laybach ; the  Austrian  invasion.  Revolution  of 
Piedmont  : the  Carbonari  in  Piedmont ; Charles  Albert ; the  army 
rises  , Charles  Albert  Regent ; the  revolution  collapses.  Movements 
in  Modena  and  Romagna.  Character  of  the  revolution ; weakness 
of  feeling  of  Unity.  Ferdinand’s  revenge  and  death.  Charles  Felix. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  partitioned  Italy  into  eight  states. 
Piedmont  and  the  Austrian  provinces  divided  the  north; 
the  Papal  States,  ^Tuscany,  the  petty  duchies  of  '’Modena, 
,5. Parma,  and  ^ Lucca  occupied  the  centre;  the  kingdom  of 
^ Naples  covered  the  southern  mainland  and  Sicily.  Parma 
was  given  to  Maria  Louisa,  the  Austrian  princess,  who  had 
been  Napoleon  s wife ; Lucca  went  to  another  Maria  Louisa, 
of  the  Spanish  Bourbons  who  reigned  at  Parma  before  the 
revolution.  All  the  other  states,  except  the  suppressed 
republics  of  Venice  and  Genoa,  returned  to  their  old  rulers. 
As  in  Spain  and  Germany,  the  princes  were  welcomed  back 
not  only  by  the  friends  of  the  old  order  but  by  the  mass  of 
the^  people,  to  whom  they  represented  the  national  protest 
against  French  absorption.  Even  a tyrant  like  Ferdinand 
of  Naples  met  the  same  welcome  that  greeted  the  better 
princes.  Safe  on  their  thrones,  better  and  worse  alike  set 
themselves  to  undo  the  revolution.  It  was  impossible. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

^deed,  to  ignore  mucli  of  the  reform  that  the  French  had 
introduced ; but  even  where  the  form  of  the  new  order  was 
preserved,  the  Restoration  tried  to  kill  its  spirit 

Victor  Emmanuel  was  welcomed  back  to  Piedmont  with 
clamorous  loyalty.  He  had  the  qualities  of  his  race;  he 
was  kindly  and  well-intentioned.  But  he  hated  innovation ; 
all  reform  smacked  to  him  of  revolution,  and  now  that  he 
had,  as  he  believed,  the  revolution  at  his  feet,  he  hastened 
to  sweep  away  its  every  trace.  He  threatened  to  recognise 
no  law  passed  during  his  exile,  to  own  no  civil  servant  who 
did  not  figure  in  the  directory  of  the  year  when  the  French 
drove  him  out.  The  anachronisms  of  the  old  order  came 
back,  the  legal  abuses,  the  feudal  privileges,  monasteries  and 
ecclesiastical  courts,  the  disabilities  of  Jews  and  Protestants. 
For  the  moment  it  was  feared  that  civil  marriages  contracted 
under  the  French  rule  would  not  be  recognised,  that  pur- 
chasers of  church  lands  would  be  compelled  to  surrender.  ^ But 
the  Restoration  was  soon  shorn  of  its  worst  excesses.  ^ Victor 
Emmanuel  found  himself  forced  to  compromise  with  the 
passive  resistance  of  his  people.  The  directory  of  1798  was 
quietly  dropped;  provincial  councils  were  instituted;  the 
prerogative  was  less  used  to  override  the  law.  ^ Officials  of 
the  French  period  found  their  way  into  the  Ministry  itself, 
and  the  accession  to  office  of  Prospero  Balbo  (1817),  their 
most  distinguished  administrator,  seemed  to  herald  further 
reforms.  But  though  some  real  progress  was  made,  tne 
Jesuits  crept  back,  and  critics  complained  that  the  govern- 
ment still  united  the  worst  features  of  the  old  order  and  of 
the  French  rule, — the  obscurantism  of  the  first,  the  political 
police  and  centralization  of  the  latter. 

The  mass  of  the  Lombards  and  Venetians  were  well 
pleased  when  the  Austrians,  in  taking  possession,  erected 
the  provinces  into  a kingdom,  and  instituted  the  Central 
Congregations,^  which  in  time,  it  was  hoped,  would  grow 
into^representative  institutions.  The  new  rule,  Metternich 
promised,  should  “ conform  to  Italian  character  and  customs, 
and  it  seemed  as  if  the  rights  of  nationality  were  to  obtain 

recoo-nition  even  from  the  Austrian  government.  All  the 
o 

1 See  below,  p.  57. 


THE  CARBONARI 


15 

more  pungent  was  the  disappointment,  when'  the  Lombards 
found  that  the  taking  phrases  were  empty  words.  The 
Austrian  law  was  introduced;  contrary,  it  seems,  to  Met- 
ternich’s  advice,  Austrians  and  Tyrolese  seized  on  the  higher 
posts  in  the  administration;  conscription  was  enforced  in 
spite  of  the  promises  of  1814.  The  emperor  let  it  be 
known  that  he  “wanted  not  learned  men,  but  submissive 
and  loyal  subjects”;  and  the  brutality  and  insolence  of  the 
Austrian  soldiery  showed  the  Italians  in  what  light  they 
were  regarded  by  their  new  rulers. 

In  l.uscany  the  reaction  was  less  pronounced.  No  at- 
tempt was  made  indeed  to  restore  Leopold  I.’s  liberal  local 
institutions,  which  Napoleon  had  sacrificed  to  his  centraliza- 
tion. But  though  most  of  Napoleon’s  Code  was  swept 
away,  Leopold’s  Code,  which  came  back  again,  was  in 
some  respects  as  advanced.  The  Tuscan  statesmen  of  the 
Restoration  were  not  blind  to  the  world’s  growth : the 
Grand  Duke,  it  is  said,  would  have  given  a representative 
Parliament,  but  for  the  veto  of  Vienna.^  The  police  system, 
execrable  in  theory,  was  mild  in  practice;  after  angry  debate 
with  Rome  the  monks  were  restored  to  only  a'  part  of  their 
possessions,  and  the  J esuits,  as  in  Lombardy,  were  rigorously 
shut  out. 

Rome  was  saved  by  Consalvi  from  the  worst  extremes 
of  reaction.  Many  of  the  ecclesiastics  would  have  welcomed 
a root-and-branch  destruction  of  the  French  reforms,  and 
the  prayer  of  the  great  Roman  nobles  for  a lay  government 
was  scornfully  tossed  back;  Pius  VII.,  the  gentle,  amiable 
Pope,  whom  Napoleon  had  dragged  into  captivity,  could 
easily  have  been  won  to  the  bigots.  But  Consalvi  returned 
triumphant  from  Vienna,  and  his  success  at  the  Congress 
made  him  master  of  the  government.  The  state,  which  he 
had  saved,  he  hoped  to  make  strong  by  centralization  and 
moderate  reform.  He  had  learnt,  with  the  other  statesmen 
of  Europe,  how  much  of  the  strength  of  France  lay  in  the 
anity  of  her  administration.  He  was  no  blind  reactionary, 
md,  though  far  from  being  a Liberal,  he  was  sensitive  to 
:he  opinion  of  Europe,  and  wished  to  see  the  Papal 

^ Tivaroni,  Dominio  Austriaco,  II.  5. 


1 6 A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

dominions  creditably  governed  and  tbeir  peoples  prosperous. 
Even  the  Papacy,  he  saw,  must  recognise  “ the  new  habits, 
new  opinions,  new  lights,  which  political  economy  had 
fortified  and  spread.”  His  aim  was  to  create  a strong 
bureaucracy,  immediately  dependent  on  the  Pope,  and  free 
alike  from  control  of  cardinals  and  people.  The  Legates 
who  ruled  the  provinces  were  made  to  feel  that  they  were 
no  longer  sovereign  princes  as  of  old.  But,  though  Jonsalvi 
earnestly  attempted  to  moderate  the  excesses  of  the  restora- 
tion, he  was  not  able,  perhaps  he  hardly  wished,  to  prevent 
it  from  bringing  back  many  of  the  old  abuses,  the  feudal 
privileges,  the  obsolete  administration,  the  uncertain  and 
complicated  law.  Church  lands  were  restored,  and  the  pur- 
chasers imperfectly  indemnified;  the  Jesuits  were  solemnly 
reinstated.  And  when  the  great  cardinal  tried  to  reform 
the  law  and  encourage  education,  the  growing  opposition 
foiled  him ; he  had  the  support  of  the  nobles  and  educated 
middle  classes,  but  he  found  himself  baffled  by  priestly  and 
popular  antagonism,  and  Pius  timid  scruples.  He  gave  up 
reform  in  disgust,  and  devoted  his  remaining  years  to  the 
embellishment  of  Rome. 

At  Naples,  Ferdinand,  obliged  to  outbid  Murat,  had 
prepared  a proclamation  promising  a constitution  (May  i, 
1815),  but  suppressed  it  when  the  news  came  of  his  rival  s 
rapid  downfall.  The  government  kept  its  hand  on  the 
4migr6s  and  clergy,  who  returned  hot  for  revenge.  But 
though  the  purchasers  of  church  lands  were  recognised,  the 
^migrSs  got  back  their  property,  and  the  promised  amnesty 
found  limited  observance.  Sicily,  which  had  sheltered  the 
kina’  in  his  exile,  was  rewarded  with  true  Bourbon  ingrati- 
tude The  old  Norman  Constitution  had  remained  intact 
till  1812,  when  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  king  to 
tax  without  consent  of  Parliament  led  to  a quarrel  be- 
tween crown  and  barons,  and,  under  the  influence  of  Lord 
William  Bentinck,  who  commanded  the  English  garrison, 
the  popular  party  carried  what  was  practically  a copy  of  the 
English  Constitution.  Liberties,  to  which  the  king  had 

1 Sansone,  Rivoluzione,  274;  Colletta,  Storia,\ll.  410;  Gualterio,  Rivol- 
gimenti,  II.  169;  Pepe,  Narrative,  86. 


THE  CARBONARI  17 

sworn,  and  England  given  her  moral  guarantee,  might  seem 
secure  m spite  of  triumphant  reaction.  But  the  court  at 
Naples  feared  the  contagion  of  parliamentary  government 
so  close  at  hand;  and  Ferdinand,  by  his  treaty  with  Austria,' 
had  implicitly  pledged  himself  to  abolish  the  constitution. 
The  English  Government,  after  some  hesitation, ^ was  per- 
suaded to  throw  over  the  Sicilians,  and  A’  Court,  the  British 
minister  at  Naples,  lent  himself  to  undo  Bentinck’s  work, 
and  perjure  his  country  in  Sicilian  eyes.  The  ancient 
autonomy  of  Sicily  was  destroyed  by  an  Act  of  Union 
(December  1816),  which  joined  the  island  to  Naples,  and 
abolished  the  Sicilian  flag  and  army.  Despite  a remnant 
of  illusory  privileges,  Sicily  had  lost  its  independence ; every 
one  realised  that  it  had  lost  its  constitution  too,  and  that, 
though  parliament  was  still  nominally  recognized,  it  would' 
never  be  summoned  again.  Ferdinand  and  Castlereagh,  in 
defiance  of  legal  right  and  plighted  word,  had  reduced  the 
proud  and  ancient  state  to  an  appanage  of  Naples.^ 

Reactionary,  however,  as  the  Restoration  was,  it  was  not 
cruel.  The  nobles  and  clergy  sometimes  thirsted  for  pro- 
scription, but,  with  the  exception  of  Ferdinand,  the  princes 
who  returned  were  men  of  honesty  and  elevated  purpose. 
However  unable  to  understand  the  spirit  of  the  new  age 
they  had  the  welfare  of  the  people  at  heart,  and  their 
government  between  1814  and  1820  was  mild  and  in- 
creasmgly  so.  But  to  the  men  of  the  Restoration  the 
French  rule  had  meant  the  breaking-up  of  the  moral  safe- 
guards on  which  society  rested.  It  had,  so  they  thought 
not  without  reason,  weakened  religion  and  endangered  the 
family.  They  insisted  on  the  re-establishment  of  strict 
paternal  authority  over  the  young,  on  the  repeal  of  civil 
marriage  and  of  the  Napoleonic  law  of  divorce.  Education 
WAS  given  up  to  the  clergy,  security  was  taken  for  the 

^ See  above,  p.  ii. 

2 MeUernich,  Memoires,  III.  8o ; Castlereagh,  op.  cit,  III  j. 

^ British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1816-17,  552-564 ; Biar  ^apoli,  534 ; 

castlereagh,  op.  cit.,  II.  112,  113,  237;  Parliamentary  ' Commons," 

une  21,  1821;  Bela  Sidle;  Sicily  and  England;  Pal  - ^(^ggio ; Fyffe 
mdern  Europe,  II.  88  n.  The  Sicilians  called  Bentinck  dliam  the  Good 
nd  A’  Court  “ William  the  Bad.”  ’ 

VOL.  I. 


B 


i8 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


obUgatory  teaching  of  Catholic  doctrine,  the  Universities 
were  suspected  and  watched  by  the  police.  They  had  then- 
best  exponent  in  Duke  Francis  of  Modena.  The  prince, 
who  has  been  painted,  perhaps  justly,  as  the  worst  t^ant 
of  modern  Italy,  was  in  private  hfe  a patient,  kmdly, 
courteous  man,  a devoted  husband  and  father,  a capable 
and  hard-working  ruler.  His  interest  in  his  people  was 
very  real.  He  wished  to  see  justice  speedy,  taxation  light 
and  regular;  he  aided  ivith  easy  loans  the  needy  peasants 
of  his  state ; in  time  of  famine  his  generosity  was  princely. 
He  tried  to  raise  public  morality  by  a bastardy  law  and  t e 
reclamation  of  the  fallen.  But  beyond  the  rudiments  of 
morality  and  material  well-bemg  his  light  failed.  He 
dreaded  the  political  results  of  education,  though  a pnerous 
patron  of  art  and  such  research  as  was  safely  dissevered 
from  politics.  The  teacher  who  led  the  young  li'f  rM 

doctrines  was  in  his  eyes  the  greatest  of  smners. 
it  a prince’s  sacred  duty,  at  whatever  cost  to  himself  and 
subjects,  to  save  society  from  Liberalism  and  its  disinteg- 
rating influences.  For  this  he  supported  the  nobles  and 
priests  restored  the  suppressed  monasteries,  scattered  dis- 
tinctions broadcast,  for  “rich  proprietors,”  he  said,  “are 
always  grateful  to  any  one  who  gives  them  titles.  An 
more  than  on  baronial  favour  or  priestly  education  he  relied 
on  the  sword  of  the  magistrate.  In  the  “epidemic  of 
criticism  and  insubordination,  which  leads  to  the  loss  o 
eternal  salvation  and  of  earthly  tranquillity,”  it  was  “a  false 
philanthropy,”  he  thought,  to  punish  lightly.  “The  Liberals 
he  said,  “ are  sinners ; pray  for  their  repentance,  but  punish 
the  unrepentant.”  ^ 


mild  as  the  reaction  was,  it  was  bound  to  come 
ir  't  with  aU  that  was  progressive  in  the  nation. 

Mle  class,  which  had  learnt  its  strength  under 
'le,  found  its  commerce  paralysed  by  the 
cusi  t divided  state  from  state,  by  the  obsolete 


1 GalvR 
Cantli,  Croni. 
commercial  spe. 


TV.,  III.  126-140,  194;  Bianchi,  Ducati,  I.  74»  75  ! 
>-142.  I am  inclined  to  discredit  the  stories  of  his 
respecting  which  see  Tivaroni,  op.  at.,  I.  61 1,  624. 


THE  CARBONARI  ic, 

economy  that  still  informed  the  law;  it  angrily  resented 
the  return  of  privilege,  of  arbitrary  law,  of  clerical  assertion, 
of  intellectual  stagnation.  The  armies,  which  had  caught 
the  democratic  sense,  which  even  in  its  worst  times  was 
present  in  the  Napoleonic  system,  chafed  at  the  loss  of  social 
liberties,  the  promotion  of  imigr6  officers,  the  presence  of 
the  domineering  Austrians,  whom  they  had  so  often 
defeated.  Theories  of  constitutional  liberty  thrived  in  such 
a ground.  Russian  agents  during  Alexander’s  brief  spell  of 
Liberalism  busily  encouraged  them.  English  travellers 
brought  an  atmosphere  of  freer  life.  The  proceedings  of 
the  English  and  French  parliaments,  the  movements  of  the 
Greek  Hetairia,  were  keenly  watched.  There  was  brisk 
hterary^  life  m the  north  and  centre,  and  all  the  younger 
generation  read  Alfieri  and  Foscolo  and  translations  from 
Germany  and  England.  Everywhere,  so  far  as  the  police 
and  the  ^censorship  would  allow,  men  were  dreaming  or 
discussing  the  hopes,  vague  and  speculative  for  the  most 
part,  of  national  regeneration.  Disappointed  Liberals,  civil 
servants  who  had  lost  their  posts,  cashiered  officers  and 
soldiers  of  the  grandu  armie  longed  for  the  unclouding  of 
the  freer  day,  whose  dawn  Napoleon  had  brought.  For 
the  first  time  since  Guelf  days  something  of  a national 
party  came  into  life  under  the  auspices  of  the  Carbonari. 

They  were  practically  an  offshoot  of  Italian  Freemasonry, 
with  similar  statutes  and  ritual,^  but  with  a more  definite 
political  aim.  The  Freemasons  had  long  been  numerous 
and  influential  in  the  south  of  Italy,  and  the  new  society 
was  founded  by  republican  refugees,  who  fled  from  Joseph 
Bonaparte’s  rule  to  the  Abruzzi  and  Calabria.  They  were 
joined  by  others,  whose  only  point  of  sympathy  was  a 
common  hatred  to  French  rule ; and  thus  from  the  first  it 
was  uncertain  whether  they  should  be  counted  as  re- 
publicans or  royalists.  But  they  were  obviously  useful 
allies  against  the  French,  and  as  such  were  encouraged 
by  Ferdinand  and  Bentinck.  Murat  in  the  latter  years 
01  his  reign  tried  to  win  them,  but  in  vain,  and  their  oppo- 
sition hastened  his  fall.  After  the  Restoration  Ferdinand 

^ Saiut-Edme,  Carhonari,  7-8. 


20 


A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

naturally  persecuted  the  men  who  had  helped  him  to  his 
throne,  and  his  minister  Canosa  patronised  the  Calderari, 
the  rival  society  which  terrorised  the  Liberals,  till  Austria, 
anxious  for  some  measure  of  decent  government,  persuaded 
Ferdinand  to  dismiss  Canosa  and  dissolve  them.  Whether 
persecuted  or  protected,  the  Carbonari  spread  apace  through 
southern  Italy.  Their  democratic  and  communistic  doc- 
trines, their  Christian  phraseology  swept  in  converts  of  dif- 
ferent parties;  their  dim  power  satisfied  men  who  were 
groping  for  authority  in  a state,  whose  official  government 
commanded  no  respect ; their  fantastic  symbolism  appealed 
to  an  uneducated  people,  traditionally  susceptible  to  the 
esoteric  and  mysterious.  They  started  with  a high  moral 
ideal ; their  leaders  hoped  to  purify  society,  and  initiate  an 
ill-defined  socialism,  inspired  half  by  Christianity,  half  by 
the  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Their  enigmatic  • 
prophecies  were  inspired  by  Christian  mysticism ; ‘‘  Christ, 
they  said,  was  the  first  victim  of  tyrants,”  and  the  crucifix 
hung  in  every  Carbonaro  lodge.^  They  were  even  tender 
to  the  religious  orders  and  the  Pope,  and  sometimes  dreamt 
of  a reformed  Catholic  church  that  he  would  lead.  Theii 
rules  breathed  the  austerest  morality;  severe  penalties 
threatened  any  immoral  or  dishonourable  conduct  from  a 
member,  and  persons  of  ill-fame  were  rigorously  excluded 
from  the  lodges,  till,  as  large  numbers  thronged  for  admis- 
sion, the  officers  relaxed  the  strictness  of  the  scrutiny.  It 
is  more  difficult  to  say  what  was  their  political  creed.  It 
was  imparted  to  the  higher,  grades  only,  and  the^  rank-and- 
file  were  contented  with  vague  formulas  of  liberty  and 
resistance  to  tyrants.^  The  more  elaborate  doctrines  of  the 
leaders  seem  to  have  been  a strange  compound  of  Konaan 
Imperialism  and  the  democratic  semi- socialistic  teachi£ig 
of  Rousseau’s  school.  Sometimes  they  aimed  at  a federal 
government  under  the  presidency  of  the  Pope,  sometimes  at 

1 Frost,  Secret  Societies,  I.  214,  222  ; Cantii,  op.  cit.,  II.  130  ; Leopardi,  Nar- 
razioni,  lo ; Saint-Edme,  op.  cit.,  15,  97;  Cretineau-Joly,  Veglise  romaine, 
though  the  latter’s  documents  are  of  doubtful  genuineness. 

2 The  oath  of  the  highest  grade,  pledging  them  to  exterminate  kings,  was 
a mere  form  : Pepe,  Memoirs,  II.  277. 


THE  CARBONARI  2 1 

an  united  Italy  with  Rome  for  its  capital ; ' but  the  fantastic 
constitutions,  which  they  loved  to  build,  ran  through  every 
varying  shade  of  republicanism  and  democratic  monarchy, 
though  the  idea  of  Italian  Independence  was  always  present. 
A large  number  were  more  or  less  republicans,  but  the  loose 
organization  of  a society,  whose  only  links  were  personal 
and  hierarchic,  prevented  any  real  unity  of  principle.  They 
were  practically  a vast  Liberal  association,  but  with  more 
power  to  destroy  than  to  create.  The  threads  of  their 
complex  organization  were  held  by  a supreme  lodge,  which 
sat  at  Naples.  They  had  an  elaborate  administration  of 
justice,  with  courts  and  juries,  and  penalties  of  boycotting 
or  rarely  of  death  j and  their  independent  laws  and  execu- 
tive were  accepted  by  the  people,  as  more  trusted  than 
those  of  a government  associated  with  every  cruelty  and 
" treachery. 

From  Naples  they  spread  northwards.  The  Carbonari, 
the  Guelf  Knights,  the  Adelfi  of  Piedmont  and  Parma,  the 
Federali  of  Lombardy  were  hardly  distinguishable  sections 
of  the  great  conspiracy,  which  prepared  the  revolution  of 
1820-21.  The  earliest  public  symptom  of  the  new  spirit 
appeared  ip  Lombardy,  where  it  took  a social  and  literary 
form.  Disaffection  had  grown  apace  in  the  Austrian  pro- 
vinces, as  hope  in  the  Emperor’s  “ paternal  ” government 
broke  down.  But  the  political  instincts  of  the  Lombards 
were  too  weak  to  allow  of  more  than  passive  discontent. 
Active  interest  was  confined  to  a section  of  the  nobles  and 
middle  classes,  especially  at  Milan  and  Brescia.  Their 
chief  was  Confalonieri ; but  his  aristocratic  sympathies, 
thinly  veneered  with  the  more  popular  spirit  of  Napoleon’s 
army,  his  Voltairean  scepticism  which  had  nothing  in 
common  with  the  new  religious  Liberalism,  his  want  of 
stability  and  scrupulousness,  made  him  an  ill  leader  of  a 
party  of  reform.  He  and  his  followers  introduced  steam- 
boats, spinning  jennies,  gas;  they  popularized  Lancaster’s 
methods  of  education.  In  the  salons  of  Milan  they  met 

^ Saint-Edme,  o^.  cit.,  38-40,  1 12-157;  Hiv.  stor.  del  risorg.,  I.  560-562; 
(^rte  segrete,  I.  143  ; Cantii,  op.  cit.,  II.  125  ; Heckethorne,  Secret  Societies,  108  ; 
Del  governo  austriaco,  1 1 7. 


22 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


the  Liberals  of  France  and  England — Madame  de  Stael, 
Byron,  Hobhoiise,  Brougham.  The  Romanticist  literature 
was  just  beginning  to  reach  Italy,^  and  the  new  school 
founded  the  Conciliatore  magazine,  under  the  editorship  of 
the  gentle  irresolute  poet,  Silvio  Pellico,  to  wean  their 
countrymen  from  the  pedantry  and  unreality  of  the  classical 
school.  At  first  the  government  was  contented  with  a 
paper  attack,  and  writers  of  the  old  school  were  paid  to 
decry  the  patriotism  of  thinkers,  who  sought  their  inspira- 
tion in  Germany  or  England.  But  the  Austrians  soon  saw 
the  danger  of  the  movement ; the  new  periodical  “ smelt 
of  the  charcoal  of  the  Carbonari,”  and  harassed  and 
mutilated,  till  little  was  left  of  it  but  its  name,  it  died 
after  a year’s  existence  (October  1819);  and  the  party 
plunged  into  conspiracy,  as  the  schemes  of  the  Carbonari 
matured  for  revolution. 

These  schemes  were  ripest  in  the  south.  After  the  first 
wave  of  the  Restoration  Ferdinand’s  rule  had  been  more 
corrupt  than  tyrannical.  The  law  was  codified  on  French 
models ; there  was  little  interference  with  speech  or  writing ; 
provincial  and  district  councils  made  a skeleton  of  local 
administration  estimable  in  theory.  But  no  one  trusted 
the  government;  Ferdinand’s  word  had  been  too  often 
broken,  and  the  royalist  terror  of  1799  could  never  be 
forgotten.  The  peasants  groaned  under  the  tyranny  of 
their  landlords,  the  drastic  forest  laws,  the  revival  of  con- 
scription. The  national  pride  was  hurt  by  the  presence, 
till  1817,  of  an  Austrian  army  of  occupation,  by  the 
humiliation,  when  in  the  following  year  the  King's  anxiety 
to  save  his  soul  surrendered  the  traditional  independence  of 
Rome.  The  government  was  rotten  and  blundering;  the 
new  local  bodies  were  kept  in  careful  leading-strings ; justice 
was  abused  in  the  interests  of  the  rich.  Wide  distress 
added  to  the  discontent ; the  cotton  and  brandy  industries 
had  declined  as  soon  as  the  Peace  opened  the  ports  of 
Europe ; the  corn  and  oil  trade  was  crippled  by  the  inter- 
ference of  the  government.  Terrible  famines  and  epidemics, 

1 See  below,  p.  in. 


THE  CARBONARI 


23 

regarded  by  the  populace  as  the  divine  chastisement  for 
Murat’s  death,  left  a trail  of  woe  behind. 

Such  a rule,  feeble,  undignified,  corrupt,  made  a fair 
seed-bed  of  conspiracy.  The  Carbonari  were  becoming  the 
real  government  of  the  country.  Malcontents  from  every 
class  joined  them — the  overtaxed  small  proprietors,  the 
lower  ranks  of  the  civil  service,  unsatisfied  office-hunters, 
many  of  the  lower  clergy.  The  army,  ill-disciplined  and 
smarting  under  a reduction  of  its  privileges  and  the 
partiality  shown  to  the  6mi'gr4s,  was  largely  affiliated  ; the 
magistrates  joined  perforce.  There  was  no  longer  the 
careful  scrutiny  of  noviciates ; all  sorts  and  conditions  were 
admitted;  and  at  whatever  sacrifice  of  the  society’s  high 
standard,  it  could  count  its  numbers  by  tens  of  thousands. 
The  provincial  militia,  numbering  over  50,000  men,  fell 
into  its  hands.  The  militia  had  been  organized  to  protect 
the  country  from  the  brigands  by  Guglielmo  Pepe,  a young 
Calabrian  officer  ; a Carbonaro  himself,  he  was  preparing  to 
turn  them  to  political  uses,  and  a plot  to  seize  the  King 
with  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  Metternich  only  failed 
through  a misadventure.^  Pepe  was  maturing  the  con- 
spiracy, when  he  was  anticipated  by  a military  revolt. 

The  bloodless  Spanish  Revolution  inspired  two  young 
cavalry  officers,  Morelli  and  Salvati,  to  imitate  that  model  of 
military  democracy.  Deserting  with  a troop  of  cavalry  from 
their  depot  at  Nola,  they  marched  to  Avellino,  cheering  for 
king  and  constitution  (July  2,  1820).^  Disconnected  as  the 
movement  was,  its  success  showed  how  ripe  the  country  was 
for  revolt.  In  forty-eight  hours  the  Revolution  had  spread 
through  the  Capitinata  and  Basilicata,  a day  later  it  had 
reached  the  Terra  di  Lavoro  in  one  direction,  and  Puglia  in 
the  other,  and  several  regiments  had  followed  Pepe  to  the 
insurgent  camp.  There  were  now  at  least  1 2,000  armed 
constitutionalists  at  Avellino,  and  Pepe  was  preparing  to  take 
the  offensive,  when  on  the  night  of  July  5 the  King,  “ of  his 
own  free  will,”  granted  a constitution,  but  without  defining 
its  terms.  Suspicious  of  the  King’s  sincerity,  the  Carbonari 

^ Pepe,  Memoirs,  II.  182-183. 

^ The  Neapolitan  Kevolution  inspired  Shelley’s  Odes  to  Naples  and  Liberty. 


24  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

demanded  the  Spanish  Constitution  of  1812,^  under  which  a 
parliament  of  a single  chamber  oversaw  every  detail  of  the 
executive.  It  was  a masterpiece  of  doctrinahism,  complicated 
and  unworkable ; few  or  none  knew  more  of  it  than  that  it 
was  ultra-democratic.  But  it  made  a popular  cry,  and  the 
King’s  eldest  son,  Francis,  who  had  been  appointed  Regent, 
was  swept  away  by  the  tide  and  proclaimed  its  adoption. 
Army  and  people  hailed  it  with  ignorant  enthusiasm ; the 
Regent  swore  to  defend  it  with  his  blood ; the  King  pro- 
fessed himself  a happy  man  to  have  lived  to  grant  it,  and 
swore  fealty  to  it  on  the  Gospel. 

The  ministers  resigned  when  the  constitution  was  granted, 
and  their  place  was  taken  by  statesmen  of  Murat’s  time. 
In  comparison  with  the  Bourbonists  they  were  in  a way 
Liberals,  but  they  had  been  trained  in  a school  that  had 
little  popular  fibre  in  it,  and  they  looked  with  suspicion  on 
the  more  democratic  Carbonari.  Pepe  alone  among  them 
represented  the  forces  that  had  made  the  Revolution.  It 
was  inevitable  that  they  should  come  into  conflict  with  the 
Carbonaro  organization.  Not  that  there  was,  as  they  fancied, 
any  real  danger  of  disorder  ; fears  of  agrarian  laws  or  attacks 
on  the  Church  were  absurd,  when  the  strength  of  the  Car- 
bonari lay  among  the  landed  proprietors,  and  the  Spanish 
Constitution  tolerated  no  religion  but  Catholicism.  But 
none  the  less  they  were  a state  within  the  state ; they 
controlled  the  militia  and  the  local  bodies,  and  the  courts 
were  afraid  to  proceed  against  their  members.  Even  Pepe 
for  a time  was  inclined  to  put  them  down  with  a high 
hand.^ 

The  position,  difficult  enough  in  itself,  was  complicated 
by  a revolution  in  Sicily.  The  Sicilians  were  exasperated 
by  the  loss  of  their  independence,  by  the  ingratitude  of  the 
King,  by  the  odious  subjection  to  Austria.  The  old  local 
government  had  been  destroyed,  and  the  restraint  which 
the  new  system  laid  on  baronial  tyranny  was  dearly  bought 
by  enslavement  to  a corrupt  bureaucracy.  The  departure 
of  the  English  garrison  at  the  Peace  had  been  followed  by 


^ Text  in  La  Farina,  Storia,  V.  169. 
2 Carrascosa,  MemoireSy  135. 


THE  CARBONARI 


25 

a scarcity  of  money  and  fall  in  prices,  and  the  peasant  could 
obtain  no  corresponding  reduction  in  his  rent.  The  mis^y, 
which  was  mainly  due  to  economic  changes,  was  set  down 
to  the  loss  of  independence.  So  strong  was  the  hatred  to 
the  rule  of  Naples,  that  in  the  greater  portion  of  the  island 
it  hid  the  deep  divisions  that  parted  the  propertied  classes 
from  the  masses.  To  the  nobles  independence  meant  the 
return  of  feudalism,  immunity  from  the  better  laws  of  the 
mainland,  a free  hand  to  monopolise  the  soil  and  lord  it 
over  their  vassals.  To  the  masses  in  the  towns  it  brought 
vague  hopes  of  plunder,  or  at  best  of  agrarian  decrees.  It 
was  only  a few,  the  heirs  of  the  Liberals  of  1812,  who  saw 
in  a return  to  parliamentary  government  a road  to  progress 
and  reform. 

The  news  of  the  Revolution  at  Naples  reached  Palermo 
on  the  festival  of  its  patron-saint,  Santa  Rosalia,  and  the 
city’s  great  holiday  (July  14).  The  Spanish  Constitution 
was  hailed  with  enthusiasm,  and  it  seemed  for  the  moment 
as  if  Sicilians  and  Neapolitans  might  forget  their  differences 
in  the  common  Liberal  triumph.  But  the  nobles  dreaded 
the  new  development,  for  the  Spanish  Constitution  would  be 
fatal  to  their  power ; some  of  the  Liberals  themselves  were 
at  one  with  them  in  wanting  separation  or  Home  Rule;  and 
the  earlier  notes  of  reconciliation  were  drowned  in  the  cry 
for  independence  and  the  Sicilian  constitution  of  1812.^ 
The  puzzled  crowd  found  its  vent  in  sacking  the  house 
of  the  hated  General  Church,  and  destroying  the  tax-offices. 
But  generally  it  was  the  blind  tool  of  the  nobles,  and  it  was 
to  serve  their  own  ends  that  the  nobles  persuaded  the  Viceroy 
jto  allow  it  to  arm  itself  from  the  government’s  stores.  At 
! first  the  troops  had  been  inclined  to  fraternize,  but  the 
generals  were  frightened  when  they  saw  how  events  were 
j drifting,  and  on  the  17th  the  soldiers  attacked  the  mob  and 
were  ignominiously  beaten.  But  the  barons  had  used  a 
'double-edged  tool.  The  prisons  were  forced,  and  the  escaped 
convicts  made  the  mob  even  more  ready  for  mischief  than 
before.  Two  of  the  great  peers  were  barbarously  murdered  ; 

^ Sansone,  Rivoluzione,  28  et  scq. ; Fa  min,  Revolution,  21  ; Colletta,  Storia, 
II.  378;  Palmieri,  Saggio,  323  ; Afan  di  Rivera,  Sicilia  24. 


26  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

plunder  and  assassination  terrorized  the  city,  and  a Junta  of  i 
nobles  and  “ consuls  ” of  the  artisan  crafts  tried  in  vain  to 
stem  the  disorder.  It  was  not  till  they  had  taken  the  con- 
victs and  unemployed  into  their  pay  and  enrolled  them  into 
squadre,  that  modified  order  was  restored. 

The  riot  made  the  insurrection  a hopeless  one  from  the  i 
start.  Power  had  passed  to  a coalition  of  feudalism  and 
anarchy.  The  Liberals  feared  that  an  independent  Sicily 
would  be  the  sport  of  foreign  powers,  or  that  its  parliament 
would  he  controlled  by  the  barons  ; and  though  if  the  Union 
were  preserved,  the  Sicilian  deputies  would  be  in  a minority 
at  Naples,  they  hoped  to  win  from  a free  government  re- 
forms that  a king  had  refused.  Messina  and  much  of  the 
east  of  the  island  were  loyal  to  Naples.  Through  the 
centre  and  west  the  officials  and  middle  classes  followed 
the  Liberals  of  the  capital,  and  savage  faction-fights  raged  I 
through  the  island  between  the  friends  of  the  Spanish  Con- 
stitution and  the  masses,  whose  hatred  of  their  employers 
and  sympathy  with  the  Palermo  mob  made  them  fierce  par- 
tisans of  the  Constitution  of  1812.  The  Palermitans  sent 
the  squadre  of  the  capital  to  help  their  friends.  The  squadre, 
which  reappear  at  every  crisis  of  Sicilian  history,  were  irre- 
gular hands,  sometimes  of  peasants  armed  and  officered  by 
the  local  lord,  sometimes  of  criminal  or  semi- criminal  prole- 
tarians from  the  cities,  capable  at  times  of  reckless  braveiy, 
but  easily  discouraged ; on  the  whole,  of  little  military  value, 
and  often  a terror  to  the  populations  they  professed  to  de- 
fend. They  carried  fire  and  sword  through  the  districts  that 
refused  allegiance  to  the  capital;  Caltanisetta  was  sacked 
and  burnt,  and  the  opposition  was  cowed  in  two-thirds  of 
the  island.  But  there  was  intimidation  on  both  sides,  and 
it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  with  the  great 
mass  of  Sicilians  in  the  Avest  and  centre  the  one  absorbing 
motive  Avas  the  passionate  demand  for  independence. 

The  neAvs  roused  beAvilderment  and  indignation  at 
Naples.  Exaggerated  rumours  of  the  atrocities  exasperated 
the  people ; the  Liberals  regarded  the  movement  as  feudal 

1 Sansone,  op.  cit.,  76-77,  84-89,  loi  ; Famin,  op.  cit.,  86,  132-133  ; Pepe, 
Memoirs,  II.  334  ; Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  365,  et  seq. 


THE  CARBONARI 


27 

and  reactionary,  and  the  refusal  to  accept  the  Spanish  Con- 
stitution seemed  the  working  of  mere  faction.  Except  in 
Calabria,  they  were  unanimous  in  calling  for  severe  repres- 
sion. But  the  government  hesitated.  The  King,  perhaps 
with  deliberate  design  to  sow  dissension,  had  promised  the 
Sicilians  the  Constitution  of  1812,^  and  he  and  the  Regent 
were  playing  the  barons  with  hopes  of  Home  Rule.  At  the 
end  of  August  (August  31)  the  Regent,  with  the  consent  of 
the  ministers,  offered  a separate  parliament,  provided  that 
the  island  as  a whole  demanded  it ; but  at  the  same  time 
Florestano  Pepe,  the  brother  of  the  minister,  was  sent  with 
7000  men  to  frighten  the  home-rulers  from  their  programme, 
and  give  the  government  its  chance  to  escape  from  its 
promises.^  Advancing  with  his  troops  on  Palermo,  Pepe 
found  the  Junta  ready  to  come  to  terms.  The  propertied 
classes  were  willing  to  accept  any  compromise  as  an  escape 
from  anarchy.  They  had  organized  a citizen-guard,  which 
had  had  daily  skirmishes'  with  the  assassin  gangs,  and  was 
beginning  to  control  the  capital.  The  Junta  willingly  ac- 
cepted Pepe’s  promise  to  grant  an  amnesty,  and  refer  the 
decision  between  Union  or  Home  Rule  to  a representative 
assembly  of  the  island  (September  22).  But  the  mob, 
frenzied  by  fears  for  its  own  safety  (for  the  amnesty  specially 
excluded  common  crime),  and  impelled  by  their  wild  passion 
of  patriotism,  turned  on  the  Junta  as  Pepe’s  accomplices, 
and  fired  on  the  citizen  guard.  Again  the  gangs,  superior 
in  numbers  and  courage,  were  easily  victorious;  again  the 
prisons  were  opened  and  palaces  were  sacked,  while  Pepe 
was  attacking  by  land  and  sea.  Ten  days  they  fought  him 
with  desperate  bravery,  and  again  and  again  he  was  driven 
back,  till  his  position  became  critical.  But  reaction  was  in 
full  tide  at  Palermo.  All  but  the  mob  were  sick  of  the 
anarchy,  and  pillage,  and  savagery ; the  squadre  had  lost  ter- 
ribly in  the  ten  days’  fighting,  and  each  day  saw  more  who 
were  weary  of  the  struggle.  On  October  5 one  of  the  nobles 
cajoled  the  unconquered  people  into  surrender.  The  terms 
that  were  offered  and  accepted,  repeated  Pepe’s  earlier  pro- 

^ Sansone,  op.  cit.,  23,  58,  59. 

Ih.,  112-114,  306;  Pantaleone  e Lumia,  Memoire,  216-218. 


/ 

/ 

2 8 A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

posals,  but  stipulated  that  in  any  case  Sicily  should  remain 
under  the  crown  of  Naples,  and  accept  the  Spanish  Con- 
stitutiond 

Sicily  had  been  conquered,  but  a more'formidable  danger 
was  showing  on  the  horizon.  The  Revolution  had  broken 
like  a thunderclap  on  Metternich  s security ; it  had  been  his 
boast  that  he  had  built  a system  safe  from  revolutionary 
disturbance,  and  the  Neapolitan  rising  “ upset  all  his  calcula- 
tions.” Already  threats  were  heard  from  Vienna,  and  it 
became  more  than  probable  that  Austria  would  attempt  to 
strangle  the  new-born  constitution.  But  the  Neapolitans  were 
rejoicing  in  their  deliverance  too  much  to  think  of  danger. 
The  taxes  were  paid  before  they  fell  due,  and  the  better-to- 
do  enrolled  themselves  in  the  militia.  Parliament  met  on 
October  i , and  the  King  again  swore  to  protect  the  constitu- 
tion. There  had  been  pressure,  perhaps  intimidation,  at  the 
elections;  but  the  majority  of  the  deputies  were  moderate 
men,  taken  almost  exclusively  from  the  middling  proprietors 
and  professional  classes  ; well-meaning  amateurs,  their  heads 
full  of  schemes  of  reform,  but  inexperienced,  and  preferring 
rhetoric  to  legislation.  Despite  the  show  of  peace  and  har- 
mony, the  future  was  thick  with  difficulties.  Nothing  had 
been  done  to  prepare  the  country  for  invasion.  The  Car- 
bonari seemed  bent  on  cowing  or  superseding  parliament. 
The  reactionary  party  was  recovering  from  its  first  shock, 
and  a Bourbon  s word  could  never  be  relied  on.  There  was 
only  too  much  ground  to  suspect  that  treason  was  hatching 
in  the  palace,  and  that  the  feeble  ministers  were  making 
themselves  its  tools. 

Parliament  opened  with  a fatal  blunder.  Florestano 
Pepe’s  treaty  had  laid  the  foundations  of  peace  with  Sicily, 
and  the  islanders  had  offered  10,000  men  for  the  common 
defence.  Blinded  by  the  prejudice  against  the  Sicilians, 
the  Chamber  repudiated  the  treaty  (October  15),  and  the 
ministers  were  only  too  ready  to  escape  behind  it  from 
their  obligations.  It  was  as  dishonourable  as  it  was  fatuous, 
but  Pepe  protested  in  vain  against  the  unworthy  act. 
General  Colletta  was  sent  to  supersede  him,  and  the  new 

1 Famin,  op.  cit,  141-187 ; Colletta,  op.  cit.,  395,  396. 


THE  CARBONARI 


29 

governors  stern  rule  produced  a show  of  order.  But 
Sicilian  hate  only  smouldered  the  more.  Except  in  the 
eastern  provinces,  deputies  to  the  parliament  at  Naples 
were  elected  only  under  pressure  or  by  the  official  vote. 
The  Sicilian  Carbonari  were  preparing  a general  conspiracy 
through  the  winter,  and  the  Neapolitans  not  only  lost  the 
Sicilian  contingent,  but  had  to  keep  6000  of  their  best 
troops  to  overawe  the  island. 

Parliament  then  turned  to  attack  the  ministry.  The 
men  who  composed  it  had  neither  the  training  nor  the 
capacity  for  the  times.  They  were  afraid  of  popular  forces, 
they  felt  how  little  they  had  in  common  with  a democratic 
movement,  they  knew  the  strength  of  Austria;  and  their 
policy,  so  far  as  they  had  one,  was  to  temporize,  to  hamper 
the  revolution,  to  humour  the  King  and  Metternich ; and  so 
with  good  fortune  to  save  the  country  from  invasion.  But 
they  were  the  King’s  dupes.  Ferdinand  knew  that  Austria 
would  never  sanction  the  constitution,  and  when  the  allied 
sovereigns  invited  him  from  Troppau  to  meet  their  adjourned 
conference  at  Laybach,  he  asked  permission  of  parliament 
to  go  (December  6),  and  meant  to  dissolve  it  by  force,  if 
it  refused.!  There  were  two  feasible  policies  before  the 
deputies.  They  might  with  good  prospect  of  success  have 
bid  for  the  support  of  France,  and  appeased  the  Allies  by 
consenting  to  a house  ol  peers  and  a large  increase  in  the 
power  of  the  crown.^  Or,  deposing  Ferdinand  in  favour  of 
his  son,  and  throwing  down  the  gauntlet  to  Austria,  they 
might  have  roused  the  country  to  a brave  defence  and 
carried  the  revolution  across  the  Papal  border.  They  did 
neither.  Guglielmo  Pepe  alone  stood  for  the  bolder  alter- 
native. The  Carbonaro  doctrinaires  would  not  abate  an 
iota  of  the  constitution ; but  anxious  to  give  no  pretext  for 
invasion,  perhaps  trapped  by  the  prospect  of  getting  rid  of 
the  king,  they  resolved  that  he  should  go. 

The  King  wrote  amiably  from  Laybach  about  his 


^ La  Cecilia,  Memoir e,  26  ; Carrascosa,  Memoir es,  237. 

2 Palma,  Napoli,  237,  238;  Le  comte  D.,  Precis,  41  ; Carrascosa,  op.  ciL, 
230,  231;  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  II.  37;  Wellington,  Supp.  Despatches,  N.S., 
I.  401. 


30 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


greyhounds.  Then,  dropping  the  mask,  he  warned  his  j 
ministers  that  the  Allies  were  determined  to  put  down 
the  constitution,  and  with  feeble  apologies  announced  his 
concurrence  in  their  plans.  Despite  the  suspicions  of  the 
Powers,  Metternich  had  won  their  consent  to  send  an  ‘ 
Austrian  army  to  restore  him  to  absolute  power.^  Nothing 
was  left  now  but  to  make  a brave  defence.  There  was  still  j 
no  small  chance  of  success.  The  government  could  put  | 
40,000  regulars  and  at  least  as  many  militia  into  the  field.  | 
Even  if  the  army  were  driven  back  along  the  coast,  parlia-  j 
ment  could  retire  to  Calabria,  and  keep  up  a defence  in  the  | 
Apennines,  which  would  weary  out  the  invader.  Piedmont,  ; 
though  the  Neapolitans  did  not  know  it,  was  at  the  point 
of  rising ; revolution  was  fermenting  in  Romagna  and  the 
Marches,  and  a prolonged  resistance  might  have  stirred  a 
movement  there,  which  would  cut  the  Austrian  communi- 
cations. The  people  were  eager  for  war;^  all  that  was  I 
needed  was  a vigorous  lead.  But  of  this  there  was  none ; 
the  Regent  was  playing  a double  game ; the  incurable  { 
optimism  of  the  government  gave  the  reactionaries  free 
play ; parliament  buried  its  head  in  the  faith  that  because 
its  cause  was  “ innocent,”  nobody  would  attack  it.  The 
army  distrusted  its  officers ; there  was  no  matured  plan  of 
defence;  and  it  was  not  till  the  last  moment  that  the 
militia  was  called  out. 

The  Austrians  crossed  the  Po  late  in  January,  and 
advanced  slowly  southwards.  The  Neapolitans,  who  mus- 
tered between  40,000  and  50,000,  half  of  them  militia,  were 
divided  into  two  bodies ; the  first  corps,  under  Carrascosa,  | 
defending  the  line  of  the  Garigliano,  the  second,  under  Pepe, 
occupying  the  Abruzzi  passes.  It  would  probably  have  ' 
been  wise  strategy  to  remain  on  the  defensive.  But  Carras- 
oosa  and  Colletta,  who  was  now  minister  of  war,  were  dis-  j 
posed  to  treat  with  the  enemy  and  it  was  possibly  the  | 
knowledge  of  this  that  induced  Pepe,  who  had  the  whole  i 

^ Castlereagh,  op.  cit.,  IV.  3 12-3 17,  350,  372. 

^ Pepe,  Narrative,  31,  33,  38;  Id.  Memoirs,  III.  108,  128,  135;  Voce  del 
Popolo,  1 19;  Colletta,  op.  cit.,  II.  434. 

2 Carrascosa,  op.  cit.,  330-331  ; Colletta,  op.  cit.,  II.  435  ; Pepe,  Memoirs, 
III.  143-144- 


THE  CARBONARI 


31 

Austrian  army  in  front  of  him,  to  cross  the  frontier  and 
attack  them  at  Rieti  (March  7).  The  militia  fought  well 
for  the  raw  soldiers  that  they  were,  and  retreated  in  good 
order  after  seven  hours’  fighting.  But  defeat  destroyed 
their  confidence;  proclamations  from  the  King,  threatening 
death  and  confiscation  to  all  who  resisted,  scared  the  popu- 
lation, and  the  army  melted  away  among  the  mountains. 
At  Naples  the  guards  declared  for  the  King,  and  parliament, 
giving  up  the  game,  humbly  appealed  to  his  clemency.  The 
Austrians  entered  Naples  without  another  blow  (March  23). 

Three  days  after  Pepe’s  defeat  at  Rieti  the  Revolution 
broke  out  in  Piedmont.  The  whole  strength  of  Piedmontese 
conservatism  had  mustered  to  wreck  Prospero  Balbo’s  efforts 
for  reform,  and  the  discontent  became  the  more  acute  for 
the  hopes  that  he  had  raised.  Constitutionalism  became 
the  fashion  of  the  young  nobles,  and  the  army  was  led  by 
men  who  had  fought  at  Austerlitz,  to  whom  Austria  was 
always  the  enemy,  and  who  dared  to  think  that  Piedmont 
must  “ choose  between  vassalage  to  her  and  the  Italian 
crown.”  The  Carbonari  gathered  together  the  threads  of 
discontent.  But  whatever  it  was  elsewhere,  in  Piedmont 
Carbonarism  was  not  republican.  Victor  Emmanuel’s  ani- 
mosity to  the  “white  leeches”  of  Austria  was  still  smoul- 
dering, and  De  Maistre  was  intriguing  at  St.  Petersburg  for 
a North  Italian  kingdom  under  Russian  protection.^  The 
Carbonari  were  not  entirely  building  on  sand,  when  they 
looked  to  the  King  to  champion  them  and  draw  the 
nationalists  of  all  Italy  to  his  flag.^  But  before  the  war  of 
independence  came,  the  conspirators  wished  to  secure  reform 
at  home,  and  the  majority  determined  to  demand  the  Spanish 
Constitution.  Even  to  this  they  fondly  hoped  the  King 
would  accede,  and  to  assist  them  they  looked  for  the  con- 
nivance of  Charles  Albert,  the  young  Prince  of  Carignano, 
and  heir  presumptive  to  the  crown. 

He  came  of  a younger  branch  of  the  House  of  Savoy. 
His  father  had  copied  Philippe  £galite  in  miniature  at  the 

^ Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  I.  454. 

^ Id.  Santa  Rosa,  no;  Santa  Rosa,  Memorie,  31. 


32  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

time  of  the  revolutionary  wars ; himself  had  been  brought 
up  at  Paris  as  a French  citizen,  had  held  rank  in  Napoleon  s 
army,  and  been  a Count  of  the  Empire.  He  was  now 
twenty-two  years  old,  tall,  manly,  devoted  to  arms ; brave 
and  proud,  but  without  strong  affection,  and  with  a youth’s 
morbid  sensitiveness  for  his  own  freedom.  The  Liberals 
had  long  looked  to  him  as  the  one  prince  from  whom  they 
might  find  real  sympathy.  Monti  had  sung  his  praises,  and 
the  prince  had  not  concealed  his  hopes  of  reform  and 
independence.  Though  it  might  suit  him  at  court  to  parade 
an  orthodox  horror  of  modern  thought,  he  openly  encour- 
aged the  Liberals,  and  had  relations  with  the  Carbonari, 
though  probably  he  was  never  initiated  into  the  society. 
The  Neapolitan  revolution  fired  him  with  ambition  to  lead  n 
the  nationalists,  to  drive  the  Austrians  from  Italy,  and 
extend  the  bounds  of  Piedmont.  ^ I 

The  plan  of  the  conspirators  was  to  extort  the  Spanish 
Constitution,  then  move  the  army  rapidly  across  the  Ticino^ 
join  their  forces  with  the  conspirators,  whom  Confalonieri 
was  preparing  for  revolt  at  Milan  and  Brescia,  overpower 
the  denuded  garrisons,^  and  cut  off  the  Austrian  retreat  from 
Naples.  They  took  for  granted  that  the  Piedmontese  troops 
would  win  an  easy  victory,  and  the  Lombards  promised  to 
summon  a representative  assembly  to  vote  on  the  question 
of  fusion  with  Piedmont.  An  accidental  affray  at  Turin 
between  the  university  students  and  the  military  (January 
1821)  brought  the  exasperation  against  the  government 
to  a point,  and  for  two  months  the  court  and  the  people 
faced  each  other.  Early  in  March  the  real  or  supposed 
discovery  of  the  plot  decided  the  Liberals  to  rise  at  once. 
They  only  waited  to  pledge  Charles  Albert  to  the  revolution, 
and  an  interview  took  place  between  the  prince  and  some  of 
the  leading  conspirators.  Of  what  passed  there,  we  have 
directly  conflicting  statements  ; but  the  probability  is  that  the 
prince  promised  his  ad^  when  satisfied  that  no  hostility 

was  intended  against  morrow, 

1 Cantu,  Conciliator e,  164 

2 There  were  13,000  Aust,  ops  left  in  the  North : Castlereagh,  op. 

cit.,  IV.  375,  378  ; Casati,  cL  ■ 1 18  ; Carte  segrete,  II.  195- 

3 Vol.  II.,  Appendix  A 


THE  CARBONARI  33 

1 frightened  and  penitent,  above  all,  anxious  to  have  no  share 
I in  suborning  the  army,  he  betrayed  the  secret  to  the  govern- 
jment.  Discovering  his  defection,  the  Turin  conspirators 
I tried  to  defer  the  rising ; but  their  accomplices  in  the  garri- 
j son  at  Alessandria,  whether  ignorant  of  the  prince’s  treachery 
jor  impatient  of  waiting,  proclaimed  the  revolution  and 
(the  Spanish  Constitution,  and  saluted  Victor  Emmanuel 
las  King  of  Italy  (March  10).  In  the  capital  itself  the 
students  clamoured  for  the  constitution,  and  the  garrison 
began  to  waver  (March  1 2).  The  officers  refused  to  march 
against  the  rebel  city,  and  the  movement  seemed  to  have 
friends  in  the  government  itself.  In  the  Council  the  Queen 
was  alone  in  opposing  concession.  The  King,  perhaps,  had 
pledged  himself  to  the  Powers  at  Laybach  to  part  with  none 
of  his  absolute  authority ; but  he  shrank  from  a resistance 
that  meant  civil  war,  and  when  the  garrison  threatened  to 
bombard  the  city,  unless  the  constitution  were  granted,  he 
, solved  the  dilemma  by  abdication.  It  was  a heavy  blow 
to  the  conspirators,  who  had  been  careful  to  proclaim  their 
(loyalty,  and  boasted  that  they  were  setting  the  King  free 
to  follow  the  promptings  of  his  Italian  heart.”  Before  his 
abdication  he  had  appointed  Charles  Albert  regent,  pending 
the  arrival  of  the  new  king,  his  brother  Charles  Felix.  The 
young  prince,  left  alone  and  uncounselled  (for  the  ministers 
had  resigned),  had  a task  beyond  his  years.  He  was  loyal 
to  the  royal  family,  but  tied  by  his  relations  with  the  in- 
surgents ; he  had  to  save  the  capital  from  anarchy,  the 
country  from  foreign  occupation.  He  probably  knew  how 
unready  the  army  was  to  fight  the  Austrians.  To  a deputa- 
tion that  urged  the  immediate  adoption  of  the  constitution, 
he  replied  that  he  was  ready  to  die  for  the  royal  cause, 
isvhich  he  represented ; but  a day  later,  as  the  garrison  grew 
QQore  threatening,  and  the  Notables,  whom  he  consulted, 
idvised  surrender,  he  granted  the  Spanish  Constitution 
r under  the  stress  of  circumstances  and  to  preserve  the  state 
:)0  the  new  King.”  For  the  moment  he  seemed  to  revert  to 
Ms  earlier  enthusiasms ; he  spoke  of  union  with  Naples 
lind  national  glory,  and  made  no  secret  of  his  nationalist 
sympathies  to  the  Lombard  messengers,  who  came  from 

VOL.  I.  c 


34  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Confalonieri  to  urge  him  to  march  to  Milan.^  But  he  was 
frightened  back  by  an  uncompromizing  manifesto,  in  which 
Charles  Felix  refused  to  recognize  any  concessions ; and 
when  he  received  from  the  new  King  a peremptory  order 
to  go  to  Novara,  he  secretly  fled  with  a portion  of  the 
garrison. 

After  this  there  was  little  hope  for  the  Revolution. 
Confalonieri  played  an  ambiguous  and  irresolute  part,  and 
the  Lombards  would  take  no  action  till  the  Piedmontese  had 
crossed  the  frontier.  The  Genoese  indeed  rose  angrily  on 
receiving  Charles  Felix’s  manifesto,  the  reserves  came  up 
well  to  join  their  colours,  and  the  Revolution  was  willingly 
accepted  in  many  of  the  cities.  But  the  capital  was  cold ; 
the  nobles  disliked  the  Spanish  Constitution,  and  after  | 
Charles  Albert’s  desertion  the  moderate  men  lost  hope  and  ■ 
drifted  away.  The  new  ministers  might  have  done  some- 
thing to  rouse  the  country,  but  they  had  no  stuff  for  vigorous 
action.  Santa  Rosa,  perhaps  the  only  earnest  man  among 
them,  tried,  when  it  was  too  late,  to  give  life  to  the  Revolu- 
tion by  a rush  on  Lombardy.  “ Sink  domestic  differences 
and  hasten  to  the  Ticino;  Lombardy  waits  for  you,  and 
France  is  stirring.”  It  was  the  one  hope  of  success.  But 
the  soldiers  had  lost  their  enthusiasm,  and  more  and  more 
troops  went  over  to  the  loyalist  camp  at  Novara.  The 
tidings  of  Rieti  deepened  the  gloom,  and  the  Turin  ministers  | 
in  despair,  Santa  Rosa  dissenting,  accepted  Russian  media- 
tion in  the  hopes  of  staving  off  an  Austrian  invasion.  But 
Charles  Felix  on  the  one  side  and  the  Alessandrian  Junta 
on  the  other  would  have  no  compromise.  The  Austrians 
crossed  the  Ticino,  and  the  constitutional  troops  advanced 
on  Novara.  To  the  last  they  refused  to  believe  that  the 
loyalist  regiments  would  fight  on  the  Austrian  side.  But 
the  patriotism  of  the  army  had  little  root,  and  the  9000 
constitutionalists  found  themselves  confronted  by  an  almost 
equal  force  of  Piedmontese  and  a large  Austrian  contingent. 

1 Leopardi,  op.  cit,  253;  Poggi,  Storia,  I.  346;  Bollati,  Fasti,  1.  13; 
Pallavicino,  Memorie,  I.  22-23  ; Arrivabene,  Intorno,  118  ; Mario,  Mazzini,  32  ; 
contra  Martini,  Storia,  IV.  210  n.  ; Brofferio,  Miei  Tempi,  XII.  20.  In  view  of 
the  passages  in  Pallavicino  and  Arrivabene,  it  is  impossible  to  believe  Confa- 
lonieri’s  denials  in  Casati,  op.  cit.,  I.  30,  45,  108-112. 


THE  CARBONARI 


35 

A battle  outside  Novara  (April  8)  ended  in  their  easy  rout. 
The  Austrians  occupied  Alessandria,  and  Genoa  after  securing 
the  escape  of  the  fugitives  made  a tame  surrender. 

The  Revolution  had  ended  in  complete  discomfiture.  It 
. never  had  the  stuff  of  success  in  it.  Its  sudden  collapse  in 
the  south  pointed  to  some  deep-seated  weakness,  for  Neapo- 
litan soldiers  had  proved  their  worth  against  Massena  and 
in  Napoleons  campaigns.  It  had,  indeed,  great  difficulties 
• to  face  ; the  hideous  blunder  in  Sicily,  the  treachery  of 
; King  and  Regent,  the  European  coalition  made  success  not 
I easy  in  any  event ; but  the  Austrian  forces  were  not  over- 
whelming, and  the  Revolution  might  have  triumphed  but 
for  its  own  mistakes.  It  fell  into  the  hands  of  men  who 
had  little  sympathy  for  it ; and  if  it  proved  the  abnegation 
of  the  Carbonari,  it  proved  their  great  unwisdom  that  they 
handed  the  government  to  men,  whose  whole  training  taught 
them  suspicion  of  the  Liberal  movement,  made  them  tem- 
porize and  compromize,  and  wait  on  events.  There  could  be 
no  harmony  under  such  conditions,  and  the  rivalry  of  Pepe 
and  Carrascosa  was  typical  of  the  suspicions  that  divided 
Carbonari  . and  Murattists  all  through.  Ostensibly  they 
worked  together,  but  the  want  of  trust  on  either  side  drove 
the  Carbonari  to  organize  an  extra-legal  power  which  para- 
lyzed the  executive.  But  a deeper-seated  weakness  than 
Murattist  lukewarmness  or  Carbonaro  suspicion  was  the  want 
of  stability  in  the  people.  The  Neapolitans,  now  as  always, 
rushed  into  the  Revolution,  and  rushed  out  of  it  again. 
They  welcomed  it,  they  cheered  for  it,  they  were  willing 
[even  to  march  to  Avar,  but  the  first  defeat  discouraged  them, 
.and  they  had  no  fibre  in  them  for  a long  and  desperate 
defence.  Had  they  had  something  of  the  reckless  bravery 
lof  the  Palermo  mob,  they  might  have  triumphed ; but 
Neapolitan  nervelessness  stood  in  sharp  contrast  to  Sicilian 
[virility,  and  Naples  lost  her  chance  of  the  hegemony  of  Italy. 
In  those  days,  Avith  the  memory  of  Murat  behind  her,  Avhen 
|the  House  of  Savoy  had  yet  won  little  place  in  Italian 
■imagination,  Naples,  mistress  of  one-third  of  the  peninsula, 
might  have  taken  the  lead  of  Italian  destinies,  and  changed 
the  course  of  Italian  history.  It  was  a lucky  day  for  Italy, 


36  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

when  the  Bourbons  and  their  unstable  subjects  missed  this, 
but  not  the  last,  opportunity. 

In  the  north  there  was  even  less  chance  of  success.  In 
Naples,  at  all  events,  the  Revolution  had  been  democratic ; 
here  it  failed  even  to  interest  the  masses.  The  anglo- 
maniac  young  nobles  wanted  a House  of  Peeis,  and  the 
Lombard  grandees  looked  to  the  Piedmontese  to  restore 
the  lost  privileges,  which  Austria  refused  to  give  them 
back.  The  army  had  learnt  in  the  French  wars  to  regard 
itself  as  arbiter  of  the  nation’s  politics,  and  cared  little  to 
consult  the  people  for  Avhom  it  professed  to  act.  Had 
the  Revolution  triumphed,  it  Avould  have  left  the  country 
under  a parliamentary  aristocracy  as  exclusive  as  English 
Whigs.  But  though  less  popular,  the  Piedmontese  Revolu-j 
tion  had  a higher  note  than  at  Naples.  It  was  not  simply] 
the  revolt  of  discontent,  the  protest  of  individual  rights' 
and  ambitions  debarred  of  outlet ; there  was  the  rebellion 
of  sentiment,  which  Alfieri  and  Foscolo  had  inspired, 
and  which  looked  vaguely  forAvard  to  the  golden  future 
of  a great  free  Italy.  But  the  honest  and  well-meaning^ 
men  Avho  led  it  Avere  sentimentalists,  Avho  mistook  words; 
for  facts,  enthusiasts  for  liberty  and  independence,  but  avRIi 
little  comprehension  of  their  meaning.  With  great  capacity  I 
for  self-illusion,  great  ignorance  of  the  feeling  of  the  country,; 
they  neglected  the  detailed  preparation  which  earns  success,: 
and  were  easily  discouraged  when  the  dramatic  and  sensa- 
tional changed  to  need  for  patient  endeavour.  They  made 
no  attempt  to  summon  parliament ; the  Alessandrian  leaders 
styled  themselves  the  J unta  of  the  Italian  Federation,  but 
their  political  vicAvs  stopped  short  at  a North  Italian  King- 
dom. They  were  full  of  the  one-man  idea,  Avhich  had  sur- 
vived from  the  Napoleonic  rule,  and  thought  success  assured, 
if  they  had  a prince’s  patronage.  In  the  educational  or 
social  uplifting  of  the  masses  they  had  little  interest.  Ex- 
cept to  reduce  the  price  of  salt,  no  social  legislation  marked 
the  rule  of  the  provisional  government.  Theh  politics  Avere 
of  the  barracks  and  draAving-room,  not  of  the  market-place. 
Santa  Rosa  stands  preeminent  among  them,^  but  even  he, 
pure  and  disinterested  as  he  Avas,  had  no  masculine  democratic 


THE  CARBONARI 


37 

fibre.  Nurtured  on  Rousseau  and  Foscolo,  he  had  all  the 
passive  virtues ; but  his  unpractical,  dreamy  nature  was 
helpless  in  the  face  of  popular  apathy  and  Austrian  steel. 

Both  Revolutions  were  alike  in  proving  how  weak  was 
the  sentiment  of  Unity.  A few  like  Santa  Rosa  hoped  to 
combine  the  national  forces  of  north  and  south ; Man- 
zoni  had  an  ode  ready  on  Italy,  “ one  in  arms,  in  speech,  in 
laws,  in  heart.”  But  the  Piedmontese  conspirators  left  the 
Neapolitans  in  ignorance  of  their  plans,  and  delayed  their 
rising  till  the  Neapolitan  movement  was  nearly  doomed. 
Piedmont,  Lombardy,  Romagna,  Naples,  Sicily,  each  had  its 
unconnected  policy,  sometimes  with  divergent  or  hostile 
aims.  The  Piedmontese  and  Lombards  were  already  dis- 
puting whether  Turin  or  Milan  should  be  the  future  capital.^ 
The  Sicilians  were  so  dominated  by  hatred  of  Naples,  that 
after  the  repudiation  of  Florestano  Pope’s  treaty  many  of 
them  welcomed  the  Austrians  and  rejoiced  in  their  success. 
The  Neapolitans  preferred  to  sacrifice  the  national  cause 
rather  than  give  Sicily  home  rule,  and  rejected  the  appeal 
from  the  nationalists  of  the  Marches  to  carry  the  Revolution 
into  Papal  territory.^  It  was  clear  that  the  work  of  the 
Carbonari  was  on  wrong  lines  or  incomplete.  The  Liberal 
movement  had  yet  to  become  popular  and  national. 

The  Revolution  had  its  feeble  echoes  through  the  Po 
valley.  At  Modena  Francis  had  been  frightened  from  his 
plottings  with  the  Pope  against  Austria,  to  crush  an 
incipient  revolt.  Conspiracy  was  busy  in  Romagna,  where 
the  “American  Hunters”  drilled  in  the  forest  of  Ravenna, 
md  Byron  stored  his  house  with  arms  for  a rising  that 
failed  to  come  off.^  Now  the  whole  country  lay  crushed, 
md  at  the  mercy  of  the  victors.  The  statesmen  at  Lay- 
bach  had  been  prompt  to  stamp  out  the  Revolution,  but  they 
vere  anxious  not  to  exasperate  the  country  by  an  excessive 
severity.  Austria,  indeed,  permitted  herself  the  luxury  of 

^ Archivio  Triennale,  I.  72,  73. 

2 Martini,  op.  cit.,  HI.  255. 

^ Moore,  Byron,  441,  468;  Carte  segrete,  1.  205,  208,  303,  407;  Del  Cerro, 
Polizi.a,  134-140.  He  thought  the  conspirators  “wanting  in  principle.” 


38  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

a persecution,  infamous  even  among  her  own  state-trials, 
and  sent  Confalonieri  (his  life  saved  by  his  wifes  heroic 
importunacy),^  and  many  another  of  his  comrades  to  the 
Moravian  fortress-prison  of  the  Spielberg,  where  the  Emperor 
Francis  played  with  his  victims  like  a cat  with  maimed 
birds,  and  whose  horrors  Pellico’s  pen  has  made  the  symbol 
of  Austrian  cruelty.  Metternich  allowed  Francis  of  Modena 
to  wreck  a revenge  as  savage.^  But  elsewhere  he  thought 
it  prudent  that  a veil  should  be  drawn  over  the  past.  He 
insisted  that  Ferdinand  should  make  a small  concession 
to  Liberalism  by  increasing  the  power  of  the  Provincial 
Councils,  and  giving  Sicily  an  independent  civil  service,  II 
with  a separate  though  subordinate  Council  under  the) 
Viceroy.  But  the  Bourbon  was  thirsting  for  revenge, 
and  no  counsels  of  expediency  were  likely  to  deter  him.  \ 
Massacre,  indeed,  was  now  more  than  the  times  'would  .l 
swallow ; but  he  was  successful  in  removing  the  veto  ■: 
that  the  Allies  had  put  on  persecution.  The  civil  service, 
the  army,  the  beneliced  clergy  were  purged  of  all  who  had 
Liberal  sympathies.  Men  were  arrested  quicker  than  the-, 
courts  could  try  them;  public  whippings  made  Naples 
aghast ; and  though  the  Austrians  interfered  to  save  the  i 
revolutionary  officers  (except  Salvati  and  Morelli)  from 
death,  thirty  were  sent  to  an  island  penal  settlement  to  ^ 
sleep  on  the  bare  ground  and  starve.^  Ferdinand  recalled 
Canosa  and  the  Jesuits  to  complete  the  work.^  Holocausts 
were  made  of  suspected  books,  and  a catechism,  founded 


1 For  Teresa  Confalonieri,  see  Mrs.  Browning’s  lines 


“ Spielberg’s  grate, 

At  which  the  Lombard  woman  hung  the  rose 
Of  her  sweet  soul  by  its  own  dewy  wmight, 

To  feel  the  dungeon  round  her  sunshine  close, 

And  pining  so,  died  early,  yet  too  late 
For  what  she  suffered.” 

For  Metternich’s  attempt  to  induce  Confalonieri  to  inculpate  Charles  Albert 
(which  I see  no  reason  to  doubt),  see  Gualterio,  Rivolgamenti,  I.  63,  66, 
67;  Tabbarrini,  Capponi,  168;  Andryane,  Memoires,  11.  59,  62;  Cantu,  Con- 

cUiatore,  152,  192.  _ o -r,  i.  ht 

2 Among  those  who  escaped  was  Antonio  Panizzi,  of  British  Museum 


fame. 

3 Gabriel  Eossetti  was  among  those  who  escaped, 
the  re  fellon  in  Cantu,  Cronistoria,  II.  234,  256. 


See  his  song  against 


THE  CARBONARI 


39 


on  Bossuet,  was  burnt  because  it  contained  a reference 
to  love  of  country.  Heavy  import-duties  stopped  the  intro- 
duction of  foreign  or  Italian  literature,  the  minister  Medici 
confessing  that  his  object  was  to  keep  the  people  ignorant. 
Again  and  again  the  government  struck  savagely  at  the 
Carbonari.  No  Liberal  was  safe,  and  fearful  of  proscription 
many  hed  to  the  mountains,  or  roamed  the  country  in 
armed  bands.  Assassination  on  both  sides  marked  the 
violence  of  political  feeling ; and  when  Vesuvius  broke  out 
in  eruption,  and  inhospitable  Rizzo  ^ was  submerged  by  a 
tidal  wave,  the  superstitious  populace  remembered  Murat’s 
death,  and  marked  it  as  an  omen  for  the  Bourbons. 

And  even  when  Ferdinand’s  revenge  was  sated,  the 
sordid  chronic  oppression,  the  measureless  corruption,  the 
burdens  of  the  Austrian  occupation,  which,  before  they  left 
in  1827,  cost  the  country  three  years’  revenue,  stereotyped 
the  misery  of  the  land.  And  though,  after  a financial  crisis 
in  1824,  the  government  made  some  fiscal  reforms,  its 
meddlesome  fears  still  hampered  trade.  Medici  refused  to 
sanction  societies  for  improving  the  mulberry  or  lighting 
toAvns  with  gas ; “ associations,”  he  said,  “ are  hurtful  to  the 
state,  for  they  enlighten  the  people,  and  spread  Liberal 
ideas.”  In  the  midst  of  the  discontent  and  misgovernment, 
Ferdinand’s  death  brought  his  long  reign  of  sixty-five  years 
to  a dishonoured  close  (January  4,  1825).  The  rule,  which 
had  begun  with  Tannucci’s  reforms,  had  changed  at  the 
French  Revolution  to  the  savagest,  wickedest  tyranny ; had 
encouraged  Fra  Diavolo  and  his  bands  to  make  the  streets 
of  Naples  run  with  blood;  had  woven  its  long  shameless 
tissue  of  broken  pledges  and  fierce  revenge  and  unspeak- 
able corruption.  A brutish,  illiterate,  superstitious  tyrant, 
Ferdinand  had  made  the  name  of  Bourbon  for  ever  execrated 
in  the  land. 

In  Piedmont  Charles  Felix  emulated  his  royal  relative 
in  the  severity  of  the  reaction ; but  Piedmontese  traditions 
saved  it  from  the  wantonness  and  indecency  of  Ferdinand’s 
misrule.  Charles  Felix  was  not  cruel  by  nature ; but  he 
looked  on  the  Revolution  as  the  accursed  thing,  and  meant 

1 See  above,  p.  8. 


40  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

to  stamp  it  out.  The  son  of  an  Infanta,  the  son-in-law  of 
Ferdinand  of  Naples,  Charles  Felix  was  an  absolutist  of  the 
straitest  sect.  Even  his  own  ministers  savoured  to  him  of 
revolution,  and  he  assumed  a lofty  scorn  for  an  innovating 
generation.  ‘‘  The  King,”  so  he  laid  down,  “ is  the  only 
person  empowered  by  God  to  judge  of  the  fittest  means  to 
compass  the  welfare  of  his  subjects,  and  it  is  the  first  duty  of 
a loyal  subject  not  to  complain.”  But  he  had  no  qualifica- 
tions for  playing  the  grand  monarch.  Alone  among  the 
princes  of  Savoy,  he  was  no  soldier.  He  “ was  no  King  to 
be  bored,”  and  he  hated  alike  state  business  and  court 
ceremonial.  Of  poor  presence,  superstitious,  irritable,  he 
had  few  friends,  and  his  chroniclers  have  dealt  hardly  with 
him.  : 

Meanwhile,  Liberal  Piedmont  lay  stunned.  Twelve  i 
thousand  Austrians  remained  to  cow  the  country.  The  i 
exiles  scattered  to  Spain  and  ‘^Vance  and  England,^  to 
Egypt  and  South  America;  Santa  Rosa  taught  languages  i 
at  Nottingham,  till  he  went  to  meet  a hero’s  death  at  s 
Sphacteria.  Still  there  was  progress;  some  of  Balbo’s  j 
projects  of  judicial  reform  were  carried  through ; agricul- 
tural science  was  taught,  the  drama  encouraged,  literature 
protected  and  stifled.  And  slowly  Charles  Felix  broke  to  a 
certain  extent  from  his  Austrian  and  Roman  friends.  He 
had  his  quarrels  with  the  Pope  on  ecclesiastical  taxation. 
After  the  first  fit  of  gratitude  to  Austria,  he  remembered  i 
her  earlier  unfriendliness.  He  grumbled  at  Metternichs  j 
insolence,  and  the  protracted  occupation  of  Alessandria ; i 
and  though  he  encouraged  Austria  to  stay  at  Naples,  he  j 
rejected  her  proposals  for  common  action  against  the  Liberals, 
and  lost  no  opportunity  to  parade  his  sovereign  independence. 

^ A Committee,  on  which  Hume  and  Whitbread  sat,  was  formed  to 
relieve  the  refugees. 


CHAPTER  III 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITAL  Y 

Piedmont  : its  growth,  and  character  ; the  House  of  Savoy  ; government  ; 
nobles  ; clergy  ; army  ; the  class  system  ; justice  ; education  ; trade  ; 
Genoa  ; peasants  ; Piedmontese  hegemony. 

Lombardy-Vbnetia  : the  Austrian  rule  ; Milan  under  the  Kingdom  of 
Italy  ; the  bureaucracy  ; taxation  ; justice  ; clergy  ; education  ; 
censorship ; local  government ; the  Congregations  ; state-trials  ; 
police  ; Lombard  character  ; nobles  ; middle  classes  ; peasants  ; 
nationalist  sentiment. 


Piedmont 

The  Kingdom  of  Piedmont  was  the  creation  of  centuries  of 
patient  statecraft.  From  lords  of  a few  Burgundian  fiefs, 
the  Counts  of  Savoy  had  come  to  possess  the  second  greatest 
state  of  Italy,  and  hold  high  rank  among  the  secondary 
powers  of  Europe.  It  had  not  been  an  easy  work.  Mid- 
way between  the  French  and  Austrian  powers,  a battle- 
ground in  every  war  between  the  great  hereditary  enemies, 
the  little  state  again  and  again  ran  the  danger  of  extinction. 
But  the  House  of  Savoy  sold  its  help  to  the  highest  bidder, 
and  generally  found  itself  on  the  winning  side.  In  the 
seventeenth  century  it  was  the  only  power  in  Italy  that 
held  its  own  against  the  Spanish  domination.  Early  in  the 
following  century  it  won  Alessandria  and  the  Lomellina  as 
the  price  of  its  help  to  Austria  and  England.  Twenty-five 
years  later  a French  alliance  secured  for  it  Novara.  In  the 
war  of  the  Austrian  Succession  it  returned  to  the  alliance 
with  Vienna,  and  gained  the  country  up  to  the  Ticino. 
There  was  hardly  a treaty  but  it  crept  on  to  some  new 
fragment  of  territory,  and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  French 
Revolution  the  Kingdom  of  Sardinia,  as  diplomatists  called  it, 
comprised  the  north-western  Italian  plain  to  the  Apennines, 

Sardinia,  Nice,  and  Savoy.  It  was  not  a very  noble  policy ; 

41 


42 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


as  a Belgian  diplomatist  observed,  geography  hardly  allowed 
the  Kings  of  Piedmont  to  be  honest.  But  it  was  the  only 
alternative  to  extinction,  and  begging  the  morality  of  it,  the 
Savoy  princes  and  their  statesmen  showed  a masterly  skill 
and  perseverance.  “ The  policy  of  the  Court  of  Turin,” 
wrote  Horace  Walpole,  ‘‘has  the  subtlety  of  the  air  it 
breathes  ” ; and  Chesterfield  extolled  its  diplomatists  as  the 
model  for  his  generation. 

The  history  of  the  little  state  moulded  its  temper.  The 
people  of  the  “ Subalpine  ” Kingdom,  like  its  princes,  were 
stubborn,  wary,  serious,  with  a military  pride  and  concentra- 
tion of  purpose  rare  in  Italy.  Hardly  Italians,  speaking 
French  or  their  own  half-Proveneal  dialect,^  with  little 
sense  of  heritage  in  the  past  of  Italy,  they  despised  litera- 
ture and  art,  and  were  happy  in  the  mephitic  dulness  that 
stifled  strangers  in  Turin.  More  shrewd  than  inventive, 
their  agriculture  was  backward,  their  industries  hardly 
existent.  For  political  or  religious  liberties  the  mass  of  the 
people  cared  nothing. 

Hence  they  accepted  with  undemonstrative  loyalty  the 
paternal  military  absolutism  of  the  House  of  Savoy.  Its 
princes  were  men  of  high  ability  and  sense  of  duty.  Brought 
face  to  face  with  their  subjects  in  the  long  struggle  for 
existence,  they  had  identified  themselves  with  the  nation. 
The  court  was  stern,  hardworking,  simple;  the  govern- 
ment an  honest,  unprogressive,  punctilious  bureaucracy ; its 
exchequer  one  of  the  best  regulated  in  Europe.  It  had  its 
analogies  with  Prussia,  and  much  of  its  system  was  con- 
sciously modelled  on  hers.  It  fostered  commerce,  en- 
couraged nascent  industries  by  royal  patronage  and  a strict 
protective  system.  It  guarded  the  masses  from  pressing 
grievances,  made  humane  laws  for  the  relief  of  the  poor, 
protected  farmers  from  unfair  rents,  legislated  to  safeguard 
leaseholders,  levied  forced  loans  on  the  rich  to  procure  corn 
in  time  of  famine;^  till  the  French  rule  popularized  the 

^ A1  fieri : “Italian  speech  is  contraband  at  Turin.”  Even  at  a much 
later  date,  when  the  Piedmontese  had  learnt  to  write  Italian,  they  were 
lavish  of  French  idioms. 

2 Bianchi,  Monarchia,  I.  192-196,  211-213;  Avvocato  milanese,  Opuscoli, 
I.  1 29-147  ; Sclopis,  Legislazione  italiana,  III.  222.  By  a law  of  1762,  repealed ^ 


PIEDMONT 


43 


new  laissez-faire  economy,  and  made  all  efforts  vain  to  return 
again  to  the  traditions  of  a restrictive  paternal  rule.  But 
of  political  rights  or  social  progress  neither  prince  nor  people 
recked.  As  elsewhere  in  Italy,  person  and  property  and 
honour  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  police,  though  in  quiet 
times  their  powers  lay  dormant,  and,  except  when  it  was 
frightened,  the  government  was  too  much  bound  by  pre- 
cedent to  be  capriciously  tyrannical.  The  right  of  register- 
ing laws,  which  attached  to  the  Senate  or  Supreme  Court, 
as  to  the  French  parlements,  was  of  small  real  value,  for  its 
members  were  nominees  of  the  crown,  and  not  as  in  France 
hereditary  holders  of  office.  The  magistrates,  the  one 
genuine  element  of  opposition,  were  gradually  degraded. 
The  communes  had  their  Councils  with  considerable 
liberties,  and  Turin  and  Genoa  had  their  municipalities ; 
but  though  there  was  a skeleton  of  provincial  local  govern- 
ment, the  provinces  were  ruled  by  military  governors,  the 
cities  by  the  commandants  of  the  garrisons.  In  the  words 
of  a Piedmontese  noble  there  was  only  a king  who  com- 
mands, a nobility  which  supports  him,  and  a people  which 
obeys.” 

The  nobles,  like  their  king,  strict,  economical,  proud, 
were  a military  caste.  New  creations  brought  in  a certain 
element  of  Liberalism,  but  the  older  peers,  tenacious  of  their 
feudal  rights,  lived  a life  of  patriarchal  simplicity,  and 
though  often  kind  and  generous  to  their  vassals,  ruled  them 
with  a heavy  hand.  The  younger  sons,  left  portionless  by 
the  strict  laws  of  entail,  monopolized  the  higher  posts  in 
the  army  and  civil  service ; but  they  worked  hard  and 
strove  to  live  worthily  of  their  families  and  nation.  The 
clergy  were  kept  in  comparative  subservience  to  the  state. 
Ecclesiastical  property  paid  its  share  to  the  revenue,  and  it 
was  the  traditional  policy  of  the  law  courts  to  restrict 
clerical  jurisdiction.  The  traditions  of  the  Piedmontese 

by  the  French,  but  apparently  re-enacted  in  1814,  any  person  renting  a 
house  in  Turin  under  a written  agreement  might,  on  the  determination  of 
his  tenancy,  prolong  his  lease.  The  rent  might  be  raised,  but  not  unreason- 
ably, and  there  was  reference  to  an  arbitrator  with  plenary  powers.  The 
Senate  of  Turin  tried  to  minimise  the  operation  of  the  law  as  being 
“ against  the  tenor  of  liberty.” 


44  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  ' 

Church  were  Gallican,  though  the  Restoration  saw  their 
gradual  decay.  The  bishops  were  nominated  by  the  crown, 
and  in  Savoy  the  decrees  of  Trent  had  never  been  recog- 
nized. Even  Charles  Felix  and  Charles  Albert,  devoted  as 
they  were  to  the  Papacy,  suffered  no  infringement  of  their 
prerogative.  But  the  clerical  yoke  weighed  heavy  on  the  i) 
people.  The  Jesuits  returned  in  i8i8;  Charles  Felix  dis- 
liked them,  Charles  Albert  protected  them,  but  under  both 
reigns  alike  they  slid  into  greater  power,  winning  a mighty 
influence  through  their  schools,  which  educated  a large 
proportion  of  the  boys  of  the  richer  classes.  The  “ Society 
of  Catholic  Friendship,”  whose  object  seems  to  have  been 
to  defend  the  Church  alike  from  Liberals  and  government, 
was  powerful  in  the  aristocracy,  and  by  its  proselytism  and 
doles  won  many  of  the  army  and  the  poor.  Religions,  other 
than  the  Roman  Catholic,  were  only  tolerated ; even  in 
1845  no  Protestant  chapel  was  allowed  in  Turin  outside  I 
the  walls  of  the  embassies.  The  Protestant  Waldenses, 
despite  the  ancient  protection  of  England,  might  not  hold 
office,  or  send  their  children  to  school  outside  their  ovm 
valleys.  Mixed  marriages  were  unrecognized  by  the  state, 
and  as  late  as  1838  their  issue,  illegitimate  in  the  eyes  of 
the  law,  were  liable  to  be  taken  from  their  mothers  and 
baptized  in  the  Catholic  faith.^  The  Jews  were  excluded 
from  public  office  and  the  universities.  And  the  Church 
bound  a grievous  burden  on  the  whole  national  life.  Every 
Piedmontese  was  driven  to  communicate  at  Easter ; shops 
were  compulsorily  closed  on  religious  festivals ; cabinet 
ministers  observed  fast-days  on  pain  of  losing  office ; twice 
a year  classes  were  suspended  at  the  universities  for  a week 
of  religious  observance.  There  were  over  300  monasteries 
and  convents  on  the  mainland  and  100  in  Sardinia,^  some 
of  scandalous  repute.  The  ecclesiastical  courts,  despite  the 
opposition  of  the  judges,  reserved  all  cases  to  which  a cleric 
was  a party,  all  matters  of  conjugal  rights,  of  tithes,  of 
blasphemy,  and  heresy.  But  the  Church  was  content  with 

1 Boggio,  Chiesa  e Stato,  153-155  ; Bert,  Valdesi,  278,  284-285  ; v.  Kaumer, 
Italy,  I.  247-248. 

- Serristori,  Statistica,  4-5  ; this  is  probably  an  under-estimate,  in  1854 
there  were  604  in  all. 


PIEDMONT 


45 

outward  conformity.  The  clergy  themselves  often  bore  an 
indifferent  name.  Among  the  richer  classes  religion  was 
the  handmaid  of  fashion,  and  though  there  was  no  overt 
scepticism,  there  was  little  fervour  and  abundant  hypocrisy. 
Despite  th^  frequent  and  splendid  ceremonies  of  its  churches, 
Turin  was  perhaps  the  most  immoral  city  in  North  Italy. 

Even  more  than  clergy  and  nobles,  the  pivot  of  the 
Piedmontese  system  was  the  army.  Hereditary  traditions, 
the  necessities  of  their  position,  ambitions,  more  or  less 
defined,  of  expansion  in  Italy,  made  the  kings  of  Piedmont 
maintain  a force  disproportionate  to  the  size  of  the  state. 
Three-quarters  of  the  revenue  went  to  support  the  army 
and  navy,  and  the  little  country  could  put  70,000  men  into 
the  field.  The  generals,  indeed,  had  seldom  any  qualifica- 
tion but  their  birth ; they  were  martinets  in  the  barracks, 
blunderers  in  the  field.  There  was  little  promotion  for  officers 
from  the  middle  classes,  and  the  prizes  of  the  service  went 
to  the  crass  and  ill-educated  cadets  of  noble  houses,  for  it 
was  a maxim  at  the  War  Ministry  that  “books  make  a 
soldier  unlearn  his  trade.’'  But  the  officers  were  brave,  the 
men,  even  when  they  hated  the  service,  docile  and  strenuous, 
and  in  those  days  of  low  military  efficiency,  the  Piedmontese 
army  was  no  contemptible  force. 

Nobles,  clergy,  army  were  all  part  of  the  machinery  for 
keeping  the  people  loyal  to  one  religious  and  monarchical 
creed,  for  making  Piedmont  respected  among  its  grasping 
neighbours.  The  whole  social  life  of  the  country  was  per- 
meated by  the  discipline  and  narrowness  of  military  rule. 
The  princes  were  “ by  necessity  and  choice  drill-sergeants.” 
Young  men  were  absolutely  under  the  control  of  their 
fathers  till  twenty-five  years  of  age,  considerably  so  even  in 
mature  years.  The  country  was,  as  Alfieri  called  it,  “ a 
noble  prison.”  Turin,  with  its  streets  mapped  out  in  rec- 
tangular precision  like  a Roman  camp,  was  “half  barrack, 
half  cloister.”  Close  guilds  of  masters  and  men  carried  a 
rigid  organization  into  industry.  The  sharpest  distinction 
of  classes  was  preserved.  The  nobles  were,  perhaps,  the 
most  exclusive  aristocracy  in  Italy  ; ^ a scion,  who  married 
^ Martini,  Storia,  TV.  334-339. 


46  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

below  his  station,  was  disinherited,  and  those  who,  like 
Massimo  D’Azeglio,  broke  through  the  rigid  caste  laws,  were 
ostracized.  The  middle  classes  were  divided  among  them- 
selves by  minutest  distinctions  of  etiquette.  The  lower 
ranks  of  the  civil  service  and  the  magistrates  formed  almost 
hereditary  castes.  It  was  in  vain  that  Charles  Albert  in 
later  years  tried  to  bring  the  different  sections  of  the  aris- 
tocracy and  bourgeoisie  together.  No  class  could  escape 
the  atmosphere  of  ignorance  and  prejudice.  Even  the 
artisans,  well  as  they  responded  to  later  changes,  had  little 
of  the  alertness  of  their  Lombard  brothers.  | 

The  French  rule,  which  lasted  with  one  brief  interval  li 
ffom  1798  to  1814,  brought  indeed  a considerable  advance,  j 
Slowly  and  grudgingly  Victor  Emmanuel  and  his  brother  s 
were  compelled  to  make  concessions  to  the  new  spirit  they  j 
found  on  then  return.  For  all  this,  the  institutions  of  I 
Piedmont  were  far  in  arrears  of  those  of  Western  Europe. 
Piedmontese  law  was  a medley  of  Roman  and  Canon  law, 
of  royal  edicts,  local  customs,  and  decisions  of  the  courts, 
without  attempt  at  codification.  The  Genovesate  retained  ^ 
the  French  civil  and  commercial  codes ; the  Duchy  of  Aosta  i 
had  its  special  laws ; even  small  towns  had  then  pecuhar  i 
customs  or  exemptions.  The  criminal  law,  at  least  in  the  i 
letter,  was  worthy  of  the  middle  ages.  Forgers  might  be 
strangled  in  public,  and  their  bodies  burned ; death  was  the  : 
penalty  for  sacrilege,  for  all  but  the  smallest  thefts,  for  bear-  ■ 
ing  the  challenge  to  a duel.  If  the  evidence  was  insufficient  | 
for  conviction,  a reduced  penalty  might  be  mfficted.  The 
judges  were  on  the  whole  honest  and  able,  but  in  spite  of 
the  efforts  of  De  Maistre  and  Prospero  Balbo,  they  were 
still  removable,  and  down  to  1822  were  partially  paid  by 
suitors’  fees.  And  justice  was  impossible  in  face  of  the 
royal  prerogative,  which  overrode  the  decisions  of  the  courts, 
and  used  its  “ paternal  equity  ” to  set  court  favourites  above 
the  law.  Even  when  the  reforms  of  1822  swept  away  some 
of  the  worst  abuses,  there  was  still  no  pubhcity  of  justice,  no 
cross-examination,  no  adequate  rules  of  procedure.^ 

^ Avvocato  milanese,  op.  cit.,  IV.  29  et  seq. ; Dal  Pozzo,  Observations; 
Sclopis,  op.  city  III.  218,  24k 


PIEDMONT 


47 

In  education  the  country  was  equally  behindhand. 
Charles  Felix,  in  1822,  ordered  schools  to  be  provided 
for  boys  in  every  commune,  but  no  grants  were  made 
before  1 846,  and  the  poorer  communes  disregarded  the  law. 
In  1845  hardly  more  than  half  of  them  had  schools,^  and 
the  great  majority  of  the  artisans  and  peasants  were  illite- 
rates.^, It  Avas  not  till  1846  that  public  elementary 
education  was  extended  to  girls,  and  the  whole  financial 
responsibility  thrown  on  the  Provincial  Councils.  There 
was  a better  provision  of  secondary  schools,  and  the  state 
made  grants  in  aid ; but  Latin  and  Greek  were  the  only 
subjects  well  taught,  and  there  was  no  instruction  in  modern 
history  or  languages,  and  little  in  science.  Priests  were 
almost  the  only  schoolmasters  and  professors,  and  their  ferule 
drilled  the  pupils  to  unreasoning  obedience  or  drove  the 
intelligent  to  rebellion  or  despair.  Prospero  Balbo  attempted 
to  supply  lay  teachers  by  founding  normal  schools  (1817), 
but  his  scheme  apparently  Avent  under  in  the  reaction  of 
1821,  till  Charles  Albert  alloAved  Cesare  Alfieri  to  revive  it 
tAventy- three  years  later.  The  Universities  of  Turin  and 
Genoa  were  in  almost  as  evil  case.  After  1821  the 
Jesuits  seized  on  them ; the  traditional  Jansenist  theology 
of  Turin  Avas  discouraged,  and  no  student  Avas  admitted 
without  certificate  of  confession  and  communion.  Professors 
and  students  alike  Avere  spied  on,  and  the  least  mark  of 
independence  brought  expulsion,  Avith  its  sequel  of  exclusion 
from  public  office  and  the  liberal  professions.  And  though 
Piedmontese  scholarship  survived  all  discouragement,  such 
literature  as  there  was  was  courtly  and  nerveless.  The 
double  censorship,  civil  and  ecclesiastical,  Avas  perhaps  the 
severest  in  Italy;  and  until  the  reforms  of  the  ’40s  eased 
the  way,  the  path  of  learning  Avas  streAvn  Avith  every  obstacle 
that  timidity  and  prejudice  could  accumulate. 

Trade  Avas  more  kindly  looked  on.  As  in  Prussia,  it 

^ Pareto,  Genova,  II.  428-430,  whose  authority  I prefer  to  Serristori,  op. 
cit.,  27,  28;  and  Mittermeier,  Condizioni,  203.  In  1848,  however,  four-fifths 
had  schools. 

2 Riv.  stor.  del  risorg.,  I.  91.  -912  ; Eandi,  Saluzzo,  I.  316-317;  Sacchi,  Istru- 
zione,  29 ; Brofferio,  Parlamento,  V.  307.  In  Sardinia  a successful  scholar’s 
prize  was  to  whip  his  competitors. 


48 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

was  all  important  for  the  ends  of  the  government  that  the 
people  should  be  prosperous.  King  and  nobles  vied  in  pro- 
moting production.  The  raw  silk  of  the  Po  valley,  the 
olive-oil  of  the  Genovesate,  the  wines  of  Asti  and  Voghera 
began  to  win  a wide  repute.  But  the  government  more 
than  undid  its  work  by  the  restrictions  with  which  it  ham- 
pered industry.  Protection  discouraged  inventiveness ; high 
duties  well-nigh  ruined  the  trade  of  Genoa,  and  developed 
an  enormous  contraband  along  all  the  frontier.  Provincial 
customs- lines  cut  off  Piedmont  from  Savoy,  and  both  from  ;i 
the  Genovesate.  There  were  practically  no  banks.  Dovm  jl 
to  1838  letters  were  distributed  in  the  capital  only  thrice  a 
week.  Under  such  conditions  industry  found  it  difficult  to 
compete  with  the  products  of  Lombardy  and  Tuscany,  much 
less  with  those  of  other  western  countries,  and  the  foreign 
trade  reached  a total  of  only  £7,000,000  a year.  Still  the 
country  bore  many  marks  of  prosperity.  Population,  though 
it  grew  slowly,  was  nearly  as  dense  as  that  of  Lombardy, 
denser  than  that  of  Great  Britain  of  the  time.  In  1820 
Turin  and  Genoa  each  numbered  nearly  100,000  inhabi- 


tants. 

The  commercial  interest  however  was  weak  in  Piedmont 
itself.  In  Genoa,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  rooted  deep  in 
the  very  life  of  the  people.  The  Genoese  merchant  inherited 
the  commercial  tradition  of  centuries;  but  simple,  careful, 
parsimonious  as  he  was,  he  had  not  suffix* ent  enterprise  to 


fight  against  the  revolutions  of  trade 
city  low.  The  Indian  trade  was  fa 
Trieste  was  a dangerous  rival;  a 
business  with  Marseilles;  protective 
of  agriculture  crippled  the  import 
and  when  the  government  came  to 
dues  on  foreign  vessels,  it  only  d: 
benefiting  native  shipping.  The 
that,  with  a general  reduction  of  d 
its  position  as  a commercial  cent 
the  shipowners  prevented  the  re 
while  stagnant  trade  meant  povn 
industrial  population  of  the  cit 


had  brought  his 
iing  to  England; 
f tarifis  crippled 
s in  the  interests 
.n  corn  and  wine ; 
hef  by  raising  the 
lem  away  without 
raders  pointed  out 
Genoa  might  regain 
ut  the  opposition  of 
ill  1842,  and  mean- 
i worse  to  the  thick 
le  Genoese  workman 


PIEDMONT 


49 

was  serious  and  hardworking,  thrifty  when  he  had  the 
chance,  fairly  sober.  His  whole  character  was  at  the 
opposite  pole  to  that  of  the  Turin  artisan ; he  was  restless, 
insubordinate,  ready  to  assert  his  rights  against  employers ; 
he  made  a poor  soldier  but  a better  citizen.  And  this  anti- 
pathy reflected  the  old  political  antagonism.  It  was  only 
among  the  thoughtful  middle  classes  that  there  was  any 
tendency  to  approach  the  Piedmontese ; the  poor  and  the 
patricians  alike  idealized  their  old  independence,  and  for  a 
time  hated  Piedmont  more  than  Austria.  And  when  the 
hope  of  independence  died  away,  and  Genoa  merged  its 
hopes  in  those  of  Italy,  its  affinities  were  with  Milan  rather 
than  Turin,  and  however  loyal  it  grew  to  be  towards  the 
House  of  Savoy,  its  influence  was  always  cast  against  the 
leadership  of  Piedmont. 

Outside  Genoa  almost  the  only  occupation  of  the  people 
was  agriculture.  One-fifth  of  the  population  were  land- 
owners,^  and  in  the  valleys  of  the  Alps  and  Apennines  and 
in  the  olive  country  of  the  Eiviera  there  were  many  peasant 
proprietors,  sometimes  farming  well,  in  other  places  miser- 
ably poor.  Most  of  the  plain  country  was  in  the  hands  of 
landlords,  generally  absentee,  and  sometimes  on  bad  terms 
with  their  tenantry.  The  mezzaiuoli  farmers,^  who  in  some 
districts  occupied  all  the  land  with  their  holdings  of  ten  to 
sixty  acres,  were  comparatively  prosperous  and  independent. 
Elsewhere  the  tenants  were  afraid  to  farm  well,  lest  their 
rents  should  be  raised ; it  was  a growing  practice  for  land- 
lords to  take  the  farms  into  their  own  hands,  and  the  evicted 
tenants  became  landless  labourers,  downtrodden  by  bailiffs, 
wretchedly  fed  and  housed.^  The  government  tried  to  pro- 
tect the  tenants  by  giving  the  courts  power  to  reduce  rents 
in  time  of  dearth  alike  to  yearly  tenants  and  leaseholders, 
it  tried  to  check  evictions  by  legislating  for  the  extension 
of  small  holdings;  but  the  policy  seems  to  have  been  too 
much  in  opposition  to  the  economic  doctrines  of  the  time 

^ V.  Eaumer,  ojp.  cit.,  I.  264.  So  too  in  1871  ; Beauclerk,  Rural  Italy,  119. 

^ See  below,  p.  71  n. 

^ Eandi,  op.  cit.,  II.  63;  Avvocato  mUanese,  op.  cit,,  V.  418-419;  Pareto, 
Genova,  114;  at  a later  date,  Beauclerk,  op.  cit.,  120-126.  For  the  pauperism 
which  followed,  see  Mittermeier,  op.  cit.,  167. 

VOL.  I. 


D 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


50 

to  have  commanded  much  success^  And  whatever  govern-  i 
ment  might  do,  the  endemic  stagnation  infected  agriculture, 
and,  except  on  the  fertile  pastures  and  ricefields  of  the  plain, 
its  methods  were  inferior  to  those  of  Lombardy  and  the 
Duchies.  Here  and  there  in  later  years  there  were  improv- 
ing landlords,  and  there  was  a great  advance  in  agricultural 
theory.  The  meadows  and  mulberries  of  the  Lomellina  were : 
cultivated  with  intense  and  increasing  care.  But  as  a rule 
any  improvement  in  practice  broke  down  before  the  con- ' 
servatism  of  the  peasants  and  the  contracts  of  tenancy,  which  | 
forbade  any  change  from  the  customary  methods  of  farming. . 

Taking  them  in  the  mass,  the  Piedmontese  were  a stolid, ) 
patient  people,  with  narrow  ideals  but  great  powers  of  perse- 
verance and  attainment.  And  the  government,  however 
stupid  and  unprogressive,  was  painstaking  and  patriotic;^ 
inferior  as  it  was  in  many  respects  to  that  of  Lombardy,  i 
it  was  far  more  popular,  just  because  it  was  national. 
Instinctively  it  was  felt  that  the  hegemony  of  Italy  was  j 
passing  to  the  Subalpine  Kingdom.  Its  population  barely  I 
exceeded  one-half  of  that  of  Naples  and  Sicily ; in  wealth 
and  intelligence  it  stood  below  Lombardy;  it  was  imperfectly 
fused  with  the  Genovesate,  and  one-fifth  of  its  subjects  were 
of  another  race  and  tongue  beyond  the  Alps.  But  the  solid 
qualities  of  the  people  made  amends  for  inferiority  in  num-  < 
bers  or  wealth.  If  the  House  of  Savoy  had  kept  them  in  I 
tutelage,  cowed  and  docile  in  matters  political,  it  had  trained  < 
them  to  a manly,  martial  character,  rare  in  Italy.  These  i 
uninteresting  Boeotian  peasants  could  fight  and  endure,  and  • 
were  capable  of  loyalty  and  sacrifice.  And  the  traditions  | 
of  the  government  impelled  it  to  a forward  policy.  East- 1 
wards  to  Milan  had  been  for  centuries  the  motto  of  its 
princes.  Lombardy  was  always  to  them  the  “ goodly  1 
artichoke,”  to  be  stripped  leaf  by  leaf  from  the  Austrians. 
And  now  the  old  policy  of  territorial  growth  had  been 
touched  by  a nobler  conception.  De  Maistre  was  the*, 
prophet  of  the  new  school,  which  pointed  to  the  Italian, 
crown,  and  bade  Victor  Emmanuel  “ forget  the  throne  of 

1 V.  Raumer,  op.  cit,  I.  304  ; Avvocato  milanese,  op.  cit.,  V.  291-292,  312-394  j j 
Eandi,  op.  cit.,  II.  66. 


LOMBARDY-VENETIA 


51 

Piedmont  and  think  of  that  of  Italy.”  ^ The  nobles  might 
still  boast  their  Provencal  origin  and  despise  the  pure  Italian 
blood ; the  bureaucracy  might  regard  Italy  as  an  “ appendix 
of  Piedmont.”  But  the  greater  vision  of  Piedmont  leading 
Italy  in  a war  of  national  redemption  seized  more  and  more 
on  men’s  minds  after  1814.  Even  to  Victor  Emmanuel  and 
Charles  Felix  in  their  worst  days  Austria  was  the  enemy ; 
and  it  was  only  the  greater  fear  of  revolution,  which  kept 
them  from  breaking  with  her.  Sooner  or  later  a life  and 
death  struggle  was  bound  to  come ; and  it  was  to  the  prince 
and  people  of  Piedmont  that  the  patriots  of  all  Italy  were 
learning  to  look  for  light  and  leading. 

Lombardy-Venetia 

Though  the  emancipation  of  Lombardy  and  Venetia  was 
the  dream  of  every  Italian  patriot,  Neapolitan  and  Roman 
and  Piedmontese  might  well  envy  the  institutions,  under 
which  their  inhabitants  lived.  The  Austrian  Empire  was 
too  strong,  too  much  in  evidence,  to  condescend  to  the  in- 
decent corruption  of  a petty  tyranny.  Its  civil  service  had 
its  settled  traditions  of  capacity  and  method;  and  though 
the  improving  spirit  of  Joseph  II.’s  time  had  gone,  his 
reforms  remained.  German  officialism  might  be  slow  and 
unsympathetic;  national  susceptibilities  and  habits  might 
be  sacrificed  to  Austrian  interests  and  centralization;  the 
false  position  of  the  government  inevitably  produced  abuses 
of  police,  and  rare  fits  of  pitiless  despotism.  But  there  was 
a regularity  and  robustness  of  administration,  an  equality 
before  the  law,  a social  freedom,  which,  except  in  Tuscany 
and  Parma,  was  without  its  parallel  in  Italy. 

As  Lombardy  in  the  early  half  of  the  eighteenth  century 
gradually  passed  into  Austrian  hands,  it  had  shared  in  the 
reforms  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Joseph  II.  After  Napoleon’s 
early  conquests,  Milan  had  become  the  capital  of  the  Cisal- 
pine Republic,  and  afterwards  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.  The 
territory  of  the  Venetian  Republic,  which  in  1797  had  been 

^ La  Maison  de  Savoie,  ii  ; Bianchi,  I.  46;  for  a similar  doctrine 

in  1791,  see  Id.  Monorchia,  III.  452-453. 


52  A HISTORY  0.  XIAN  UNITY 

sacrificed  to  Napoleon’s  pc  strategy,  was  permitted  in 

1806  to  become  part  of  the  new  kingdom.  Milan  became 
an  European  capital,  the  home  of  a brilliant,  court,  the  first  y 
city  of  Italy  in  literature  and  industry  and  social  enterprise,  j 
Lombard  engineers  built  the  Simplon  Pass,  Lombard  archi- 
tects  completed  the  Cathedral  of  Milan,  Lombard  soldiers 
shared  in  the  glories  of  Napoleon’s  campaign;  Monti  and  h 
Foscolo  made  Lombard  literature  known  through  Europe.  | 

Had  Austria  after  the  Restoration  granted  a generous  : 
measure  of  Home  Rule,  she  might  not  improbably  have  re-  ^ 
conciled  the  provinces  to  her  sway.  Unfortunately  plighted  , 
word  and  expediency  alike  bowed  before  the  evil  lesson  of  | 
centralization  that  the  European  Powers  had  learnt  from  t 
Napoleon.  The  moral  of  the  national  movement  of  the  ji 
past  six  years  was  lost  on  men,  who  thought  they  could  ji 
make  of  the  loose  Austrian  Empire  a compacted  whole  like  } 
France.  German  and  Slav  and  Italian  were  to  be  fitted  to  l 
one  measure ; “ the  Lombards,”  said  Metternich,  “ must  f 
forget  that  they  are  Italians.”  The  entire  Austrian  law,/ 
civil  and  criminal,  was  re-introduced  without  regard  for 
native  prejudices  and  customs.  Almost  every  vestige  of 
independent  administration  disappeared.  The  Viceroy,  Im- 
perial Archduke  though  he  was,  was  a mere  puppet  to  be  | 
danced  by  the  Aulic  ministers.  Feuds  between  viceroy  and  j 
provincial  governor,  between  governor  and  chief  of  police,  | 
made  it  easier  for  the  Departments  at  Vienna  to  keep  the 
threads  of  rule  in  their  own  hands.  In  spite  of  Metter- 
nich’s  anxiety  to  make  concessions  to  Italian  opinion,  Ger- 
mans and  Tyrolese  filled  almost  every  higher  post  in  the 
civil  service  and  on  the  bench.^  Austrian  handbooks  weie 
used  in  the  primary  schools,  Austrian  law  and  history  were 
taught  to  the  exclusion  of  Italian  in  the  Universities; 
chemists  were  compelled  to  use  the  Austrian  pharmacopeia. 
Not  a road  could  be  made,  not  a dyke  built,  mthout  re- 
ference to  Vienna ; manuscripts  had  often  to  pass  the  Viennese 

1 For  Metternich’s  opinion,  see  his  Memoires,  III.  93  ; for  the  neglect  of  his 
recommendations,  Gualterio,  Rivolgimenti,  III.  408  ; Casati,  Rivdazioni,  I.  19, 
227  ; Schonhals,  Campagnes,  23.  In  1848  there  were  410  civil  servants  0 
German  birth  : Jl  Veglio  of  April  15,  1848. 


I 


LOMBARD  Y-YENETIA  5 3 

censorship  before  they  could  be  published.  The  govern- 
ment had  the  characteristic  faults  and  virtues  of  a bureau- 
cracy: it  had  all  the  evils  of  irresponsibility — corruption, 
sluggishness,  want  of  initiative.  The  quick  Lombard  wit, 
used  to  the  business-like  enterprise  of  Beauharnais’  rule, 
sniffed  at  German  stupidity,  and  told  how  the  post  of 
municipal  engineer  was  abolished  at  Milan  “because  the 
city  had  got  on  for  centuries  without  one  ” ; how  memorials 
were  pigeon-holed  for  five  years  before  an  answer  was  vouch- 
safed ; how  soldiers’  boots  were  sent  from  Venice  to  Vienna 
to  be  cobbled.  Yet  the  Austrian  rule,  slow  and  crass  and 
timid  as  it  was,  showed  a good  deal  of  patient  working  out 
of  problems  and  encouragement  of  national  prosperity. 

At  a later  date  the  government  was  bitterly  assailed  for 
its  financial  burdens.  Austria’s  Italian  provinces,  it  was  said, 
contributed  out  of  proportion  to  their  just  liabilities.  It 
is  true  that  heavy  surpluses,  sometimes  half  of  the  whole 
revenue,  went  to  the  expenses  of  the  Imperial  government ; 
it  is  true  also  that  on  a basis  of  population  Lombardy  and 
Venetia  paid  double  their  share.  But  wealthy  Lombardy 
could  not  be  on  a footing  with  poor  Carinthia ; she  paid  less 
in  proportion  to  her  riches  than  Lower  Austria,  the  most 
favoured  province  of  the  Empire,  and  it  is  probable  that 
on  a basis  of  wealth  she  paid  no  more  than  her  quotum.^ 
Taxation  none  the  less  was  heavy.  The  peace  revenue  came 
to  the  level  of  the  war  budgets  of  the  French  rule  ; the 
land-tax  rose  till  in  time  it  far  exceeded  the  promised  maxi- 
mum of  20  per  cent,  of  net  revenue,  and  swallowed  one- 
third  to  one-half;^  the  salt  monopoly  raised  the  price  to 
eleven  times  its  natural  value.  But  the  charges  of  heavy 
increases  in  the  taxes  were,  except  in  the  case  of  the  land- 
tax,  unfounded ; ^ and  despite  some  disingenuous  attempts 

^ British  and  Foreign  Review,  XXVIII.  570-573  and  table ; T^goborski, 
Finances,  IL  362;  Bonghi,  Pasini,  689  et  alibi;  Valentini,  Perequazione ; 
Meneghini,  Condizione,  97-99;  Cantu,  Milano,  I.  165-166;  32iC,mi,  Proprietd, 
iio-iii  ; Bianchi-Giovini,  Gravami,  5;  Lettere  ad  A.  Panizzi,  116,  127;  Rac- 
colta  dei  decreti,  II.  75  ; Correspondence — Italy  (1847-49),  99- 

2 See  below,  Vol.  II.,  p.  13. 

^ Zajotti,  Veritd,  312-3 13,  327  ; Jacini,  op,  cit.,  108  ; Venezia  e le  sue  lagune, 
II.  368-^69;  contra  Misley,  Ultalie,  ill,  207. 


54  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

to  repudiate  debts  to  local  bodies  and  tamper  with  charitable 
funds,  the  management  of  the  finances  seems  to  have  been 
on  the  whole  honest. 

Nor,  except  for  political  offences,  was  Austrian  justice 
especially  open  to  attack.  It  had  many  of  the  defects 
common  to  the  Italian  codes  of  the  time ; the  public  were 
not  admitted  to  the  courts,  the  defendant  was  not  allowed 
counsel  or  permitted  more  than  a limited  perusal  of  the 
depositions  against  him ; there  was  no  jury,  and  often  too  , 
much  suspicion  of  police  influence.  But  its  main  defect  was 
rather  that  it  was  unsuited  to  Italian  habits,  and  that  not  a 
few  of  the  judges  were  foreigners.^  There  wa^^  absolute 
equality  before  the  law ; there  were  no  special  courts,  except 
in  political  trials;  clerics,  as  a rule,  were  tried  before  the 
ordinary  tribunals.  The  civil  code,  which  dated  from  1814, 
was  in  some  respects  in  advance  of  the  Code  Napoleon,  and 
the  peasants  welcomed  it  for  the  protection  it  gave  them 
against  their  landlords. 

In  church  affairs  the  government  was  the  most  pro- 
gressive in  Italy.  The  traditions  of  Joseph  II.  s time  were 
still  alive ; the  priest  was  looked  on  as  a state  official,  and  if 
he  refused  to  co-operate  in  public  education  or  the  relief  of 
the  poor,  he  might  be  punished.^  Though  the  police  helped 
the  bishops  to  check  the  sale  of  Diodati’s  Bibles,  Protestants 
and  Orthodox  had  perfect  religious  liberty,  and  the  J ews  had 
few  disabilities  beyond  that  of  holding  office.^  As  a conse- 
quence probably  of  the  state’s  control,  the  clergy  were  the 
best  educated  and  the  most  public-spirited  of  Italy.  In  the 
two  provinces  there  were  only  1000  monks ; and  though 
the  Jesuits  were  allowed  to  return  to  Venetia  in  1843,  they 
never  gained  a footing  in  Milan,  where  Qaysruck,  the  German 
archbishop,  “ had  enough  to  do  with  his  priests. 

In  education,  too,  Lombardy  was  far  ahead  of  the  rest 
of  Italy,  except  Parma  and  Lucca,  perhaps  abreast  of  any 

1 Statements  as  to  their  number  are  contradictory.  Compaq  op. 

cit.,  63,  with  Pallavicino,  Memorie,  I.  55,  and  Bianchi-Giovini,  op. 

2 Lorenzoni,  Instituzioni,  II.  21. 

3 I cannot,  however,  reconcile  Carte  segrete,  II.  363,  with  Canti 
I.  187. 


LOMBAKDY-VENETIA 


55 


European  country  of  the  time.  Elementary  education  was, 
in  theory  at  least,  compulsory  on  both  sexes  from  six  to 
twelve  years;  as  late  back  as  1786  restrictions  had  been 
placed  on  child  labour ; all  but  the  smallest  communes  were 
obliged  to  provide  schools.  In  Lombardy,  in  1834,  68  per 
cent,  of  the  boys  and  42  per  cent,  of  the  girls  of  school  age 
attended,^  though  there  was  still  little  teaching  for  girls  in 
Venetia,  and  the  attendance  of  both  sexes  was  irregular  in 
the  rural  districts.  Infant  schools  on  the  model  of  Kobert 
Owens  were  introduced  in  1829,  and  here  alone  in  Italy 
were  patronized  by  the  government.  A careful  gradation 
carried  on  the  scholar  from  the  primary  school.  Every 
considerable  town  had  a ‘‘  major  elementary  ” school,  which 
took  the  pupil  to  grammar  and  Latin  and  sometimes  science. 
Secondary  education  began  with  the  gymnasiums  of  which 
each  of  the  large  towns  owned  at  least  one,  and  went  on  to 
the  twelve  more  advanced  Lyceums.  There  were  Univer- 
sities at  Padua  and  Pavia,  each  with  about  1500  students, 
whose  explosive  Liberalism  was  the  terror  of  the  police  ; and 
though  the  professors  were  too  often  foreigners,  much  be- 
fooled by  the  scholars,  or  mere  agents  of  the  government, 
the  Universities  stood  second  only  to  those  of  Bologna  and 
Naples.^ 

The  censorship  was  perhaps  the  lightest  in  Italy.  It  is 
true  that  the  law  of  1815,  which  explicitly  allowed  political 
criticism,  was  a dead  letter;  that  no  political  journals  could 
be  published  without  permission  of  the  chief  censor  at 
Vienna ; that  after  1821  all  foreign  books  had  to  pass  the 
same  ordeal.  Eomances  that  “ had  no  scientific  merit,” 
writings  that  “ offended  against  the  rules  of  style  and  purity 
of  language  ” were  proscribed ; Balzac  and  Bentham,  Victor 
Hugo  and  Macchiavelli,  Hallam  and  Kabelais  were  alike 
consigned  to  the  list  of  forbidden  literature.^  But  in  quiet 
times  the  prohibited  volumes  were  almost  openly  sold ; 
much  of  the  censorship  was  a well-meant  attempt  to 

^ Sacchi,  Istruzione,  1 1 ; Lorenzoni,  op.  cit.,  II.  59.  In  the  province  of  Ber- 
gamo*90  per  cent,  of  both  sexes  attended. 

^ For  education  generally  see  Sacchi,  op.  cit.  ; Lorenzoni,  op.  cit.,  11.  49  et 
seq. ; Cantii,  op.  cit.,  I.  228-241  ; Mittermeier,  op.  cit.,  192-198. 

^ Dante  too  in  Venetia,  according  to  Riv.  star,  del  risorg.,  I.  489. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


56 

suppress  unclean  books;  scientific  and  non-political  and 
sometimes  theological  literature  was  left  tolerably  free,  and  ;i 
there  was  an  openness  and  activity  of  thought  at  Milan  that 
at  one  time,  at  all  events,  was  unequalled  in  Italyd  One- 
third  of  the  journals  of  the  peninsula,  and  in  1842  nearly 
one-half  of  its  literary  publications,  appeared  in  the  two  i 
provinces.^ 

In  local  government  they  were  the  only  states  of  Italy  I 
which  enjoyed  an  effective  system.  All  proprietors,  includ- 
ing women,  had  the  franchise,  and  the  wide  diffusion  of 
landed  property  made  this  often  nearly  equivalent  to  house- 
hold suffrage.  In  the  smaller  communes  (with  less  than 
300  proprietors)  the  whole  body  of  electors  met  twice  a 
year,  and  the  initiative  of  important  business  lay  with  them, 
an  executive  committee  of  three  administering  the  com- 
munal business  in  the  intervals.  In  the  larger  communes 
the  meeting  disappeared,^  and  the  administration  vested 
entirely  in  a Council  of  thirty  to  sixty  members.  In  the 
chief  cities  the  executive  was  given  to  the  Podesta  and  his 
Assessors,  but  the  consent  of  the  Council  was  requisite  for 
any  new  departure.  The  communes  supported  the  schools, 
the  local  police,  the  by-roads,  and  occasionally  the  priest;  | 
they  controlled  the  local  sanitation,  the  police,  the  parochial 
charities,  and  had  powers,  subject  to  the  consent  of  the  central 
authority,  to  carry  out  public  works ; the  meetings  or  coun-  ; 
cils  elected  the  school-teacher  and  the  public  doctor  and 
midwife,  who,  here  as  elsewhere  in  Italy,  were  paid  by  every 
commune  to  attend  the  poor  gratuitously.  On  the  whole, 
the  central  authority  made  little  use  of  its  powers  of  con- 
trol, and  the  spirit  of  local  government  was  strong  and  self-  ' 
assertive. 

But  in  proportion  as  self-government  approximated  to 


1 D’Azeglio,  Ricordi,  450,  453  ; G.  Torelli,  Ricordi,  14;  Chiala,  Dina,  I.  17. 

2 Many  details  of  the  censorship  in  Riv.  stor.  del  risorg.,  I.  489-521.  The 
cast  of  a play  might  not  include  a bad  King,  unless  there  was  a good  King 
too.  Hume’s  History  was  allowed  to  circulate  at  Venice,  but  not  at  Milan. 

^ There  was  a tendency  for  councils  to  take  the  place  of  meetings.  Out 
of  809  communes  in  Venetia,  450  had  councils  in  1819,  and  583  in  1853  ; 117 
had  uffizio  proprio,  which  made  them  more  independent  of  central  officials. 
Morpurgo,  Saggi,  120. 


LOMBARDY-VENETIA 


57 


national  representation,  the  fears  of  the  autocracy  emascu- 
lated it.  In  each  of  the  seventeen  provinces  sat  a Provincial 
Congregation,  on  which  the  noble  and  untitled  proprietors 
and  the  nineteen  royal  cities  each  had  their  representatives. 
Their  powers  were  limited;  they  managed  the  provincial 
finances,  supervised  those  of  the  communes,  and  had  a cer- 
tain control  over  roads,  rivers,  and  charities ; but  they  played 
small  part  in  the  public  life  of  the  country.  The  Central 
Congregations  of  Lombardy  and  Venetia  failed  still  more  to 
realize  the  hopes  that  they  would  become  active  political 
powers.  “A  constitution,”  said  the  Emperor  Francis,  “would 
break  down  the  confidence  which  should  exist  between  a 
prince  and  his  people.”  But  it  was  necessary  in  1 8 1 4 to  pacify 
his  Italian  provinces  with  a show  of  representative  govern- 
ment, and  the  Congregations  were  empowered  to  present 
the  prayers  of  the  Lombards  and  Venetians.  But  they  were 
expressly  debarred  from  legislative  functions ; candidates 
for  election  had  to  show  a high  property  qualification,  and 
were  subject  to  the  government’s  veto.  Their  functions  were 
only  those  of  local  bodies ; their  one  substantial  power,  the 
right  of  petition,  was  little  used  by  men  who  represented 
only  a section  of  the  people,  and,  except  by  accident,  in- 
cluded none  but  such  as  were  acceptable  to  the  government. 
They  made  one  effort  in  1825  to  procure  legal  and  fiscal 
reform  and  the  exclusion  of  foreigners  from  the  civil  service. 
But  no  answer  was  made  to  their  prayer,  and  their  next 
petition,  in  1838,  to  increase  the  number  of  the  Emperors 
Italian  body-guard,  only  made  them  ridiculous.  The  people, 
who  regarded  them  as 

“Well-paid  to  get 

Engrossed  in  liospital  administration,”  ^ 

lost  interest  in  them  and  their  work. 

Wherever  the  political  fears  of  the  government  came 
into  play,  there  was  the  same  sharp  contrast  with  the  real 
and  sober  value  of  the  ordinary  administration.  In  frank 
moments  the  government  confessed  that  it  had  no  moral 
force  behind  it,  and  the  sense  that  there  was  no  safety-valve 


^ Giusti. 


A HISTOEY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


58 

for  discontent  kept  it  in  perpetual  terror  of  conspiracy.  The 
law,  comparatively  mild  and  wise  in  all  else,  was  in  matters 
of  state- concern  systematically,  cynically  iniquitous.  The 
bastinade,  starvation,  belladonna  were  used  to  extort  con- 
fessions.^ And  when  the  defendant  in  a state-trial  at  last 
came  into  court,  he  found  himself  without  counsel,  without 
seeing  the  depositions  against  him,  without  the  protection 
of  publicity,  confronted  by  a packed  bench  of  Austrian  or 
Tyrolese  judges.  Mere  expression  of  political  discontent 
sufficed  for  conviction  and  a lingering  death  in  the  Spiel- 
berg. In  times  of  popular  commotion  or  epidemic  crime 
the  giudizio  statario  enabled  the  authorities  to  dispense  with 
formalities,  and  sentence  without  appeal. 

The  political  police^  were  probably  no  better  and  no 
worse  than  in  Piedmont  or  at  Rome;  there  was  less  in-  i 
terference  with  personal  liberty,  but  more  espionage,  more  ■ 
fussy  surveillance  of  private  life.  They  delighted  to  collect 
each  petty  detail  of  the  lives  of  suspects — a mass  of  in- 
formation, which  has  probably  proved  more  valuable  to  the 
historian  than  it  ever  did  to  the  government.  The 
Emperor  Francis,  a hard,  unteachable  official,  scared  to 
monomania  by  Kotzebue’s  assassination,  embodied  his  ideal 
of  government  in  the  police  spy.  Men  of  every  station 
were  in  the  pay  of  the  sbirri,  from  the  cardinal  and  noble 
or  the  dilettante  who  m’ote  odes  to  its  chief,  down  to  the 
common  spy,  the  outcast  of  society,  who  earned  his  two 
francs  a day  by  garnering  more  or  less  untruthful  gossip 
from  the  cafe  or  the  street.  The  letters  of  the  general 
public  were  opened  “with  interesting  results.”  A normal 
state  of  fussy  suspicion  agitated  the  bureaus  of  the  police ; 
endless  scares  of  Bonaparte  plots  or  of  English  and  Russian 
intrigues  filled  their  verbose  reports ; English  travellers 
and  harmless  artists  like  Rossini  and  Vernet  were  shadowed. 
A worse  fate  befell  the  native  suspect ; he  might  not 
emigrate  or  travel  abroad  without  their  leave ; secret 
influences  could  prevent  him  from  obtaining  office.  A 

^ Misley,  op  cit.,  23 ; Casati,  Confalonieri^  I.  52-65. 

2 It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  sbirri  were  more  for  political 
purposes  than  to  preserve  law  and  order  ; hence  the  hatred  of  them. 


LOMBARDY-VENETIA  \ 59 

professor  was  dismissed  for  referring  to  Pope  Julius  \cry 
of  “Out  with  the  foreigner”;  it  was  necessary  even  .to 
obtain  their  leave  to  hold  a private  ball. 

All  through  the  government  ran  the  same  intermingling 
of  good  administration  and  political  tyranny.  But  on  the 
whole  the  Lombards,  shrewd,  genial,  tenacious,  were  but 
too  ready  to  acquiesce  in  a rule  that  secured  their  material 
interests  and  their  amusements,  however  fatal  it  might  be 
to  the  finer  sides  of  civil  life.  Milan,  though  fallen  from 
her  high  estate,  was  still  busy,  brilliant,  sceptical,  dissolute. 
At  Venice,  save  for  brief  intervals  of  higher  feeling,  all 
sense  of  dignity  had  gone,  and  nobles  and  plebeians 

“ neither  thought  nor  felt.”  Her  aristocracy  fawned  on 

Austria,  her  middle  classes  had  neither  enterprise  nor 

influence,  two-fifths  of  her  population  received  charitable 
relief.  The  Austrians  knew  well  how  to  play  on  this 

demoralization.  They  gave  heavy  subsidies  to  the  opera, 
and  a greater  glut  of  carnival  splendour  was  their  ready 
panacea  for  political  excitement.  The  time-honoured  feuds, 
which  divided  Milan  from  Brescia  or  Venice,  were  quietly 
fomented ; and  the  noble,  who  showed  interest  in  public 
affairs,  found  himself  under  the  government  s frown. 

It  was  only  by  slow  degrees  that  any  class  rose  above 
these  temptations.  Each  city  had  its  group  of  noble 
families,  for  the  most  part  engrossed  in  money-making  or 
frivolity.  But  at  Brescia  and  Milan  there  was  a better 
spirit.  The  powerful  and  wealthy  Milanese  nobles  came 
in  time  to  recognize  that  they  could  not  regain  their 
privileges,  and  their  exclusiveness  made  way  for  a friendli- 
ness towards  the  middle  classes,  that  contrasted  well  with 
the  class-spirit  of  their  peers  at  Turin.  Confalonieri  had 
won  many  of  them  to  his  cause,  and  they  never  forgot  or 
forgave  the  insult  thrown  at  their  order  by  his  cruel  doom. 
The  heavy  land-tax  helped  more  generous  instincts  to  keep 
alive  a certain  flame  of  patriotism ; and  their  sons  and 
daughters  were  brought  up  to  regard  the  Austrians  as 
hardly  tolerated  aliens,  to  be  flouted  and  boycotted  at 
theatre  or  ball. 

But  the  nobles  were  of  comparatively  small  importance. 


6o 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


Lombardy  was  preeminently  a country  of  the  middle 
classes ; they  owned  the  greater  part  of  the  land ; they 
were  enterprising  and  successful  in  trade.  The  shrewdness 
and  artistic  faculty  of  the  Lombard  made  industry  flourish 
through  all  discouragements,  and  their  land  was,  with  the 
exception  of  Belgium,  the  most  densely  populated  state  of 
Europe.  The  silk  trade  advanced  by  leaps  and  bounds, 
and  gave  employment  to  large  numbers  of  spinners  through- 
out the  hill  country.  The  cheese  industry  of  Lodi  and 
Crema  was  famous;  the  cotton  manufacture  was  growing, 
and  sugar  refineries  had  been  built.  The  first  insurance 
society  was  founded  in  1827;  Milan  was  lighted  with  gas 
in  1843.  however  much  the  long  peace  might  help 

trade,  the  Lombard  manufacturers  had  to  pay  the  price  of 
belonging  to  the  Austrian  Empire.  A heavy  and  com- 
plicated tariff  crippled  trade  and  encouraged  contraband;’- 
and  down  to  1822  a customs-line  along  the  Mincio  was 
a never-failing  irritant.  The  trade  of  Venice,  at  all  events 
till  she  was  made  a free  port  in  the  ’30s,  was  sacri- 
ficed to  the  interests  of  her  rival  Trieste.  Verona  was 
ruined  by  German  competition ; Brescia  was  compelled  to 
close  her  armouries,  because  the  War  Office  sent  its  orders 
to  Germany. 

The  mass  of  the  people,  as  everywhere  in  Italy,  was 
agricultural.  One  in  eight  of  the  population  was  a pro- 
prietor, and  their  number  was  increasing.^  In  the  mountain 
districts  every  peasant  was  an  owner,  and  though  his  tiny 
farm  was  heavily  mortgaged,  his  common  rights  curtailed 
by  an  Enclosure  Act,  his  home  and  food  of  wretched  quality, 
he  preferred  his  independence  to  comfort.  In  the  hills  and 
non-irrigated  plains  property  was  nearly  as  much  divided, 
but  was  cultivated,  as  a rule,  in  Venetia  rack-rent,  in 

Lombardy  by  tenants  under  various  form  mezzedria,  or 

on  perpetual  leases  at  fixed  rents,  sometm  '.nturies  old. 

The  population  was  very  thick,  rents  wei  h,  and  the 

1 English  stuifs,  charged  6o  per  cent,  ad  valorem  d re  sold  at  15 

per  cent,  advance  on  the  untaxed  value  : Witt,  Societes  sec 

2 So  Cantii,  op.  cit.  v.  Raumer,  op.  cit.,  I.  155-156,  sa}  n eleven  ; in 

the  province  of  Bergamo  there  was  one  property  to  evei  nhabitants  : 

Rosa,  Bergamo,  44. 


LOMBARDY-VENETIA 


6i 


fairdly  income  was  almost  invariably  supplemented  by  silk- 
spinning  at  home.  Here  (at  all  events  in  Lombardy,  for 
Venetia  was  always  behind  her  more  prosperous  sister)  the 
peasant  was  at  his  best ; he  was  poor,  but  less  so  than  in 
France,  his  food  wa3  very  plain,  but  his  house  and  clothing 
were  comparatively  good.  These  conditions  were  reversed 
in  the  irrigated  plain,  which  lay  between  the  Ticino  and  the 
Adda.  Here  the  staples  of  agriculture  changed  from  vines 
and  mulberries  to  rice  and  maize  and  rich  pastures  of 
temporary  grasses,  famous  for  their  cheese.^  Large  farms 
of  frorn  200  to  700  acres  were  held  on  short  leases  of  the 
English  type  by  wealthy  and  educated  farmers.  The  peasant 
had  no  hold  on  the  soil  except  in  the  precarious  tenure  of 
an  allotment.  His  food  was  probably  no  worse  than  that  of 
the  peasants  of  the  hills,  the  pellagra  was  not  as  yet  the 
scourge  it  has  been  since ; but  in  character  the  labourer 
of  the  plains  was  immeasurably  inferior.  Badly  educated, 
nomadic,  housed  in  huts  of  canes  and  mud,  hating  his 
employer  and  landlord,  sometimes  poverty-stricken  to 
despair,^  he  was  a dangerous  element  in  the  state.  Even 
in  the  low  country  east  of  the  Adda,  where  the  farms  were 
smaller  and  the  labourer  better  off,  he  had  little  of  the 
independence,  which  characterized  the  peasant  of  the  hills. 
And  alike  in  plain  and  hill  the  peasant  often  found  in  the 
Austrian  government  a protector  against  his  more  present 
enemy,  the  rack-renting  landlord.  If  it  were  not  for  the 
cruel  eight-years’  military  service,  he  would  have  had  little 
material  cause  of  complaint  against  the  alien  rule.^ 

But  even  the  apathetic  Lombard  and  Venetian  could 
not  be  fed  by  peace  and  prosperous  trade  alone.  To  the 
finer  spirits  among  them  the  Austrian  bureaucracy,  because 
it  was  Austrian,  was  more  odious  than  the  crying  tyrannies  of 


^ The  irrigation  works  cost  on  the  average  £28  per  acre ; rents  ran  from 
;^2  to  ;^ii  per  acre  ; the  best  meadows  yielded  twenty-five  to  thirty  tons  of 
grass  per  acre,  or  fed  sixty  cows  on  fifty  acres  : Beauclerk,  op.  cit.,  183-188. 

^ His  wages  in  1845  were  is.  per  day,  Cantti,  op.  cit.,  I.  166,  in  1882  they 
appear  to  have  fallen  to  6^d.  a day  : Beauclerk,  op.  cit.,  19 1. 

^ Jacini,  Proprietd,,  passim;  Bowring,  Report,  94-99  ; Canth,  op.  cit.,  I.  184- 
185;  II.  150-160;  Beauclerk,  op.  cit.,  169-233;  Carte  segrete,  I.  256-257; 
Morpurgo,  Saggi ; Visconti-Venosta,  Valtellina. 


62  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Rome  and  Naples.  Civil  servants  and  soldiers,  and  a few 
ricL  conservatives  might  denationalize  themselves ; ^ rack- 
rented  tenants  and  their  labourers  might  care  more  for 
agrarian  than  nationalist  politics ; material  prosperity  might 
sometimes  smother  the  patriotism  of  manufacturer  and 
artisan;  Venice  might  be  sunk  in  lethargy.  But  even 
Venice,  brooding  over  the  lost  glories  of  the  Republic, 
would  at  times  chafe  at  the  sullen  domineering  stranger;  ; 
and  at  Milan  and  in  every  Lombard  city  and  through  the 
Alpine  valleys  a fierce  hatred  of  the  Austrian  gradually  took 
possession  of  the  best  in  every  class.  To  noble,  and  shop- 
keeper, and  artisan,  as  Mazzini’s  teaching  filtered  into  every 
rank,  the  white  uniform  of  the  Austrian  soldier  meant  a 
tyranny  to  be  endured  only  so  long  as  force  compelled. 

1 A catechism,  used  in  the  elementary  schools,  taught  that  “ God  punishes 
with  eternal  damnation  soldiers  who  desert  their  sovereign.” 


CHAPTEE  IV 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY— [continued) 

Modena.  Parma.  Lucca.  Tuscany  : Fossombroni ; Leopold  II. ; Tuscan 
government ; the  Tuscans  ; the  Georgofils  ; clergy  ; education  ; 
peasants  ; Tuscan  life.  Papal  States  : the  theocracy ; the  Curia j 
administration  ; trade  ; local  government ; law  ; justice  ; police  ; the 
Inquisition  ; the  Jews  ; education  ; religion  and  morality  ; condition 
of  the  people  ; Komagna  and  the  Marches  ; separatist  movement  in 
Komagna  ; Umbria  ; Agro  Bomano;  Rome. 

Modena 

South  of  the  Po,  between  Lombardy  and  Tuscany,  lay  the 
little  Duchies  of  Modena  and  Parma.  Modena,  which 
reached  from  the  lower  Po  across  the  Apennines  to  a piece 
of  coast  at  Massa  and  Carrara,  with  a population  of  half  a 
million,  had  been  modelled  to  conformity  with  Duke  Francis’ 
ideal  of  sovereignty.^  In  theory  the  state  teemed  with 
benevolent  provisions  for  the  people;  but  the  facts  of  a 
personal  despotism  inevitably  clashed  with  the  ideal.  The 
taxes  were  heavy,  the  law,  both  civil  and  criminal,  was  bad, 
arbitrary,  secret.  Eoyal  decrees  could  override  the  law ; 
political  suspects,  against  whom  there  was  no  proof,  could 
be  detained  in  prison,  “ till  the  truth  came  out.”  Under 
the  French  rule  there  had  been  activity  and  enterprise,  and 
Modena  had  been  famous  for  her  school  of  administrators. 
Now  all  was  crushed  under  the  dead  weight  of  Francis’ 
suspicions.  The  free  communal  government  was  first 
weakened,  then  destroyed.  Elementary  education  did  not 
exist  save  in  a very  few  towns ; secondary  schools  were 
almost  a monopoly  of  the  Jesuits;  the  University  was 
ruined  by  the  new  discipline  which  the  Duke  introduced 
after  1821.  The  censorship  was  in  the  hands  of  Sanfedist 

^ See  above,  p.  18. 

63 


64  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

fanatics,  who  made  Dante  a forbidden  book,^  and  allowed 
no  literature  to  enter  the  state  except  such  as  received  their  i 
sanction.  There  was  little  trade ; Avhile  the  government 
protected  its  subjects’  eyes  by  prohibiting  the  use  of 
matches, 2 its  high  tarifis  made  commerce  impossible.^  Such 
merchants  as  there  were,  were  mainly  Jews  and  Swiss,  and 
the  former  suffered  under  every  disability  that  Francis  j 
suspicions  could  invent.  The  only  industry  of  importance 
was  the  marble  trade  of  Carrara.  The  bulk  of  the  popula-  I 
tion  were  peasants,  almost  all  proprietors,  careful  tillers  of  j 
the  niggard  soil  of  the  mountains ; often  harassed  by  ^ 
officials,  often  living  a hand’s-breath  from  starvation,  but  ;l 
devoted  to  the  government,  and  furnishing  Francis  at  need  ' 
with  Sanfedist  volunteers. 


Parma  ! 

The  bordering  Duchy  of  Parma  presented  every  contrast 
to  Francis’  dark  rule.  The  state,  with  its  thickly-planted 
population  of  450,000,  had  in  the  ’20s  the  most  en- 
lightened government  in  Italy.  Napoleon’s  widow,  idle  and 
dissolute  as  she  was,  was  a generous  and  well-meaning  ruler, 
and  her  ministers  seconded  her  likings  for  indulgent  and 
comparatively  liberal  government.  The  French  law  had 
been  retained,  had  been  even  improved  on,  as  m the 
equality  it  made  between  male  and  female  heirs.  There! 
were  no  privileges  before  the  law,  trials  were  public,  the 
iudges  independent.  A council  of  state  was  consulted  on 
all  leo'islative  projects.  The  police  were  comparatively 
innocuous,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  French  Concordat 
kept  the  clergy  in  check.  Parma  was  the  only  state  in 
Italy  where  Jews  were  admitted  to  the  civil  service.  The 
law  carefully  protected  the  mezzahiolo  tenant.^  The  country 
was  ahead  of  all  Italy  in  its  education.  Most  of  the  com- 
munes had  schools  for  boys,  and  20  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion attended  them  or  the  private  girls’  schools. 

1 Valery,  Voyages,  21 1. 

2 Giusti,  Efistolario,  134. 

3 V.  Raumer,  Italy,  I.  307-308. 


LUCCA 


65 


Lucca 

Least  among  the  little  states,  its  destinies  closely  linked 
to  those  of  Tuscany,  was  the  tiny  Duchy  of  Lucca,  placed 
among  the  Apennines,  and  along  the  coast  between  Carrara 
and  Pisa.  Its  area  was  but  320  square  miles,  its  dense 
population  150,000.  The  Congress  of  Vienna  had  pro- 
mised that  its  constitution  of  1805,  which  was  to  a certain 
extent  representative,  should  be  preserved,  but  the  pledge 
was  forgotten,  and  even  the  ecclesiastical  independence  of 
the  state  was  gradually  surrendered.  But  the  government 
was  not  intolerant  or  cruel ; the  Duchess,  though  bigoted, 
was  generous,  and  won  sufficient  favour  from  the  Liberals  of 
Italy  to  make  them  in  1831  think  of  her  son,  Charles 
Louis,  as  a possible  leader  of  the  Revolution.  But  Charles 
Louis  was  soon  the  laughing-stock  of  Italy;  he  became  a 
Protestant,  apparently  from  a whim,  then  returned  to  the 
Catholic  Church;  he  made  a Yorkshire  groom,  Thomas 
Ward,  his  prime  minister;  his  extravagance  and  dissolute- 
ness won  for  him  from  Giusti  the  title  of  ‘‘  the  Protestant 
Don  Juan.”  The  country  was  comparatively  prosperous, 
yielding  much  wealth  from  its  famous  oliveyards,  though 
insufficient  for  its  thick  population,  which  emigrated  in 
large  numbers.  There  was  a certain  measure  of  free-trade, 
and  a considerable  industry  in  silk  and  wool  and  cotton. 
There  were  many  schools,  and,  though  less  than  half  were 
gratuitous,  the  attendance  was  high.  The  secondary  schools 
were  good,  and  the  University  boasted  25  professors  and 
180  scholars. 


Tuscany 

The  Tuscan  government  was  the  only  one  outside 
Piedmont  and  Parma,  which  was  willingly  accepted  by  its 
subjects.  But  in  principles  and  methods  the  governments 
of  Florence  and  Turin  stood  in  sharpest  contrast.  There 
was  a certain  truth  in  Mazzini’s  criticism  that  the  velvet 
glove  only  hid  the  gauntlet ; but  compared  with  the  other 
VOL.  I.  E 


66 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

governments  of  Italy,  the  Tuscan  was  mild,  tolerant,  en- 
lightened. Reform  of  a kind  was  a tradition  with  the  . 
descendants  of  Leopold!,  the  first  Austrian  Grand  Duke,  i 
one  of  those  Liberal  sports,  which  appear  from  time  to  time  i 
in  the  Hapsburg  family-tree.  Fossombroni,  the  premier,  ] 
was  a quiet-loving,  unenthusiastic  man,  who  carried  into 
the  government  his  motto,  “ The  world  goes  of  itself.” : 
Stagnation,  he  thought,  was  a cheap  price  to  pay  for  the  j 
absence  of  crises.  Careless  of  principle,  capable  of  energy  | 
but  self-indulgent,  both  inclination  and  statecraft  prompted  ! 
him  to  drug  the  people  into  dull  contentment.  The  men  j 
of  mediocrity,  with  whom  he  filled  the  civil  service,  were  '< 
toM  not  to  he  over-zealous  but  content  themselves  with 
drawing  their  pay.  But  he  had  served  under  Napoleon, 
and  liked  a name  for  tolerance  and  progress;  again  and 
again  he  gave  shelter  to  the  refugees  from  Romagna  and 
Naples;  he  allowed  the  Florentines  to  send  help  to  the 
Greek  insurgents ; he  favoured  Charles  Albert’s  claims  to 
the  Piedmontese  throne.  There  is  some  evidence  that  in 
later  life  he  favoured  representative  institutions,  and  won  his 
master  to  ineffective  acquiescence.^  Leopold  II.,  the  prince 
in  whose  name  he  governed  after  1824,  was  a worthy,  pains- 
taking bourgeois,  whose  chief  interest  it  was  to  superintend 
drainage  works,  and  visit  his  experimental  farms  in  straw-hat 
and  gaiters.  Giusti  satirized  him  as  the  “ Tuscan  Morpheus,” 
whom — 

“ Itcli  of  glory  pricks  to  drain 
Pockets  and  fens  ” ; 

but  like  his  premier,  he  loved  a repute  for  tolerance,  and 
he  was  too  good-natured,  and  in  a dim  kind  of  way  too 
patriotic,  to  be  an  oppressive  ruler.  Unfortunately,  he  was 
a Hapsburg  prince ; and  though  he  resented  unsought 
dictation  from  Vienna,  and  Fossombroni’s  masterly  states- 
manship prevented  Tuscany  from  becoming  a mere  Austriaq 
fief,  Leopold  could  hardly  fail  to  be  affected  by  subtkj 
family  influences. 

Outside  high  politics,  however,  his  Tuscan  softness  helc 

1 Zobi,  Storia,  IV.  Documents,  208  ; Gualterio,  Rivolgimenti,  I.  246. 


TUSCANY 


67 

its  own.  The  ordinary  law  was  mild  as  the  people  who  lived 
under  it.  Leopold  I.  s criminal  code  had  been  in  its  day 
a model  to  Europe,  and  it  was  improved,  when  many 
principles  of  French  law  were  introduced  after  1832. 
Trials  were  public,  bail  was  allowed,  the  death  penalty 
was  rarely  inflicted.^  Even  the  police  were  infected  with 
the  universal  slackness,  and  provoked  Metternich’s  indig- 
nant remonstrances.  But  though  seldom  cruel,  they  were 
minutely  vexatious.  Many  minor  offences  came  before 
them  under  a procedure  secret  both  to  defendant  and 
public;  espionage  was  active;  nowhere  was  there  more 
violation  of  the  secrecy  of  the  post,  and  such  adepts  were 
the  Tuscan  police  in  the  art,  that  the  Milanese  government 
applied  for  their  reagents  to  decipher  the  invisible  ink  of 
treasonable  correspondence.  They  irritated  or  amused  the 
public  with  the  usual  vagaries  of  a fussy  officialism;  and 
when  Giotto’s  portrait  of  Dante  was  discovered  in  the  Bar- 
gello,  the  colours  were  altered  in  the  repainting,  lest  they 
should  suggest  the  revolutionary  tricolor.^  The  censorship 
suffered  little  criticism  of  the  government ; but  prohibited 
books  were  often  sold  openly  on  the  bookstalls,  foreign 
literature  was  admitted  freely  except  by  fits,  and  Vieusseux’s 
library  at  Florence  was  the  only  place  in  Italy,  where  men 
could  freely  meet  to  discuss  political  questions,  or  read  the 
leading  European  journals.  Florence  was  the  one  city,  where 
Alfieri’s  and  Niccolini’s  plays  could  be  presented  on  the  stage. 

Taxation  was  light  and  equable.  There  were  no  mono- 
polies or  guilds  to  strangle  trade : the  import  duties  were 
the  lowest  in  Europe,  and  Tuscany  was  the  Mecca  of  free- 
traders;^ so  unrelenting  was  the  devotion  to  industrial 
freedom,  that  in  its  name  no  tariff  of  cab  fares  was  allowed 
at  Florence.^  There  was  indeed  no  lack  of  governmental 


1 After  a capital  sentence  in  1829,  f^e  crowd  nearly  lynched  the  execu- 
tioner, and  apparently  there  were  no  more  executions  after  this.  Mittermeier, 
Condizioni,  114, 

^ Horner,  Giusti,  90 ; see  Guerrazzi,  Memorie,  80. 

^ See  the  Blue  Book,  drawn  up  by  Sir  John  Bowring  in  1837  J its  analysis, 
however,  of  the  Tuscan  fiscal  system  is  incomplete.  For  the  effect  of  Free 
Trade  in  mitigating  commercial  crises,  see  Poggi,  Storia,  I.  482. 

4 Till  1859. 


68 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


enterprise  in  certain  directions.  Miicb.  of  the  Maremna 
was  drained,  a cadastral  survey  completed,  the  port  of  Leg- 
horn revived.  The  railway  between  Leghorn  and  Pisa, 
opened  in  1844,  was  one  of  the  earliest  in  Italy.  But 
these  reforms  owed  themselves  to  Fossombroni’s  and  his 
Grand  Duke’s  passion  for  engineering  schemes.  Where 
they  were  not  equally  interested,  the  administration  was 
paralysed  by  its  own  lethargy.  The  army  was  neglected 
and  despised ; kept  up  partly  from  treaty  obligations,  partly 
for  the  sake  of  the  military  bands.  The  officers,  with  few 
exceptions,  were  the  most  worthless  scions  of  the  richer 
classes ; recruits  were  drawn  from  the  scum  of  the  people, 
and  convicts  were  relegated  to  the  so-called  penal  regiments. 
The  judges  shared  in  the  general  corruption,  and  the  decay 
went  on,  till  in  the  ’30s  the  Tuscan  Bench  was  notoriously 
tainted  and  uncertain.  The  civil  service  had  learnt  that 
the  government  hated  earnestness  and  connived  at  pecula- 
tion ; the  ministers  had  little  control  over  their  departments, 
and  Fossombroni’s  system  sank  to  inevitable  rottenness. 
Though  the  local  franchise  was  popular,  the  municipalities 
had  lost  real  power,  and  were  mere  instruments  for  collect- 
ing taxes.  Tuscany  was  historically  “ an  aggregate  of 
communes  more  democratic  than  the  United  States,”  but 
they  were  not  even  allowed  to  levy  their  own  local  rates. 
Their  officials  were  nominated  by  the  central  government, 
and  cringed  to  their  real  masters,  the  police. 

The  government  reflected  the  character  of  the  people, 
its  easy-going  materialism,  its  dislike  of  hardness,  its 
“ poisonous  gift  ” of  a tolerance  that  came  less  of  conviction 
than  want  of  earnestness.  Manners  were  more  gentle  than 
moral ; there  seemed  to  be  no  stuff  for  great  deeds.  Critics 
complained  of  the  gallantry  without  passion,  the  wit  without 
decorum,  the  tolerance  without  dignity  of  Florentine  society. 
Among  the  richer  classes  a sinecure  in  the  civil  service 
was  the  very  path  to  beatitude.  The  feuds  of  opera-dancers, 
the  rivalries  of  Donizetti  and  Verdi,  the  excitement  of 
religious  ceremonies  absorbed  their  feeble  energies.  Ener- 
vation, the  fatal  heritage  of  the  Medici,  was  fostered  by  the 
elegant  scepticism  of  the  aristocracy,  and  the  prevalence  of 


TUSCANY 


69 

a somewhat  sordid  comfort.  Tuscany  was  perhaps  the  most 
prosperous  state  in  Italy ; but  as  Gino  Capponi  lamented,  it 
was  “ a Garden  of  Paradise  without  the  tree  of  knowledge 
and  without  the  tree  of  life.”  It  was  in  Giustis  words 
“ good-humour  at  top  and  good-humour  at  bottom,”  a mild, 
mediocre  life,  with  little  of  bad  in  it  and  less  of  good. 

There  was  nothing  of  the  patrician  in  the  Florentine 
nobles.  Descended  from  the  bankers  and  merchant-princes  of 
medieval  Florence,  they  were  still  traders  and  farmers.  The 
best  were  zealous  social  reformers,  and  the  society  of  the 
Georgofils,  like  the  writers  in  the  Conciliatore,  promoted 
economic  studies,  schools,  savings-banks,  which  slowly  but 
certainly  made  their  mark.  Raffaello  Lambruschini  and 
Enrico  Mayer  became  the  apostles  of  elementary  and 
secondary  education ; Liberal  landed  proprietors  like  Ridolfi 
and  Capponi  and  Bettino  Ricasoli  devoted  themselves  to 
agricultural  improvements  and  the  education  of  the  peasantry, 
founding  agricultural  shows,  experimental  farms,  village  even- 
ing schools,  doing  their  best  to  supply  the  gap  that  the 
indifference  of  the  government  had  left.^  They  were  worthy  , 
philanthropic,  country  gentlemen,  but  too  attached  to  their 
mansions  and  vineyards  to  risk  them  in  a hazardous  revolu- 
tion. Most  of  them  thought  with  Vieusseux,  that  ‘‘  politics 
meant  nothing  and  social  customs  everything,”  and  it  is 
largely  due  to  them  that  there  was  so  much  that  was  doc- 
trinaire and  flaccid  and  unpractical  in  the  later  reform 
movement. 

The  church  in  Tuscany  was  as  much  in  subjection  as  in 
Lombardy.  The  government  refused  to  admit  the  Jesuits 
or  relax  the  laws  of  mortmain.  The  church  was  part  of  the 
machine  for  keeping  things  quiet ; in  Fossombroni’s  scheme 
there  w^as  no  place  for  a zealous  clergy.  The  6000  monks 
and  friars  were  a corrupting  influence  in  the  country  districts ; 
the  9000  secular  clergy,  often  ordained  without  proper  train- 
ing, were  conspicuous  neither  for  morality  nor  learning.^ 
But  the  government  never,  down  to  1846,  forgot  the  erastian 
traditions  of  the  last  century,  and  saved  Tuscany  from  the 

^ Ricasoli,  Lettere,  I.  39. 

^ Zobi,  op.  cit.^  IV.  308 ; Del  Cerro,  Polizia,  153. 


70  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

ecclesiastical  tyranny  "whicli  enslaved  Piedmont  and  desolated 
Romagna. 

With  a debased  civil  service  and  an  ignorant  priesthood 
education  was  under  bad  auspices.  The  government  patron- 
ized the  universities  of  Pisa  and  Siena ; but  little  was 
taught  beyond  law  and  medicine,  and  even  in  these  the 
instruction  was  second-rate,  and  the  work  spoilt  by  the 
absence  of  a sound  elementary  foundation.  There  were  few 
secondary  schools,  and  at  Pistoia  alone  they  were  under 
public  control.  There  were  elementary  schools  for  boys, 
generally  gratuitous,  in  almost  every  commune ; but  though 
in  the  towns  some  were  fairly  good,  the  rural  schools  were 
very  indifferent,  and  the  attendance  reached  only  to  one- 
tenth  of  those  of  school  age.^  There  was  practically  no 
teaching  for  girls.  The  Georgofils  tried  to  supply  the 
deficiences  and  overcome  the  difficulties  caused  by  the 
isolation  of  the  mezzaiuoli  farmers  and  the  absence  of  village 
life.  But  the  government  showed  an  intermittent  opposi- 
tion to  the  pupil-teacher  system,  and  it  was  introduced 
almost  by  stealth,  and  to  a very  limited  extent.  And  when 
in  later  years  the  progressive  section  of  the  ministry  pro- 
jected a national  system  of  elementary  schools,  they  were 
not  sufficiently  in  earnest  to  prevent  the  intrigues  of  Rome 
from  wrecking  the  scheme. 

The  non-interference  of  the  government,  which  was 
fatal  to  the  schools,  should  have  helped  industry.  But 
there  was  not  sufficient  energy  in  the  country  to  give  it  the 
prosperity  of  Lombardy.  Though  there  were  a few  nourish- 
ing manufactures  of  silk,  wool,  and  straw  hats,  and  a good 
many  little  iron  mines  near  the  coast,  the  total  number  of 
industries  was  small,  and  Florence  and  Leghorn  were  the 
only  cities  with  more  than  50,000  inhabitants.  The  mass 
of  the  people  was  agricultural.  Nearly  one  half  were 
proprietors,^  a third  were  farmers,  most  of  them  cultivating 
under  the  mezzedria  system,  which,  however  much  it  may 

1 Bowring,  Report,  57,  60;  Ricasoli,  op.  cti.,  I.  131  ; ^&rx\stox\,  Statistica, 
149,  150;  contra  Sacchi,  Isti'uzione,  45. 

2 Bowring,  Report,  11.  Cini,  Della  iassa,  28,  says  that  in  1835  there  were 
132,000  landowners,  which  would  give  rather  more  than  one-third  of  heads  of 
families. 


TUSCANY 


71 


have  checked  progress,  at  all  events  secured  to  the  tenant 
a modicum  of  comfort.^  More  than  half  the  country  was 
mountain  or  maremna,  but  competent  judges  pronounced 
the  agriculture  of  the  Valdarno  superior  to  that  of  the 
Lothians.^  The  economic  standard  of  the  peasants  was 
indeed  not  high ; but  their  houses  were  comparatively  good, 
and  their  position  was  secure.  Among  the  increasing  class 
of  farm  labourers  there  was  at  times  acute  distress,  and 
though  begging  was  forbidden  in  Florence,  there  was  much 
of  it  elsewhere.  Taken  however  as  a whole,  the  rural 
population,  clever  and  shrewd,  but  ill-educated  and  easy- 
: going,  was  wrapped  in  a sordid  but  not  uncomfortable 
security.  The  general  distribution  of  property,  combined 
with  the  absence  of  education  and  political  life,  made  the 
masses  conservative  and  averse  to  change.  Class  animosity 
seemed  almost  absent.  The  traveller,  seeing  the  prosperity 
and  contentment  of  the  country,  looked  on  Tuscany  as  one 
of  the  favoured  spots  of  earth.  But  the  fair  structure  was 
built  on  an  unsure  foundation.  Alike  in  the  better  and 
worse  sides  of  Tuscan  life  there  showed  the  same  fatal  want 
of  moral  energy,  the  same  lack  of  the  finer  virtues.  Under- 
neath the  polish  of  Florence  and  the  contentment  of  the 
peasantry  lay  an  absence  of  the  more  virile  elements  of 
national  being.  Monotony  and  uneventfulness  in  private 
life,  a want  of  statesmanship  and  administrative  chaos  in 
public  life ; an  almost  entire  absence  of  local  government 
and  education ; a standard  of  comfort  too  much  and  too 
little  to  stimulate ; all  were  a worse  school  of  progress  than 
was  the  discipline  of  Piedmont  or  the  unendurable  misrule 
of  Rome  or  Naples.  It  was  only  in  turbulent  Leghorn, 
with  its  rough,  seafaring  population,  or  among  the  students 
of  Pisa  and  Siena,  that  there  were  any  germs  of  real  and 
fruitful  life. 

^ Under  the  mezzedria  system  the  landlord  advanced  all  or  part  of  the 
capital,  and  took  in  return  for  rent  and  interest  a certain  proportion  of  the 
produce,  generally  from  one-third  to  one-half.  The  mezzaiuoli  tenants  often 
had  a sort  of  customary  fixity  of  tenure.  See  Capponi,  Scritti,  I.  389,  et  seq. 
(translated  in  Bowring,  Eeport,  40-46) ; Id.,  Lettere,  III.  151-161. 

^ Laing,  Notes,  460  ; Cobbett,  Tour. 


72 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  HNITY 


Papal  States 

The  States  of  the  Pope  stretched  from  the  Latin  coast  f 
across  the  Campagna  and  the  Tiber  valley,  over  the  high- 
lands of  Umbria  and  the  Central  Apennines  to  the  Marche? 
of  Fermo  and  Ancona ; thence  turning  northwards  along  l 
narrow  strip  of  country  between  the  Tuscan  Apennines  and 
the  sea,  they  spread  into  the  fertile  plains  of  Romagna,  and 
were  bounded  by  the  Po.  In  1827  the  census  gave  a 
population  of  two  millions  and  a half. 

The  dominant  note  of  the  country,  marking  it  of? 
among  European  states,  was  its  government  of  priests. 
The  Catholic  world  held  it  essential  to  the  Pope’s  honour 
and  prestige  that  he  should  possess  the  prerogatives  of  a 
prince.  Diplomacy  beheved  that  as  such  he  was  less  likely  ► 
to  be  a puppet  of  one  of  the  great  Powers.  “ God  has  i 
entrusted  the  state,”  Avrote  Cardinal  Bernetti,  “ to  His  Yicar  l 
on  earth  for  the  freer  exercise  of  the  Pontifical  primacy 
throughout  the  world.”  The  theory  demanded  an  inde- 
pendent territory,  ovming  the  Pope  as  sovereign.  But  the 
Roman  court  was  not  content  with  a rule,  whose  only 
differentiating  mark  was  its  ecclesiastical  prince.  Long  after 
the  creation  of  the  Papal  dominion,  the  Popes  had  trans- 
formed their  temporal  sovereignty  into  a theocratic  govern- 
ment, and  the  state  became  an  appanage  of  the  Roman 
priesthood.  It  was  the  theory  of  the  Church  that  only 
ecclesiastics  might  administer  a government  of  divine 
appointment ; they  made  its  laws  and  ruled  its  provinces, 
sat  in  its  law  courts,  directed  its  education  and  its  pohce. 

The  Sacred  College  of  Cardinals,  which  elected  the  Pope, 
was  torn  by  factions  and  eaten  through  by  French  and 
Austrian  intrigues.  “Cajolery,  promises,  plots,  betrayed 
without  trace  of  shame,”  so  wrote  a Piedmontese  ambas- 
sador, “ are  the  chi'onic  symptoms,  which  reappear  in  the 
history  of  every  conclave.”  ^ Each  of  the  four  great  Catholic 
Powers  possessed  a veto,  and  the  election  often  resulted  in 

^ Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  III.  34.  See  Salvagni,  Corte  Homana,  III.  122  et  stq., 
178  et  seq. 


PAPAL  STATES 


73 


the  choice  of  a weak,  colourless  man,  who  mounted  the 
throne  stricken  in  years,  and  under  pledges  to  the  party 
which  elected  him.  ‘‘  The  radical  vice  of  the  Roman 
government,”  said  Chateaubriand,  “ is  that  old  men  appoint 
an  old  man  like  themselves,  and  he  in  turn  makes  none  but 
old  men  cardinals.”  ^ The  party-leader  became  Secretary 
of  State,  whose  first  work  was  to  reverse  the  traditions  of 
his  predecessor.  “ Every  Pope’s  rule,”  ran  the  Roman  pro- 
verb, “ is  the  last  one’s  enemy ; ” and  the  new  officials,  who 
came  in  with  each  new  Pontiff,  made  haste  to  feather  their 
nests  before  they  in  turn  were  displaced.^  The  great  officers 
and  heads  of  departments  were  the  more  fortunate  or  power- 
ful of  the  Roman  hierarchy,  and  governed  by  its  grace.  The 
prelates,  or  monsignori,  not  necessarily  priests,  who  held  most 
of  the  chief  posts  in  the  government,  Avere  often  obscure 
adventurers,  who  found  the  prelature  an  easy  road  to  Avealth 
or  a cardinal’s  hat.  Bigoted,  timid,  luxurious,  sometimes 
vicious,  they  formed  an  exclusive  and  tyrannical  oligarchy,^ 
which  differed  from  a feudal  aristocracy  only  in  that  many 
of  its  members  Avere  self-made  men.  A few  scholars,  a fcAv 
ecclesiastical  statesmen  of  ability,  a few  old  men  of  simple, 
pious  worth  only  set  in  blacker  relief  the  general  Avorldliness 
and  frivolity  of  the  Roman  court. ^ 

Outside  Rome  the  government  was  still  in  the  hands  of 
great  ecclesiastics.  Cardinals  ruled  the  four  Legations  of 
Romagna — Bologna,  Ferrara,  Ravenna,  Forli;^  prelates  the 
less  important  delegations  of  the  other  provinces.  Only 
between  1831  and  1836,  and  to  a very  limited  extent  after 
1849,  were  laymen  allowed  to  hold  these  offices.  Though 

1 Chateaubriand,  M6moires,  IV.  451,  465.  He  adds  that  the  ambassadors 
could  not  now  dictate  the  choice  of  a Pope  unless  they  used  heavy  bribery  : 
Ih.  470. 

2 Galeotti,  Sovranitci,  144,  253  ; D’Azeglio,  Lettere  inedite,  II.  194-195. 

’ D’Azeglio,  Scritti  postumi,  159;  Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  III.  167-168,  397  ; Carte 
segrete,!.  303,  344-345,  377  ; D’Ideville,  Journal,  II.  124.  In  1848  the  average 
pay  of  ecclesiastics  in  the  civil  service  was  782  scudi ; of  laymen,  234  scudi. 
See  below,  Vol.  II.,  p.  9. 

^ Liverani,  II  papato,  81-86;  Galeotti,  op.  cit.,  143;  Carte  segrete,  I.  375; 
Farini,  Roman  State,  I.  142 ; Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  III.  403,  405 ; D’Azeglio, 
U Italic,  141  ; Pantaleoni,  Idea  italiana,  58-59,  108  ; Mamiani,  Scritti,  492 ; 
Gaiani,  Roman  Exile,  59  ; Perfetti,  Ricordi,  14. 

® In  1832  Urbino-Pesaro  and  Velletri  were  made  Legations. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


74 

nommally  responsible  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  a legate  or  j 
delegate  was,  in  spite  of  Consalvi’s  efforts  to  bridle  them,  an  | 
almost  independent  prince.  “ A cardinal,”  said  Pellegrino 
Rossi,  ‘‘  is  a prince  at  Rome,  a pacha  in  the  provinces.”  They  i 
claimed  to  impose  taxes  at  discretion;  they  misread  or  j 
neglected  orders  from  Rome.  One  cardinal  made  his  police 
tear  down  Consalvis  edicts,  another  created  new  capital 
offences  unknown  to  the  law.  Sometimes  tyrants,  some- 
times sinecurists,  their  rule  with  few  exceptions  was  one 
long  misgovernment.  “ Vanity,  money,  fear,”  said  a prelate, 

“ have  ruled  this  country  for  several  centuries.”  ^ In  con- 
trast with  the  painstaking  bureaucracies  of  Piedmont  and 
Lombardy  and  the  tolerance  of  Tuscany,  Papal  administra- 
tion was  characterized  by  ferocious  bigotry  and  effrontery  of 
corruption.  To  its  ecclesiastical  rulers,  all  that  savoured  of 
the  nineteenth  century — railways,  telegraphs,  free  trade,  vac- 
cination, modern  literature — were  the  work  of  a spirit  fatal  to 
the  Church.  The  finances,  especially  at  a later  date,  were 
in  the  utmost  confusion.  Consalvi  and  Leo  XII.,  indeed, 
kept  income  and  expenditure  fairly  balanced;  but  under 
Gregory  XVI.  all  pretence  of  order  vanished.  The  treasurer 
was  irresponsible;  from  1835  to  1844  no  statement  of 
accounts  was  published  till  in  after  years;  from  1837 
onwards  there  was  no  proper  book-keeping  or  audit.  The 
public  debt  kept  leaping  up  in  time  of  peace,  and  so  reckless 
was  the  bori^’owing,  that  a loan  from  the  Rothchilds  was 
taken  up  at  a discount  of  35  per  cent.2 

Taxation,  indeed,  was  not  heavy ; ^ but  trade  was  injured  ’ 
by  customs-barriers,  by  want  of  railways  and  good  roads,  by 
the  jobbery  and  officialism  of  the  government.  The  hemp 
of  Romagna,  the  wool  of  the  Agro  Romano  might  have 
developed  a flourishing  commerce.  But  there  was  little 


I Gouvernement  temporel,  102. 

^ Spada,  Rivoluzione,  I.  160.  Spada,  who  was  a pious  bankers  clerk, 
observes  that  the  Rothchilds  “as  Hebrews  were  not  bound  to  believe  in  the 
divine  promises  made  by  Jesus  (Jurist  as  to  the  stability  of  the  Catholic 
Church.”  See  Gennarelli,  Governo  pontificio,  11.  581. 

3 According  to  Pujos,  Legislation,  104,  Rossi  put  the  taxes  per  head  in  1848 
at  one-third  of  those  in  France  or  England;  but  the  comparative  poverty  was 
probably  in  equal  proportion.  See  Bianchi,  op.  cit,  III.  394. 


PAPAL  STATES 


75 


intercourse  across  the  Apennines ; travellers  crawled  along 
the  wretched  roads;  brigands,  though  Consalvi  and  Leo 
did  something  to  put  them  down,  infested  parts  of  the 
country,  especially  near  the  Neapolitan  frontier,  and  it  was 
found  necessary  to  cut  down  trees  near  the  roads,  as  in 
England  of  the  thirteenth  centuryd  Every  province  had 
its  different  standard  of  weights  and  measures ; the  use  of 
gas  was  illegal ; charters  were  rarely  and  grudgingly  granted 
to  chambers  of  commerce.^  There  were  few  manufactures 
beyond  a struggling  wool  and  silk  industry ; there  was  no 
marine,  no  foreign  trade  except  from  Ancona.  Bounties 
and  protection  only  crippled  production  the  more,  and  the 
woollen  industry  languished,  though  clergy  and  officials  were 
at  one  time  practically  forbidden  to  wear  stuffs  of  foreign 
wool.^  High  duties  gave  birth  to  an  organized  contraband 
with  all  the  mercantile  machinery  of  clerks  and  insurances.^ 
Economic  knowledge  was  indeed  medieval  or  non-existent. 
A prelate  high  in  control  of  the  Exchequer  refused  to  study 
political  economy,  because  its  books  were  ‘‘  pernicious  and 
on  the  Index.”  When  prices  of  food  were  high,  the  com- 
munes were  compelled,  public  opinion  assenting,  to  purchase 
supplies  and  sell  at  an  artificial  cheapness.  And  to  keep 
prices  low  at  Home,  corn  might  be  moved  across  a parish 
boundary,  only  when  it  went  in  the  direction  of  the  capital. 

Nor  were  there  any  local  liberties,  at  least  in  the 
’20s,  to  temper  the  misrule.  The  old  vigorous  muni- 
cipal life  had  been  crushed  by  the  French,  and  Consalvi 
swept  away  the  little  that  was  left.  There  was,  indeed,  a 
framework  of  communal  government,  but  the  powers  were 
nominal.  The  governor,  who  ruled  each  district,  controlled 
the  police,  administered  summary  justice,  tyrannized  over 
the  communes,  unchecked  so  long  as  he  displaj^ed  a due 
obsequiousness  to  his  ecclesiastical  superior.  And  though 

^ V.  Raumer,  op.  cit.,  II.  52 ; Gavazzi,  Four  Last  Popes,  68.  The  brigands 
once  carried  off  a whole  seminary,  masters  and  pupils.  On  another  occasion 
9000  soldiers  guarded  the  roads  to  protect  the  King  of  Prussia  from  capture. 

^ In  one  charter  it  took  five  articles  to  define  the  position  of  the  Porter. 

® Miscellaneous  Edicts,  No.  27  ; see  Galli,  Cenni,  258,  and  Bowring,  Report, 
82-84,  for  opposite  views  respecting  bounties. 

^ Farini,  op.  cit.,  I.  147. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


76 

his  despotism  might  be  somewhat  tempered  in  the  towns,  j 
the  villages  were  at  his  mercy.  To  conciliate  the  Powers,  H 
Bernetti  framed  at  a later  date  an  elaborate  scheme  of 
provincial  councils.  On  the  surface  it  was  perhaps  the 
most  liberal  law  of  the  kind  in  Italy.  Each  council  was  ^ 
to  be  elected  indirectly  by  the  communes  of  the  province ; 
but  none  but  landed  proprietors  were  eligible,  the  councils 
met  once  only  in  the  year,  and  debated  with  closed  doors. 
Opinions  differed  as  to  their  work ; at  all  events,  whether 
through  their  fault  or  not,  they  wore  the  muzzle  of  the 
government  and  after  the  first  few  years  it  was  rare  for 
men  of  position  to  sit  upon  them. 

The  general  law  was  of  a piece  with  the  rest  of  the 
government.  Before  1831  there  Avas  no  serious  attempt 
to  codify  it,  and  it  Avas  still  a monstrous  compound  of  enact- 
ments of  every  age,  obsolete  and  uncorrelated.^  To  men 
Avho  had  tasted  of  the  simplicity  and  equity  of  Napoleon  s 
code.  Papal  laAV  seemed  a plunge  back  into  medievalism. 
Consalvi,  indeed,  had  retained  the  French  commercial  law, 
had  sAvept  away  most  of  the  baronial  courts,  and  abolished 
suitors’  fees.  But  his  promises  of  codes  came  to  little,  and 
under  Leo  the  modest  reforms  he  had  made  nearly  disappeared 
aofain.  Even  the  Civil  Code,  Avhich  Bernetti  introduced  in 
1831,  though  based  on  the  Code  Napoleon,  retained  many 
of  the  abuses  of  the  older  laAV.  It  gave  special  sanction  to 
entails ; it  forbade  divorce  under  any  circumstances ; it 
alloAved  no  property  to  pass  to  Avomen  in  cases  of  intestacy ; 
it  invalidated  wills  Avhich  omitted  legacies  to  the  Church. 
The  Avhole  judicial  system  w^as  complicated  beyond  expres- 
sion. Up  to  1831  there  were  at  Rome  fifteen  separate 
jurisdictions,  besides  the  private  courts  of  barons  and 
religious  corporations  ; and  the  Pope’s  “ most  holy  auditor  ” 
could  quash  proceedings  or  verdict  in  any  court.  Bernetti’s 
reforms  SAvept  aAA^ay  much  of  this ; the  Pope’s  auditor  dis- 
appeared, and  a better  system  AA-as  inaugurated  in  the 
provinces.  But  at  Rome  much  of  the  old  machinery 
remained,  and  the  greatest  abuse  of  all,  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  ecclesiastical  courts,  Avas  left  untouched.  Canon  law 

^ Sauzet,  Rome^  198-202  ; Pianciani,  Rome  des  Papes,  III.  243,  et  seq. 


PAPAL  STATES 


77 

ruled  the  principles  of  government,  and  by  the  canon  law 
the  priest  had  a sacred  character.  It  followed  that  cases, 
to  which  he  was  a party,  must  be  tried  by  men  of  his  own 
order,  that  his  punishments  must  be  on  a lower  scale  than 
those  of  laymen.^  Under  various  pretexts  the  ecclesiastical 
courts  were  constantly  encroaching  on  the  ordinary  law. 
Widows,  orphans,  the  servants  of  prelates,  were  swept  within 
their  jurisdiction ; they  decided  on  cases  of  church  property 
and  charities,  of  sexual  immorality  and  blasphemy.  And 
while  ecclesiastics  could  be  judged  only  by  ecclesiastics, 
prelates  monopolized  the  bench  in  the  high  courts,  that 
tried  laymen  and  cleric  alike.  They  sat  in  the  Segnatura, 
the  Rota,  the  Sagra  Consulta ; they  were  a majority  in  the 
Exchequer  Court  and  in  the  criminal  court  of  the  Aitditor 
Cameroe.  The  young  prelates,  who  were  placed  on  the  bench 
as  a stepping-stone  to  better  posts,  were  venal  and  incapable. 
The  real  work  was  done  by  the  lay  assessors,  the  “ auditors,” 
who,  being  without  responsibility  or  pay,  were  the  tools  of 
the  government  or  of  the  richest  suitor.  The  provincial 
judges,  though  laymen,  bore  no  better  repute;  all  were 
removable,  most  were  miserably  paid.  They  were  often 
young  and  untried  men,  foisted  into  office  by  powerful 
patronage,  ignorant,  corrupt,  too  closely  connected  with  the 
administration  to  be  impartial.  Only  in  particularly  scan- 
dalous instances  would  the  government  interfere;  and  a judge, 
convicted  of  forgery,  was  known  to  have  received  pension 
instead  of  punishment.^  The  procedure  of  the  courts  was 
often  equally  discredited.  Pleadings  before  the  Rota  and 
Segnatura  were  in  Latin,  and  before  1831  the  same  rule 
applied  in  many  of  the  lower  courts.  On  the  pretext  of 
preventing  intimidation  of  witnesses,  the  public  were  excluded 
from  all  the  more  important  criminal  cases.  Every  encour- 
agement was  given  to  informers;  no  bail  was  allowed; 
before  Bernetti’s  reforms  no  criminal  defendant  might 

o 

cross-examine ; and  though  after  1831  he  was  nominally 
permitted  to  select  his  own  counsel,  the  advocate,  who  made 
a genuine  defence,  was  liable  to  be  punished.  Even  more 

1 See  Minghetti,  Uetat,  5. 

* Farini,  op.  cit.,  I.  158. 


78  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  1 

iniquitous  was  the  procedure,  that  obtained  in  cases  of  i 
treason  and  sedition.  Here  even  after  1831  no  cross-  • 
examination  was  allowed ; men  were  sentenced  without 
knowing  who  their  accusers  were ; their  counsel  was  ap-  d 
pointed  by  the  court,  and  often  worked  for  conviction.^  It  !| 
was  treason,  punishable  with  death  and  confiscation,  to  be 
present  at  a meeting  of  a secret  society ; the  galleys  for  life 
were  the  penalty  for  being  privy  to  the  escape  of  an  affiliate 
(unless  he  were  a relative),  or  to  an  attempt  to  proselytize. 
Sacrilege,  however  innocent  of  political  complexion,  was  con- 
structed into  treason  and  punishable  with  death.  Political 
convicts  were  deported  to  “ unhealthy  localities,”  or  confined 
with  criminals  “ contrary  to  the  law  of  nations,”  or  chained 
for  life  to  the  walls  of  their  cells.^ 

'The  police  were  more  than  ordinarily  vexatious.  “They 
can,”  complained  a pamphleteer  in  1846,  “imprison  a man, 
banish  him,  exercise  surveillance  over  him,  refuse  his  pass- 
port, confine  him  to  a district,  deprive  him  of  civil  rights, 
rob  him  of  office,  forbid  him  to  carry  arms  or  leave  his 
house  at  night.  They  open  his  letters  in  the  post,  and 
make  no  attempt  to  conceal  it.  They  can  invade  his  house 
and  seize  his  papers,  they  can  close  shops  and  cafes  and 
inns,  and  fine  us  at  their  pleasure.”  Espionage  was  general ; 
they  had  domestic  servants  in  their  pay ; men  were  arrested 
at  the  bare  hint  of  the  parish  priest.  There  were  at  one  | 
time  3000  political  suspects  at  Pome,  confined  to  their  i 
houses  between  sundown  and  sunrise,  and  driven  to  con-  j 
fession  once  a month.  There  was  special  surveillance  of  I 
what  a police  document  termed  “ the  class  called  thinkers.” 
Too  busy  to  spare  time  for  the  protection  of  person  and: 
property,  it  sometimes  seemed  as  if  they  were  in  league 
with  criminals  against  the  propertied  classes.^ 

1 Whiteside,  Italy,  II.  292;  Pianciani,  op.  cit.,  III.  244,  266,  286-288; 
Galetti,  Memoria,  7. 

2 Orsini,  Memoirs,  31  ; Pianciani,  op.  cit.,  III.  343  ; D’Azeglio,  Iltimi  Casi, 
99.  For  the  administration  of  law  generally,  see  Raccolta  delle  leggi,  VII. ; Pujos, 
op.  cit.;  Guizot,  Memoires,  II.  439-442 ; Vesi,  Rivoluzione,  78-86;  Farini,  op. 
cit.,  I.  158-161  ; Pantaleoni,  op.  cit.,  13-14- 

3 Un  Galantuomo, /uciiW^zo,  41-42;  Gaiani,  07).  cit.,  207,  259-260;  Carte 
segrete,  II.  32-33;  About,  Question  romaine,  170;  Orsini,  op.  cit.,  248;  Raccolta 
delle  leggi,  V.  680. 


PAPAL  STATES 


79 

They  found  efficient  allies  in  the  Holy  Office  of  the 
Inquisition.  While  the  police  harried  the  people  in  their 
^aily  lives,  the  Inquisition  collected  the  secrets  of  the 
confessional,^  and  launched  its  spiritual  thunders  on  the 
unconforming.  An  edict  is  extant,  issued  by  the  Inquisitor- 
General  of  Pesaro  in  1841,  commanding  all  people  to  in- 
form against  heretics,  Jews,  and  sorcerers,  those  who  have 
impeded  the  Holy  Office,  or  made  satires  against  the  Pope 
and  clergy.  A brother-inquisitor  threatened  excommunica- 
tion against  any  who  were  privy  to  and  did  not  denounce 
those  “ who  worship  the  devil  in  their  hearts.”  ^ Unsavoury 
stories  were  told  in  later  years  of  skeletons  and  instruments 
of  torture  found  in  their  dungeons  at  Eome.^  Their  most 
hapless  victims  were  the  Jews.  Though  Jewish  capital  sup- 
ported the  trade  of  Romagna  and  Ancona,  and  their  co- 
religionists financed  the  Holy  See,  they  were  compelled  to 
wear  a badge,  and  prohibited  from  acquiring  land.  Leo 
forbade  them  to  travel  without  leave,  and  confined  them  to 
the  Ghettos  after  nightfall.  Under  the  Lambruschini  mis- 
rule their  lot  was  even  worse;  the  Jews  of  Ancona  and 
Sinigaglia  were  forbidden  to  “ have  friendly  relations  with 
Christians,  or  bury  their  dead  with  funeral  ceremonies ; 
and  an  attempt  was  made  to  drive  them  from  the  province 
by  an  order,  doubtless  evaded,  to  sell  their  property,  real  or 
personal. 

While  the  Inquisition  coerced  the  people  into  outward 
conformhy,  the  government  tried  to  kill  out  heterodoxy 
and  sedition  by  crippling  education.  Its  critics  said  that 
its  maxim  was  ‘‘  to  tolerate  vice  and  proscribe  thought.” 

Ignorant  people,”  said  a Monsignor  to  D’Azeglio,  ‘‘  are  easier 
to  govern.”  There  was  indeed  no  lack  of  educational  insti- 
tutions ; traditions  of  days,  when  the  church  had  protected 
learning  and  Italy  had  planted  thick  her  Universities, 


■ 107  ; Carte  segrete,  I.  136,  369  ; Orsini,  op. 


^ Niccolini,  Pontificate,  106 
nt.,  232. 

Gennarelli,  Lutti,  I55'“i59  » Miscellaneous  Documents,  No.  14. 

^ I state  this  with  considerable  reserve.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
skeletons  and  instruments  of  torture  were  found,  but  there  is  some  suspicion 
-hat  they  were  placed  there  after  the  Inquisition  had  been  expelled.  See 
iol.  II.,  Appendix  E. 


8o  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

had  not  been  entirely  effaced.  But  education  was  mono- 
polized by  the  clerics,  and  enervated  by  a rigid  and  absurd 
cmTiculum.  No  person  might  teach  without  the  sanc- 
tion of  the  bishop;  in  spite  of  Dominicans  and  parish 
clergy  and  local  authorities  the  Jesuits  got  secondary  edu- 
cation into  their  own  hands;  the  Ignorantelh  Brothers, 
unpopular  for  their  questionable  pedagogy  and  morality, 
supplied  the  staff*  for  many  of  the  elementary  schools ; even 
in  the  Universities  the  majority  of  professors  were  ecclesi- 
astics. The  church  managed  education  no  better  than  law 
or  finance.  Elementary  teaching,  even  such  as  it  was,  faded 
to  reach  large  sections  of  the  people.  Boys’  schools  were 
maintained  by  the  commune  in  the  great  majority  of  tovms 
and  villages,  but  the  teaching  was  of  a poor  order,  and  the 
peasants  used  them  little.  There  was  practically  no  ele- 
mentary education  for  girls,  for  mixed  schools  were  strictly 
prohibited,  and  public  opinion  was  prudish  and  opposed  to 
female  learning.  It  was  estimated  that  only  two  per  cent, 
of  the  population  attended  school,  and  even  in  Rome  the 
proportion  was  only  one  in  ten.^  In  the  secondaiy  schools 
the  scholars  stagnated  under  a dreary  course  of  Latin  gram- 
mar and  scholastic  metaphysics.  Of  machinery  for  higher 
teaching  there  was  a superfluity.  There  were  two  great 
Universities  at  Rome  and  Bologna ; smaller  ones  at  Perugia, 
Ferrara,  Camerino,  Macerata,  Fermo.  Bologna  still  retained 
some  of  her  old  prestige,  and  the  Roman  University  boije  a 
fair  repute.  But  the  professors  were  appointed  by  com- 
petition, and  were  liable  to  summary  dismissal,  modem 
hterature  and  political  economy  were  excluded ; down  to 
1835  at  Bologna,  and  probably  later  elsewhere,  Latin  was  I 
the  compulsory  medium  for  lectures  in  theology,  law,  and 
metaphysics,  even  to  a certain  extent  in  medicine.  The 
government  was  always  tormented  by  the  fear  that  the 
Universities  might  become  centres  of  Liberalism.  In  order 
to  matriculate  it  was  necessary  to  produce  the  governor’s 

1 Bowring,  op.  cit.,  85,  89;  Tonrnon,  Etudes,  87;  Serristori,  op.  cit.,  229; 
Mittermeier,  op.  cit.,  210-21 1 ; Sacchi,  op.  cit.,  63. 

- “Ove  la  maggior  decenza  esige  sec.  83  of  Leo’s  Bull.  See  About,  op. 
cit.,  71.  It  was  said  that  a teacher  of  veterinary  medicine  was  obliged  to 
lecture  in  Latin  ; Pianciani,  op.  cit.,  III.  145- 


PAPAL  STATES 


8i 


and  bishop’s  certificates  of  ‘‘  good  religious,  moral,  and  poli- 
tical conduct  ” ; ^ and  nobody  was  admitted,  “ who  had  given 
any  cause  for  suspicion  of  rebellious  tendencies.”  And  alike 
to  students  and  adults  the  lawful  literary  diet  was  of  the 
meagrest.  The  Jesuits  forbade  the  study  of  Dante  in 
their  schools ; private  circles  to  read  economic  books  were 
forbidden;  in  the  ’30s  a censor  struck  out  some  verses 
referring  to  the  motion  of  the  earth.^  It  was  of  course 
impossible  that  any  native  literature  of  worth  could  flourish  ; 
and  except  where  they  were  surreptitiously  obtained  or  con- 
nivance was  paid  for,^  the  great  bulk  of  Italian  and  foreign 
publications  were  excluded.  Most  modern  books  of  high 
repute,  most  newspapers  were  placed  upon  the  Index.^  By 
means  like  these  the  rulers  hoped  to  keep  orthodoxy  im- 
maculate ; perhaps  all  the  more  because  of  them,  free- 
ohought  spread  fast  among  the  cultured  classes,  and  sapped 
3he  authority  of  the  Papal  See. 

It  was  impossible  that  it  should  be  otherwise.  The 
strictest  moral  laws  were  in  monstrous  contrast  to  the  moral 
axity  of  those  who  administered  them.  While  attendance 
it  church  and  communion  at  Easter  were  obligatory,  the 
laily  traffic  in  sacred  offices,  the  jugglery  in  eternal  salva- 
ion  was  shameless  as  in  Luther’s  day.  While  men  were 
lenied  the  physician’s  aid  if  they  refused  the  sacraments,^ 
iovert  freethought  was  rife  in  the  Roman  hierarchy.  The 
:ensorship  kept  the  theatres  pure,  but  left  the  churches 
entres  of  intrigue.  Children,  who  at  school  were  com- 
telled  to  strictest  religious  observance,  heard  from  the  pulpit 
ulogies  of  devout  highwaymen,  whom  the  saints  protected 
rom  the  gallows.  Fiscal  necessities  kept  the  lottery  open 
n Sundays,  while  shops  and  cafes  had  to  close.  There  was 

0 doubt  a purer  section  of  the  hierarchy  which  cherished  an 
leal  of  a godly  state,  but  the  vexatious  jurisdiction  of  the 

^ Raccolta  delle  leggi,  II.  8. 

1 ^ Campanella  and  Niccolini,  op.  cit.,  149;  Gaiani,  op.  cit.,  105;  Ming- 

|)tti,  Ricordi,  I.  47,  223.  ^ Curci,  Vaticano  regio,  168. 

^ Of  English  papers,  the  Times  was  “suspected”  ; the  Standard,  Morning 
\ronicle,  and  Examiner,  and  “in  general  all  the  Protestant  and  Tory  papers,” 
ere  “adverse  to’religion”;  the  Globe  and  Observer  were  “ indifferent.” — Orsini, 
'emoirs,  257.  ^ Farini,  op.  cit.,  I.  137. 

VOL.  I. 


F 


82 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


stricter  ecclesiastics  only  prejudiced  the  cause  of  morality. 
Illegitimate  children  were  excluded  from  the  universities; 
confession  was  refused  to  those  who  did  not  denounce  blas- 
phemy and  fornication ; an  archbishop  of  Smigagha  ordered 
betrothals  to  be  broken  off  if  the  parish  priest  refused  his 
sanction,  and  forbade  young  men  and  women  to  pay  more 
than  three  visits  to  each  other’s  houses.  The  good  men, 
who  prompted  the  compulsion  of  virtue,  were  more  m 
fault  in  their  methods  than  their  aims ; but  viewed  m con- 
nection with  the  lives  of  some  of  their  colleagues,  it  seemed 

the  very  organization  of  hypocrisy.^  ^ i m 

Such  was  the  misrule  that  held  high  com’t  m the  Tem- 
poral Dominions  of  the  Pope,  with  stagnation  and  discontent 
often  anarchy  and  sheer  misery  for  its  fruits.  A travelled 
Irish  fudge  pronounced  that  the  Pope’s  subjects  were  e 
only  people  in  Europe  more  wretcEed  than  his  own  country- 
men ■ and  though  the  popular  conception  of  their  backward- 
ness and  unhappiness  took  inadequate  account  of  Romagnuol 
vigour,  it  was  not  much  exaggerated.  The  very  disgus 
produced  by  the  hypocrisy  of  the  government  proved  per- 
haps the  moral  safeguard  of  the  people ; but  no  industry  or 
ability  could  make  a state  prosperous  in  the  face  of  a corrupt 
administration  and  an  economic  system  that  strangled  trade. 
And  the  nearer  to  Rome,  the  more  miserable  was  the  decay 
of  the  country  and  its  inhabitants.  In  the  eastern  por- 
tions of  the  state  the  misrule  had  not  had  time  to  'wrec 


all  traces  of  prosperity. 


Romagna  and  the  Marches  had 


down  to  the  days  of  the  French  rule  enjoyed  a large 
measure  of  independence,  and  in  consequence  they  were 
comparatively  prosperous  and  advanced.  There  was  i 
vigorous  middle  class  in  many  of  the  cities,  and  the  Rornag 
nuol  artisan  was  perhaps  the  finest  specimen  of  Ita hai^ 
manhood.  Bologna  was  the  most  important  manufactuimg 
centre  in  the  state ; Ancona  was  the  only  port  that  boasted 
a trade.  Even  the  peasants  here,  farming  on  mezzedria 
tenures,  were  comparatively  prosperous.  The  hemp  industrj 
of  the  Romagnuol  plain  was  thriving ; and  along  the  coasi 

. Bianchi, op.  oil., III.  4.1-414;  11.3, 8,  " > 

I.  369;  Gennarelli,  Lutti,  160-161 ; Id.,  Ooverno  fontvfino,  I.  324.  Misce 
laneous  Edicts,  No.  i8. 


PAPAL  STATES 


83 

provinces  as  far  as  Fermo  the  culture  of  the  soil  was  fairly 
good.  But  the  exactions  of  brigands  and  Centurions  ^ at  times 
brought  misery  on  the  thrifty  farmers,  and  the  Sanfedists  ^ 
found  zealous  defenders  of  the  faith  among  the  unemployed* 

Their  comparative  prosperity  and  intelligence  were  prob- 
ably the  chief  cause  of  the  perpetual  unrest,  with  which 
the  trans-Apennine  provinces  seethed.  The  hereditary  feuds 
of  the  Middle  Ages  transmuted  themselves  into  bitter  and 
bloody  struggles  between  Liberals  and  Sanfedists.  Romagna 
was  the  unfailing  seed-bed  of  conspiracy ; and  through  the 
Legations  ran  a vast  network  of  secret  correspondence,  which 
had  never  been  betrayed.  The  bulk  of  the  Liberals  were  separa- 
tists. There  was  no  homogeneity  between  the  eastern  and 
western  portions  of  the  state ; the  barrier  of  the  Apennines 
parted  off  the  Legations  and  the  Marches  from  Rome,  and  their 
affinities  lay  with  the  provinces  that  had  formed  the  Kingdom 
of  Italy.  The  cities  of  Romagna  could  never  forget  their  lost 
liberties,  granted  them  by  old  treaties,  which  Napoleon  had 
swept  away,  and  Consalvi  had  refused  to  restore.  They  looked 
on  the  Papal  Government  as  a pledge-breaker,  and  most  of  all 
Bologna,  proud  of  its  history,  its  university,  its  trade,  ill-dis- 
guised its  hatred  of  rival  Rome,  the  home  of  the  venal  bureau- 
cracy that  plundered  the  state.  Better  the  Turks  than  the 
Pope,”  ran  the  Romagnuol  proverb ; and  many  would  have 
even  taken  Austrian  rule,  if  it  would  free  them  from  his 
tyranny.^  Even  in  the  ’30s  statesmen  like  Rossi  and  Bernetti 
saw  that  Home  Rule  was  the  only  means  of  preserving  the 
Adriatic  provinces  to  Rome ; ^ and  the  separatist  feeling  came 
to  the  fore  at  every  crisis  in  the  history  of  the  state. 

The  inland  provinces  on  the  western  slope  of  the 
Apennines  showed  a progressive  deterioration.  The  hill 
districts  of  Umbria  were  not  far  behind  Romagna  in  pro- 
sperity. But  there  was  less  virility  and  self-reliance,  more 
sentimental  attachment  to  Rome,  and  the  Liberals  were 
strong  only  in  a few  towns.  South  and  west  of  Umbria, 

1 See  below,  pp.  116,  141. 

i 2 Carte  segrete,  I.  354,  360-361,  454  ; Cantu,  Cronistoria,  II.  282,  III,  127  n.  ; 
Gualterio,  op.  cit,  I.  143  ; D’Azeglio,  Ultimi  Casi,  52. 

I ^ Guizot,  Memoires,  II.  451-452 ; Chateaubriand,  Memoires,  IV.  379;  Poggi, 
Storia,!.  151. 


84  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

in  the  Comarca,  all  traces  of  prosperity  rapidly  disappeared, 
except  in  the  small  hiU-district  of  Frosinone.  The  great 
entailed  and  mortmain  properties  began,  and  as  the  traveller 
neared  Rome,  he  found  the  population  more  and  more 
sunk  in  ignorance  and  brutish  squalor.  The  climax  v as 
reached  in  the  desolate  solitudes  of  the  malaria- smitten 
Agro  Romano,  which  stretched  along  the  coast-line  south- 
wards from  Civita  Vecchia,  Here  the  great  Roman 
families,  whose  estates  stretched  to  portentous  magnitude  in 
Italian  eyes,  had  their  patrimonies.^  The  land,  naturally 
fertile,  but  almost  valueless  through  neglect,  was  let  at 
very  low  rents,  in  huge  farms  averaging  1500  acres  and 
reaching  in  one  instance  to  over  thhty  square  miles. 
AVhat  had  once  been  the  centre  of  Roman  civilization  was 
now  the  home  of  a few  ragged  and  fever-stricken  herdsmen. 
Migrant  labourers  came  in  gangs  from  the  hills  in  harvest- 
time,  the  high  wages  overcoming  the  terror  of  the  malaiia, 
which  decimated  then*  ranks,  and  made  the  work  a fearful  , 
lottery.  In  spite  of  its  native  richness,  the  average  produce 
was  one-third  of  that  of  Romagna,  and  the  population  of  the 
pro^unce  of  Civita  Yecchia  was  thhty-five  to  the  square  mile.  1 
Rome  naturally  occupied  a position  by  herself.  In  a 
sense,  the  city  was  only  the  suburb  of  the  Papal  court.  ^ The 
reverence  which  surrounded  the  centre  of  Cathohc  Chiisten- 
dom,  the  pomp  of  cardinals  and  nobles,  the  daily  procession 
of  mystic  ceremony  tied  the  Romans  to  the  Pope  b}-  stiong 
bands  that  were  absent  in  the  rest  of  the  state.  The  native 
aristocracy  was  parasitic  and  exclusive  in  a sense  little 
knovTL  in  Italy,  jealous  of  the  ecclesiastical  power,  but 
bound  by  tradition  to  the  Papacy.  The  professional  and 
mercantile  classes  were  Liberals,  but  they  were  few  in 
number,  and  without  a municipal  authority  to  give  expres- 
sion to  their  wishes.  The  Roman  populace  was  biave, 
alert,  comparatively  educated ; but  the  pride  of  a supposed 

^ Prince  Borghese  owned  100,000  acres. 

2 Toumon,  Etudes,  1.  310;  GaUi,  Cenni,  182,  207  et  seq.  ; according  to  76. 
205,  the  produce  was  2^  bushels  per  acre.  A special  tax  was  imposed  in  1832 
for  killing  wolves:  Raccolta  delle  leggi,  VI.  21.  See  also  About,  op.  cit.,  274- 
276  et  alibi;  Chateauvieux,  Travels;  Didier,  Campagne;  and  for  its  condition 
in  1882,  Beauclerk,  RuraZ  Italy,  72-81,  86,  87,  104. 


PAPAL  STATES 


85 

classical  descent  and  the  demoralization  of  lavish  charities  ^ 
made  it  idle  and  quarrelsome,  and  the  lower  strata  led  a 
life  of  infinite  degradation.  Rome,  in  fact,  as  Metternich 
said,  was  like  a magnificent  theatre  with  bad  actors.^  Its 
churches  were  “ full  of  monuments,  but  empty  of  people.” 
On  the  surface  the  most  moral  of  European  cities,  in  reality  it 
was  corrupt  as  any.^  There  was  little  industry ; the  streets 
swarmed  with  beggars;  large  numbers  of  the  poor  were 
; hangers-on  in  the  households  of  prelates  and  nobles,  and  had 
I learnt  to  wear  the  badge  at  least  of  servility.  In  Sismondi’s 
j words,  all  Romans  wore  either  the  tonsure,  or  livery,  or  rags. 
For  the  Pope  the  populace  had  an  unbounded  reverence ; 
they  were  interested  in  the  pomp  of  the  Prelacy,  and  even  in 
the  ecclesiastical  small- talk;  but  they  profoundly  disbelieved 
in  its  virtues,  and  relished  the  pasquinades  which  lashed  the 
I abuses  of  the  government  and  the  vices  of  the  great.  Still 
they  had  little  sympathy  with  Liberalism  ; the  spoilt  children 
of  the  state,  they  despised  the  progressive  middle  classes. 
It  was  not  till  Gregorys  reign  that  a change  came  over 
them.  His  life  and  character  were  little  calculated  to 
! stir  their  loyalty.  Young  Italy  made  many  converts,  and 
i Lamennais’  Words  of  a Believer  are  said  to  have  made  a 
deep  impression  on  the  more  thoughtful.  Though  much 
of  the  old  sentimental  loyalty  survived,  the  men  whom  the 
Trasteverines  followed  in  the  ’40s  were  earnest  democrats, 
with  little  love  for  a Pope,  unless  he  threw  his  lot  in  with 
them.  Still,  even  in  later  times,  except  in  the  early  years  of 
Pio  Nono  and  under  Mazzini’s  republic,  Rome  was  perhaps  the 
least  Italian  of  Italian  cities.  The  Papal  influence  was  always 
.strong;  the  foreign  residents  and  visitors  distracted  their 
I clients  from  politics.  And  though  the  majority  were  probably 
I always  passively  nationalist  after  1846,  though  they  hated 
I and  despised  the  Pope’s  government,  they  gave  a poor  backing 
to  the  efforts  outside  to  free  them,  and  gave  some  colour  to 
the  argument  that  Rome  was  not  Italian,  but  cosmopolitan. 

^ On  New  Year’s  Day  1848  the  Senate  distributed  120,000  lbs.  of  bread 
and  30,000  lbs.  of  meat. 

2 Metternich,  Memoires,  III.  201.  He  adds,  “I  cannot  understand  how  a 
Protestant  can  turn  Catholic  at  Rome.” 

3 Liverani,  op.  cit.,  124-125,  251;  Gregorovius,  Diari  romani,  129;  Dicey, 
Rome,  35  ; About,  op.  cit.,  48-50. 


CHAPTEE  V 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY— (continued) 

Naples  : the  new  land  system ; theory  and  practice ; justice ; local 
government ; education  ; corruption  of  government ; nobles  ; clergy  ; 
educated  classes  ; trade  ; city  of  Naples  ; peasants  ; political  indiffer- 
ence. Sicily  : character  ; Home  Kule  ; land  system  ; the  peasants  ; 
malendrinaggio  ; want  of  education. 

The  Elements  of  the  Italian  Nation  : church ; nobles ; middle 
classes  ; universities ; artisans  and  town  labourers  ; peasants.  The 
oppression  ; absence  of  political  life  ; dawn  of  patriotism. 


Naples 

In  tlie  south  of  the  peninsula,  covering  three-eighths  of 
its  surface,  lay  the  Kingdom  of  Naples  and  Sicily,  the 
“ Two  Sicilies  ” of  diplomatic  language.  Character,  geo- 
graphical position,  the  bitter  feud  between  Neapolitan  and 
Sicilian,  made  it  the  most  distinctive  and  isolated  of  Italian 
states.  The  two  countries,  which  were  held  together  merely 
by  the  common  pressure  of  the  government,  had  their 
different  traditions  and  aspirations,  their  character  and 
social  life  most  dissimilar.  Naples  shared  in  the  reform- 
ing movement  of  the  eighteenth  centmy.  Charles  III. 
reduced  the  privileges  of  the  nobles ; Acton  in  the  earher 
years  of  his  ministry  designed  the  gradual  abolition  pf 
feudalism.  But  the  French  Revolution  frightened  the 
government  back  into  extremes  of  reaction.  The  Bourbon 
court,  driven  into  Sicily  by  the  French,  returned  in  1799 
to  wreak  its  revenge,  and  under  Nelson’s  willing  patronage^ 
Fra  Diavolo  and  his  crew  outran  their  royal  master’s  orders 
and  made  Naples  red  with  civil  blood.  years  later 

the  French  advance  again  made  the  court  take  refuge 
behind  the  English  arms  in  Sicily,  and  Naples  for  nine 

1 For  his  atrocious  conduct  see  Hervey-Saint-Denys,  Histoire,  236-253. 

86 


NAPLES 


87 

years  came  under  the  Freneh  rule,  first  of  Joseph  Bonaparte, 
then  of  Murat.  Feudalism  was  abolished;  the  great  majority 
of  monasteries  were  dissolved,  and  their  immense  properties 
were  sold  or  let  on  perpetual  leases.  Entails  became 
illegal,  and  many  of  the  large  feudal  estates  passed  into 
the  hands  of  creditors ; communal  lands  were  divided  into 
small  holdings  and  let  to  the  poorer  inhabitants.  The  land- 
system  was  revolutionized  at  a blow,  and  great  slices  of 
the  country  were  bought  up  by  small  proprietors.  There 
were  now  a million  landowners,  or  one  in  five  of  the 
population.  It  is  true  that  many  of  the  properties  were 
too  small  to  yield  an  independence ; that  others  were 
bought  up  by  speculators ; that  to  some  extent  the  change 
only  increased  the  number  of  little  tyrants  of  the  middle 
class,  who  owned  both  land  and  capital.^  Yet  the  French 
legislation  went  far  towards  democratizing  the  social  struc- 
ture. Murat  left  Naples  free  from  feudalism,  with  a reformed 
law,  an  ordered  finance,  a more  stable  land-system.  Civil 
institutions  had  advanced  four  centuries  in  the  nine  years 
of  French  rule.  And  though  the  Restoration  undid  much, 
it  left  the  law,  the  church,  the  land,  in  theory  at  least,  in 
harmony  with  modern  conditions.  No  other  state  in  Italy 
could  boast  institutions  so  advanced  : no  government,  save 
the  Pope’s,  was  so  utterly  degraded  in  practice  as  that 
which  afflicted  Naples  and  Sicily  under  the  Bourbon  rule. 

It  was  the  same  story  of  corruption  in  every  branch  of 
the  administration.  Naples  had  the  most  enlightened  code 
of  justice  in  Italy.  The  courts  were  generally  open  to  the 
public;  there  was  a modified  system  of  bail;  a defendant 
might  select  his  own  counsel  and  cross-examine.  In  prac- 
tice too  often  caprice  was  the  only  law.  Secret  orders  in 
council  overrode  the  codes;  the  crown  interfered  to  pro- 
tect Bourbonists  or  persecute  Liberals;  the  police  were 
empowered  to  try  suspects  by  their  own  secret  and  illegal 
procedure,  to  liberate  convicted  men,  or  detain  those 
acquitted  by  the  courts.  Prisoners  were  flogged,  torture 

^ Bianchini,  Napoli,  551-552;  M.  L.  R.,  Saggio,  54,  298;  Franchetti,  Pro- 
vincie  napolitane,  125-126;  Chateau vieux,  Lettres,  I.  28.  I cannot  believe 
the  figures  in  Bodio,  Movimento  economico,  48. 


88  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

was  connived  at  or  encouraged ; ^ the  prisons,  though  the 
official  regulations  were  good,  were  “ gulfs  of  hell.  An 
almost  universal  corruption  completed  the  wreck  of  justice. 
Assassinations  in  full  day  went  unpunished  if  the  criminal 
had  friends  in  office;  and  everywhere  there  were  informal 
societies  with  common  bribery  funds  to  get  enemies  con- 
demned and  friends  acquitted.  So  too  in  local  government, 
the  law  was  good,  the  facts^were  vicious.  Each  of  the 
fifteen  provinces  of  the  mainland  had  its  council  appointed 
by  the  government,  with  powers  to  assess  taxes,  to  execute 
public  works,  to  control  main-roads  and  public  societies, 
with  liberty  to  criticise  officials,  to  propose  reforms  of 
administration,  to  discuss  matters  of  general  import  to  the 
state.  The  communal  councils  controlled  by-roads,  elemen- 
tary schools,  vaccination,  the  maintenance  of  foundlings. 
But  the  fabric,  so  liberal  in  principle,  was  spoilt  by  the 
corruption  of  the  government  and  the  tyranny  of  the  local 
magnates.  The  public  vote,  which  elected  the  communal 
council,  often  only  voiced  the  orders  of  the  ex-feudal  lord, 
whose  nominees  plundered  in  his  interest  the  estates  of 
the  commune  and  wasted  its  forests,  wffiile  the  officials 
leagued  themselves  to  the  conspiracy.^  In  education  the 
gulf  between  theory  and  practice  was  as  great.  By 
a law  of  1 8 1 o every  commune,  except  the  smallest,  was 
bound  to  have  its  primary  school,  every  province  its 
secondary  school.  But  nothing  was  done  to  bring  the 
children  to  them.  Even  in  Naples  itself  there  were  but 
four  gratuitous  public  schools,  and  only  one  in  three  of 
school  age  attended.  For  girls  there  was  practically  no 
provision.  In  the  provinces  it  was  worse.  The  bishops 
did  their  best  to  frustrate  the  efforts  of  the  Education 
Ministry  to  open  schools.  There  were  whole  communes 
without  a literate  peasant ; and  how  general  was  the  igno- 
rance, is  shown  by  the  law  that  required  that  one-third  of 
the  members  of  a town  council  should  read  and  write. 

1 Nisco,  Francesco  37 ; Carlo  Poerio,  etc.,  38-39 ; Settembrini,  Protesta, 
28  ; see  also  Correspondence — Naples  (1848),  95. 

^ Franchetti,  op.  cit.,  passim;  Bianco  di  Saint- Jorioz,  BHgantaggio,  48-49; 
Gualterio,  Rivolgimenti,  II.  246. 


NAPLES 


89 


The  secondary  schools,  with  a few  notable  exceptions  at 
Naples,  suffered  from  the  same  “grecism”  that  afflicted 
the  intermediate  education  of  all  Italy.  The  University 
bore  a high  name,  its  classes  were  crowded,  and  its  pro- 
fessors kept  to  some  extent  their  independence;  but  the 
idle  life  and  enervating  atmosphere  of  the  capital  too  often 
demoralized  the  young  provincials. 

Everything — law,  local  government,  education, — was 
tainted  by  the  corruption  that  had  eaten  through  the 
public  service.  The  government  was  “a  pyramid  with 
priests  and  police  for  its  base,  and  the  king  for  its  apex,” 
and  from  top  to  base  reigned  the  same  callousness  to  the 
commonwealth.  The  Bourbon  court  treasured  all  the  vices 
of  the  family.  Under  Francis,  courtesans  ruled  it;  under 
Ferdinand  II.,  priests.  One  of  Ferdinand’s  brothers  worried 
a creditor  to  death  with  his  mastiffs ; another’s  bravoes 
carried  to  his  harem  his  neighbours’  wives  and  daughters. 
Corruption  found  good  soil  at  such  a court.  In  Francis’ 
reign  ‘‘justice,  titles,  high  offices  were  brought  to  the 
hammer.  “ The  man  who  pays  for  a post,”  said  the  King, 
“wants  to  keep  it,  and  is  loyal.” ^ Ferdinand’s  Jesuit 
confessor  kept  an  open  sale  of  office ; the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior  was  a market  of  jobbery ; at  Palermo  places  in  the 
civil ^ service  were  publicly  sold.  High  officers  of  state 
manipulated  the  corn  duties  to  help  their  own  speculations, 
and  the  Home  Minister  took  for  his  private  collection  the 
finest  discoveries  of  Pompeii.  His  subordinates  copied 
him ; no  official  could  be  sued  without  royal  sanction,  and 
they  made  good  use  of  the  immunity.  “ Every  civil  ser- 
vant, said  an  official  report,  “makes  what  he  can  out  of 
his  office.  In  collusion  with  contractors,  they  s^j^randered 
the  public  monies ; the  police  levied  blackmail,  and  carried 
on  a contraband  trade ; they  warned  the  Calabrian  brigands 
when  danger  threatened,  and  sheltered  them  when  osten- 
sibly in  pursuit. 

The  corruption  had  free  play,  because  there  were  no 
strong  elements  of  opposition.  Many  of  the  nobles  were 
well  contented  with  a system,  which  gave  them  a rich  share 

^ Nisco,  Francesco  6,  22. 


90  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

of  the  plunder.  Others  had  been  drawn  to  Naples  and 
ruined  by  its  luxury  and  vice.  The  great  landlords  of 
Calabria  were  less  often  absentees  than  in  the  rest  of  Italy, 
and  their  influence  proportionately  greater ; but  they  loved 
the  misrule,  and  their  custom  of  allowing  only  one  son  of  a 
family  to  marry  demoralized  the  country-side.  The  church 
was  silent  as  the  nobles.  It  had  always  been  subservient  to 
the  government ; and  when  it  tried  after  the  Restoration  to 
assert  its  independence,  it  found  that  the  hand  of  the  crown 
was  not  shortened.  And  though  the  Concordat  of  i8i8 
gave  it  some  privileges,  and  marked  a surrender  to  Rome 
unknown  before  at  Naples,  it  only  tied  the  clergy  more-eom- 
pletely  to  the  interests  of  the  absolutism.  The  26,000 
priests  and  20,000  monks  and  nuns  ^ were  one  in  thirteen 
of  the  population.  But  the  ill-fame  of  bishops  and  priests 
alike,  their  petty  tyranny  and  injustice,  the  knowledge  that 
many  of  them  were  spies  of  the  government  robbed  them 
of  moral  weight.  Nor  was  there  any  virile  intellectual  ele- 
ment. Some  of  the  traditional  culture  was  left,  at  all  events 
at  Naples  and  in  Calabria ; but  there  was  little  that  was 
worthy  of  the  country  that  had  produced  Pythagoras  and 
Thomas  Aquinas,  Bruno  and  Campanella  and  Vico.  Much 
of  it  was  a rude,  forgotten  land,  with  little  oases  of  civiliza- 
tion in  a great  waste  of  ignorance  or  superstition.  An 
almost  prohibitive  duty  kept  out  foreign  books ; and  though 
there  was  latitude  for  economic  discussion,  and  keen  contro- 
versies were  waged  over  free-trade  and  the  land-tax,  no  purely 
political  writings  were  allowed.  The  educated— class  was  | 
small — a crowd  of  lawyers,  a few  literary  men  of  high  attain-  | 
ments, — and  they  lacked  the  stamina  and  patriotism  of  their  j 
fellows  in  North  and  Central  Italy.  Such  writing  andj 
thought  as  there  was,  had  little  in  common  with  the  rest  of 
the  peninsula.  It  was  not  till  the  study  of  Dante  grew  and  ■ 
spread,  and  the  revival  that  followed  Ferdinand  II.  s accession 
stimulated  literature,  that  any  serious  effort  was  made  to 
assimilate  speech  and  thought  to  that  of  Upper  Italy. 

> So  Serristori,  Due  Sicilie.  At  a later  date  Crisp!  (Scritti,  l86)  puts  the 
total  number  at  70,000. 

^ Settembrini,  Ricordanze,  I.  56,  57. 


NAPLES 


/ The  trading— class,  too,  was  small  and  unimportant. 
While  the  Continental  System  lasted,  there  had  been  a cer- 
tain fictitious  prosperity  in  The  production  of  cotton  and 
brandy,  but  both  industries  collapsed  with  the  Peace,  and 
the  influence  of  the  Physiocrat  economists  kept  prejudice 
strong  against  manufactures.  After  the  crisis  of  1824 
the  government  tried  to  encourage  industry  by  lavishing 
bounties  and  protective  duties  and  abolishing  the  guilds. 
But  protection  did  little  to  stimulate,  and  it  was  not  until 
the  short-lived  confidence  in  the  government  that  obtained 
from  1831  to  1834,  that  there  was  any  serious  progress. 
Even  then  the  imports  remained  small ; the  staple  export 
was  olive-oil ; the  manufactured  exports  were  insignificant, 

, mainly  spirits,  silk  of  a high  quality,  and  gloves.  The 
meddle  and  muddle  of  the  government  still  hampered  en- 
terprise ; and  the  King  restricted  banks  and  dissolved  insur- 
ance societies,  because  they  expected  interest  on  their 
capital.^ 

In  contrast  with  the  halLbarbarous  condition  of  much 
of  the  country  stood  Naples  with  its  veneer~~of  civilized 
luxury,  and  its  unfathomed  depths  of  degraded  life,  with  all 
the  vices  and  few  of  the  virtues  of  a metropolis.  At  this 
time  it  was  by  far  the  largest  city  in  Italy,  with  a popula- 
tion of  over  300,000.  The  capital  was  the  spoilt  child 
of  the  government;  while  peasants  were  dying  of  hunger, 
great  sums  were  lavished  on  its  theatre  of  San  Carlo;  it 
had  enormous  charities,  and  after  1830  the  government 
made  large  grants  for  its  poor.  There  was  a traditional 
understanding  that  the  Bourbons  should  leave  the  paupers 
of  the  slums  to  their  idleness  and  crime,  if  they  supported 
it  at  need,  to  cow  the  respectable  and  progressive  classes. 
The  lazzaroni  numbered  at  least  40,000;^  a demoralized, 
idle  mob,  hardened  by  suffering,  brutalized  by  superstition, 
with  the  anarchical  instincts  of  licensed  pariahs,  ready  at 
a call  to  massacre  artisans  and  tradesmen,  and  loot  in  the 
interests  of  church  and  throne.  Already  the  ccLiiwTTOb  ex- 
isted, with  its  dreaded  secret  organization,  to  shelter  crime 

^ Gualterio,  0^.  cit,  II.  273  ; La  Farina,  Storia,  II.  i68. 

2 Lady  Morgan,  Italy,  II.  393. 


92  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

and  levy  blackmail.^  A want  of  enterprise  and  manliness 
weighed  on  the  whole  city.  The  cultured  classes,  acute 
and  inquiring  though  they  were,  made  no  sustained  effort 
for  their  principles ; the  municipal  government  was  corrupt 
as  all  else ; the  civic  guard  was  an  armed  faction  under  the 
orders  of  the  police ; the  draconic  laws  against  beggars  were 
a dead  letter ; and  in  the  Foundling  Hospital  nine  infants 
out  of  ten  died  of  starvation. 

But  the  gay,  thoughtless,  gesticulating  Neapolitan  was 
no  type  of  the  bulk  of  the  population.  Five-sixths  of  the 
workers  were  employed  on  the  land.  From  the  mountains 
of  the  Abruzzi  in  the  north  the  country  sloped  down  to  the 
fertile  Terra  di  Lavoro,  to  Naples  and  Sorrento  on  the  west ; 
on  the  east  to  the  flat  pastoral  district  of  the  Capitinata  on 
the  Adriatic,  to  the  Basilicata  round  the  Gulf  of  Taranto,  i 
and  Puglia  with  its  rich  vineyards  and  oliveyards  in  the  heel 
of  Italy ; while  the  Apennines  formed  a continuous  back-bone 
do’vvn  the  centre,  through  the  Principati  to  Calabria  in  the  i 
toe.  By  nature  a great  portion  of  the  land  was  exceedingly 
fertile,  but  neglect  and  bad^-government  had  made  large 
tracts  well-nigh  useless.  Immense  stretches  of  land,  Avhich 
only  needed  the  drainage  of  the  rich  alluvial  soils,  were 
given  over  to  malaria.  Lake  Fucino,  which  had  been 
drained  under  Claudius,  had  been  allowed  to  make  pestilent 
the  great  valley  round  it ; the  mountain  district  of  La  Sila 
in  Calabria  was  deserted  save  by  banditti  and  wandering 
herdsmen;  the  vast  Tavoliere  di  Puglia,  stretching  for 
seventy  miles  along  the  Adriatic,  was,  despite  the  protests 
of  the  economists,  kept  in  the  state  of  natural  pasturage  to 
which  it  had  been  devoted  since  the  fifteenth  century.  All 
through  the  southern  portion  of  the  country  the  want  of 
thoroughfares  crippled  the  agriculturist.  Carriage-roads,  i 
along  which  the  mails  crept  at  the  rate  of  fifty  miles  a day, 
were  very  few ; in  some  districts  of  the  interior  it  was  i 
almost  impossible  to  travel  on  horseback  in  winter ; even  I 
fifty  years  later,  in  the  province  of  Aquila,  one-third  of  the 
communes  had  not  even  a proper  cart-road.  It  is  small  I 
wonder  that  agriculture  showed  few  signs  of  progress,  that 

^ Monnier,  La  Camorre ; and  below,  Vol.,  11.  p.  184. 


NAPLES 


93 

the  bulk  of  the  grain  and  wine  and  oil  were  of  poor  quality. 
It  was  only  in  the  Terra  di  Lavoro,  and  round  Bari,  and  in 
the  oliveyards  of  Gallipoli,  that  there  was  any  better  culture. 

Despite  the  French  legislation,  a large  proportion  of  the 
cultivators  rented  their  farms,  often  on  onerous  terms,  and 
paying  exorbitant  interest  to  the  usurious  landlord  or  private 
loan-monger.  Sometimes,  as  in  the  Basilicata,  much  of  the 
land  was  let  on  short  improvement  leases,  the  landlord 
finding  everything,  and  at  the  end  of  the  tenancy  taking 
land  and  crops  with  little  or  no  compensation.  In  the 
western  provinces  the  system  of  tenure  varied,  mezzedria 
farms  alternating  with  yearly  tenancies  or  large  holdings 
on  long  leases.  But  almost  everywhere  the  peasants  were 
practically  the  serfe  of  their  lords,  tied  hand-and-foot  by 
their  indebtedness,  driven  by  poverty  and  the  keen  com- 
petition for  land  to  accept  the  cruel  contracts  imposed  on 
them.^  The  tax-gatherer  took  what  the  landlord  left.  The 
very  heavy  land-tax  was  rigorously  exacted  from  the  famine- 
stricken  peasants,  and  to  pay  the  hated  grist-tax  implements 
and  houses  were  often  seized.  Salt,  which  was  a government 
monopoly,  was  so  dear  that  the  people  were  sometimes 
unable  to  buy  it.  And  though  there  were  districts  where 

the  squalor  of  the  peasants  had  disappeared,  their  general 

condition  was  one  of  more  or  less  degraded  and  savage 

poverty.  The  small  proprietors,  who  had  sufficient  land  of 

their  own,  were  hardly  better  off.  The  labourers,  though 
wages  were  sometimes  comparatively  high,  had  a precarious 
lot.  And  the  land- system,  though  it  showed  so  admirable 
in  statistics,  proves  on  examination  rotten  as  the  rest  of 
the  social  fabric.  In  some  parts,  as  in  Calabria,  there  was 
i severance  between  rich  and  poor  rare  in  Italy.  The 
imtilmmini  kept  the  peasants  and  labourers  in  a state  of 
>erfdom,  grinding  their  faces  in  abject  poverty,  corrupting 

^ Franchetti,  op.  cit.  ^ passim ; De  Augustinis,  Condizione,  156;  C.  D.  V. 
7enm,  34,  38;  Della  Valle,  Considerazioni ; Bianco  di  Saint-Jorioz,  op.  cit.,  18, 
24-125;  Villari,  Lettere  meridionali,  55-59;  Laing,  Notes,  396;  Beauclerk,' 
Ural  Italy,  43-46.  Already,  in  1835,  the  farmers  were  feeling  the  effects  of 
oreign  competition  “even  from  America.”  The  communes  tried  sometimes 
0 provide  a remedy  for  usury:  v.  Raumer,  Italy,  11.  251.  The  recent  rapid 
•xtension  of  land-banks  is,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  killing  out  the  usurer. 


94  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

their  family  honour.  Their  miserable  condition,  their 
superstition  more  pagan  than  Christian,  their  brutish  ignor- 
ance seemed  sometimes  to  have  killed  all  moral  sense. 

“ Theft,”  wrote  one  who  knew  them,  ‘‘  is  their  second  nature, 
almost  their  necessity  ” ; and  sometimes  a whole  village, 
seized  with  a common  passion  for  crime,  would  leave  their 
ploughs  to  plunder  and  murder.  Brigandage  had  for  genera- 
tion^  been  endemic  in  some  of  the  mountain  districts ; under 
the  French  rule  it  had  taken  a political  colour ; when  its 
Bourbon  patrons  returned,  it  became  frankly  criminal.  At 
times  sentries  had  to  guard  the  whole  length  of  road  from 
Capua  to  the  Papal  frontier.  The  Calabrians  went  about 
armed  to  the  teeth ; and  the  roving  banditti  were  recruited 
from  the  murderers,  who  “ went  into  the  country,”  while  the 
scent  was  fresh  on  their  wild  deeds  of  violence. 

From  such  a people  no  steady  politieaU^ivity  could 
be  expected.  There  was  of  course  a considerable  class 
above  the  level  of  actual  poverty— the  middling  proprietors, 
the  merchants  of  the  towns,  the  tradesmen  who  had  retired 
to  their  small  estates.  It  was  from  these,  doubtless,  that 
the  Carbonari  of  1820  drew  their  strength.  But  they 
were  a minority,  too  often  a corrupt  and  fibreless  minority. 
The  mass  of  the  people  were  sunk  in  an  ignorance  and 
misery,  which  left  no  room  for  hope  or  progress.  An  ears 
of  civilization  and  sunderance  of  interests  were  likely  for 
generations  yet  to  prevent  Naples  from  marching  in  line 
vith  the  rest  of  Italy. 


N Sicily 

Sicily  and  Naples  were  members  of  one  state,  but  they 
were  parted  by  a bitterness  as  intense  as  that  which  divided  1 
Ireland  from  England.  Differences  of  race  and-history  and  i 
character  made  it  impossible  to  fuse  the  mainland  and; 
island.  The  large  admixture  of  Norman  and  Saracen  and, 
Berber  blood  in  Sicily,  the  semi-tropical  climate,  the  longi 
parliamentary  tradition  had  produced  a character  that  had 
nothing  in  common  with  that  of  the  mainland.  In  con- 
trast to  the  lazy,  vivacious,  shallow  Neapolitan,  the  Paler- 


SICILY 


95 


mitan  was  silent,  laconic,  brave.  Though  the  Sicilian  was 
wanting  in  resource  and  perseverance,  and  though  his 
southern  blood  and  the  absence  of  intellectual  outlet  made 
him  subject  to  wild  bursts  of  sexual  passion  and  savage 
vengeance,  yet  he  was  generous  and  chivalrous,  he  had 
virility  and  a rough  kind  of  loyalty.  A Sicilian  rarely 
betrayed  another ; while  the  Neapolitan  was  a courtier  by 
nature,  he  was  rugged  and  independent,  and  Ferdinand  I. 
had  found  him  unsusceptible  to  court  favours.  Thanks  to 
his  seven  centuries  of  parliamentary  history  he  had  more 
interest  in  public  affairs,  a patriotism  which  was  all  the 
intenser  for  its  narrowness.  And  despite  the  lawlessness 
of  Palermo  and  its  neighbourhood,  despite  the  murders  four 
times  more  numerous  than  in  Piedmont  and  the  universal 
prevalence  of  theft,  there  was  not  the  same  depth  of  corrup- 
tion that  prevailed  on  the  mainland.^ 

History  combined  with  difference  of  character  to  sever 
the  two  peoples.  From  the  Sicilian  Vespers  to  l^5  Sicily 
had  been  independent  of  Naples.  Even  when  joined  under 
one  crown,  it  had  kept  its  own  flag,  its  parliament,  and 
separate  administration.  The  struggle  between  crown  and 
barons  in  1812  had  only  confirmed  the  Sicilians  in  their 
rights ; and  when,  four  years  later,  the  Bourbons  stole  their 
liberties,  the  free  past  beckoned  to  them  with  ever  more 
alluring  fascination.  Feudalists  and  Liberals  might  endanger 
the  common  cause  with  their  quarrels,  but  the  same  intense 
love  of  independence  ruled  them  all.  The  very  clergy  and 
monks  redeemed  their  ignorance  and  wealth  by  their  fervid 
patriotism.  On  all  classes  weighed  the  oppression  of  the 
Bourbon  government.  “The  Sicilians  are  barbarians;  we 
have  come  to  civilize  them,”  boasted  the  Neapolitan  oflicials, 
and  they  treated  the  island  “ beyond  the  Faro  ” as  a 
conquered  province.  The  Sicilians  repaid  them  with  a hate 
that  embraced  both  court  and  people  of  the  ruling  race. 
There  was  little  sympathy  between  the  Liberals  of  Palermo 
and  Naples,  still  less  respect  or  loyalty  to  the  crown.  It 
followed  that  Sicily  had  no  share  in  the  common  life  of 

1 Palmieri  de’  Micciche,  Perishes,  I.  258,  263  ; Famin,  R6volution,  4 ; Nisco, 
Ferdinando  IL,  34  ; Pasqualino,  Letters,  8,  9 ; La  Masa,  Documenti,  I.  41. 


96  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Italy,  that  in  its  bitter  hostility  to  Naples  it  turned  rather 
to  England,  to  Russia,  to  France,  to  any  Power  that  would 
secure  its  independence  of  the  mainland.  It  was  only  at  a 
later  date  that  the  Italian  spirit  reached  them,  that  they 
learnt  to  appeal  to  Italy  against  Naples,  and  seek  for  freedom 
by  merging  themselves  in  the  bigger  fatherland,  of  which 
Sicily  and  Naples  would  be  equal  and  independent  provinces. 

The  nature  of  the  Neapolitan  rule  was  sufficient  of  it- 
self to  create  the  repulsion.  It  is  true  that  Sicilians  and 
Neapolitans  were  fellow-sufferers,  that  the  government  was 
little,  if  at  all,  more  corrupt  and  tyrannical  than  it  was  on 
the  Mainland.  But  its  bitterness  lay  in  its  being  an  alien 
rule.  In  some  respects,  indeed,  the  laws  of  Naples  were  in 
advance  of  their  own,  and  the  Neapolitan  Liberals  might  I 
regard  their  imposition  as  a gain  to  the  cause  of  progress,  i 
But  while  they  provoked  the  unresting  hostility  of^  the  ^ 
nobles,  they  were  too  much  opposed  to  the  national  tiadition  j 
to  be  acceptable  even  to  the  down-trodden  masses.  This  I 
was  especially  apparent  in  the  attempts  to  reform  the  native  I 
land-laws.  Feudalism  had  been  nominally  abolished  m 1 8 1 2,  ; 
but  in  a half-hearted  way,  that  contrasted  with  the  root-and- 
branch  reforms  which  the  French  had  carried  out  at  Naples. 
Numberless  questions  of  detail  were  left  to  be  decided  by 
the  courts  (there  were  many  still  pending  in  1838),  and  for 
some  time  the  presumption  of  the  courts  went  in  favour  01 
the  lords.  In  spite  of  legislation  to  facilitate  the  sale^  of  - 
encumbered  estates,  there  was  none  of  the  wide  distribution  : 
of  property  which  had  taken  place  at  Naples.  A league  1 
of  latifondisti  protected  the  interests  of  the  big  proprietors,  | 
and  the  few  commercial  men,  who  purchased  land,  ranged  i 
themselves  on  their  side.  Here  and  there  the  commons  j 
were  divided  into  small  holdings,  but  the  great  majority 
of  the  people  were  landless,  and  it  was  only  in  the  rich 
Conca  d’Oro  round  Palermo,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Messina  and  Marsala,  that  small  properties  could  be  found. 
Nine-tenths  of  the  soil  belonged  to  the  barons-nnd  prelates, 
and  one  noble’s  princely  estate  stretched  for  thirty  miles. 
The  insecurity  and  unhealthiness  of  the  fields  drove  the 
people  to  live  almost  entirely  in  towns;  in  three  large 


SICILY 


97 


provinces  only  two  per  cent.  lived  in  the  country;  and  the 
great  reaches  of  natural  pasturage,  without  villages  or  trees 
much  of  It  smitten  with  malaria,  with  little  produce  save 
the  food  of  scattered  herds,  stretched  over  what  had  been 
the  granary  of  Italy.  The  farms  were  leased  for  short  terms 
at  rack-rents ; and  the  middleman-farmers,  with  insufficient 
capital  for  their  enormous  holdings  (many  ranged  from  2000 
to  5000  acres),  sublet  the  corn  land  in  small  parcels  to 
peasants  paying  rent  in  kind,  advancing  the  seed  and  sup- 
plying oxen  for  the  plough,  and  taking  sometimes  three- 
quarters  of  the  produce  in  return.  So  much  was  the  peasant 
at  their  mercy,  that  his  plot,  when  rent^and  interest  were  paid 
barely  allowed  him  a subsistence.  But  he  could  legally  claim 
enough  food  to  save  him  from  starvation,  and  such  was  the 
uncertainty  of  employment,  that  he  preferred  to  have  a rack- 
rented  holding  rather  than  work  for  wages.^ 

culture  was  necessarily  primi- 
implements  were  of  antique  shape,  and  as  late 
as  i860  threshing  was  done  by  treading.  It  was  only  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  large  towns,  where  the  land  was  held 
by  small  proprietors,  that  there  was  any  effort  to  improve. 

he  vine;^ds  of  Marsala,  and  the  orange  and  lemon 
gar  ens  o the  Conca  d’Oro  alone  showed  of  what  the 
land  was  capable.  Even  where  there  was  disposition  to 
improve,  the  government  did  what  it  could  to  discourage 
It.  Down  to  1819  all  corn  for  export  had  to  be  deposited 
in  bonded  warehouses  {caricatoi),  where  the  export  duty  was 
collected.  _ When  these  were  abolished,  the  want  of  roads 
still  practically  stopped  the  trade  in  grain.  Means  of  com- 
munication were  lacking  even  more  than  on  the  mainland; 

was  not  till  1828  that  carriages  could  travel  from  Messina 
.0  Balermo,  and  for  long  years  after  the  interior  was  inac- 
cessible to  them.  Robbers  infested  the  rough  tracks,  that 

fftL  island  communication  in  the  greater  part 

Memorie;  Palmeri,  Saggio ; 

sf  n ^0  ,06  34;  Cordova,  DiZd, 

, 11.  2«9-3o6;  Villari,  op.  cit.,  31-36. 

ame“e?re‘snSf 

VOL.  I. 

G 


98  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


The  backwardness  of  its  agriculture  was  the  more 
serious,  because  Sicily  had  little  commerce  ^ 

industries  were  the  wine  trade  of  Marsala'and  the  sulphur 
mines  round  Caltanisetta  and  Girgenti,  and  these  were 
worked  by  foreign  enterprise  and  capital.  Doivn  to  1824 
there  was  no  free  trade  even  with  Naples,  and  protection 
crushed  all  attempts  to  create  a commerce.  Wretched, 
indeed,  was  the  condition  of  the  people.  The  sulphur- 
workers  lived  in  a degradation  hardly  reached  by  the  white 
slaves  of  early  factory  days  in  England.  The  agricultural 
labourers,  going  long  distances  to  their  work  froin  their 
squalid  homes  in  the  towns,  earned  but  from  five  to 
seven  shillings  a week.  The  peasants,  sober  and  bar  - 
workino-  as  they  were,  were  weighed  to  the  ground  with 
usury  robbed  bare  by  the  exactions  of  grist-tax  and  land- 
tax,  to  escape  from  which  they  would  sometimes  forsake 
their  holdings,  and  turn  to  the  more  profitable  call  ot  ^ 
briffandacre.  All  were  slaves  to  the  corruption  and  tyi'anny  : 
of  the  Intendants  and  their  underlings;  slaves  too  to  the 
barons,  whose  armed  retainers  terrorized  them,  and  whose 
feudal  dues  and  jurisdiction,  though  abolished  at  law, 
remained  as  customs,  against  which  they  dared  not  rebel. 
From  high  to  low  there  was  no  respect  for  the  law  ihe 
government  never  scrupled  to  break  it;  the  officias  pro- 
bated it  to  their  own  greed;  the  nobles  employed  their 
retainers  to  assassinate  their  enemies.  It  is  small  wonder 
that  crime  was  organized  to  an  extent  hardly  credible  in 
Western  Europe.  The  vast  households  of  the  nobles,  the 
criminal  gangs  of  Palermo,  the  orange-growers  of  the  Conca 
d’Oro  (descendants  of  the  old  bravoes  of  the  barons),  the 
middlemen  of  the  centre  of  the  island  formed  a vast  unseen 
conspiracy,  before  which  justice  was  powerless  and  govern- 
ment paralyzed.^  It  was  this  malendrinar/gto  or  mafia,  wtiicn 
has  made  part  of  Sicily  the  despair  of  constitutional,  as  it 

was  then  of  despotic  government. 

But  while,  because  of  it,  severe,  almost  cruel,  repression 


1 V Eaumer,  op.  cit.,  II.  308,  309:  Centrallizzazione,  142;  Mottillarol 

Eeminiscenze,  164  ; contra,  Bracci,  Memorie,  48. 

2 Villari,  op.  cil.,  34>  35  : Ciottl,  Palermo,  6,  7. 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY 


99 


has  been  a necessity,  the  unhappy  island  has  needed  and 
not  had  the  patient  work  of  a generation  to  heal  its  igno- 
rance and  poverty  and  superstition.  Of  education  there  was 
then,  as  long  after,  almost  none  ; even  the  children  of  the 
nobles  were  often  hardly  literate.  And  though  there  was 
limited  amount  of  culture  and  a few  men  of  real  ability  . 
Palermo  spent  ten  times  as  much  on  its  foundlings  as  on  its 
schools,  and  professors  at  Messina  University  had  less  than 
a gendarmes  pay.  The  religion  of  the  people  was  a pagan 
superstition.  The  Church  was,  indeed,  very  powerful;  monks 
swarmed,  and  their  property,  untouched  by  the  Revolution 
exceeded  m value  that  of  all  the  other  monasteries  of  Italy’ 

ui.  their  dirt  and  their 

wealth.^  Santa  Rosalia  ranked  above  the  Redeemer  to  the 
Palermitans ; and  the  sulphur-workers  of  Girgenti,  after  an 
explosion,  broke  their  image  of  the  Madonna,  and  sub- 

p hshed  luxury  of  Palermo,  it  was  a lawless,  semi-barbarous 
people,  bred  in  a school  of  violence  and  force;  a nation  of 
nobles  and  proletarians,  with  no  middle-class,  with  few  local 
mstitutions,  with  nothing  to  hold  them  together  save  the 
feudal  tradition  and  the  intense  common  pride  of  race.  But 
while  Sicily  has  been  and  remains  one  of  Italy’s  greatest 
problems,  while  normal  settled  government  there  seems  still 
a dream,  its  people  has  a strength  and  an  independence,  a 
half-Oriental  dignity,  a latent  fire,  which  has  always  made 
them  the  hope  of  the  advanced  patriots  of  Italy. 


The  unbelievers  in  Italian  nationality  would  point  to  the 
wide  (hversity  of  character,  which  parted  the  inhabitants  of 
,he  different  states.  There  seemed  little  in  common  between 
he  heavy,  painstaking  Piedmontese  and  the  light-hearted 
e dissolute  proletarian  of  Venice  or  Naples ; between  the 
rentle,  mtelligent  Tuscan  and  the  passionate,  sullen  Sicilian- 
•etween  the  activity  and  enterprise  of  Genoa  or  Lombardy 
•nd  the  dead  stagnation  of  the  Comarca.  There  was  no 
ommon  Italian  stock;  Teuton  blood  predominated  in  the 
nrth,  Greek  blood  in  the  Basilicata  and  Puglia;  Arabs  and 
Jormans  and  Spaniards  had  left  their  traces  in  Sicily,  while 


lOO 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  , 

the  old  Italic  and  Etruscan  stocks  remained,  perhaps  with  > 
little  mixture,  in  Tuscany  and  Umbria  and  the  Abruzzi 
Uifferent  governments  had  trained  them  to  varying  soci 
habits  and  widely  dissimilar  land  systems,  to  activity  oi 
stac^nation  of  industry,  to  high  or  low  standards  of  edu- 
cation.  Feudal  customs  were  still  strong  in  Piedmont  and  | 
Naples  and  Sicily,  while  in  Lombardy  and  Tuscany  they 
were  half-forgotten  memories.  But  the_  existing  states  had  , 
not  even  the  merit  of  recognizing  the  minor  affimties  of  e j 
populations.  Romagna  gravitated  to  the  states  of  the 
Lin  • the  Abruzzi  and  the  Principati  had  more  m common  i 
with  the  Roman  border-country  than  with  Calabria.  Siciy 
was  divided  less  from  any  Italian  state  than  from  Naple  , 
and  the  worst  municipal  rivalries  were  between  cities  of  the 
sZe  state.  And  beneath  the  differences  ran  a common 
likeness  The  remoteness  of  Piedmontese  and  Reapolitan 
was  no  greater  than  that  which  divided  Norman  and  Pro- 
vencal, Prussian  and  Bavarian,  English  and  Irish,  and 

the ’rich  mixture  of  blood  promised  a TtaH  had 

virility  and  many-sidedness.  Despite  the  dialects,  Italy  had 
a common- tongue,  a common  name,  a common  naemory  of 
the  days  when  she  had  ruled  the  world;  and  history  was 
very  rei  where  every  district  had  its  traditions  of  the  great 
men  and  deeds  of  Rome.  She  had  a common  literatwe  a 
common  possession  of  Dante  and  Ariosto  and  Macchiavelli. 
ThTgreal  barrier  of  the  Alps  meant  more  than  a geo- 
graphical expression,  and  necessities  of  trade  itHhe 

day  a-ainst  the  partition  of  the  peninsula.  Despite  the 
ieabuSes  of  Piedmont  and  Genoa,  of  Naples  and  Sicdj,  o 
Romaona  and  Rome ; despite  the  interests  that  pleaded  t e 
fndTpince  of  each  petty  metropolis;  despte  the  gi-eater 
differences  that  parted  North  and  South  it  ° 

thinkers  like  Napoleon  and  Alfieri  and  Mazzini  that  senti- 
and  expediency  alike  would  ^eacyhe  different 
fractions  to  merge  themselves  m a great  united  Italy. 

To  the  hasty  traveller  belongs  the  monopoly  of 
generalizimr  on  the  Italian  character ; a historian  must  go 
lelicately  even  when  he  deals  with  particular  sections  and 
districts.^  Of  the  various  classes  that  made  up  the  Italian 


lOI 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY 

people,  first  in  power  without  doubt  came  the  150,000 
ecclesiastics.  The  nearer,  indeed,  to  Rome,  the  more  the 
abuses  of  the  Church  stank  in  the  nostrils ; but  none  the 
less  the  presence  of  Rome  gave  an  unique  power  to  its  hold 
on  Italian  minds ; and  its  subtle  net  of  influence  reaching 
to  every  commune  and  hamlet  in  the  land,  its  pomp  of 
power,  the  support,  however  grudging,  of  the  civil  arm,  its 
control  of  the  schools,  its  authority  over  the  marriage  rite, 
its  claim  to  open  and  shut  the  gates  of  heaven,  gave  it  an 
unmeasured  influence  over  a religious  and  imaginative,  often 
superstitious,  people.  For  the  Italians  were  essentially  not 
only  religious,  but  Catholic.  A little  rationalism  had 
filtered  in  in  the  last  century ; there  was  a certain  fashion- 
able scepticism  at  Florence  and  Milan ; hypocrisy  often  held 
high  state  in  church  and  court.  But  the  masses  of  the 
people,  high  and  low,  even  when  they  did  not  accept  the 
whole  Catholic  doctrine,  even  when  they  abominated  the 
Roman  court  or  satirized  the  clergy,  gave  willing  adhesion 
to  the  Catholic  faith  and  ritual,  and  felt  a sentimental  pride 
in  the  possession  of  the  Papacy.  The  attacks  of  the  govern- 
ments on  the  Church  in  the  last  century  had  already  faded 
into  a not  very  cordial  alliance  between  it  and  the  state. 
The  attempts  of  after  years  to  reform  the  discipline  of  the 
Church  always  aimed  at  reforming  it  within  the  pale  of 
Catholicism;^  the  abolition  of  ecclesiastical  abuses,  that 
followed  the  rise  of  constitutional  government,  was  careful 
to  disclaim  hostility.^  And  at  this  moment  it  seemed  not 
impossible  that  the  ChurcR  might  range  itself  with  the 
nation.  Though  it  had  thrown  in  its  lot  with  the  Restora- 
tion, many  a parish  priest,  many  a monk,  was  a patriot  and 
in  a way  a Liberal.  Each  revolution  contributed  its  batch 
of  martyr-priests.  Especially  in  Lombardy  and  Sicily,  the 
fire  of  patriotism  burnt  bright  in  sacristy  and  monastery. 
Sprung  largely  from  the  people,  they  shared  the  people’s 
poverty^  and  hopes ; and  the  earlier  years  of  Pio  Nono 
proved  how  easily  the  clergy  might  have  been  won  to  the 

^ See  below,  Vol.  II.,  p.  125-6.  2 below,  p.  393 ; Vol.  II.,  pp.  3,  126 

^ In  1867  the  average  stipend  of  a parish  priest  was  795  lire  (under  i^32) ; 
Frigyesi,  V Italia,  355. 


102 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

national  cause,  if  Rome  had  led  the  way.  But  the  collapse 
of  Pius’  brief  Liberalism  showed  that  the  Roman  Curia  could 
never  become  national,  that,  without  far-reaching  changes  in 
its  constitution,  it,  the  most  worldly  and  unteachable  of 
courts,  can  never  accept  reform,  that  the  Temporal  Power 
stands,  and  must  always  stand,  between  Papal  claims  and 
Italian  rights. 

It  was  often  said  that  Italy  possessed  no  landed  -a^stoc- 
racy.  This  was  true  in  the  sense  that  there  were  few  terri- 
torial magnates,  and  that  even  such  as  there  were,  were,  except 
perhaps  in  Sicily  and  Calabria  and  in  later  years  in  Piedmont, 
absentees  and  dwellers  in  towns,  and  therefore  had  little  of 
the  influence  of  the  English  landed  peer.  The  unnumbered 
counts  of  the  north  and  centre,  the  dukes  and  princes  of  the 
south  cheapened  the  prestige  of  a title.  In  Naples  and 
Venice  and  Rome  the  nobles  were  corrupted  and  degen^te. 
In  all  the  political  vicissitudes  of  the  century  the  creation 
of  a hereditary  second  chamber  never  seriously  entered  the  \ 
head  of  an  Italian  politician.  None  the  less  their  power  i 
was  great,  and  often  deserved.  In  Sicily  they  were  omni- 
potent, both  because  of  their  wealth  and  because  they  shared 
the  great  political  passion  of  the  people.  The  brilliant 
aristocracy  of  Milan  made  its  wealth  and  capacity  felt 
through  Lombardy.  The  best  of  the  nobles  of  Florence, 
sprung  from  the  great  mercantile  families  of  the  republic 
and  the  Medici  rule,  had  identified  themselves  with  all  that  i 
was  most  progressive  and  improving  in  Tuscany.  The  i 
military  nobility  of  Piedmont,  crass  and  out-of-date  as  it 
was,  kept  much  of  its  feudal  prestige  and  tradition  of  simple,  ] 
solid  patriotism.  There  was  an  unpretentiousness  of  life  in 
their  vast  uncomfortable  palaces,  where  they  would  rather 
see  a masterpiece  of  the  great  painters  than  an  easy  chair 
or  a warm  fireside.  And  on  the  whole  the  Italian  nobility, 
except  in  Piedmont  and  at  Rome,  was  not  exclusive.  In 
Tuscany,  and  partially  in  Lombardy,  it  had  sprung  from  the 
bourgeoisie,  and  everywhere  constant  fresh  creations  fed  it 
with  new  blood.  The  Universities,  the  free  social  life  ■oP  the 
cities,  the  comparative  absence  of  great  wealth  fused  it 
more  or  less  with  the  class  beneath  it.  Its  courtesy  to  all 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY  103 

classes  awoke  the  marvel  of  German  observers.  And  though 
much  of  it  was  worthless  and  discredited,  there  was  a sec- 
tion of  high  note  in  every  state,  which  identified  itself  with 
the  best  hopes  of  the  nation.  Every  Liberal,  even  every 
Revolutionary  movement  could  find  its  noble  leaders;  and 
if  the  middle  classes  can  claim  Mazzini  and  Manin,  Gioberti 
and  Farini  and  Rattazzi,  the  nobles  can  boast  that  Santa  Rosa 
and  Pallavicino,  D’Azeglio  and  Cavour  and  Ricasoli,  the 
Bandieras  and  Pisacane  sprang  from  their  ranks. 

But  the  best  life  of  the  nation  was  in  the  middle- classes. 
They  had  felt  their  power  under  the  French  rule ; Modena 
had  had  its  famous  school  of  civil  servants ; as  engineers,  as 
scientists,  as  writers,  men  of  ability  had  had  their  chance. 
No  class,  therefore,  suffered  more  from  the  repression,  to 
which  they  were  condemned  at  the  Restoration.  The  civil 
service  offered  few  attractions,  for  it  meant  selling  help  to 
the  oppressors,  and  there  was  little  hope  of  promotion,  while 
in  Lombardy  the  Austrians,  in  Piedmont  the  nobles,  in  the 
Papal  States  the  monsignori  monopolized  the  higher  posts. 
Literature  was  a thorny  path,  with  censors  watching  at  every 
corner  to  crush  out  originality  or  check  the  smallest  incur- 
sion into  politics.  Italy  indeed  was  fairly  rich  in  writers  ; 
she  had  her  philosophers  in  Galluppi  and  Rosmini  and 
Romagnosi,  her  poets  in  Leopardi  and  Niccolini,  her  scholars 
in  Mai  and  Mezzofanti,  her  novelist  in  Manzoni.  But 
Rossetti  and  Berchet  had  been  driven  into  exile ; and  not 
only  was  political  and  social,  even  economic,  literature  almost 
killed  out,  but  the  expense  and  delay  and  uncertainty  of 
obtaining  the  censor’s  imprimatur  checked  authorship  of 
every  kind.  Literature  often  passed  with  difficulty  from 
state  to  state ; the  total  number  of  new  books  and  editions 
published  in  Italy  in  1835  was  2811,  and  the  majority  of 
these  were  probably  reprints;  in  1833  there  were  less  than 
100  periodicals,  mainly  scientific  or  commercial.^  The 
official  gazettes,  it  was  said,  gave  more  space  to  the  affairs 
of  India  and  Japan  than  to  those  of  Europe,  and  had  no 
intelligence  of  contemporary  politics.  The  Antologia  was 
the  only  periodical,  that  took  a place  among  the  great  Euro- 

^ Cantu,  Milano,  I.  73  ; Id,,  Cronistoria,  II.  387. 


104 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

pean  reviews.  Of  journalism  proper  there  was  none.  There 
Avas  hardly  more  outlet  in  trade.  Protective  duties  and 
customs -barriers,  the  absence  of  a common  coinage  or 
common  weights  and  measures,  the  official  discouragement 
of  banks  were  fatal  to  a vigorous  manufacturing  or  com-  . 
mercial  life.  Except  in  some  of  the  Lombard  cities,  and  at 
Genoa  and  Leghorn,  mercantile  enterprise  Avas  hardly  known. 
There  Avas  no  at  all  important  manufacture,  except  a silk- 
spinning  industry  in  Lombardy  and  Piedmont;  no  great 
staple  exports,  except  the  raw  silk  of  the  north,^  the  olive- 
oil  of  the  Genovesate  and  Lucca  and  Naples,  the  sulphur  of 
Sicily.  The  Avhole  export  trade  of  the  country  A\^as  probably 
under  A 1^.000,000.  Thus,  Avith  little  opening  in  the  civil 
service  or  literature  or  trade,  the  young  men  who  left  the 
Universities  croAvded  into  laAv  or  medicine,  to  SAvell  the  ranks 
of  the  educated  unemployed,  bitterly  feeling  the  social 
oppression,  which  snuffed  out  their  ambitions  and  doomed 
them  to  an  idle  and  profitless  existence. 

The  bright  spot  in  middle-class  life  AA'as  the  Universities: 
The  country  boasted  tAventy-four  Avith  some  14,000  students. 
Those  of  Bologna  and  Naples  bore  a high  repute;  Turin, 
Rome,  Pavia,  Padua,  Avere  justly  proud  of  their  position.  It 
is  not  easy  for  an  Englishman  to  realize  AAdiat  a part  Italian 
Universities  played  in  the  life  of  the  country;  ahvays  to  the 
front  in  every  national  movement,  destroying  social  barriers 
by  their  free  democratic  life,  exercising  through  the  great 
number  of  their  scholars  a preeminent  influence  on  the 
action  of  the  educated  classes.  It  Avas  not  Avithout  reason 
that  the  governments  suspected  and  harassed  them.  It 
Avas  the  Universities  that  supplied  the  spiritual  fuel  for  the 
nationalist  movement,  that  gave  it  its  thinkers,  its  writers, 
sometimes  its  fighters.  It  Avas  the  professors  at  Bologna 
who  led  the  revolution  of  1831,  professors  and  students 
from  Pisa  and  Pavia  and  Genoa,  AAffio  Avere  the  soul  of  the 
volunteers  in  1848,  and  who  made  up  the  largest  section 
of  Garibaldi’s  Thousand.  The  students  might  be  often  de- 
sultory, sentimental,  excitable  ; but  there  Avas  a purity  of 

1 Valued  in  1835  at  ^^12,000,000;  the  olive-oil  trade  perhaps  reached 
;^2,ooo,ooo  to  ;^3,ooo,ooo. 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY  105 

life  and  motive,  a devotion  to  ideals,  a readiness  to  pulse 
with  the  nation  s life,  to  act  rather  than  criticize,  to  follow 
their  heroes  even  to  the  battlefield  or  dungeon,  that  made 
them  the  very  salt  of  Italian  society. 

The  same  causes,  that  cribbed  the  life  of  the  middle 
classes,  depressed  the  artisans.  Their  material  condition, 
indeed,  was  comparatively  a tolerable  one ; though  often  far 
below  a level  of  comfort  in  food  and  housing,  the  cheap  living 
of  a warm  climate  and  the  steadiness  of  an  inelastic  trade 
kept  them  from  want.  Of  class  ambition  there  seems  to 
have  been  little.  Italian  manufacture  was  still  mostly  in 
the  domestic  stage,  and  there  is  little  evidence  of  friction 
between  masters  and  men.  Besides,  in  Piedmont  at  all 
events,  to  strike  was  a crime,  unless  the  courts  decided  that  it 
was  with  just  cause.^  Socialistic  feeling  was  almost  entirely 
absent,  even  in  1848.  In  a country,  too,  where  they  pro- 
bably did  not  exceed  15  per  cent,  of  the  population,  the 
artisans  were  too  humble  a factor  to  play  any  large  part  in 
the  national  life.  ^ But  they  were  alert,  intelligent,  often 
fairly  educated,  highly  skilled  in  some  minor  industries. 
There  were  gondoliers  and  master-workmen  at  Venice  of 
no  little  culture ; Guerrazzi  s father,  an  artisan  of  Leghorn, 
was  well  read  in  the  classics  and  Dante.  And  though  the 
artisans,  as  a body,  took  little  or  no  part  in  the  earlier 
revolutions.  Young  Italy  brought  politics  home  to  them, 
and  they  were  the  backbone  of  the  Liberals  in  the  later 
nationalist  movement.  The  Five  Days  of  Milan,  the  defence 
of  Venice  and  Bologna  proved  their  sturdiness  and  patriot- 
ism. The  stratum  below  them  varied  much  in  the  different 
cities.  In  Genoa  and  Leghorn  and  Palermo  there  was  a 
mass  of  rough  and  uneducated  unskilled  labourers,  of  tough 
and  manly  fibre,  but  with  wild  passions,  that  drew  them 
into  every  revolution  and  seldom  left  it  unstained  by  crime. 
Rorne^  had  its  populace  of  proud  Trasteverines,  idle,  de- 
moralized by  charities,  but  generous  and  brave ; at  first 
ihe  Pope’s  loyalist  supporters,  afterwards  his  bitterest  foes. 
Naples  had  its  40,000  lazzaroni,  Venice  its  crowd  of  unem- 
doyed  poor,  both  in  their  squalor  and  superstition  a danger 

^ Economic  Journal,  December  1893. 


% 


io6  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


to  the  state,  though  in  time  the  Venetian  nature  hardened 
to  a robuster  patriotism,  while  that  of  the  Neapolitan  seeme 

But  Italy  was  essentially  a non-industriai-country.^  Only 
six  cities,  Naples,  Rome,  Milan,  Venice,  Palermo,  Turm^Tiad 
over  100,000  inhabitants^  The  capitals  of  the  eight  states 
had  an  united  population  of  less  than  a million.  Probably, 
at  least  6o  per  cent,  of  the  people  depended  direotljr-Dn 
agriculture,^  though,  as  in  Sicily,  this  did  not  necessarily 
mean  a village  life.  And  miserable  indeed  was  the  plight 
of  Italian  tillage.  Great  tracts  of  the  richest  soil  m Europe 
were  given  over  to  the  malaria.  With  the  continuous  de-  ■ 
struction  of  forests,  that  went  on  in  the  earlier  decades  of  ■ 
the  century,  the  rivers  made  ever  wider  waste  with  their  j 
uncontrollable  floods.  And  apart  from  the  rich  pastures  • 
and  ricefields  of  parts  of  Lombardy  and  Piedmont,  or  the  i 
minute  culture  of  the  Valdarno,  or  improved  olive  and  vine-  i 
yards  and  orange  groves  in  a few  favoured  or  progressive  ^ 
districts,  the  land  gave  a miserable  return.  The  yield  of  1 
wheat  was  twelve  bushels  per  acre ; ^ the  vines  were,  for  , 
the  most  part,  carelessly  cultivated,  and  the  wine  made  m i 
primitive  fashion.  The  agricultural  societies  and  improv- ; 
ing  landlords  had  hardly  come  into  existence,  and  even: 
a quarter  of  a century  later  their  attempts  to  improve/ 
methods  and  breeds  and  machinery  made  little  miFession 
on  the  crass  obstinacy  of  the  peasants.  The  condition  of , 
the  agricultural  classes  corresponded.  The  statistics  of  wide 
diffusion  of  property  are  somewhat  deceptive ; many  of  the, 
small  freeholds  belonged  to  tradesmen,  others  were  too  small/ 
to  yield  a living.^  In  the  districts,  indeed,  where  peasanti 


1 In  i8lo  Naples  exceeded  300,000 ; the  others  ranged  between  iTO,ooo  andg 

.00  oo^  Genoa'^and  Florence  had  over  90,000  ; Bologna  and  Leghorn  abou.t 

rot^.c:^rSndra^^^^  'cultural  popu! 

r : TrB:;S'op.  O.  U comd  not  have  bee. 

“-I  ' 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY  107 

ownership  or  mezzedria  tenancy  was  general,  the  farmers, 
though  living  hard  and  miserably  housed,  had  a fixity  of 
tenure  and  a certain  security  against  privation,  which  made 
hfe  tolerable  to  an  abstemious  people.  The  peasants  had  a 
bright-hearted  childlike  enjoyment  of  the  present ; in  sexual 
morality  and  sobriety  they  perhaps  stood  unequalled  in 
Europe.  But  below  them,  little  noticed  by  governments 
or  revolutions,  but  laying  up  its  store  of  trouble  for  the 
future,  lay  the  sore  and  aching  mass  of  Italian  rural  poverty 
Their  misery  unrelieved  save  by  the  princely  charities,'^  the 
famous  hospitals  and  orphanages  (and  in  the  south  ’even 
these  failed),  the  agricultural  labourers  of  Sicily  and  the 
Lombard  plains,  the  rackrented  peasants  of  parts  of  the 
Comarca  and  Campania,  the  migrant  harvestmen,  whom 
poverty  drove  from  the  Abruzzi  to  sow  the  Maremna  with 
their  bones,^  had  a lot  of  hopeless  misery,  beside  which  that 
of  the  English  factory  slave  or  Irish  peasant  was  bright. 

^ But  the  material-misery  of  the  rural  masses  had  compara- 
tively little  attention  from  the  Liberals.  It  was  inevitable 
that  a movement,  whose  strength  lay  in  the  middle  classes 
and  whose  doctrines  were  those  of  the  old  Liberal  school’ 
ihould  give  more  thought  to  the  abuses  of  the  government 
than  to  the  social  condition  of  the  disinherited.  Through 
ill  Italy  the  despotism,  against  which  they  rebelled,  varied 
inly  in  degree.  The  Austrian  rule  indeed  had  its  redeem- 
ng  features  in  its  fair  and  dignified  judicial  system  and 
ts  admirable  schools;  that  of  Tuscany  in  its  enlightened 
Timinal  law  and  free  trade ; that  of  Piedmont  in  its  strict 
-nd  honourable  civil  service.  Taxation,  though  high  in  re- 
ition  ^to  the  poverty  of  the  land,  was  only  crushing  in  the 
'outh.  But  outside  Lombardy- Venetia  and  Parma  there 
^as  no  serious  system  of  national  education.  In  Piedmont 


as  2,871,439,  or  13.13  of  the  population,  with  an  average-sized  holding  of  71 
ectares.^  The  size  of  holding  was  smallest  in  Lombardy,  Naples,  and  Pied- 

ont ; highest  in  Tuscany,  Komagna,  the  Marches,  and  Umbria : Galeotti 
rima  legislatura,  142.  ’ 

^ Mittermeier,  Condizioni,  127-145  ; see  below,  Vol.  II.,  p.  305. 

150-154)  Gori,  Rivoluzione,  278. 

“ In  1834,  II  lire  per  head  in  the  Papal  and  Neapolitan  states,  13  in 
iscany,  19  in  Piedmont ; at  the  same  time,  45  in  France  • M L R 
'ygio,  261.  . . iv., 


j8  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

and  the  Papal  States  and  Modena  the  law  was  cumbrous, 
antiquated,  severe  to  a degree  that  discredited  justice ; it 
was  only  in  the  northern  states  that  the  Bench  bore  a 
creditable  name.  Exceptional  courts  protected  the  clergy 
in  Piedmont  and  the  Pope’s  dominions ; there  was  no  trial 
by  jury,  no  hail  except  in  Naples  and  Tuscany;  the  criminal 
courts  were  open  tp  the  public  only  in  Tuscany  and  Parma, 
and  to  a limited  extent  in  Rome  and  Naples.  The  whole 
bias  of  judicial  procedure  was  against  the  defendant  even 
in  ordinary  crime,  still  more  where  the  government  was 
concerned ; and  in  times  of  civil  commotion  every  infamous 
art  was  employed  to  secure  conviction.  Every  state  had  its  I 
secret  tribunals  to  follow  in  the  wake  of  each  political  plot,  c 
with  moral,  sometimes  physical,  torture  to  assist  them.  And  3 
behind  the  secret  tribunal  stood,  responsible  to  itself  alone,  | 
sometimes  half-independent  of  the  government,  the  terrible  ( 
power  of  the  sUrri.  Their  spies  were  in  the  cafes,  in  the  | 
theatres,  in  men’s  households;  the  confessional,  the  school, 
the  post  yielded  to  them  their  secrets,  and  the  man  whoj 
came  under  their  suspicion  was  doomed  for  life.  They  s 
could  ruin  his  career  at  the  University,  in  the  civil  service,  ) 
in  trade ; they  could  prevent  him  from  travelling,  or  sending 
his  children  to  be  educated  away  from  home.  And  though  ^ 
the  higher  officials  no  doubt  seldom  acted  from  other  than  i 
political  motives,  the  common  sbirro  often  used  his  power  to , 
crush  his  private  enemies.  It  was  this  petty  persecution  of 
individuals,  the  cynical  denial  of  justice,  the  intolerable 
interference  in  the  privacy  of  home,  that  maddened  Itahans.i 
and  drove  them  to  desperate  protest  and  conspiracy. 

It  was  a minor  grievance  in  comparison,  that  the  poli-: 
tical  life  of  the  nation  was  driven  underground.^  Buti 
Italians  could  not  be  content,  whde  there  was  no  right  ol 
public  meeting  or  association,  while  even  agricultural  anai 
scientific  societies  were  only  tolerated  and  often  froTOea 
on,  while  there  was  little  liberty  of  speech  or  writing,  and 
it  was  only  on  purely  economic  questions  that  criticism 
of  the  government  was  tolerated.  France,  Spain,  Portuga 
had  their  parliaments ; but  Italians  had  no  control  oye. 
taxation,  no  responsible  executive,  not  even  a consultatiw 


SOCIAL  CONDITION  OF  ITALY  109 

voice  in  legislation.  Even  local  government  had  little 
chance  of  vitality,  for  Napoleon  had  done  much  to  destroy 
the  vigorous  municipal  life  of  Italy,  and  the  Restoration  had 
no  desire  to  revive  it.  The  rural  communes  indeed  had 
everywhere  far  greater  powers  than  an  English  village  pos- 
sesses at  the  present  day ; but,  judged  by  the  continental 
standard,  their  liberties  were  not  very  wide,  and  they  were 
subject  to  the  petty  and  capricious  interference  of  the 
central  government.  The  municipalities  of  the  great  towns 
were  under  practically  the  same  conditions.  Provincial 
councils  existed  in  Lombardy-Venetia,  Piedmont,  Naples, 
and  after  1832  in  the  Papal  States,  but  nowhere  except 
in  the  Austrian  provinces  had  they  any  vigorous  life  or 
independence.  The  Central  Congregations  of  the  Austrian 
provinces  were  m theory  the  germ  of  representative  institu- 
tions ; but  the  fears  of  the  government  kept  them  tightly  in 
hand,  and  it  needed  the  great  national  impulse  of  1847  to 
give  them  voice. 

It  was  small  blame  to  the  Italians,  if  they  lacked  the 
commonplace  virtues  of  citizenship,  if  they  put  their  faith 
m theories  and  programmes,  and  wanted  in  patience  and  prac- 
tical capacity.  These  were  the  inevitable  results  of  a system, 
that  allowed  no  political  training  or  responsibility.  But  the 
taunts  of  Lamartine  and  Niebuhr,  that  Italy  was  the  land 
of  the  dead,  were  only  the  expression  of  foreign  spleen  or 
ignorance.  The  ferment  that  produced  three  revolutions  in 
ten  years,  and  the  ever-recurring  crop  of  small  conspiracies ; 
the  patriotism  that  rose  up  undiscouraged  after  each  defeat' 
that  sent  Italian  men  to  the  scaffold  and  Italian,  women  to 
widowhood,  that  for  thirty  years  toiled  and  suffered  in  un- 
quenchable faith,  bore  testimony  to  the  life  that  was  within. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  LATER  CARBONARI 


1823-1832 


E0MA^-TICISM  : in  Italy  ; Manzoni ; the  zlntofojm;  Mazzini.  The  Later 
Carboxari.  Position  of  Austria.  The  Goncuimo.  The  Papal 
States  I82T-TO-  Leo  XII.;  the  Zelanti  Cardinals;  tLe  Liberals  m 
Eomaina  ^Revolution  of  Central  Italy  ; Francis  IV.’s  plots ; 
revolution  at  Bologna;  the  Temporal  Power;  Xon-intervention ; 
collapse  of  the  first  revolution;  the  “new  era”;  the  Memorandum 
of  the  Powers;  second  revolution  of  Romagna;  the  French  at 
Ancona  ; character  of  the  revolution. 


Meanwhile  the  revolutionary  movement-was  only  quiescent. 
Thouo-h  it  seemed  crushed  by  the  failure  of  the  Neapohtan 
and  Piedmontese  revolutions  and  the  fate  of  the  Lombard 
conspirators,  it  had  really  entered  on  a new  phase.  The 
Conciliatore  began  the  transition  from  the  mere  blind  revolt 
against  despotism  to  the  thoughtful  constructive  movement, 
which  cared  more  for  intellectual  and  moral  progress  than 
for  political  change  in  itself.  The  movements  of  1820-21 
were  in  Italy  the  finale  of  the  drama,  which  began  with  the 
French  Revolution ; the  last  struggles  of  the  half-democratic 
half-military  idea,  which  had  governed  the  Napoleonic  age. 
New  forces,  partly  a development  from  it,  partly  a reaction 

ac^ainst  it,  were  coming  into  play. 

^ The  Romanticist  movement  was  much  rnore  than  a 
phase  of  literary  development.  The  Classicist  school, 
against  which  it  was  a protest,  was  as  much  a phenomenon 
of  politics  and  society  as  of  literature;  and  as^  such  Napo- 
leon had  appropriated  it  and  turned  it  to  his  ends.  Its 
style  harmonized  well  with  a system,  that  was  based  on 
positive  and  commonplace  views  of  life,  and  dreaded  the 
progressive  and  sphitual  elements  of  national  existence. 


THE  LATER  CARBONARI 


1 1 1 


Its  framework,  modelled  on  the  myths  and  history  of 
Imperial  Rome,  was  an  instrument  to  the  hands  of  one 
who  took  the  Caesars  for  his  model.  Its  paganism  appealed 
to  a generation  bred  in  the  scepticism  of  the  Revolution. 
It  was  inevitable  therefore  that  the  reaction  against  the 
Napoleonic  order  should  seek  a new  form  of  literary  expres- 
sion. The  Germans  went  back  to  their  national  traditions, 
and  discovered  that  the  peoples  of  modern  Europe  had 
a history  and  legends  and  popular  life,  worthy  of  epic  and 
lyric.  But  while  the  new  school  supplied  the  fire  for  the 
War  of  Liberation,  inspired  its  songs,  filled  Germans  with 
the  belief  in  a great  Fatherland,  the  spirit,  that  followed  it 
from  its  medieval  sources,  made  it  the  tool  of  the  reaction, 
and  its  ultimate  results  in  Germany  were  conservative  and 
clerical.  Even  before  the  Restoration  the  movement  had 
passed  to  France.  Men,  who  were  weary  of  a system  which 
lived  entirely  in  the  obvious  and  matter-of-fact,  took  refuge 
in  the  kingdom  of  dreams,  and  turned  to  the  fantastic  and 
marvellous.  The  logic  of  the  Revolution  had  started  from 
so  many  false  premisses,  that  common-sense  itself  was  dis- 
credited. The  Revolution  had  apparently  failed,  and  men 
turned  to  the  past,  with  which  it  had  violently  broken,  the 
past  of  monarchy  and  Catholicism.  The  great  religious  re- 
action, which  He  Maistre  and  Chateaubriand  led,  found  in 
Romanticist  literature  matter  and  style  exactly  fitted  to  its 
purpose.  They  made  it  a revolt  of  art  against  science,  of  the 
spiritual  against  the  material,  of  conventional  morality  against 
sensualism,  of  artificial  society  against  the  equality  of  man. 
In  France,  therefore,  as  in  Germany,  Romanticism,  at  all 
events  in  its  earlier  stages,  helped  the  reaction.  But  even 
here  by  correcting  the  one-sidedness  of  the  Revolution,  and 
by  being  in  its  essence  a protest  against  the  present,  it  inevit- 
ably became  in  the  long  run  a revolutionary  influence. 

When  it  passed  to  Italy,  more  from  Germany  and  Eng- 
land than  from  France  (it  had  as  its  teachers  Byron  and 
Macpherson,!  Schiller  and  Goethe),  it  took  from  the  first  a 
Liberal  imprint.  In  Italy  Catholicism  had  been  practically 
unchallenged  by  the  Revolution,  and  there  was  no  room  for 

^ Ossian  was  immensely  popular. 


I I 2 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


a religious  reaction.  Romanticist  literature  sent  the  Italians, 
like  the  Germans,  back  to  their  past ; hut  their  traditions, 
which  Sismondi  had  lately  popularized,  were  of  republics  and 
vigorous  civic  life  and  democratic  victories  over  German 
feudalism.  A few  who,  like  Monti,  clung  to  the  classicist 
tradition,  attacked  the  new  school  as  a foreign  importation, 
but  its  writings  were  accepted  as  the  literature  of  progress 
by  the  great  mass  of  earnest  men.  Romanticist,”  said 
Pellico,  “ is  synonymous  with  Liberal.”  The  keen  literary  life 
of  Milan,  full  of  humanitarian  sympathies,  protested  against 
the  sterile  classicist  literature,  whose  “ ideas,”  in  Manzoni’s 
indictment,  “ were  impotent  for  good  or  evil,  whose  teaching 
was  neither  of  duty  nor  hope,  of  glory  nor  wisdom.”  Roman- 
ticism inspired  Berchet  to  sing  of  the  “ inexhaustible  woe  ” 
of  Italy.  Foscolo  had  been  to  some  extent  under  its  influ- 
ence, and  his  Jacoi^o  Ortis  was  full  of  the  despondency  of  the 
German  school,  inevitable  where  t3rranny  shut  up  every 
outlet  for  endeavour ; and  its  purity  of  passion  and  self- 
renunciation,  its  worship  of  Petrarch  and  Dante,  its  de- 
spairing but  fervid  patriotism,  made  it  a power  among  the 
younger  generation.  But  the  prophet  of  Italian  Romanticism 
was  Alessandro  Manzoni.  He  was  a grandson  of  Beccaria,  a 
genial,  sensible  Milanese,  large-hearted  and  tolerant,  a Gallio 
among  enthusiasts;  at  heart,  however,  an  ardent  Catholic, 
whose  “ Sacred  Hymns  ” were  full  of  the  religious  note.  His 
Tragedies  teemed  with  veiled  political  teaching,  and  their 
choruses  became  in  after  years  the  marching  songs  of  the 
Volunteers.  In  1827  he  published  I Promessi  Sposi,  and  the 
famous  novel  easily  lent  itself  to  the  allegory  intended  by  its 
author,^  of  Italy  sundered  from  her  peace  by  foreign  rule  and 
social  tyranny.  Martzoni  went  to  the  people  for  his  studies 
of  character ; he  discarded  the  romance  of  chivalry  as  much 
as  the  mythological  poem,  and  his  work  had  a true  demo- 
cratic ring.  But  whatever  were  the  political  lessons  that  he 
meant  to  teach,  Manzoni  was  convinced  that  the  times  were 
not  ripe  for  revolution.  His  country  must  be  morally  healed 
before  she  could  be  politically  regenerated.  Practical  Chris- 

^ Cantu,  Manzoni,  183-190;  see  Settembrini,  Litteratura,  III.  320-324 
Bersezio,  Regno,  III.  167. 


THE  LATER  CARBONARI 


I tianity,  justice,  self-sacrifice,  were  the  only  road  to  liberty 
and  so  he  preached  a patient,  dignified  quietism,  that  had 
more  to  do  with  morals  than  politics. 

■ In  close  connection  with  Manzoni  and  his  school,  Vieus- 
^ seux,  the  Florentine  librarian,  and  the  Liberal  noble,  Capponi, 

I founded  (1820)  the  Antologia  in  imitation  of  the  Edinburgh 
I Review.  Though  its  circulation  was  smalV  its  influence  was 
great : the  leading  Italian  writers  of  the  time.  Carlo  Troya, 
Tommaseo,  Leopardi,  Colletta,  Mazzini,  wrote  in  its  pages. 

I Its  object  was  “ to  represent  Italian  society  and  its  moral 
( and_  literary  needs,  to  make  Italy  know  itself,  to  bring  before 
Italians  a national  and  not  a municipal  ideal.”  It  was  more 
defimtely  political  than  Manzoni’s  work ; it  was  more  closely 
in  touch  with  the  social  reform  movement,  and  in  many 
respects  was  the  direct  precursor  of  the  Moderate  Nation- 
alists. And  round  the  Antologia  grew  up  an  eager  group  of 
Dante  students  in  the  footsteps  of  Foscolo  and  Gabriel 
Rossetti,  and  a school  of  history,  which  Romanticism  had 
directed  to  the  past  glories  of  Italy.  Carlo  Troya  at  Naples, 
^esare  Balbo,  the  son  of  Prospero,  at  Turin,  Capponi  at 
Florence,  made  the  middle  ages  known  to  their  countrymen; 
and  Rossetti  and  Berchet  in  their  exile  were  writing  patriotic 
songs  and  fierce  philippics  against  Pope  and  princes.® 

But  history  and  romance  only  irritated  men,  who  were 
wearmg  out  their  souls  in  rage  against  a brutal  tyranny. 
Sensible  and  masculine  as  was  much  of  Manzoni’s  teaching,  its 
reverence  for  the  priest,  its  acceptance  of  the  whole  Catholic 
dogma  could  not  content  those  who  hated  the  one  and 
doubted  the  other.  “ Manzoni  grumbled,  where  Alfieri 
gnashed  his  teeth;”  and  a gospel,  which  taught  non-re- 
sistance and  universal  forgiveness,  rang  false  to  men  who 
fretted  under  present  political  wrong.  The  first  note  of 
opposition  came  from  a young  Leghorn  lawyer,  Guerrazzi 
j (1 027).  Like  the  Komanticists,  he  drew  his  scenes  from 


1 


^ VOL.  1. 


H 


1 14  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  ( 

the  great  medieval  days  of  Italy.  His  writings,  bitter,  misan- 
thropic, hopeless,  were  the  protest  of  a generous  soul  agamst . 
oppression,  and  had  a trumpet-note  that  told  of  revolt  ano  l 
battle.  But  his  cynicism  went  far  to  spoil  his  work,  and  a 
sounder  protest  against  the  defects  of  Italian  Romanticisr  n 
came  from  Mazzini.  He  had  learnt  discontent  from  Byroi  i 
and  Foscolo,  but  had  got  a manlier  fibre  from  the  Bible  ani  1 
Dante  and  Roman  history.  Romanticism,  he  objected  ii  i 
brilliant  but  not  quite  fair  criticism  (1828),  belonged  to  tht ; 
individualist  school ; it  had  no  sense  of  personal  or  national 
mission,  and  therefore  could  not  found  a literature.  It  mus« 
become  practical  and  political  and  didactic,  and  concent 
itself  with  the  revival  of  national  life.  To  a certain  extentj. 
Mazzini  was  himself  a Romanticist,  but  with  him  the  school 
became  intensely  patriotic  and  radical.  With  Manzoni  poliJ 
tical  reform  was  to  come  through  the  personal ; with  Mazzm:, 
personal  reform  was  to  come  through,  the  political.  Hc) 
made  Romanticism  a battle  for  liberty  and^  independence,. 
“It  aims,”  he  said,  “at  giving  Italy  an  original  nationa.1 
literature,  to  voice  eloquently  the  ideas  and  needs  of  thje 
social  movement.”  ^ | 

/ Romanticism  is  the  starting-point  of  modern  pohtica| 
/schools  in  Italy.  In  the  sphere  of  ideas  it  marked  the  clos4 
of  the  Carbonaro  period  ; it  was  the  direct  precursor  alike  of 
I Young  Italy  and  the  Moderates.  But  as  yet  its  influenoo 
was  only  imperfectly  felt  in  political  action.  Manzoni  s 
system  of  moral  reform  required  time ; Mazzini  was  not  yet 
known  as  a politician.  Politics  were  still  in  a transitional 
stage,  retaining  much  of  the  old  purely  negative  Libera,  1 
school,  but  with  a new  view  of  patience  and  earnestness, 
and  something  more  social  and  constructive.  _ The  nmii 
dh-ection  of  the  reform  movement  still  lay  with  the 
bonari.  After  the  collapse  of  the  Neapolitan  Revolution, 
they  had  moved  their  Supreme  Lodge  to  Pans,  still  the 
Mecca  of  European  democracy.  The  society  ceased  to  oe 
purely  Italian  ; its  chiefs,  Lafayette,  Pepe,  and  Louis  Philippe, 

1 Pesenti,  Romanticismo. 

2 Mazzini,  Opere,  II.  6o,  138. 


1 THE  LATEK  CARBONARI  uj 

If  f f r “rzinirjr 

appeared,  and  it  became  the  unthinking  instrument  ef  m 
tTlac^foT^  though  they  were,  had  little  democraS 

ifnrdei^iat;r^^^^ 

’ ‘‘iadfhTr*''^  else  they  had  in  common,  the  Carbonari 
4ny  a vounritT?'  sf  red  equally  in  the  hatred  of  Austria. 
o<f  oL  ^ ^ ^ throat,  regardless 

h er  revolutions  of  1820-2  1 had  given 

1 the  excuse  to  revive  her  pretensions  to  controf  the 

t/o  peninsula.  She  feared,  or  professed 

~ o/LaTt  afterE  S 

presses  of  Laybach  and  Verona  she  openly  posed  as  tbp 

r“SutS  Ak  tLnes  of  Italy  from 

T?  Alexander  had  come  over  to  the  reactionarv 

he^-^tb^^'^^^”®  vras  unfriendly  but  unwilling  to  act  against 

.nfluent  T r^tfas^Eif  E^^ 

^wn.:  * zi"rre'“st“ ,?  klz 
'■rrzz'H  ■>»  «s»» 

lawyers— were  spies— cardinals,  officers, 

JtalLs  ‘‘aTeTlrffiE?;EE'  But^?^" 

ftir'pS  stdZrz " ““ «'  '""5 

We'nr  cLSEnTCcTs  f Sfples 

I ; «•»“.  u-  -9. 

Rivolgimcnti,  1.  463;  Manno,  Informa- 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


1 16 

and  there  was  a great  and  growing  suspicion  between  the- 
Papal  See  and  the  great  erastian  Empire.  i 

The  common  distrust  shaped  itself  into  something  of  anJ  ‘ 
active  alhance.  Of  the  details  of  the  Concistorio  little  ir  a 
certainly  known ; of  its  existence  there  can  be  no  doubr  a 
The  restless  Duke  of  Modena  had  turned  to  new  schemes  oi  i 
enlarge  his  dominions,  this  time  at  the  expense  of  Austriic  1 
and  he  found  a party  in  the  Church.  Ever  since  the  reaction  i 
of  1799  there  had  been  a more  or  less  defined  society  h^i 
“ Sanfedists  ” ^ (followers  of  the  Holy  Faith),  the  “Daail 
Quixotes  of  militant  Catholicism,”  in  touch  with,  if  not  fusust 
into,  the  Calderari  of  Naples  and  the  Catholic  Society  of  Piedn 
mont.  Reactionary  and  ultramontane  and  intolerant  as  theit 
were,  they  had  a strain  of  nationalist  sentiment,  which  mad3l 
them  regard  Austria  with  unfriendly  eyes  as  heiress  of  thd- 
Ghibelhne  attack  upon  the  Papacy.  How  far  the  Sanfedists  ^ 
merged  themselves  in  the  more  organised  Concistorio,  how ) 
far  the  latter  expanded  into  a general  plot,  we  can  only . 
guess.  At  all  events  Francis  had  some  sort  of  understanding! 
with  the  Zelanti  ^ of  the  Papal  Court,  possibly  with  thee 
Kings  of  Piedmont  and  Naples,  to  partition  Italy  afresh  at 
the  expense  of  Austria  and  the  House  of  Lorraine.  Fo^ 
this  he  was  willing  to  approach  the  Carbonari,  or  at  leasR 
that  section  which,  under  the  name  of  Guelfs,  looked  kindhe 
on  the  Papacy,  and  hoped  to  make  it  the  rallying  point  o)f 
the  national  movement.  There  was  much  obscure  intriguingo 
for  a compromise  on  a common  nationalist  policy.^  's 

Jfc 

All  the  time,  underneath  the  workings  of  Carboaa^ri  ancil 
Concistorio,  the  popular  discontent  was  making  an  explosion’ 
sooner  or  later  inevitable.  Romagna  was  now  the  focu^^, 
round  which  ever}^  conspiracy  centred.  Hitherto  the  comk 

^ Compare  the  “Congregation”  in  France  and  the  “ Apostolicals ” inj 
Spain.  , 

- See  below,  p.  1 17.  a 

^ An  estimate  of  the  Concistorio  must  depend  largely  on  the  credit  to  be 
given  to  Didier’s  Rome  Souterraine,  especially  I.  146-153,  first  published  in  1833.® 
See  also  Witt,  SocieUs  Secretes,  26-33  ; Saint-Edme,  Carbonari,  207-212  ; Cantu}, 
Cronistoria,  II.  137-138;  III.  411-412;  Carte  segrete,  II.  56,  67,  83,  90,  3^4 
III.  50-60,  96-99;  Bianchi,  Ducati,  I.  318-319;  Gualterio,  op.  cit.,  I.  42-433 
Poggi,  Storia,  I.  546-549,  558  ; Casati,  Confalonieri,  I.  94. 


THE  LATER  CARBONARI 


ii; 


parative  mildness  of  Consalvi’s  rule,  and  the  absence  of  an 
army  possessed  by  Carbonaro  ideas  bad  saved  the  Papal 
jStates  from  revolt.  But  every  year  the  mrsgovernment 
'*grew  more  intolerable.  Consalvi  bad  only  been  able  to 
j-jpostpone  the  reaction.  He  lived  to  see  it  triumphant,  and 
ibis  enemy,  Della  Genga,  Pope  (August  1823).  In  spite  of 
'age  and  sickness,  Leo  -XII.  was  an  alert  and  busy  ruler. 
His  settled  aim  was  to  establish  the  theocracy  in  its  strictest 
form,  to  restore  the  pre-Revolution  order,  to  exterminate 
all  shapes  of  Liberalism.  His  “ Congregation  of  State  made 
the  Cardinals  once  more  supreme  over  the  government.  He 
gave  the  nobles  back  many  of  their  privileges,  placed 
educati^  and  charities  in  the  exclusive  grip  of  the  clergy, 
disqualified  the  Jews  from  holding  property  and  drove  them 
itO'  hear  sermons.  It  was  part  of  his  scheme  that  the 
hierarchic  state  must  be  free  from  foreign  intrusion,  and  for 
this  Leo  was  prepared  to  throw  down  the  gauntlet  to 
Austria,  which  little  relished  the  prospect  of  aggressive 
ultramontanism.  His  nationalism,  such  as  it  was,  was  not 
the  only  well-meant  chapter  in  his  policy.  However  obscur- 
j antist  and  impossible  it  may  have  been,  he  had,  no  doubt,  a 
dream  of  a state  preeminent  in  piety  and  orthodoxy,  where, 
though  Liberals  might  be  fiercely  persecuted,  the  plain  moral 
' virtues  would  flourish,  and  government  provide  for  the 
bomfort  of  a conforming  people.  There  were  efforts  to 
^reform  Roman  morals,  so  drastic  as  to  induce  an  exodus  of 
Ihigh-placed  sinners  to  more  tolerant  Tuscany.  Leo’s  edicts 
hhow  some  care  for  the  Roman  poor,  and  his  educational 
<Bull  was  a well-meant  effort  to  put  down  scholastic  abuses. 
®ut  while  he  tried  to  dragoon  his  people  into  virtue,  his 
'Teforms  left  undisturbed  the  vices  of  the  Roman  court. 
iMen  might  be  driven  to  church,  and  Lenten  abstinence 
{enforced,  but,  while  Cardinals  plundered  the  treasury,  and 
’the  police  harried  the  poor,  the  obtrusive  religiosity  of  the 
jgovernment  could  only  move  contempt.^ 

\ On  Leo’s  death  in  1829  the  struggle  was  revived  in  the 
Iconclave  between  the  partisans  of  Austria  and  the  Zelanti 
Cardinals,  who  desired  an  independent  and  ultramontane 

^ Carte  segrete,  I.  341  ; Salvagni,  Corte  Romana,  III.  67. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


1 18 


Pope.  The  Papal  Court  was  a traditional  battleground  oi' 
Austrian  and  French  diplomacy,  and  the  Zelanti  naturalP"^ 
looked  to  France  for  patronage.  In  spite  of  it,  Albani,  th-^' 
leader  of  the  pro-Austrisdi  cardinals,  manoeuvred  the  elec^ 
tion  of  his  candidate.  Cardinal  Castiglioni  became  Pop“* 
Pius  VIII.,  and  Albani,  a rich  irreligious  man,  with  handP"’ 
soiled  in  commercial  speculations,  was  his  Secretary  of  State^ 
Pius’  short  reign  of  twenty  months  was  uneventful,  and  his 
death  in  November  1830  saw  a repetition  of  the  intrigues. 
The  Zelanti  avenged  their  defeat,  Mauro  Cappellari  wa" 
elected  Pope  as  Gregory  XVI.,  and  Leo’s  secretary,  Bernett/^. 
returned  to  oflSce.  C'  i 

Gregory  had  lighted  on  troublous  times.  It  was  thd 
year  of  revolution,  and  the  Papal  question  had  passed  beyonA 
the  diplomatic  duel  of  France  and  Ausffia.  The  transj- 
Apennine  provinces  were  honeycombed  with  Carbonari^^l 
and  the  secret  societies  recruited  even  from  the  officials  and 
police.  Five  years  before,  Leo  had  sent  Cardinal  Rivarola 
to  crush  them  (1825),  but  all  his  hideous  severity  failed, 
and  a succession  of  attempts  on  his  life  frightened  him  back 
to  Rome.  There  was  almost  open  revolt  in  some  of  the 
cities,  and  so  dangerous  looked  the  future  that,  even  before 
Leo’s  death,  Bernetti  had  predicted  that  the  days  of  tha 
Temporal  Power  were  numbered.  The  July  RevoMtionI 
brought  the  ferment  to  a head.  The  Parisian  Carbonahi 
had  been  industriously  connecting  the  threads  of  insurrec-^ 
tion  in  North  and  Central  Italy.  Before  the  Revolution  ; 
and  in  the  early  days  of  the  Orleanist  monarchy,  the 
plotting  went  on  briskly  under  Louis  Philippe’s  patronage  i 
Duke  Francis  was  ready  to  lead  a crusade  against  Austriaf 
or  partition  the  Pope’s  dominions,  provided  that  France' 
would  secure  him  by  promising  her  support.  Protestin^^ 
himself  “a  true  Italian,”  he  opened  negotiations  with  Menottij 
and  Misley,  the  leaders  of  the  Modenese  Liberals,  and  the’ 
credulous  patriots  of  North  ItaP"  - ^re  ready  to  look  to  hin? 
as  a possible  royal  leader.  I.  touch  with  Menotti,  th^ 

Carbonaro  lodges  at  Bologna  , me  were  preparing  fop 

insurrection,  and  had  fixed  the  k for  an  early  day  ot 

February.  But  Francis  found  . embarked  on  tooj 


\ 

THE  LATER  CARBONARI  119 

hazardous  a venture.  He  had  clearer  proof  than  the  other 
conspirators  that  that  “ abyss  of  roguery,”  Louis  Philippe, 
was  plotting  treachery,  perhaps  that  he  had  already  betrayed 
him  to  Austria.  Much  mystery  hangs  on  the  Duke’s  rela- 
tions with  Menotti  and  Misley,'  but  whatever  may  have 
been  his  promises  to  them,  he  was  preparing  to  repudiate 
them  and  buy  himself  back  into  Austrian  favour  by  a 
daring  stroke.  A premature  rising  at  Rome,  while  the 
Conclave  that  elected  Gregory  was  sitting,  had  been  easily 
put  down.  The  news  of  its  failure  decided  Francis  to  act. 
On  the  night  of  February  3 (1831)  his  troops  surrounded 
Menotti’s  house,  and  capturing  the  conspirators  assembled 
there,  he  sent  an  express  to  fetch  the  executioner.  But  it 
was  too  late.  Bologna  rose  next  morning,  and  many  who 
had  small  sympathy  with  the  Carbonari  threw  themselves 
into  a movement  that  promised  an  escape  from  Papal  rule. 
The  soldiers  fraternized  or  retired ; the  frightened  Pro- 
legate nominated  a Provisional  Government  and  withdrew.  ^ 
As  soon  as  the  news  reached  Modena,  Francis  fled,  taking 
his  prisoners  with  him.  The  Duchess  of  Parma  followed, 
and  from  Bologna  to  Piacenza  the  country  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  Liberals.  The  Revolution  spread  rapidly  through 
Romagna ; within  three  days  of  the  Bologna  revolt,^  Forli, 
Rimini,  Ravenna,  Ferrara  had  risen;  by  the  9th  it  had 
reached  Pesaro,  Ancona,  and  Perugia.  The  rest  of  Umbria 
and  the  Southern  Marches  sent  in  their  adhesion  a fortnight 
later,  as  the  Liberal  army  under  Sercognani  passed  through. 
In  less  than  three  weeks  all  Romagna,  the  Marches,  and 
Umbria  down  to  Terni  and  Narni  had  thrown  off  Papal 
iule.  There  was  no , opposition ; the  troops,  the  municipal 
(officers,  the  civil  servants  quietly  adhered.  Even  most  of 
(the  priest's,  and  here  and  there  a bishop  submitted  with 
apparent  'willingness."  Never  had  revolution  been  made 
'iwith  more  perfect  quiet  and  unanimity. 

The  Ihorfekmal  Government  declared  the  Temporal 
(Power  abojlished  in  the  province  of  Bologna,  and  ordered 

1 The  evil^ence  is  collected  in  Tivaroni,  Dominio  Austriaco,  I.  625-627  ; 
see  Poggi,  op.  cit,  I.  557-5^1  5 5^* 

^ Z'a.no\m\, 'Rivoluzione,  lo,  13,  25. 


I 20 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

elections  for  a National  Assembly.  Of  legates  came  from 
all  the  cities  of  the  Legations  and  Marr^hf  3,  and  from  Umbria’ 
as  far  as  Perugia  and  Spoleto,  and  as  s'j'  • 1 as  they  met,  the} 
stamped  the  national  intention  of  the  niovement  by  namino 
themselves  the  “Assembly  of  deputies  the  Free  Provinces 
of  Italy,”  and  the  revolted  districts  The  United  Italian 
Provinces.”^  On  February  19,  Scrognani  with  theii 
army  was  at  Otricoli,  fifteen  leagues  from  Rome.  Here  the 
Bologna  government  halted  him,  douh'.  ing  what  reception  he 
might  find  at  Rome,  but  young  Lou's  Tonaparte,  who  had 
been  thought  of  as  a figurehead  for  the  7olution,  after  writ-j 
ing  with  boyish  impudence  to  advise  the  Pope  to  surrendeii 
the  Temporal  Power,  was  preparing  on  his  own  account  a' 
quixotic  attack  on  the  city.^  The  Roman  government  was 
in  consternation.  There  was  no  real  power  of  resistance^ 
Bernetti  had  appealed  to  the  loyalty  of  the  peasants  and  the! 
Romans,  but  there  had  been  two  attempted  risings  in  the 
capital,  and  few  except  the  poor  of  the  Trasteverine  quartei^ 
had  responded  to  his  call.  The  Pope  was  probably  intending 
flight,  and  Bernetti  was  ready  to  compromise  on  any  terms.^ 
But  Austria  was  already  on  the  way  to  save  the  Papal 
power  from  its  imminent  ruin.  The  revolutionary  govern- 
ment had  assumed  from  the  first  that  France  would  protect 
it  from  a foreign  attack.  One  of  the  formulas  of  the  July 
Revolution  had  been  that  no  state  should  be  allowed  tc 
interfere  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  another.  The  French 
ministers  had  protested  that  they  would  never  permit  the 
principle  of  non-intervention  to  be  violated ; they  had  helped 
the  Italian  exiles  to  reach  Romagna,  and  promised  that  il 
Austria  intervened,  France  would  fight.^  But  they  sent 
Metternich  private  messages  that  their  brave  words  meant 
nothing,^  and  the  old  statesman,  reassured,  contemptuously 
disregarded  French  bravado.  When  Casimir-Perier,  whose 

^ Miscellaneous  Documents,  No.  4 ; Divista  Europea,  XIX.  461-462. 

2 Vicini,  Rivoluzione,  172;  Carte  segrete,  II.  408;  Reine  Hortense,  ^6; 
Nisco,  Francesco  53.  | 

2 Vesi,  Rivoluzione,  31.  ^ 

4 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  III.  45  ; Gualterio,  op.  cit,  I.  28-31,  80  n.'  Palmieri  de’ 
Micciche,  Le  due  d'Orleans,  30 ; Louis  Blanc,  Dix  ans,  II.  204  ; Gouvernement 
de  Juillet,  11-34  ; Pepe,  Memoirs,  III.  290-301  ; Vimercati,  Histoire,  I.  60. 

5 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  III.  58,  345  ; Fyffe,  Modern  Europe,  II.  401-402. 


THE  LATER  CARBONARI 


I 2 I 


ppointment  to  the  ministry  marked  the  Kin'g’s  final  severance 
•om  the  Revolution,  declared  that  the  blood  of  Frenchmen 
longed  to  France  alone,”  he  knew  that  he  could  act.  The 
ustrians  easily  overran  Farmland  Mo'dena  (February  25 
j March  6),  and  the  Duke,  returning  with  his  Austrian 
iscfort,  sent  Menotti  to  the  scaffold.  Zucchi,  an  ex-general 
of  Napoleons  army,  who  commanded  the  Modenese  in- 
surgents, retired  with  his  troops  to  the  Romagnuol  frontier, 
but  the  Bolognese  government,  in  pedantic  observance  of  the 
non-intervention  formula,  and  still  hoping  against  light  that 
France  would  insist  on  its  observance,  treated  Zucchi’s  men  as 
belligerents  entering  a neutral  territory  and  disarmed  them. 

None  of  our  people,”  they  said,  “ shall  take  part  in  our 
neighbours’  quarrels.”  Th^^  action  gave  the  lie  to  their 
high-sounding  phrases  of  unity  and  nationality.  They  had 
no  heart  for  danger.  They  had,  it  is  true,  only  7000  ill- 
lisciplined  though  enthusiastic  men,  and  most  of  these  were 
with  Sercognani  in  Umbria.  But  a spirited  defence  would 
have  roused  the  country,  and  the  events  of  seventeen  years 
later  showed  what  possibilities  of  resistance  lay  in  the 
Bolognese.  Had  they  kept  the  Austrians  at  bay  for  a few 
weeks,  the  excitement  in  France  might  have  forced  the 
Paris  government  to  act.  But  they  tamely  withdrew  to 
Ancona,  and  the  Austrians  entered  Bologna  without  a shot 
( learch  21).  Pressing  on  along  the  Emilian  Way,  they 
eiiqountered  Zucchi’s  small  force  at  Rimini,  and  were  beaten 
Imck  with  loss.  But  Zucchi  retired  to  a better  position  at 
Ancona,  and  arrived  there  to  find  that  the  Provisional 
Government  had  capibilated  to  the  Pope’s  agent  on  the  bare 
promise  that  an  amnesty  should  be  granted  (March  27). 
One  member,  Mamiani,  refused  to  sign,  and  the  bolder 
spirits  had  advocated  a rush  on  Rome  with  Sercognani’s 
troops.  But  their  colleagues  still  feared  the  temper  of  the 
Romans  and  the  probability  that  France  would  intervene  to 
defend  the  Papacy.^  The  more  timid  counsel  prevailed,  and 
with  the  disbanding  of  Zucchi’s  and  Sercognani’s  men  the 
three- weeks-old  Revolution  ignominiously  collapsed. 

It  seemed  to  have  died  as  easily  as  it  was  born.  The 

ui  ^ Zanolini,  op.  cit.,  30;  Vannucci,  Martiri,  347-348. 


122 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


Austrians  laid  the  conquered  provinces  at  the  Pope’s  f 
Bernetti  announced  a “ new  era  ” of  beneficent  governm6 
and  initiated  it  by  repudiating  the  armistice  and  allo^ 
his  troops  to  shoot  down  the  citizens  of  Rimini  in  cold  b 
But  it  was  by  no  means  an  unchequered  victory, 
failure  of  the  Revolution  only  transferred  the  Roman  c 
tion  to  the  hands  of  the  diplomatists.  Even  Casimir-P. 
was  irritated  at  Metternich’s  prompt  action,  and  pu 
opinion  in  France  would  not  allow  him  to  leave  Austria  s 
champion  of  the  Papacy.  His  policy  was  to  get  the  Austriai 
out  of  Romagna,  and  extort  from  the  Pope  sufficient  reforms 
to  allow  the  country  to  settle  down.  Metternich,  for  his 
part,  was  anxious  to  assist  him  against  the  Liberal  opposi- 
tion, and  was  willing,  at  least  partially,  to  withdraw  the  army 
of  occupation.  But  the  other  Powers  could  not  alffiw 
the  question  to  become  a struggle  for  precedence  between 
Austria  and  France.  Papal  misrule  was  too  crying  ia 
scandal,  too  perennial  a source  of  disturbance  to  the  peace 
of  Europe.  The  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers  met  at 
Rome  to  arrange  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Austrian  troops, 
and  discuss  remedies  for  the  misgovernment.  England 
France,  Prussia  urged  large  measures  of  reform;  Austri; 
and  Russia  opposed.  But  nominally  the  latter  gave  wa^ 
and  a Memorandum  Avas  presented  to  the  Pope  (May  lo 
demanding  the  admission  of  the  laity  to  the  whole  civil  S'^c 
vice  and  Bench,  and  general  remedies  beginning  with  mu  h 
cipal  reform.  England,  hoAvever,  Avas  alone  in  earnest,  a 
Bernetti  kneAv  that  he  need  not  take  too  seriously  the  a 
monitions  of  the  Conference.  He  threatened  to  stir  th 
Catholics  and  Legitimists  in  France ; and  Casimir-Perie 
Avas  content  to  see  the  Austrians  removed  from  Romagna 
and  Avin  some  nominal  concessions  that  Avould  satisfy  French 
opinion.  Austria  and  Russia  secretly  worked  against  the 
Memorandum,  and  Bernetti  kneAV  that  it  Avas  enough  to 
promise  Provincial  Councils  and  the  admission  of  more  Hyp 
men  into  the  government.  The  Conference  broke  up  in 
July,  the  English  representative  protesting  that  not  one  oi 

1 Roman  landlords  were  forbidden  to  raise  rents  on  sitting  tenants  for  n 
year  : Miscellaneous  Edicts,  No.  72. 


THE  LATER  CARBONARI 


123 


its  recommendations  had  been  fully  adopted.  A few  days 
after,  the  Austrians  withdrew  from  PapaLierritory. 

Their  departure  left  the  government  as  powerless  as 
before.  The  vague  promises  of  reform  contented  nobody, 
and  as  soon  as  the  Austrians  had  gone,  revolt  broke  out 
again  through  almost  all  Romagna.  The  tricolor  was  worn, 
no  taxes  were  remitted  to  Rome,  and  a practically  indepen- 
dent government  ruled  the  Legations  of  Bologna,  Ravenna, 
and  Eorli.  But  the  Romagnuols  were  ready  now  to  give 
up  separation  and  even  Home  Rule,  provided  that  Rome 
would  guarantee  their  very  modest  programme  of  reform, 
withdraw  its  troops,  and  allow  them  to  arm  a citizen  guard. 
Bernetti  temporized ; but  the  Romagnuols  were  ready  to 
meet  him  half-way,  when  the  hopes  of  a settlement  were 
suddenly  dashed  by  edicts  from  Rome,  which  closed  the 
Universities  for  a year  and  increased  the  land-tax  (October). 
A meeting  of  delegates  summoned  to  Bologna  ordered  the 
citizen  guard  to  discard  the  Papal  uniform.  It  was  meant 
as  a threat  of  rebellion,  and  the  publication  of  Bernetti’s 
Code,^  despite  its  concessions,  only  roused  opposition  to  its 
defects.  An  agitation,  led  by  the  Bolognese  bar,  compelled 
the  authorities  to  suspend  its  introduction ; and  on  Christ- 
mas Day  the  delegates  summoned  a-^rliament  from  the 
three  Legations.  It  was  an  act  of  overt  rebellion,  and  Ber- 
netti refused  to  wait  longer.  The  four  Powers  (for  England 
dissented)  encouraged  him  to  demand  unconditional  sub- 
mission. France,  anxious  above  all  things  to  avoid  another 
Austrian  occupation,  urged  that  the  revolt  should  be  sup- 
pressed by  Papal  or  Piedmontese  troops  ; and  Bernetti,  eager 
as  they  not  to  call  in  the  Austrians,  sent  Albani  with  a 
strong  native  force.  Two  thousand  volunteers  fought  bravely 
but  ineffectually  at  Cesena  (January  20,  1832);  and  the 
Papal  troops  sacked  the  city  even  to  its  churches,^  and  plun- 
dered unresisting  Forli.  Bologna  might  still  have  made  a 
defence,  but  the  advance  of  an  Austrian  force  crushed  hope, 
and  the  city  was  glad  to  save  itself  from  Papal  outrage  by 
admitting  an  Austrian  garrison. 

^ See  above,  p,  76. 

^ Gennarelli,  Governo  Pontijlcio,  11.  582,  668  ; Saffi,  Scritti,  I.  35, 


24 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


f This  brought  France  again  on  the  scene:'  Austria  had 
stolen  a march,  and  the  Paris  government  had  to  calm  the 
irritation  of  the  country.  It  sent  a force  to  occupy  Ancona 
(February  22),  and  the  French  Liberals  hailed  the  move  as 
the  prelude  to  a war  of  liberation.  The  DShats  talked  of 
“ the  inevitable  struggle,”  and  Galloy,  the  commander  of  the 
expedition,  took  down  the  Papal  arms  and  released  the 
political  prisoners,  while  his  men  sang  the  Marseillaise. 
Galloy  probably  exceeded  his  instructions ; ^ and  when 
Bernetti  threatened  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations  ^ and  , 
Russia  menaced  war,  the  government  brusquely  reversed  its 
policy  and  ate  dust.  France  and  Austria  made  friends  over 
the  grave  of  Liberal  hopes,  and  Palmerston  could  do  no  more 
than  make  a barren  protest. 

The  Revolution  of  Romagna  has  been  hardly  dealt  with. 
The  irresolution  and  incapacity -c^-its  leaders,  their  pedantic 
faith  in  formulas,  their  incapacity  to  lead  admit  of  no 
apology.  The  lawyers  and  professors,  who  directed  it,  had 
small  experience  of  public  life;  they  tried  to  move  men 
with  academic  maxims,  and  despised  the  more  vital  spiritual 
forces  of  a revolution.  There  was  no  popular  fibre  in  them ; 
Vicini,  the  president,  was  old  and  feeble  ; ^ Zucchi  distrusted 
the  volunteers,  Armandi,  another  general,  branded  Italian 
Unity  as  an  utopia.  And  so  the  people,  who  welcomed  the 
revolution  at  its  outset,  soon  cooled  into  indifference,  and 
never  learnt  their  own  responsibility  and  place  in  the  new 
order.  Men,  who,  under  good  leadership,  would  have  fought 
and  perhaps  conquered,  found  themselves  isolated  and  para- 
lysed, and  resigned  themselves  with  hardly  a struggle  to  the 
old  hated  rule.  And  yet  it  was  an  advance  on  the  earlier 
revolutions.  In  some  respects  it  even  went  in  advance  of 
popular  feeling;  for,  scrupulously  deferential  as  it  was  to 
religious  sentiment,  its  abolition  of  the  Temporal  Power 
scandalized  the  masses  in  the  villages  and  small  toTOS.^  In 
spite  of  the  disarming  of  Zucchi’s  men,  it  voiced,  however 

^ Gouvernement  de  Juillet,  34. 

2 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  III.  iii.  I do  not  credit  Poggi,  Storia,  II.  47. 

3 The  charge  that  he  tried  to  revive  the  old  oligarchic  Senate  of  Bologna 
■was  untrue  : Miv.  stor.  del  risorg.,  I.  336. 

^ Pepe,  Memoirs,  III.  362. 


THE  LATER  CARBONARI 


^25 


uncertainly,  the  national  and  propagandist  side  of  the  demo- 
cratic  movement.  Ten  years  before,  the  nationalist  aspira- 
tions of  the  Piedmontese  peeped  timicRy  from  behind  the 
provincial  ambitions  of  the  subalpine  state.  Romagna 
claimed  no  hegemony;  she  was  vz-illing  to  admit  all  free 
provinces  on  equal  terms.  The  title  of  her  government, 
the  ambition  to  make  Rome  the  capital  of  the  new  state, 
showed  how  thoroughly  national  were  the  aims  of  some  at 
least  of  the  insurgents.^  Italian  Liberalism,  too,  had  broad-J 
ened  socially.  Democracy  no  longer  paraded  in  militar^’ 
full-dress ; it  had  spread  from  the  army  and  the  lawyers  tq» 
the  tradesmen  and  the  artisans.  It  had  become  middleq 
class  and  unostentatious,  and  if  it  lacked  capacity  and 
enthusiasm,  it  had  gained  a certain  plain  solidity.  There 
was  a disinterestedness  and  probity  in  the  movement,  w^hich 
testified  to  the  new  spirit ; and  the  social  reforms,  which  i 
had  been  forgotten  by  the  revolutions  of  1820-21,  came  to  j 
the  front  in  a long  list  of  practical  improvements  in  law  and 
taxation  and  social  liberty,  / 


1 Bianchi,  Zuccli%  106-IC7  ; Vicini,  op.  cit.,  113,  167,  171. 


f»tfR  

i^Mr...-->---r.’  w<® ’■’t'j]:  '''  -'hmi  ■'s 

p^n  . ^f’^u  :^r  ••  ■ *»,. 

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;;^  ./  ,}&  '‘t^/l-. 


.'7  :-il 


CHAPTER  VII 


FO  lIN  G I T A L Y 

1331-1844 

Reaction  against  the  Carlonari;  Mazzini  ; Young  Italy,  Piedmont, 
1824-30;  Charles  Albert;  becomes  King;  MazziiAs  plot;  Savo) 
Expedition.  Naples,  1824-34  ; Francis  I.  ; Ferdinand  11.  Tuscany, 
1830-40.  Modena,  1831-40.  Papal  States,  1832-40  ; Gregory  XYI.J 
Bernetti  and  the  Centurions  ; Lainbrnscliini.  The  Depression,  1833- 
37.  The  literary  revival;  Giusti.  Revolutionary  movements; 
Sicilian  rising  of  1837  ; Muratori  -ising  ; the  Bandieras. 


None  the  lees  it  left  a bitter  sense  of  failure  in  the  minds 
of  the  younger  Liberals.  It  humiliated  them  that  a few 
thousand  Austricans  should  have  boon  enough  to  crush  the 
national  rising,  that  the  masses  should  have  shown  such 
apathy,  that  the  leaders  should  have  proved  themselves  so 
unequal  to  their  work.  The  Carbonari  twice  had  led  a 
popular  rising,  and  twice  had  failed.  A new  organisation 
was  needed  with  more  vitality  and  force  than  theirs.  The 
movement  found  its  leader  in  Guiseppe  Mazzini,  the  young 
critic  of  the  Romanticists.  He  was  born  at  Genoa  in  1805, 
and  was  almost  a youth  when  he  contributed  to  the  Antologia. 
When  his  literary  career  was  ruined  by  tlie  suspicions  of  the 
Piedmontese  government,  ho  threw  himself  into  political 
agitation,  and  at  twenty-five  years  found  himself  a prisoner. 
In  the  fortress  of  Savona  the  young  conspirator  worked  out 
his  revolutionary  scheme.  The  Carbonaro  revolutions  had  \ 
failed,  so  ran  his  criticism,  because  l lieir  loaders  were  men 
of  pnall  capacity  or  originality,  seleete<l  more  because  of  j 
their  years  and  position  than  for  better  claims.  They  had 
no  programme  beyond  the  overthrow  of  the  absolutist 
governments,  no  social  outlook  beyvmd  industrial  freedom 
and  a presentable  system  of  law  and  education.  They  might 

126 


YOUNG  ITALY 


127 

have  succeeded  under  a free  government ; but  tlie  t3uanny 
could  only  be  overthrown  by  revolution,  and . that  needed 
leaders  with  a conlidence  and  energy  that  tliey  did  not 
possess.  It  was  time  for  new  ideas  and  new  men.  ''  Place  1 
the  young;'’  he  said,  ^‘at  the  head  cf  the  revolution,  make 
them  feel  they  have  a noble  part  to  play,  fire  them  with 
praise,  give  them  the  word  of  power,  then  hurl  them  on  t]\e 
Austrians.’’^  “Young  Italy,”  as  he  called  his  association, 
must  be,  like  the  Carbonari,  a secret  scciety;  otherwise  it 
would  be  stamped  out.  But  it  was  to  be  much  more  than 
a conspiracy;  its  members  must  not  act  from  blind  obedience 
but  from  personal  conviction ; its  policy  must  look  beyond 
the  liberation  of  Italy  to  the  intellectual  and  social  uplifting 
of  the  masses  of  her  people.  Thus  Young  Italy  would 
be  a moral  power,  with  the  faith,  and  brotherliness  of  a re- 
ligion.^  There  was  something  of  the  smug  and  fantastic  in 
the  picture ; but  it  was  a noble  and  daring  conception. 
Mazzihi  was  young  and  poor,  hardly  known  outside  Genoa; 
but  when  he  was  allowed  to  exchange  prison  for  exile 
(February  1831),  and  from  his  press  at  Marseilles  circulated 
his  writings  through  Italy,  tlio  new  school  quickly  supplanted 
Carbonarism,  and  its  broad  nebulous  doctrines,  its  vision  of 
social  redemption  and  national  glory,  the  passionate  and 
intolerant  dogmatism  of  the  young  revolutionist  himself 
fired  the  vague  impatience  of  thinking  Italians,  who  were 
groping  for  a leader. 

Mazzini  parted  himself  at  once  from  Guorrazzis  im- 
potent criticism  and  Manzonis  opposite  ideal  of  concen- 
tration on  the  smaller  duties  of  life.  Life  was  bo  him 
much  more  than  the  cultivation  of  the  passiA-e  virtues, 
ho  the  grooving  host  of  Ids  disciples  he  preachcal  action, 
strenuousness,  union  ; mo^'o  preparati«)n  for  revolution,  more 
vigour  when  it  came;  a programme  in  liaruiony  vdth  “ the 
social  ideal  of  the  coming  age.”  Witliout  t'ho  masses  re- 
volution could  not  conquer,  and  the  mosses  come 

by  sad  exuerieticc  ro  loolc  on  revolutions  as  Doad-soa  fruit.” 
Tju)  Liberals  must  liold  high  tlicir  social  aim.  “I'e!’  the 
people  yon  will  iVeo  them  from  tlio  rjO'amiV  uf  jcdLices, 

^ At'nzitii,  I.  205-206. 


^ ' 

tSM  '■ '/  • ' 

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tif  -''^' 

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vAP.' * *.v.;rifli» 


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■ ■ •'iv.'.V  .;..0ii'’'  ■-‘^’  '•  -'-t  , 

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,..  ; ,f-"  -i-tl  ' 

■'7' . I*’*  ‘ ' 'V 


128 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


from  the  insults  of  officials,  from  the  oppression  of  the 
privileged  and  rich ; then  and  then  only,  when  the  masses 
begin  to  stir,  point  to  Lombardy  and  preach  war  on  the 
Austrian.”  An.d  at  the  same  time  Young  Italy,  true  uj 
its  religious  mark,  must  satisfy  a nobler  thirst.  There 
was  not  only  the  xVustrian  to  fight,  but  the  dissensiors 
and  vices,  the  impatience  and  hopelessness,  that  come  of 
servitude.”  Passionately  Yazzini  appealed  to  writers  to 
give  themselves  to  practical  work ; to  biang  literature  to 
the  people,  to  tell  them  of  their  history  in  books  and 
almanacks  and  pamphlets,  “Emancipate  the  intedlect ; In 
the  name  of  your  country  and  your  own  glory,  march.” 
And  to  inspire  them,  he  lifted  up  the  v'sion  of  the  new 
Italy,  a highly-organised  democratic  state,  free  iroiu  diplo- 
matic entanglements,  ruled  on  new  and  bold  lines  in  the 
interest  of  the  people.  The  belief  in  a national  mission  | 
was  the  corner-stone  of  his  politics.  Like  Gioberti  after 
him,  the  current  depreciation  of  his  country  drove  him  into 
h3^perbole,  and  he  painted  Italy  initiating  ii  new  life  among 

the  nations,  Rome  a third  time  the  world’s  teaclier,  reconciling' 

. . . . . . ^ 
Roman  justice  and  Christian  altruism  in  the  new  social  gospeld 

This  new  Italy  must  be  republican  and  indivisible,  j 
The  royalists  in  Piedmont,  he  owned,  possibly  in  the 
other  states,  might  join  in  the  attack  on  A_iistria ; the 
advantages  that  a royal  leader  would  bring  were  obvious — 
the  standing  army,  the  treasure,  the  comparative  absence 
of  diplomatic  difficulties.  But  these  would  bo  more  than 
neutralized  by  the  jealousies,  which  woidd  assuredly  alienate 
the  other  princes.  The  circumstances  of  Italy,  all  her 
traditions,  all  her  great  memories,  he  claimed  for  republic- 
anism. A royalist  war  of  liberty,  even  if  it  brought  a 
constitution  in  its  wake,  would  leave  the  social  fabric  still 
unmended.  And  in  the  Republic  Mazzini  saw  the  ideal 
commonwealth,  where  privilege  was  banished,  where  the 
poor  were  made  the  state’s  first  care,  where  association 
and  education  opened  an  infinite  vista  of  progress.'"'  With 

1 /i.,  I.  40,  73,  82;  III,  307  ; V.  73,  250-252.  He  spoke  of  the  “moral 
primacy  ” of  Italy  ten  years  before  Gioberti:  Mario,  Mazzini,  207, 

- Mazzini,  Opere,  III.  212-224,  235-24'/ ; Mario,  o'p.cit.,  206-207. 


- v‘ 


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. • n. 

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, ■■:  \rr  m 

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YOUNG  ITALY  ,2^ 

such  a vision  before  their  eyes,  the  people,  bo  had  nor- 
snaded  himself,  would  rise  in  mass  to  expel  the  Austrians, 
lie  always  had  beforo  him  the  example  of  the  Spanish! 
_V\  ar  of  Liberation.  The  standing  armies  might  bo  swept 
into  the  movement,  but  the  burden  of  the  war  must  bo 
homo  by  volunteers.  Muoli  of  Italy  was  • admirably  mado 
for  guorill.a  fighting : the  Alps  and  Apennino.s,  the  Lombard 
plain  with  Its  network  of  canals.  Austria  could  not  st.and 
ho  believed,  before  the  strength  of  twenty-five  millions  of 
ineu,  imdisciphned  though  they  be. 

Even  dearer  to  Mazzini  than  the  Ilopublic  was  Itali.an  ' 
Unity.  _ Few  as  yet  dared  to  believe  in  its  po.ssibility.  ' 
Irovmcial  life,  m spite  of  Napoleon’s  work  of  ccntr.aliz,t 
tion,  was  still  strong;  provincial  .animosities,  though  on 
the  wane,  were  too  deeply  rooted  to  disappear  in  one 
generation.  Each  capital  rejoiced  in  its  little  court,  and 
clung  jealously  to  its  metropolitan  prestige.  The  armies 
were  attached  each  to  its  prince,  and  felt  no  iDterc.st  in 
ttay.  Ibo  Papacy  was  irreconcilably  hostile  to  a oreat 
Italian  state.  The  House  of  S.avoy,  however  it  mio-ht 
nx  Its  eyes  on  a North  Italian  Kingdom,  had  no  thoimht 
of  fusion  with  the  Centre  or  South.  It  was  Mazzini’s 
tiiith  th,at  made  an  united  Italy  possible,  that  led  men 
XbTOnd  the  existing  fact,  beyond  the  schemes  of  federation 
that  till  now  had  been  the  utmost  bourn  of  national 
lopo  on  to  wh.at  seemed  the  utopian  and  impossible,  but 
which  his  teaching  was  to  make  the  gospel  of  ids  nation. 
Only  through  unity,  ho  believed  and  made  them  believe, 
could  Judy  bo  strong  anu  democratic;  only  when  Horne 
became  bei-  capital,  could  .she  bold  her  place  among  the 
nations  of  Lurope  and  teach  a nobler  ideal  of  government.^ 

\ 1u.1g  .such  were  the  amis  of  revoiution,  its  iustrument 
must  bo  the  secret  society.  It  was  easy  for  critics  to  attack 
the  “sects,  - to  say  with  Foscolo,  that  “ wdiile  Italians  a.spired 
to  liberty,  they  conspired  to  servitude."  The  .lefeols  of  the 
secret  society  were  obvious;  its  mv.stery  and  ritual  played 
to  a feeble  sentimentalism  that  was  a bad  school  for  .action  • 
the  clnols  had  an  uncontrolled  and  irres])onsib]c  power,  that 

1 Minzhii,  tVov,  I.  lu,  1,8,  3:4  ; iij,  4,0-,,,  * 

V01..L  ^ 


..  • a 


‘'•?j4jJirl!lu.V'4i».r»  f.'p.A'-V  ^Jwl'.'tf'^ 


'•'r'*'*  ■,ir  ,‘'  " ; :u.i  .;/*?«  '■•5 

. I- .’  a*  •■'‘f 


V . AJ  , ||  r'li  «A2l*Ji 


i \ 


130  A l-ilSTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

iiiiNit  lead  t]i0  F.ociety  into  snon  cuts  by  iruuluy  p.jths,  • 
]>aper  perfection,  its  easy  coastitution-buildiog  gave  a/dis- 
tasto  lor  couiinonplace  endeavour.  Ma:/zii:d  could  nui 
■'i'oang  Italy  iroin  being  the  prey  of  the  detective  and 
ageni  gyre vovaf ear  ; even  he  resorted  to  the  wire-pulling  and 
the  dictatorial  impatienco,  with  which  his  enemies  accurately 
enough  reproached  him.  But  there  was  no  alternativo. 
a country  where  the  inildost  criticism  of  government  vva- 
punished,  wliore  there  was  not  even  a germ  o^'  ropreaont^, 
live  institutions,  secret  organisation  and  the  secret  press 
were  the  only  resources  left  to  the  reformer.  In  after  years 
when  the  princes  had  been  touched  by  the  natiouelisj, 
spirit,  it  was  safe  for  D’Azeglio  to  preach  “ conspiracy  in  the 
liglit  of  day,”  In  the  '30s,  open  agitation  meant  military 
law  and  the  state  prison. 

Mazzini  s liope.s  have  been  realized  only  in  part.  Soerci 
societies  have  generally  been  powerless  against  tlie  gold  and 
steel  of  an  omnipresent  government;  they  have  none  the 
less  been  potent  disseminators  of  ideas.  Mazzini  s work, 
from  its  clear  high  dawn  to  its  dark  and  misty  clo.so,  broke 
ineftectually  against  the  obstacles  that  must  meet  the  pure 
revolutionist ; — the  forces  of  inertia,  whicli  count  for  legions  i 
on  the  side  of  an  established  government ; the  irnpossibiliiy 
of  making  an  ill-armed  and  uiidisci])lmed  population  step  into  j 
the  field  to  lace  bayoxiets  and  artillery ; and  even  if  success 
comes  at  first,  the  ignorance  of  management  and  afiairs 
that  paralyses  the  amateur  statesman,  unless  he  has  trained 
administrators  behind  him.  And  Mazzini,  with  all  his 
energy,  all  his  enthusiasm  lor  details,  somehow  did  not  make 
things  march.  He  always  underrated  the  obstacles  in  front 
of  him.  He  was,  even  apart  from  the  irritability  which 
may  bo  pardoned  to  his  misfortunes,  a difficult  man  to  work 
with.  In  old  ago  lie  bGcairie,  as  many  a conspirator  tends 
to  be,  a mere  mischief-maker.  Nor  was  he  more  successful 
in  moulding  his-country  to  liis  ideal  The  Republic,  tbo 
social  reconstruction,  have  proved  a dream.  The  foWner 
was  p'obably  neither  possible  nor  desiralilo  ; and  in  time 
Mazzini  himstdf,  save  in  moments  of  obstinate  unreason,  came 
to  realise  that  Italy  was  too  conservative,  too  monarchical,'' 


■ "^  liiMi^''  ' "ssj-  ‘"'nSlr  •■ 

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HJIJNG  ITALY 


131 


/ pcrliaps  too  stagnant,  for  his  titanic  themes  Nnnn  / 
!.o  n.ulc  Italy  His  „,istakes  in  a tion  lna;o  boon  faL,? 
bn  anco,  by  rn.glUy  and  frnitfu  influonoo.  Jt  'Z  7ot 
<mly  that  be  practically  created  tin  belief  in  Ttaliau  Unifv 
I bat  bo  gave  now  force  to  tbo  cru.sfdc  against  thn  a , 

1,0  liftol  U,o  mUonoliot  y;,,^  lovll  ofU™ 

’ I 4.i  ^ stamped  it  with  his  own  moral  fervour 

stuS-  7flf  “L  ;;  foSLt  !nr 'toininTa 

Its  melancholy  darkened  into  niorbidnes.s  a.nmi-  tb’c  disap- 
F'lntments  and  privations  of  exile,  its  .sinoerity'and  noble 
es.  and  abs^ite  disinterestedness  won  biin  the  devotion 
a .no,,t  the  adoration,  of  tbo  men  and  women  ho  re  bS 

b„  " il  ^ framework  of  bis  mind  was  Catholic 
fooTl  • 'IT  conscientiousness,  a ruS,!n 

political  beliefs  were  to  bim  articles  of  faith  that  adinitfed 
no  questioning;  wrong  politics  to  bim  implied  wromi  morals^ 

alwnS  • » 1 sometimes  compromised,  it  was 

1-ys  against  pe  grain,  and  with  a half-sense  oi  ~ 

he  was^too'^Yn  philosopher, 

a system-  hxTZ  successful  framer  of 

}‘  , but  as  moralist,  as  inspirer,  he  stands  on  a 


rs,v:v.  si  ■ 


4V' 

•v< 


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.7' 


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, fl  •-■;  *‘‘- 

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«'jy.  tjMi-ir  ^ ^ i-r  >.*  < • 


^32  A liibiOi:i  Oir"  ^ 

])ir)naclG  wlicre  lie  has  no  rival,  a propiiet  to  Italy  and  {.> 
liio  vs^orld. 

ihe  immcdiato  result  of  Alazzini’s  leaching  was  to  fan 
to  a blaze  the  einbors  of  [talian  nationality.  Apart  iVoja 
questions  of  unity  or  federation,  of  nionai’chy  or  republic 
it  concentrated  Italian  politics  on  the  vital  point  of  iiulc- 
pcndenco.  All  tlio  memories  or  Homan  greatness,  the 
revived  study  of  Dante,  tho  tradition  of  the  medieval 
struggle  with  tho  “ barbarian,"  of  tho  Lombard  League  and 
Pontida,  the  new'  sense  of  nationality  that  had  con(|uored 
Napoleon,  and  which  Mazzini  was  formulating  into  an  article 
of  democratic  faith,  all  combined  to  make  alien  rule  yet 
more  intolerable,  and  added  to  tho  hopes  of  Italian  IndopL- 
dence  the  passion  of  a religious  instinct.  Mazzini,  like  many 
of  the  Carbonari,  looked  to  Piedmont  ns  the  starting-point l| 
of  the  national  movement.  Pordinand  11..  liad  forgotten  his  • 
brief  mood  of  Liberalism/  and  destroyed  for  ever  the  chances  | 
of  Neapolimn  hegemony.  Romagna^  was  discredited  by  her  ' 
recent  failure.  Despite  the  unprojnising  materials  in  Pied- 
mont, there  was  a growing  conviction  among  the  more  far- 
sighted  patriots  that  here  lay  tho  fairest  hopes  of  Italy. 
Tim  stubborn  recalcitrancy  of  the  Savoy  KiDgs  to  Austria's/ 
ertorts  to  draw  them  in  her  train,  the  military  strength  of 
the  little  kingdom,  the  fiery  Liberalism  of  Genoa,  tii(3 
vicmity  to  Milan  and  the  Aiistidan  border,  the  still  flickering 
belird  m Charles  Albert,  all  conspired  to  iriake  Piedmont , 
the  cynosure  of  Italian  ambitions.  ! 

On  tlie  surface,  however,  tho  state  made  little  sign  of 
responding  to  these  hopes.  Its  quiet  dull  progress  its  com- 
paraUve  prosperity  were  ill  calculated  to  stimulate  tlm  faint 
and  leaderless  Liberalism  of  the  time.  Still  there  w'cre  marks 
ot  propssivo  feeling,  wliich  found  encouragement  in  the 
hpanrsh  and  Greek  revolutions,  and  liad  its  relations  with  the 
new  Gmbonansm.  In  1830  a plot  to  extort  a constitution! 
was  fec'bly  hatched  by  Broheno  and  Giacomo  Durando,  and  ' 
had  Us  partisans  in  the  army  and.  bar.  Again  the  conspirators 
looked  for  Charles  Albert's  patronage,  but  they  had  built 

* Bee  below,  p.  138. 


....  -...  .rt.;  •/ 

^ ",  ■•  -■’“  .1X1^ 

V : •/  ■ IV.?'  . •V'i 


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‘■"'►I 


YOUNG  ITALY 


UY3 

Iheir  liopes  on  sand,  and  (.heir  ill-laid  schemes  paused,  till 
the  government  had  scent  and  nipped  them.  At.  the  ino^nent 
Charles  Felix  died,  and  Charles  Albert  ascended  the  throne 
(April  1831).  It  was  not  without  difficult}^  that  he  had 
preserved  his  title  to  the  crown.  His  cousin  had  gone  to  the 
Congress  at  Verona  (1822),  to  persuade  tlie  Allies  to  bar  him 
frorri  the  presumptive  heirship.  If  tlie  Salic  Law  were  re- 
pealed in  J^iedmont,  Francis  of  Modena  would  succeed  through 
the  rights  of  his  wife,  a daughter  of  Victor  Emrn.amieh  But 
Ittjssomhrojii  enlisted  France  and  Russia  in  Charles  Albert’s 
eaiiso,  and.  Ta-llcyrand  threatened  Avar  rather  than  see  one, 
iv'ho  Avas  practically  an  Austrian  prince,  master  of  Piedmont 
and  Savoy.  Mctternich,  Avhatevor  may  liaAn)  been  his  secret 
ivishes,  dared  not  favour  a course  so  counter  to  the  principles 
of  legitimacy ; and  Charles  Felix,  finding  encouragement  in 
no  quarter,  a.bandonod  his  purpose  for  the  time.  But  it 
appear^s  that,  despite  Wellington’s  protest,  he  persuaded  tlie 
Congress  to  extract  from  the  young  prince  a pledge  to 
preserve  tlie  established  monarchical  constitution.^  Probably 
1)0  still  hoped  to  disinherit  him ; he  kept  him  in  a sort  of 
exile  at  h’lorence,  and  it  Avas  only  after  repeated  petitions, 
that  lie  allowed  him  to  prove  his  loyalty  to  the  cause  of 
nionarchy  by  fighting  in  the  French  army  against  tho 
i^panisli  Liberals.  When  the  prince  returned  Avith  a name 
for  briiiiant  courage,  he  Avas  coldly  forgiven,  largely  at  the 
suit  of  iVetternicli ; “ but  so  fearful  was  the  king  of  latent 
hibcralisin,  that  he  extorted  a promise  from  the  prince  that 
on  his  accession  he  AAmuld  govern  by  the  advice  of  a reactionary 
council,  “and  preserve  tlie  organic  form  of  the  ^)onarch3^”^ 
dhc  persecution  left  abiding  marks  on  Charles  Albert’s 
character.  Ho  had  persuaded  himself  of  his  loyalty  in 
; ho  dreaded  standing  ill  in  the  eyes  of  monarchical 

_ clliUjy.on,  Dcspa/ches,  JV.  S.,  I.  300,  308,  411,  427-429,  61 1;  Met.tor- 
w ^hnu'ires,  HI.  526-527  ; .Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  I.  log;  11.  114,  120,  169- 
III.  25-3S  ; Vajra,  Carlo  Alberto,  141,  14S,  151- 
dr’  taken  by  Francis  of  Modena,  see  Galvani,  Francesco 

■’  5?  ••  Pofrgi,  Storia,  554,  560  ; 11.  7. 

XaUu  ; Biancbi  in  ChiriositA  e riccrchcy 

- 1.'  ^ agree  with  Tivaroiii  in  believing  Mctternich. 

- -Beiti,  A! fieri,  77. 


'"Mi 

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% ..^^'oti^q  ^ ini.'mvi  ‘V  vl, 


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.IlftwltiVn'i  * -lli*  z .f»  ^] 

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'.  ' i .tW.W-  v;4L  ^f. 


^3'.'^''t|*  ,.'\^t-;yV!-  ,’  M-  •»».  ’ * '•' 


£7^;....,,i,  .....'.-..»t'  ~>r.'j^ 


134  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

and  respectable  Europe ; and  though  he  could  never  foraly^ 
the  wrong  which  Austria,  so  he  believed,  would  ha  re 
him,  he  humbly  begged  the  Emperor’s  advice  and  licked 
the  dust  before  Charles  Felix.  The  Liberals,  though  he  i 
seems  to  have  hinted  to  them  that  his  progressive  beliefs 
were  not  dead,^  execrated  him ; Berchet  wrote  o^  him 
that — 

“ In  every  clime  an  exile’s  curse 
Arraigns  thee  traitor.” 

But  for  all  that  the  king  and  the  court  distrusted  him. 
He  chafed  at  the  misunderstanding ; he  brooded  over  the 
version  of  his  conduct,  which  was  accepted  at  the  palace, 
and  which  after  all  was  truer  than  the  one  he  had  invented 
to  quiet  his  own  conscience.  The  brilliant  cynical  youth 
grew  morbid  and  apocryphal;^  he  mingled  gallantry  and 
religion ; he  wore  a hair-shirt  and  fasted.  The  religious  j 
mood  grew  upon  him ; he  became  a devotee,  easily  played  ' 
on  by  confessor  and  Jesuit,  timidly  scrupulous  to  prove 
himself  a good  son  of  tJie  Church  and  g;ain  Papal  sanction 
for  his  acts.  He  was  conscientious,  but  his  conscience 
gave  divided  allegiance  to  the  God  of  righteousness  and 
the  God  of  the  Jesuits.  He  paltered  y/ith  truth  to  justify 
himself;  his  unhappy  introspective  mind  preferred  to  brood 
over  others’  injustice  rather  than  face  its  own  weakness; 
his  sentiments  were  noble,  but  he  had  no  courage  to  put  j 
them  into  practice.  He  had  his  silent  enthusiasms ; he  was 
affectionate  to  his  intimates,  though  not  to  his  family;  bo 
had  a high  sense  of  royal  duty,  and  proved  himself  in  aftei 
years  a wise  and  reforming  King.  But  through  all  his  life 
he  played  hide-and-seek  with  Liberalism ; he  was  at  heart, 
and  still  more  in  profession,  an  absolutist,  a monarch  proud 
of  his  historic  throne,  who  would  “ never  make  terms  with 
the  revolution.”  Constitutions  he  abhorred,  for  they  led  to 
evil  party  strife  and  made  a discord  in  the  national  har- 
mony.^ Ho  scorned  the  July  Monarchy  and  its  popular' 

^ Cibrario,  Notuie,  41  ; Nisco,  Storia,  If.  274. 

* Bianchi,  Carlo  Alberto,  8 ; Manno,  Per  no:::c,  23. 

^ Manuo,  Ppicclegin,  222-225;  Bianclii,  Dij.lomazuc,  V.  90;  Coita  de 
regard,  Dcrnierci  anncc3,  571. 


UU.!'.y  HO  Vik-:- 

ii  . -!-  Ill  il^t,.  5.  iijji  >via}h9(fpijh0i> 

•,  o..va - • «u  r*^iMjjA  .:^j!  ■^’ 

Zif..^  '(Vltnud^ 

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f. 


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t^f  I 0 .^H  tfsi  ir/l  ,Hi4  ii^W  n|  )ui>*rnw»? 

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"■V  x-A  vj'irtfci  •'  -<ti  tW;*'  ■ 

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, .;vtt  ' 

, \ ■’  4, ; .■l^iA^'^^'•'w>'i  <'i-'vitf'«4 

. ' ■.’  .1;';  /-••'Sv.  '"VW’,  y'- 

.lY'  ,>>*»Jnili 


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■'A 

-i.1 


YOUJSTG  ITALY 


; ho  tu)neci  young  Clamillo  Cavour  ont,  of  liis  liouso- 
Lohi  for  •'  v/antiDg  to  play  tbo  Jacobin.”  But  wl\ile  in  theory 
]-jC  was  the  bej]ievo]cnt  despot,  in  pi’actico  ho  bent  before 
over;/  resolute  minister.  Throiigliout  his  life  lie  ever  shrank 
from  corning  to  a decision,  and  went  down  to  posterity  as 
“ King  Wobble.”  ^ Bravo  and  chivalrous  on  the  battlefield, 
"half  friar,  half  knight,”  he  was  a coward  in  the  council 
charnher,  who  baffled  opposition  by  delay,  and  manoeuvred 
out  of  office  the  ministers  whom  he  feared  to  meet  in  argu- 
jnont;  always  hankering  after  popularity,  but  delighting  in 
tliC  secrecies  of  intrigue  and  loathing  publicity ; a strange 
compound  of  the  worldly  amd  the  martyr  spirit,  no  hero, 
but  a pciplcxed,  scruple-harassed  man,  the  victim  of  a fatal 
indecision  between  the  authority  of  convention  and  the 
nobler  promptings  of  his  heart. 

It  was  his  fate  through  life  to  bo  regarded  as  the 
](uidor  of  a cause  lie  dreaded.  On  his  accession  the  Liberals 
kr.)hed  for  largo  and  bold  reforms.  “ Everybody,”  said  Dal 
I'ozzo  from  Paris,  “ expects  a constitution  from  Charles 
Albert.”  The  King  had  doubtless  a more  or  less  definite 
programme  of  reform;  now,  as  in  1821,  he  v/ished  to  make 
oflico  independent  of  class,  to  reform  the  army,  to  encourage 
iudustr}',  to  further  social  freedom.  Could  he  have  relied 
on  Prench  protection,  he  would  perhaps,  despite  his  pre- 
judices, haA'C  granted  some  form  of  constitution ; but  Louis 
rhilippo’s  bands  were  too  busy  at  home,  and  Charles  Albert 
know  tliat,  unless  he  had  France  behind  him,  Austria  would 
fight  rather  than  see  free  institutions  in  Piedmont.^  Besides 
ho  was  hampered  by  his  pledge  to  the  Allies,  timid  and 
cautious  as  over,  anxious  not  to  take  sides  too  much  or 
alionato  either  party.  He  reappointed  his  cousins  re- 
ftetionary  ministers,  but  by  their  side  he  placed  the  Liberal 
lawyer  Barbaroux.  He  promised  large  reforms  in  education 
^lud  Ia^v  ; ho  appointed  a Council  of  State,  which  had  always 
cs;istod  in  constitutional  theory,  but  he  narrowed  its  scope 
^ovn  iroin  its  first  broad  lines  to  insignificant  proportions. 


^ /iV  Ti-rUenrifj.  See  belovr,  p,  i8S. 

vill  254  ; BrofForio,  Piemoiitc,  III.  13  ; contra  D’llaiissou- 

olHiquc  c^ldricurc,  I.  34,  248.  See  Bosio,  ViLlamarina,  25. 


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r.  it  . V ^ 


136  A HISTOEY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Meamvliile  the  country  saw  little  accoiiiplislied  and  a 
reactionary  ministry  in  power.  There  was  a sharp  rcYulsioT^ 
from  the  early  expectations.  Mazzini  published  a lottor  ! 
to  the  King,  appealing  to  him  to  lead  the  nationalists 
Eepublican  though  he  was,  ho  could  not  altogether  escape 
the  fascination  which  Charles  Albert  threw  over  the  Liber.ds 
But  the  appeal  at  best  was  only  half  sincere  ^ ; and  ho  l 
counted  on  its  failure  to  wean  the  Italians  from  im,  I 
covenanted  reliance  on  royal  figureheads.  When  the  htierl 
had  for  answer  an  angry  sentence  on  its  writer,  Mazzini 
rushed  into  insurrection.  With  the  exile’s  distorted  vision 
he  fancied  that  the  country  was  on  the  eve  of  revolution  I 
that  it  needed  only  the  bugle  of  Young  Italy  to  call  up  tlio 
hosts  of  ready  rebels;  the  Piedmontese  army  Avoidd  join  tlio 
revolutionary  flag  and  invade  Lombardy,  offering  Chailes 
Albert  the  choice  betAveen  leadership  end  deposition.  Tlio  ' 
government  quietly  unravelled  the  Avild  plot,  and  a reign  of 
savagery  succeeded  Court-martials,  torture,  tAvelve  execu-  j 
tions  stamped  out  the  conspiracy  in  blood  (April  1833).! 
The  King  egged  on  the  judges  to  strike  hard,  and  decorated* 
them,  Avhile  Europe  Avas  aghast  at  the  cruel  tale.  Whether 
from  fanaticism  or  fear,  Charles  Albert  remains  the  real 
criminal  of  one  of  the  Avmrst  pages  in  the  history  of  Pied- 
mont. Partly  to  revenge  himself  on  the  King,  partly  to  ' 
restore  the  courage  of  his  party,  Mazzini  prepared  a second  i 
attempt  at  revolution.  Some  700  exiles  of  all  countries^ 
mustered  in  &Avitzerland  to  make  an  irruption  into  Savoy ; 
the  conspirators  engaged  for  leader  an  exiled  Savoyard 
general,  Ramorino ; and  a young  sailor  of  the  Riviera, 
Guiseppe  Garibaldi,  undertook  the  hopeless  task  of  re- 
volutionizing the  fleet.  But  Ramorino  had  no  heart  in  his 
AA^ork,  and  Avas  perhaps  paid  by  the  French  government  to 
wreck  the  expedition.^  His  delays  and  incompetency  spoilt 
its  slender  chances,  and  after  some  desultory  fighting  the  1 
little  army  disbanded  (February  1 834).^  ° I 

^ Mazzini,  Opere,  I.  52  ; III.  315  ; IX,  243. 

’ Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  IV, 

3 For  Gallenga’s  attempt  to  assassinate  the  King,  see  Vol.  II.,  Appendix  B. 


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1 


YOUNG  ITALY 


137 

TIio  Liberal  niovciMcnt  of  1830  foan‘I  its  echoes  in  every 
.•tate  of  Italy.  It  proves  how  little  M'azziuis  republican 
cj'Gcd  represented  the  feeling  of  the  coiintiy,  tlurt  in  four  f)f 
tlic  states  the  Liberals  looked  to  the  throne  for  leadcrsliip. 
Tbcre  was  no  decided  note  about  t]\e  movements ; tliey  bore 
the  stamp  of  a transitional  stage,  wlien  politics  were  still 
largely  under  the  influence  of  the  old  provinci;il  and  middle- 
class  ideals,  though  the  bigger  national  and  democratic  hopes 
of  Young  Italy  were  beginning  to  make  tliemsolvcs  dimly 
felt  This  was  conspicuously  the  case  at  Naples,  where 
Ferdinand  Ls  death  in  1825  had  been  followed  by  the  five- 
years  reign  of  his  son  Francis  1.  As  Regent  in  Sicily 
in  1812,  at  Naples  in  1820,  he  had  been  the  pretended 
Liberal  and  accoraplico  in  his  fal.her’s  treachery.  Ho  was 
a vulgar,  cruel  profligate,  who  left  the  government  to  his 
favourites,  and  lived  Avith  his  mistresses  in  tlio  midst  of 
guards  in  hourly  dread  of  assassination.  While  in  Sicily 
the  Viceroy  Della  Favare  cowed  the  island  Avitli  his  vspies 
till  theatres  and  cafes  avere  deserted,  the  mainland  broke 
into  revolt  at  Oil  onto  (Jime  1828).  Delcarotto,  an  ofllcer 
who  had  served  the  revolution  in  1820  hut  like  many 
onother  had  made  his  peace  Avith  the  oppressor,  stamped 
out  the  rising  with  fire  and  SAvord,  hehcjiding  the  leaders, 
and  hanging  their  lieads  in  front  of  tlieir  own  homos.  Still, 
in  spite  of  disillusion  and  the  long  tale  of  tyranny  and  ]''er- 
jury,  the  feeble  people  were  ever  ready  to  look  to  the  throne 
for  reform.  And  when  Francis  son,  Ferdinand  XL,  came  to 
the  throne  in  1830  and  publicly  censured  his  fathers  rule, 
kopo  Avaas  bright  as  ten  years  before.  Ferdinand  Avas  young, 
liandsoine,  popular  in  address.  He  had  d abided  in  patriotie 
balk ; his  care  for  the  army  and  love  of  military  parade 
^-'ndeared  him  to  the  soldiers;  his  free  and  vulgar  manners 
>i>«de  him  the  darling  of  the  lazzaroni.  His  peop)le  did  not 
yet.  knoAA^  that  he  vras  a true  Bourbon,  “ cruel  and  craSvS  and 
proud  as  they”;  ill-educated,  superstitions,  a tyrant  by  in- 
'diiict.  IIo  Avas  no  profligate  like  his  father  and  grand- 
^^^thor;  priests  iioaa’ ruled  the  palace  instead  of  courtesans; 
k)  spare  tne  public  blush,  the  Venus  of  Pi'axitolcs  vras 
k*‘apod,  and  the  Kings  royal  pen  prescribed  the  length  of 


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V 


13S  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

ballet-dancers’  skirts.  But  his  boorish  ■^'brutality  killed 
wife,  the  gentle  Cristina  of  Savoy,  and  to  friends  and  ser 
vants  he  was  faithless  on  principle.  “ The  world,’'  he 
reported  to  have  said,  ''  likes  to  bo  made  a fool  of,  and  -i 
King  should  be  the  first  adept  at  the  business.’^  And  yet 
in  his  early  days,  shamed  perhaps  by  the  crying  corruption 
of  his  fatlier’s  court,  he  made  some  essays  towards  good 
government.  Most  of  his  father’s  ministers  were  dismissed- 
the  favourites  flitted  from  court ; the  King’s  popular  brother' 
the  Count  of  Syracuse,  v/as  sent  to  govern  Sicily.  Ferdinand . 
showed  interest  in  railways ; the  exchequer  was  reorganized  'i 
and  trade  improved  as  confidence  grew  up.  The  Liberals  ’ 
hoped  that  these  were  the  prelude  to  more  drastic  reform.  [ 
Appeals  came  to  the  King  from  home  and  from  Bologna  to 
place  himself  at  the  head  of  the  nationalist  movement,^  and 
lor  a moment  he  seems  to  have  been  tempted  to  respond. 
There  were  even  hopes  of  a constitution,  and  the  minister 
Intonti,  wishing  to  make  Ids  peace  with  the  new  order, 
proposed  a sort  of  representative  Assembly.  Louis  Bhilippei 
it  was  said,  advised  it,  but  the  twenty -ye.ars’-old  King  re- 
plied, that  his  “ people  were  not  like  the  French,  and  ho 
did  their  thinking  for  them.”  And  though  ho  refused  to 
concert  measures  with  the  Papal  government  against  the 
secret  societies,  he  proposed  an  alliance  of  the  Italian  gov- 1 
einments  to  combat  revolution.  Had  he  done  otherwise, ' 
had  he  thrown  himself  on  his  people  and  the  French  alliance 
and  granted  a constitution,  he  woidd  have  wajii  for  himself 
and  his  state  the  hegemony  of  Italy.  But  again,  as  in 
1820,  the  Bourbons  threw  away  their  chance  for  good  and 
evil.  It  is  well,  on  the  whole,  for  Italy  that  they  did  so; 
for  though  it  would  have  saved  the  South  from  a generation 
of  retrogression  and  all  the  long  painful  effort  to  recover 
ground,  it  would  have  put  the  destinies  of  Italy  in  the  hands 
of  a nerveless  people,  and  made  Italian  Unity  iriipmssible  in 
this  century. 

The  Liberals  were  repaid  for  their  folly  in  trusting  a 1 
Bourbon.  Ferdinand  in  fact  was  the  very  antithesis  of  a 

’ Nisco,  Ferdinando  //.,  27  ; Setterubiiiii,  Rlcordanze,  I.  42-43;  Leopardi 
op.  cit.,  27-28;  Bianclii,  op.  ciL,  III.  25 3 ; Poggi,  op.  cU.,  II.  jji. 


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siv  .omM* 


YOUNG  ITALY 


^39 


Liberal,  and  bis  system,  as  lie  gradually  developed  it,  vas  a 
purely  personal  government.  The  teachers  in  the  schools 
had  to  tell  the  children  that  rebellion  was  worse  than 
murder,  and  that  a prince’s  ])romiso  to  limit  his  sovereignty 
was  null  and  void.  His  ministers  were  merely  his  executive 
officers;  and  he  would  encourage  their  mutual  jealousies  to 
make  them  more  dependant  on  himself.  Though  his  in- 
dustry was  intermittent,  he  had  a grasp  of  details,  which 
made  him  master  of  every  branch  of  the  administration. 
The  exchequer,  though  it  ^i/as  shrewdly  and  economically 
administered,  was  treated  as  his  own  privy  purse.  Not  but 
what  his  rule  had  a kind  of  patriotism  ; the  tyrant  of  his  own 
people,  he  would  brook  no  foreign  influence,  whether  from 
England  or  Franco  or  Austria ; and  bigot  though  he  was,  he 
made  the  clergy  feel  his  heavy  hand.  He  found  his  in- 
strument in  Tdelcarotto.  The  now  minister  was  perhaps  a 
Liberal  in  theory ; he  hated  Austria ; he  was  sincere  and 
honest,  and  died  poor.^  Jhit  he  was  ruthless  and  unbending, 
and  in  the  public  mind  he  came  to  symbolise  the  hateful 
tyranny.  His  appointment  completed  the  Liberal  disillu- 
sioning. The  plottings  were  resumed,  and  conspiracy  and 
repression  succeeded  in  rniscrablo  alternation.  But  tho 
conspiracies  had  the  same  want  of  connection  and  thorough- 
ness, which  characterized  rill  the  work  of  the  later  Carbonari. 
Tbe  new  spirit  had  not  reached  the  South. 

Tuscany  was  hardly  touched  by  the  movements  of 
1831  ; but  as  Fossombroni’s  age  relaxed  his  grasp,  and  the 
police  deserted  their  mild  traditions,  the  discontent  found 
vent  in  a war  of  epigrams,  till  Neri  Corsini,  Fossombroni’s 
friend  and  pupil,  compelled  the  police  to  moderate  their 
new  activity  (August  1832).  Still  the  old  mild  rule  never 
fully  returned,  and  Fossombroni  s last  stand  barely  defeated 
a p’oposal  to  bring  in  Austrian  troops.  The  Antologia, 
v/hich  the  contemporary  excitoment  had  drawn  into  politics, 
suppressed  in  deference  to  Austrian  and  Russian  pres- 
sure (March  1833).  Fortunately  Leopold  was  mure  intent 
uu  reclaiming  the  Marerana  and  the  Val  di  Chiana  than  on 

^ Leopaidi,  op.  cii.,  31-32  ; Nisco,  op.  cit.,  19,  22. 


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VX  .■*_...  '1^  .-  ...  ..  .... 


^ a ;»  Vl  »•  ' <4  •'«w.-r T. 

.;  • ;jh  .!  V ri*x<«^Va* 


‘•.1. 


■ 4k^ 


'i  M'lil 


J40 


A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN;  UNITY 


liariyiDg  Young  Italy;  but  Corsini  had  neither  the  ability 
nor  the  iirmness  of  hi.s  master,  and  llio  sinister  intiueu!'^ 
that  centred  round  the  Boiirbou  Grand  Dncli.ess  overs inuliv.Yr  t 
Tuscan  toleranco  with  an  ever  encroaching  spirit  of  bic.oi-rv 


In  iModena  there  w'as  pure  persistent  reaction.  lY-anciy 
victims  crowded  to  prison  or  exile,  and  the  notorious  (hinout 
wais  called  to  rule  the  state.  A little  cabal  outdid  tlic  Dav  ’J 
in  despotism,  till  their  mutual  bickerings  led  to  OauosV^ 
fall  (1837).  Tlio  cabal  had  its  literary  organ  in  the  /Tv 
ddla  Veritd,  whoso  columns  preached  tJje  pure  Sanfedisi 
doctrine.  “God  has  made  hell,"  it  said,  “and  the  most 
pious  prince  is  he  whose  prinie  minister  is  tlie  exccutioraa’ ” 
Liberals  should  bo  killed  as  enemies  of  society,  or,  if  ibo 
Czar  permitted,  relegated  in  gangs  to  Siberia.  Deiiiocrii'‘y 
by  its  very  creed  implied  immorality,  and  in  contrast  to  tho 
lluctuating  “ common  sense"  of  the  people,  governuioul 
must  base  itsell  on  lixeit  unvarying  principles.  Those  prin- 
ciples found  their  expression  in  the  long  years  of  Francis' 
tyranny.  The  police  were  allowed  a license  of  savagorv 
rare  even  in  Italy.  Arbitrary  arrests,  domiciliary  visits, 
interference  in  the  cvery“ihiy  concerns  of  private  life,  kept 
his  subjects  in  perpetual  terror.  Lovers’  letters  were  coufis- 
cated  in  the  ].)ost-oliice  ; iiifirriages  were  arbitrarily  forbiddeii, 
or  forced  on  reluctant  couples ; the  least  exprossion  of 
Liberal  opinion  w'as  enough  to  blast  a career,  ddio  Duke’s 
apologists  pointed  to  his  rich  collections  of  books  and  coins; 
to  his  stores  of  food  collected  against  time  of  famiiio;  ^0 
the^  fact  that  only  eight  political  prisoners  v/ere  executed 
during  his  lung  reign.  But  though  resoandi  has  cleared  his 
name  of  private  greed  and  meaner  instincts,  and  shown  Idm 
a well-meaning  ruler  after  Ids  light, ^ his  rcigu  remains  one 
of  the  darkest  phases  of  the  dark  days  of  Italian  tyraijuy. 


In  the  I apal  States  the  “new  era"  liad  sot  In  ever 
blacker  aliomination  of  misrule.  Gregory  XYi.  voas  not  ' 
calculated  to  enhance  the  credit  of  the  Pa])acy.  The  storieo 
of  his  immorality  are  probably  exaggerated,  but  his  undi“- 
‘ See  above,  p.  18. 


,•■  ^-'■A'^  %>#-il^  if  E' 


’ .'  ' ^ ^'.  ff  ' * ' ^ ; ‘ 


■ “ ■ vr~7  -.  i ^liit  MRSfe^ 

. . ■'N*  „ 

'"■  • - .^;1  ""3  " 

':.J  ,.i;iwv  ' ■ -.‘aU'V.Kt  V>!*i^'»4'S)'«r/*^i,  . ''  ,_JK'-'^^ 

i,.,  -i^v-  ■'BBl'-  !'*ti*?'‘'''  -■ 

'^.1 


,.u  i-,ii!  / 


^*.,1  -ii  O';.!-'  - , .,-„.  ^ 

■ ' ..!t  iv  or*'--  ■'■  ";:i,!.’i/"‘...if:v4n?  ii-n  ■ 


i‘V\t  1v««tV  ■.■.<•■» 


■•  V^.•>t^^;■^■l^V^.•i!^t■J^rf^'Wti . '•■>  »pil^ 

^ -.Mr- ••..;■■  .5  •■«>.•<)  i<f-/> 

a - I ..  j V i -i ' ■ ' 

■ ' ’''A-?..-:';.  .Ilv..  ■ •■"'■  - -i  ^v 

B ''  A-  iidL>  *.'1  T i;/ 


' . ',  ..i  .;f.-.  " ^'■-■yi 

• . J* ii'?*.- A '■’”“‘'^4 

^M;V'«’-<.-v.,  i^tU!  hftirtt!*  ‘"^jHjd’',.'’""'  '^’fW 

' r; ., : ■!'  . if-.*  ".''•W-  . ■;  ,' ■ -'f  !^'  ' « 


' ' '"'  4 ' ’^Jia 

‘ ai-.  ' 


. ,i>  jA 

■'^  i ■■  Ar  ■ ■ .'.•ii-itA^f'^'W..  •'’■ 


■ 


YOUNG  ITALY 


141 

nified  person  and  manners,  his  gluttony,  Ins  timid,  irascible 
temper  destroyed  respect.  He  made  his  throne  a sinecure ; 
he  had  spent  most  of  his  life  in  a Carnal c'.olensian  monastery, 
and  he  hated  public  business.  “ I am  too  old  to  reform  the 
state,”  ho  is  reported  to  have  said,  and  the  world  will  get 
idong  somehow ; ” and  ho  absorbed  himself  in  ignoble  inte- 
rests, while  the  country  groaned  under  the  misrule,  and  his 
ex-barber  and  favourite  amassed  a princely  fortune.^  He 
was  an  obscurantist  of  the  most  trivial  order.  He  set  him- 
self against  the  Scientific  Congresses ; ^ he  allowed  no  railways 
in  the  state,  partly,  it  was  said,  from  belief  that  they  would 
“w^ork  harm  to  religion,”  partly  lest  they  might  bring  up 
deputations  of  provincial  malcontents.  Ho  earned  an  ill 
name  in  Liberal  Europe  for  his  counsels  of  passive  obedience 
to  the  Poles  in  1833,  though  he  partly  atoned  for  them  in 
later  years  by  the  one  bravo  action  of  his  life,  his  denuncia- 
tion to  his  face  of  the  Czar  Nicholas. 

His  reign  began  amid  revolution.  Austria  won  back  the 
revolted  provinces  for  him,  but  Bernetti  was  resolved  to  bo 
independent  of  foreign  powers.  He  and  his  master  viewed 
with  suspicion  the  patronage  of  the  erastian  Empire,  sup- 
posed still,  though  perhaps  now  with  little  reason,  to  have 
its  eye  on  the  fat  plains  of  Romagna^.  To  escape  its  perilous 
support,  it  was  necessary  to  have  a native  force  sufficient  to 
crush  revolution.  Bernetti  increased  the  army,  but  he  saw 
in  the  fanatical  section  of  the  population  the  material  for  a 
more  effective  weapon.  He  encouraged  the  formation  of 
ii’regular  volunteer  bands  under  the  name  of  Centurions 
(1832),  and  the  new  bodies  soon  counted  their  thousands. 
1 ho  Liberal  movement  of  the  previous  year  had  been  appa- 
rently so  universally  accepted,  that  it  is  difficult  to  conjec- 
bu’o  where  they  recruited  their  ranks.  Probably  the 
revolution  had  never  been  heartily  obeyed  by  the  super- 
^hticus,  priest-ruled  peasants  and  unskilled  labourers;  no 
^ eubt,  too,  there  was  much  latent  conservatism  in  the  towms, 

Salvngni,  Corte  Romana,  IIT.  197-199.  “Gaetanino”  Moroni,  tlie  ojc- 

ei,  wrote  an  Ecclesiastical  Dictionary,  and  every  commune  was  compelled 
0 ouj  a copy  : Farini,  Roman  Sta'e,  I.  141. 

See  below,  p.  150. 

Dualterio,  cp.  c/i.,  I.  134,  139.  See  Eianchi,  op.  ciL.  III.  139,  394. 


|&s’’.^’’..;.w|,,i'‘#a  .,'  . • . ■ jr, */:!-.>■  c,. 


■ ' ^4‘ef 

r-*rf  ' *,V-  V' 


ti'"’ 


i k( 


hl’^  '-'V 1^*  -v  ‘ • ' :i  • VaI 

Vi'k  'iibfi-  bi-.y/'  rri{ii'.ik« id  I’l’t''.!-’  *i>'£,v“'  .',  ' 1 


jf*}  »'  -1,  «d''  '-''dw>*'if^'r;' 

IV: 

^&ltetjl^tt.  iw  ■■  ’••!/»  o^d  '-  t ««<■■■  I'. ,:  '^id-!  ./■ 

li’i^si  .ipini’-'’  vidfviiWWfe' ■b^'-''v^,’v'^^  '' 

'jjjl  .^.V„{(;  ■j'.iv;  ..Tj  IK'  I'lUMtttlll.'  I’l'i  .ff.’f  t f '*‘'®  rWjlinl'-f,*!!  y.^TW 
■s  •’■''rf*  Wv»"  rt,4«  ^ 

J . «««,•'.■  i*MV*:V  /i.rf,  Irt  /l.daaf'rt,'..  *(«•  »d^*’  1^',  ;- 

,.^,V'V;  I 

By.... ,.'’5? 

•vrf'  ...f-  U->vV-,v;»-i  .Ik^r  r4f^l0iM  ^pd')t%Ux^' 

v;^...^  ■Vq  -Q 

f "* 

feK.y4»;t«^.i;.M,*  t».'H, , , ■■> ;i 

y«*fil.»if4«-'  'I  O.'^J  ..asiiAft.'  . '•i;Wi.»^«l^P^  , 

'.J''^i.f'*t''iM  • -1  •I'di’  !i|M.t-;V;."''i’y.  <^fi.  '-i^y  ' Ji'f' 

iT.uiig.  'i"  AiiVV'' 


r;,^...  . •',.  / ■ W '.VU,'.1>  .-jp  »i(t»|M/...ir.nl|-J  ‘i"  -‘ftliV  ' 

.l.b,'i-(;v^*  Aftfi!  Ji  .“I  st(.»  (<*.(  > i-.'iVi  ‘fc-^  '-  ’_>  I"-'  (■ 


I,.'  , Vi'^fl  ■■ -i I .>•■•<■•■■»£()  iTi'i'  'a 

4*,fe- M '•:  .Mr.i.'ftnb' *?  >tf  .‘"-i>'  ' 'f.flwjf  • - 

Vi/iWiv  :»■;■  Av|Aaw>!.'id:vrd#ii»'f'-'''f,^!' 
.^/a;  «I ..ii./  i.io  '.'B-.ir.u  fwxi  ••.1/^'<A.'^- 

. Mf  .-.■...f-.-'ifi't  Tto'rV.ii'rti-  ’.•:^‘.T»— — 4' ’ 


HJi---  "r  :•  td  ',  I ■ II  ■ 

»•■  :,  - A.  7.w»44-?4  ., vV.ssHjf# rvsiHl f^‘.  ^ 

V-  ■.••”».*••  M'AwsBlaiii' 


I'  .'  V'.f  .»K  yjy, 


V.i 


142 


A ]:roTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

unrccognizGcl  in  1831,  jind  the  lioreclitfiry  feuds 
Liberals  and  Papalists  and  the  mass  of  seini-criminai 
bondarro  brougl^t  many  to  a flag,  whicli  promised  reconcili'uf-f' 
witL  Urn  government  and  unlimited  possibilities  of  reyono'^! 
and  loot.  In  league  with  the  Jesuits  they  drove ' if! 
Liberals  into  silence,  drew  the  municipal  government  uf! 
their  own  hands,  and  enforced  a show  of  religious  conformity 
A White  Terror  reigned  through  Romagna  and  the  Marches 
Centurion  peasants  refused  their  rents,  Centurion  artisans 
threatened  their  masters ; Centurions  and  Liberals  warred  a 
grim  warfare  of  assassination,  till  for  very  shame  Austrif 
insisted  that  tlio  Pope  should  put  an  inefiectivo  curb  unon 
his  savage  alliesd 

Itemotti  himself  was  soon  to  bo  tho  victim  of  Austrian 
influence.  His  “vole.aiuc”  temper  had  made  him  numy 
enemies.  Gregory’s  hivourites  turned  against  him,  and  iu 
1^836  he  was  dismi.ssed  from  oflice.  His  successor  wa.s  tho 
Genoese,  Lambruschini,  a true  ecclesiastical  statcsuiau, 
personally  pure  and  imcorriiptiblo,  but  bigoted,  iincom- 
promismg,  ruthless.  Under  his  rule  all  pretence  of  docent 
government  disappeared.  The  whole  fabric  of  the  state  was 
J worm-eaten  with  corruption  and  incapacity ; ® the  Sanfedists 
sold  their  support  for  licen.se  of  unlimited  rapine,  and  under 
the  all-po\rerfi;l  influence  of  the  Jo.5uits  misrule  end  aiifrohy 
held  high  state.  For  a time  the  sen.so  of  holplossnoH, 
which  followed  the  succession  of  Liberal  reverses,  silenced 
protest.  Europe  had  deserted  the  Pope’s  unhaiipy  subjects, 
and  .Austria  and  France  both  evacuated  Papal  territory  io 
1838.  But  under  the  .surface  t!ie  secret  societies  thrived 
amid  persecution.^  “ If  you  ask  a youth  in  Romagna,  if  Iw 


GiiaUtrio,  op.  cit.,  HI.  105  ; J V.  4^5  ; Vusi,  Itivoluziono,  214-215  ; lliitnchi, 
lyomozu,  Jil  ,50-,;,,  408-4,0;  Id.,  J/aUeurci,  37-38;  Or., ini.  jLoir.,.  n ; 
tampanclla  and  Niocolini,  Gumzzl,  244  ; Fa, ini,  op.  cL  ,i.  7,  78'. 

See  the  of  tlio  Piedmontese  .-imba.ssa<lors  in  Biaoclii,  DIplemazia, 

ill.  paznm;  O Retlly,  Leo  X/il.,  ,04-105;  Gualtcrio,  op.  cit.,  i.  roo  ; oootm 
rerfcUl,  Ihcordi,  65. 

^ It  IS  curious  that  in  spite  of  tlie  general  belief  that  tliere  were  m.'iny 
a.ssassiiiatioiis  on  both  sides,  an  apologi.st  of  the  government  could  only  point 

to  three  by  Liberals ; pamphlet  in  Lritiidi  Museum  Catalogue  Xo.  ^ 

lb  o 71.  See  Carte  segrde,  11.  423. 


'.^^pipRv; 


, ^•'■''  ‘'V  •,♦/ 

r,-;v:,i:'  ■■  J-iHf.  * ,■-  . ,., 

7’rT).’ 

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V'P3 


a.v\-.v:  T.;  •]■'  \W'‘''’''i ''S^XiSBI.'' 

’ . lij'' ktii^K^  nil  ^ f-'  ’ ■ “ '''"^  '•n,,--...  ,1. 


l^|J->f!.  ..  ->«■ 


■■■  ^ -H'’- 

.*r 


^ •»! 


if 


rmiTO  ,,.)•. .>i.^>r:r. ’Ml  '‘  (111111.^  .. 

,>I,:.':''^«:  : ,i>i,;-  ^ ■ ■ ‘:fe' 'vj.'Tl.,^..  i 

•.ki<’  y.  j(>ii  Ufi.’i^'-'ii'tJ' J 

^ ..'i,.:;^|  , ;tJ“ 

..'■y . ..Hi»in  A •'•■  '»•. » V'*- **»■•, *^!PaM!.,.  .6 
48811^*  ■“ 


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La«  1 *.<1  .1  ' ' 


YO’'’ 


•43 


has  boon  in  prison,”  wrote  D'AzcpIio,  " o ronlioc  ■ r 
hardly  a man  or  I should.’”  Even  thf  Eo.i 
.sl.ill  halting  in  thoir  Liberalism,  were  growing  wc”u’y  I’f  ”th 
misrule.  “Compromise  is  impossible  w'th  nfiosts 
tho  popular  watchword.  But  for  the  S^Ls"' t,;op.r  ho 
government  could  not  Irave  survived  a montl. ; ' and  when 
1 10  I qm  flaunted  his  sympathy  with  tho  Sondorbund  even 
hoy  (for  many  were  Protestants)  wavered  in  their  loya  tT 
fc  was  moroasmgly  clear  that  tliere  was  no  liono 
lornau  State,  while  the  government  remained  L clerical 

S.,  i’  .8,r •I'” 

1 • r 1 1^1-1 1 in  1 educing  Koine  to  a inerelv 

ocolesias  ical  supremacy,  with  only  tlio  sliadow  of  ti  c 
Iciuporal  Power/’  hfveii  Capponi,  conservative  tlLumh  he 
was,  and  Galeott),  .staunch  defender  of  the  Temporal  Power 

or  iS.nontTr®”*'’  01-  Naples 

""il t ‘ r““ '« "r 

i'ialdiiii  Mel!  IT.  ‘’lo  D>u'andos  and 

Bpin  If  !>:  were  figlning  for  the  Liberals  in 

Ifaliin  soHl  ' otI>er.s,  like  Garibaldi,  sailed  to  the 

Brussf  “ud  V“  to  Paris 

'!‘oircounl.ry  Ef!"  star  would  have  enriched 

1 scveial  years  .Italian  politics  showed  few 

^"■incl.i,  o|,?cf,7a  40”'  Ponf.fido,  I.  4,-42,  60,  70; 

f RM^I  G.aIcotli,  So^ranM, 

CWl'7es  Cw,“.LT7  '• 

/VZer,  144  \ ..f  ® Rcmsr.cnccs,  II.  1S2  ; J.  W. 


Fuller  I • C'anyies  Fcm{ 

patent  and  potent  reality-. 


Howe, 

, , j'^-+  '-/ttiivJe  in 

conquered  ; he  has  tiansfornicd  liis 


'.  '"C' ,i'r  'f ''*’^  •%  jki^ritW'Pr'^'  'o** ' ■' f ■ ■ “'’  "'ll 

; 

■’ji3sr«iSW'-  ■ ■^’-  ■"  ■' 


i\f' 


N » 

Wt:, 

- . .rr^ 


&-#-.'-r-’:r-i;:Sti& 


^-%‘«l  ^;;j,%i'  AO m * “.v!  ' '>  ■ »-Jfc.....'ia%!;  ■ ’ ' 


5<<  ’*'  ' '5v)»  '•''"i 

.:  .1  fi-v'tiii  I'aflW  .'S  .-*5.?*'*’^!'. 


4;',  :n’y;  ! 

f£' A'  !iV  ' 

' - .!  a/'-- ■li-' 

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I 


M4  A }I1ST0R'Z  OF  ITALTAN  UNITV 

•si-ns  of  life.  Thf  Carl.onav:,  thoiigh  the,  name  still  , 

hci-e  _ mid  there, ^ liad  practically  disappoai-cd  for  ever  S' 
i\laj;:-;ini  retired  for  a time  from  tlio  direction  of  Voin.S, 
Stilly and  its  ori^anisation  \va.s  almost  broken  up.  :hi 
at  all  events,  many  an  ex-revoiuliouist  teas  ready  ciiokh  0 
Korve  llie  oan.so  f>f  despotism ; in  Lombardy  'society'  h--,! 
resioncil  and  coutentod  on  the  surface,  gildiiuj  its  materir’ 
enjoyment,  rvith  va,giio  aspirations  for  a Liglicr  and  frr-o' 
lile.  Cautious  men,  like  l)a!  Vor/.o,  pileadcd  that  it  woidd  1,* 
bott-cr  to  accept  Austrian  rule  and  inalco  Mio  best  of  y' 
KSomelhing  of  the  spirit  of  Leopardi's  misanthropy  a-jd 
possimism  seemed  to  liavo  .settied  on  the  country.'  A,,d 
just  as  tlio  Irish  Faiiiino  arrested  the  national  movomwit 
there,  so  the  cholera,  wliioii  scourged  Italy  in 
depressed  the  physique  and  industry  of  the  nation'  and 
everywhere,  e.vcept  in  the  Soutl,.  turned  men’s  mind.s'from 
public  to  pnvato  griefs.  Italy  might  well  seem  to  ti.e 
suporhe'i.al  observer  “ the  land  of  the  dead”;  it  needed  the 
taitli  ot  a Lamoimaus  to  realise  that  it  was  “the  peace  of 
tlie  ci'adlo  and  noi  of  tlio  gravo/^ 

lint  the  revival  soon  camo,  heralded  in  literature.  Silvio 
1 ellico’s  le  mie  though  intended  to  i,o  a manual 

o quietism,  burnt  into  its  readers’  hearts  with  its  desciijition 
ot  the  martyrdom  of  the  Spielberg.  Eerchet  liad  written 
ills  fain o as  clioras  : 


Arise,  Italia,  arise  in  amis,  thy  day  has  come,” 

(jiiorrazzi’s  novels  spoke  of  uu  Italian  greatness  wJiicli  might 
return  again,  and  his  Mmlia  di  Mrenze  ( i S 3 i)  was  “ writlm, 
because  lie  could  not  fight,”  ^ iJ'Aiieglio’s  JiUore  Fieram,m<. 
stiuo  ^ a ruanlj  note,  tiiat  helped  to  woau  Italian  youth 
from  ballet-aanccrs  to  patriotic  thought.  Collotta  and 
Lotta  publkslied  thou-  Idsf.ories  of  recent  Italian  .stnigglo.s. 
Gustavo  Modena’s  comedies  tauglit  Italian  and  ariti-ivqad 
ideas  as  bob  11}/  m.s  t,lio  censorship  allowed.  Kos.sini’s  aij'l 

' There  v/crc  a fev/  ]odgo.s  ut  homo  and  iu  Unibiia  as  late  aF  .1S67  : 
Mazzim,  Of.err.  XV,  Ii.':. 

- .Mazzini,  DutC'^nto  Jcttcre,  14-15. 

‘‘‘  Guerrazzi,  Memorie,  95. 


young  ITALY 


•45 


Vordi  s operas  Jiad  tales  of  national  cllbrt  for  their  themes 
Niccohm’s  tragedies  drew  from  niodioval  liislo]-y  memories 
that  I'ousod  the  people  to  rocollootions  of  their  old'domocracv" 
ylrnaUo  cU  Brescia  (,843)  was  a hymn  to  libe^y’ 
aorcoly  satirising  German  and  Pajialist.  and  teaching  how 
liinporor  and  I'ope  wore  leagued  to  ojipress  the  land 
Ginsti’s  satires  circulated  in  hundreds  of  mamiscript  copies 
11835),  labelling  the  princes,  the  police,  the  courtiers  with 
Ktmging  epigra,nis,  that  stuck  in  the  public  memory.  He 
wro'G  “ in  ins  blouse  ” in  nervous,  vernacular  Tuscan,  with 
the  sharp,  rattling  rhythm  of  popular  songs,  or  sometimes 
with  an  epic  dignity,  that  recalled  the  greater  ages  of 
Italian  litoratiiro.  Ho  lashed  t^lie  |)rinces,  who  “shaved 
at  second-hand,”  the  “conscience-jaundiced  Idodmontese ” 
the  feeble  i.azzaroni-l'aladin  ” of  Naples,  tlie  “Tuscan 
Morpheus,  rvith  lettuce  and  with  poppy  crowned”:  he 
lashed  the  police,  " those  locusts  of  the  state,”  the  priests 
10  pl  eached  resignation  and  a marrowless  iiiinianitarianisni 
ihe  M'oathcr-cook  politicians,  the  official  “ adepts  in  the  art 
of  iiot-dolug.”  The  Pope  ho  told  to  “tear  the  mask,  first 
troo!  1.11s  own  face,  tlien  from  the  tyrants.’’  But  he  was 

t- 'g' Cf  tif-  of  the  demagoLpje  as  to  the  cant 
of  tee  ofiicial;  lie  sneered  at  the  “devotees  of  King  Log”  at 
fo  thin  and  .shadowy  virtue  ” of  Florence,  at  the  eile.s 
"I'oso  “clock  alw.ay.s  stood  at  ’31.”  His  rvas  a deep  and 
ygis  patriotism;  ho  laughed  at  tlie  men  who  thouglit 
'•“•t  a cosmopolitan  idea  makes  the  brain  grow  lar^mr  ” • 

si'.'' I fiercely  on  the  .seutimenta]  foroigtiers,'’ who 

■M'.'f'O  of  Itaty  as  the  land  of  the  dead : 

“ Oil,  sucli  a noble  gi-ivcyaid  migl.t  make  tlie  living  envy  ! ” 

MciwwhHe  kTazziui’s  passionate  i.amphlets,  smuggled 

fesf.’ief'Tl  leavening  with  a now  ear- 

l)u-v!b  ‘‘niong  the  ediicateil  classes,  and  Modona’s 

rl)u' on 
jj,.' I there  the  branches  of  Young  Italy 

ivo-]-  g^-’a.diially,  .hi  spite  of  the  depression,  tlie  net- 

to  was  rewoven  from  Palermo  and  Naples 

vor hlorcncc  and  I^Iilan.  From  England  and 


I 


I 


146  A HISTORY  OF  ITALUN  IJNITT 

France,  from  Spain  and  0('rsica,  from  the  Tieino  and  M ip. 
and  the  Ionian  islands  the  e::iles  were  in  close  corrospom  ■ 
deuce  with  their  friends  at  home.  Sicily  was  now  die  focim  *' 
of  insurrection.  The  stamina  of  the  population,  the  hatred  1 
of  the  government  which  showed  itself  in  almost  yearly  ^ 

outbreaks,  the  distance  from  the  Austrian  garrison all ! 

pointed  to  the  island  as  a fitting  starting-point  for  revolu- 1 
tion;  even  the  Piedmontese  government  was  biddino- for  a 
foothold  of  influence  there.^  The  long  struggle  betw^een  tiio 
advocates  of  complete  centralization  and  tire  party  which  tried 
to  make  the  Lieutenancy  the  means  to  a modified  homo  rnlo 
had  ended  in  the  final  discomfiture  of  the  latter,  when  Fer- 
dinand s jealousy  recalled  the  Count  of  Syracuse  (i835).2 
The  intolerable  misrule,  whicli  followed,  extinguished  tljo 
divisions  among  the  Liberals;  Pakn’mo  and  Messina  were 
ostentatiously  reconciled  ; the  old  separatist  party  joined 
hands  with  the  younger  school,  ndiich  sought  to  memo 
the  island  in  an  Italian  republic.  In  1837  deputies  from 
all  the  secret  societies  of  the  island  rvere  meeting  at  Palermo 
to  concert  rebellion.  A.  month  or  two  later  the  poj)ular  fury, 
which  accompanied  the  cholera,  precipitated  the  rising.  The 
terrible  visitation,  which  struck  tire  North  with  despair,  in 
the  South  was  the  signal  ioi'  blind  outbreaks  of  panic 
and  frenzy.  The  epidemi3  was  decimating  the  population; 
22,000  died  ar  Naples,  over  40,000  at  Palermo.  The 
maddened  people  gave  a ready  oar  to  the  old  superstition, 
that  the  plague  was  bon  of  ])oison,  and  so  utterly  dis- 
credited was  the  govermreiit,  that  even  educated  mc]i  were 
ready  to  believe  that  its  f gents  had  poisoned  tlie  bread  and  . 
contaminated  the  wells.  Formidable  disturbances  broke  out 
in  the  Abruzzi  and  in  STxily.  'flte  Liberals  took  advautagoj 
of  the  panic.  They  deliberately  encouraged  the  belief  in  tk'3. 
poisoning,'  and  pi'eached  rebellion  to  the  frenzied  popidation.i 
Palermo  itself  was  crushetl  by  tlie  awful  plagvio,  ])ut  i\l cssiiiii, 
Catania,  and  Syracuse  rose ; .1.11  the  two  latter  cities  the 
yellow  flag  of  Sicilian  indepemlenco  flew ; at  Syracuse  the 


^ liianciii,  TUpUnnazia,  111.  279. 

- Jiracci,  Menun-ie,  55-58,  108-170. 
^ f^ansune,  A ivcnivicnti,  103. 


YOIjXG  ITALY  ‘ 

crowd  massacred  police  and  suspectcl  poisoners,  and  for 
three  weeks  the  c,ty  was  nnder  mob-rnle.  The  ^ictlL 
the  populace  owed  their  deaths  to  the  cholera  scare  a 
Catania,  whore  the  niovcracut  had  been  more  political,  there 
was  no  bloodshed;  but  the  murders  gave  the  government'; 
ts  excuse  for  vengeance.  Delcarotto  was  sent  1 organize'' 
terronsm,  and  condemned  to  death  over  one  hundred  of 
his  victims  AYPe,  Uie  savagery  came  to  an  end,  the  last 
remnants  of  mdependenco  were  destroyed.  The  civil  service 
was  lused  with  the  Neapolitan ; the  vicoroyalty  became  a sine! 
cure;  genaarmes  on  the  Neapolitan  model  took  the  place  of 
Je  old  local  police.  Alone  of  their  ancient  privileges  the 
Sicilians  preserved  their  exemption  from  oonscriptL  for 

Ssr”””' 

1 1 an  isolated  movement,  but  it 

rs^YminVlrT  pair  was  pas.sing  into  exa.spcvation. 

As  Young  Italy  raised  its  head  again,  the  plans  of  insur- 

cction  took  a more  organized  and  extensive  form.  In  the 

- '^53  f;''°^olutionaryconuTiitteos  projected  a 

.Wiioial  rising  in  Naples,  Romagna,  and  'I’usoany,  but  caci, 
provniee  waited  for  the  othe^-.s  to  give  the  sigmd,  and  the 
- bcl  ion  was  still-born.  The  plot  had  lo.akod  out,  however, 

. Lo  ogna  ami  R.avcima,  and  a few  conspirators,  to  osca,pc 
t',,!  revenge,  were  led  by  the  brothers  Muratori  to 

I pcnnineH,  w]io]-e  tlioy  kept  up  a desultory  <Yuerii]a  fight 
^ the  moiiutamecrs  gave  no  help;  tlio  tiny  band  .^w 
rary  of  mr  outiaived  hfe,  ami  lied  to  Tirscany  or  hidin<r. 

I ■>  p m the  mountains,  while  below  Cardinal  Spiuola  sent 
accomplices  to  the  piisoii  or  the  scallold. 

Ill'll  .yo'”'g  Romagnuols.  who  thought 

r"i>s|>ir.,to‘rs  V l'>o  rriscr  of  the 

c di'T’k-  --  frying  to 

, p ''".'P'f  -0x1  rcpuhlioans  on  a bare  prograuune 

1>  t.s  : J '*?';  ''--'I'niave  preferred  to  wait  for'-a  time, 

‘'1'  Ihe  ;I  w ‘ llr-'t  occurred  the  mo.st  noted 

I oi  A movcnieuts.  Attilio  and  Emiho  llandiora  wore 


148  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 
young  Vcnotiai']  nohles,  oinoors  in  tlio  Aiistria 


with  ti,o  !itora(an-e  of^Yonnc/ltalT 

oi  hiavo  and  vigorous  iictiori.  Tliis  example  the-  woid  i 
give  by  organixiiig  a,  guerilla  in  the  Southern  Aperniinos' 
• la^uu  and  others  did  what  they  could  to  dissuade  them  • 
hut  deaf  to  his  reasoning,  deaf  to  tlieir  father’s  tl, rents  an  1 
^ le  prayers  of  Attilio’s  young  wife,  they  determined  to  mal;' 
a descent  on  (Jalabria,  where  rumour  had  swelled  a nettv 
onthroak  to  an  insurrection.  Escaping  from  their  ship-? 
hoy  took  re  ugo  at  Corfu  (May  1844),  and  thence  sailed  m 

mr-'V'**  detailed  their  pro- 

he  Vv  with  Mai^zini,  relyiuo 

the  well-known  trustwortliincass  of  the  Erjo-lic], 

loHors  were  opened  in  the  Se! 

.i!i?  W 7 "U  oomlomMi  u,  t,; 

Alot.  1 altering  for  a moment,  they  tried  to  save  their  lives 
f^y  representing  the  movement  as  monarchical,  and  appealing 
tc  I e dmand  to  lead  it , " a King  of  Naples,”  tliey  uh  Kun, 

IS  the  only  possible  King  of  Italy/^'  It  v;as  the  onlv 
unworthy  action,  that  stained  their  perfect  honour.  ' 'Vhly 

Ie.ith,  thou-  proclamations  in  the  name  of  Italian  Inde-  ’ 
P-  once  pi  Unity,  made  a deep  sensation  Oiobiti  I 
‘ destnl-,  r"'  to«-ential  invective  for 

sf  ri  let  b ^ could  die  ”■  they 

flkc  to  e to  Yomig  plausible,  Lvever 

also  to  eprosent  Ma.zmi  from  his  safe  hiding-place  egging 
n the  Bandieras  to  their  forlorn  enterprise, .imd  the  olum  ' 

U at  fell  on  hm.  gave  a great  impetus  to  tlie  neiv  .school, 

.r"« “““  “i 


bee  Vol.  IL,  Appendix  C. 

- Kicciardi  e Lattari,  Bandicra,  i6o. 


£. J’{.  */>iiSvt:i  ,:,jv.-«jrt  -■ 

S:'«u,,C.'.s>r;>!^),t^V“^^'^  

*C^  „;iU~  fm  U-fi^  ■ - ■ 

K.J,  ■ 

i|Sir  ^ % 


r.'ir’j  "d'"  ' 

, ....--..k/-^  ■..„  .wr«>a'  --- 


1 


If  ^ . ’ « m f ■ . if ^ 

.^?ir  A%'5Wil'<-  ' 


m IV 


,-in«r  I.-,'- •’■^,  *''tT^'  '\  ^ \y 

■-  •■-■■“•  ■■»»  .-»V  U'':,;.-  “ 


V 'lljj  ■ i^siJi*}^ 

'W’  ■>(«.?«?* 


o^y-  ^:H^^r'u f'  1 T*.  -5’  '■  ■■  ■ 


..  ! .A*-  Vlt? 

V ’ij /io!^*  >'•  > ? 


■ 1^4/.  . Il 


v/'-"  . ■ ' 

i'^.'i]  ■ * ' 

*’*^1  ,.  >•  'ft. 

/V  is... 


> 


CHAPTER  VJTI 


THE  MODERATES 
1843-1846 

Tlie  reaction  against  Young  Italy.  The  social  reformers  ; Scientific  Con- 
gresses ; railways.  The  Moderates  : (i.)  The  New  Gdflfs  ; 
Gioberti’s  Pnmaio ; (ii.)TflE  Piedmontese  School  ; Hperan^e 

d’ Italia.;  D’Azeglio  ; his  Ultimi  Gasi  di  Romagna;  the  Albertists. 
Charles  Albert’s  Eeign  : his  reforms  ; railway  schemes  ; the  King 
and  Austria  ; growth  of  Liberalism  ; tariff- war  with  Austria ; the 
King  and  the  Moderates. 

Since  the  discredit  of  the  Carbonari,  the  democratic  and 
more  or  less  republican  movement,  which  centred  round 
Young  Italy,  had  inspired  the  active  patriotism  of  the  country. 
However  fitfully,  the  democrats  had  for  the  past  twelve 
years  been  almost  alone  in  upholding  the  flag  of  Italian 
Independence.  They  had  now  to  confront  a great  wave  of 
nationalist  conservatism  that  swept  over  the  country.  To  a 
-certain  extent,  no  doubt,  the  Moderate  School  Avas  descended 
from  the  earlier  Liberalism  of  the  Carbonaro  period,  retaining 
and  developing  its  nationalist  policy,  and  reverting  from 
fear  of  Young  Italy’s  democratic  programme  to  tlic  more 
conservative  and  cautious  thought,  that  had  inspired  and 
spoilt  the  movements  of  ’21  and  ’31.  There  was  an 
angry  revulsion  from  the  little  plots,  Avith  tbeir  Avaste  of 
life  and  the  cruel  retaliation  they  proAmkod.  “ It  is  hard,” 
Avrote  Gioborti  after  the  Savoy  Expedition,  ‘"to  be  calm, 
A^dien  one  reflects  that  a band  of  inexperienced  young  men, 
hoAvever  good  their  intentions,  presume  to  risk  the  future  of 
Italy.”  And  the  Moderates  bore  the  impress  of  the  con- 
structive didactic  school,  Avhich  sprang  from  the  ConciUatore, 
and  the  Anlologia  and  Manzoni.  There  was  a Aidde  con« 
viction  that  any  forAvard  pohtical  movement  was  out  of 

U9 


i ^ 


■ -u 


liVf 

' ,.v|  ’ *^>y‘' ' -. 

5i\  V-  t'm 


..ji 


title 

it' 


ife:  It; 


iQf r t 1 


jT-  _ - .,,  ^ ^ c,  • ' --A^ix  -13^  ^ 

' *.  'I'M.  *;  t*"  .^i; 

. ■*'*,*  '^' 


j,„,  . ail  jv.'K>i-/'i  J2»r'  i*  !>(*J.^ 


7rf>’ 


ifit^*<  ' .ii.  It/  ^Crvtt^ 

t ’r  i".  roifi  J 'rtii-.L?«  K^li  t^  'JI  ^ 

4,  , . I «!5rjf  -idt  tv'j  l^rt  j •■  f ii.  !'S  I4  *•  J • 


li/^  -;  1»:  ’r  >J^  V*^' 

f f-  .-  y’f . u 


_ 


^ rr  ^ U xwruwii*'*^*"**  r^i..'  <»9:»v  1—  ^ 

r V,  r-  - ?<:*  • T 

^/jpj^Cij  ^ ‘ 4^:^  tt  » jdu’=jb  jc  ' 

'ft.  -6  infr*l( 

♦r  ,,  -i;  X/?i.V..  *.  ) 

i.^  1^^.-*  Iv  ’ br  vri^Ttw^? 

; —vff  |«^  r:'.  #c  /iii 

‘k’  'ir^-f'  »i&'>:  ' -'’->fi|  ?*  r.*f  unr'*  %dfc^  ■ /'^n*;  *^*1?^ 

' * '"••  ' • ia^i Sex 

- ••  t '♦ ' '■iSv.f;!!  Ttwr"  uiii  ^ 

• ft  .aj  V U/.-V  : V i# 

**iP0ir,  *4;  4 liir  mimM'  ti  ^r.  'L 

" |il  >>.>...>,  t")  Jtatit-  -’-*  '-■■''-,^|3nfi  ■>?’•'.  >7 jx.n.  ' 

^ '41  '4.<i  '’  .“dT  .»^  ,Av ^CW^  ,V_ 

*''’  N *nfr?^';  •)_  ;;*‘9^  . 'm 


►..  4 r 


'■nt'>  < 


.«w  »>■ 


150  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

court  at  present,  that  the  energies  of  the  nation  for  the 
moment  were  best  devoted  to  education  and  social  reform. 
Men,  like  the  Georgofils  in  Tuscany,  or  Cattaneo  at  Milan, 
/ or  the  agricultural  reformers  of  Piedmont,  believed  that  the 
spread  of  schools,  agricultural  improvements,  the  introduction 
tof  railways,  the  promotion  of  literary  journuls  and  scientific 
societies  must  take  precedence  for  their  generation  over  any 
.political  movement,  though  many  of  them  looked  to  create 
an  atmosphere  where  despotism  could  not  live.  They 
attacked  the  dialects,  and  brought  classic  Italian  into  more 
general  uso;  they  started  model  farms;  they  established 
infant  schools  and  savings-banks.  They  founded,  under  the 
lead  of  Carlo  Bonaparte  and  Sir  John  Bowring,  the  Scientific 
Congresses,  first  held  at  Pisa  and  Turin  in  1839 
1840.^  The  Congresses  were  at  first  colourless  but  very 
practical  gatherings  of  naturalists  and  scientists,  who  met 
under  government  patronage;  but  it  was  impossible  for 
Italians  of  different  states  to  come  together  without  giving 
something  of  a national  complexion  to  their  meetings. 
Economic  questions  suggested  a customs -league,  social 
problems  led  up  to  politics,  geography  to  free-spoken  talk  of 
Italy.  Tlie  Scientific  Congresses  were  among  the  forces 
that  made  the  nesv  nationalism ; and  the  Pope  and  Duke  of 
Modena  were  wise  in  their  generation,  when  they  forbade  their 
subjects  to  attend  them,  it  was  the  same  school  that  gave 
the  first  serious  impulse  to  railways.  Military  necessities  and 
royal  conveniences,  if  no  higher  considerations,  compelled 
even  the  governments,  except  in  the  Papal  States,  to  favour 
them.  A short  line  from  Naples  to  Portici  was  the  first  to 
be  opened  in  1839;  another  line,  equally  for  the  comfort 
of  a court,  ran  between  Milan  and  Monza  a year  later. 
Those  were  the  preludes  to  the  great  trunk  lines.  That 
from  Milan  to  Venice  was  commenced  in  1840,  and  the  first 
section  from  Padua  to  Mestre  was  opened  in  1842.  A line 
from  Leghorn  to  Pisa,  tlie  first  instalment  of  a railway  to 
Florence,  was  working  in  1844.  The  Piedmontese  trunk 

1 The  other  Congresses  were  at  Florence,  1841;  Padua,  1842;  Lucca, 
1843;  Milan,  1844;  Naples,  1845;  Genoa,  1846;  Venice,  1847. 


ih  ^1  i»}ii»  W'  ■ ^"-  -•■'<»?  -'i'  '1  ' 

4^>ii/' M oa04^M/tr>  i<> la!,  ,. 

Mdl  hz</i^  il>i/iH  K*  ^i.";*  " ,•  1 ‘i^i.f  Mmrn^  Bx/l^  ^ 

fter’mfhi  ?^^’/  ,*  -•  u nci  ^ 

■4^,l  afiui’W'  vi4^v^  Vk  ofho^riOKi  »ir  'i^n^f'ky 

X:4^vili^  aJJu  i-u.  'i 

;3i,''f . )Vo,.;  li^r^“*-* 

v^i  r * .^wii  -.  icsr  4'  ftkOiiq^w^i'  /i>)dqif>'Tp4^* 


fticU^ii»'j  /ion,qif*7w  iU* 

^cnt  oiai  t»fc  iii^  ^ffpilci«f  ^ a ?',^'iWf*  ci<j  * 


i^tii 


^ I » 4^^  i^cua; *. 


04^4  T - “•  * i(,totr  s;fA>4l'«.  »i^ 

-/;  jV'X^'^ho  -VO  *r-di  **  ’^.:yi;^/^  ^itT  . *or.Si:  ^ 


yi1%  ^ i:i»- 

.,  •■I'tli'f’Oj.il  SVI  1' 


i.l-JI’-V  r. 


j tiiofliai^'ii'  j toi^j 


i'e6 


•Atr..-  ‘a.:n‘j<»  -i--.^  '-i  r'  if»fjp»;>-s  iaaiii.' 

i-  ij-ia.-tii  IK--’-  :- ■ iaif' J Irt  t:-;.’.  8 '>  ‘t  j{^..Ui.«4-.-.  ^ _ 

1*  '.  •.’i:/  .'  i:-'?'  .^*‘'  '-^W  uowwK.  |?3j,v 


irrjU^  . >’»tt4  ; 'jv  i)  fl'^'jU^f‘^cn'< 

Ji  Tir.rtii-i' -A  nr  i ■ -■'  < r'< m'^!^  a.i  • 

I'y.  Ml  '.  b«a*7^i^;1j  ’ i..'UiSM|Bt''^ 

v ,'''1  S'AilffniS^.^-  >,r.  il’ ‘V't.l>  !=’• 

•2  *<  -j  l<*i>iia:  ■ ' >i  'i!^1>llf& 
f i/  ; '#^ift^f6'.^■♦*iC*‘'•  ..>/J<fr*.  :'♦*  ^ 1^11*41  «J**|irvi'  ''Voliy.rf}^rj\'^ 

...olliR^fA*^  / '!  '•*  < ' ’•  > 

^uU  a n ; 


lO<i*  *«.  JDTOllivj 
**i  i*f»#TK,  • -^'i 


i/>r  ■•'»  * . - ,'M*'>UJR<?n4  ‘ / ' 

1 » 4»i  J*triii.v'-^  > *'  • *-'.4  -■’ 

t:  .i^1?l  llfh  <''1 

; i'fc^Liun  ‘i?‘j  -7i(i‘ini'>  ,.‘)nti 

^l:\A:  VuiU’i  M -t  .i 

^^ . ^ ^ i 

>-«:  oji  .4  \KHtcimn!#\v;  .w  V ■«> 

..'i  » j.:  i-;ii-  . -♦  *kf{i 

} Kt  ‘•■  it  ‘ ' .#W->-ii.’i  #rv^  .’vf^fea  U>f  1 

Jv‘  ? r ':f^t^]>4\  '1 


M I. 


i.i 


THE  MODERATES 


T5I 

system  followed  a little  later/  and  Cesare  Balbo  as  early 
as  i<S45  was  advocating  the  tunnelling  of  the  Alps.  Even 
in  the  South  there  was  talk  of  a lino  to  Brindisi.^  But 
thoiigb  the  government  helped  on  the  railway  movement,  it 
was  the  nationalists  who  saw  its  real  import.  It  was  not 
only  that  railways  promised  to  develop  trade ; the  patriots 
recognized  that  they  would  be  the  most  potent  of  material 
interests  to  bind  tbo  peninsula  together.  As  D’Azeglio  said, 
they  would  ‘‘  stitch  the  boot.”  It  was  a favourite  project 
that  a great  coast  lino  should  connect  Genoa  with  Leghorn, 
Civita  Vecchia,  and  Naples.  The  portentous  bulk  of  literature, 
which  appeared  on  railway  questions,  showed  ?;ith  what 
earnestness  tlio  country  v/as  \va,tching  their  development. 

Thus  gradually  the  social  reformers,  almost  despite 
themselves,  drifted  into  politics.  Mazzini’s  leaven  w^as  at 
Afork,  though  Avith  ultimate  issues  unintended  by  its  maker, 
swelling  his  readers’  hearts  Avith  love  of  country  and  thought-s 
of  glory  and  independence.  Giusti  was  undermining  the 
thrones  Avith  his  satire ; Guerrazzi  wa^s  making  men’s  hearts 
burn  within  them.  There  Avas  progress  and  life  in  tlie  air. 
rho  deadness  of  the  previous  decade  had  lifted ; and  the 
great  mass  of  educated  Italians,  who  had  too  much  common- 
sense  or  too  little  courage  for  Mazzini’s  gospel,  Avere  looking 
for  a milder  creed  Av^hich  would  reconcile  patriotism  and 
prudence.  Cautious  men,  who  thought  with  Balbo  that  “ im- 
successhil  conspiracies  fan  the  spirit  of  distrust  ratlier  tlmn 
of  patriotism  ” ; sensitive  men,  who  flinched  from  preaching 
to  t-he  people  a gospel  of  sacrifice  and  martyrdom ; all  who 
shrank  from  sullying  their  respGci;ahilit3^  by  contact  Avith 
a party  of  uncompromising,  democracy ; the  orthodox,  who 
feared  tlie  rationalist  elements  in  Mazzini’s  teaching;  the 
conventional,  wlio  resented  its  lack  of  dofereiico  to  the  social 
traditions ; Italian  humour,  offended  by  the  fantastic  senti- 
mentalism tliat  hung  round  Young  Italy  ; the  cowardice, 
tliat  sought  the  shelter  of  throne  and  church;  the  best  of 

* See  below,  p.  165. 

^ Ferdinand  II.  v-ouid  allow  no  tunnels,  thinking  them  immoral,  attached 
a cliapel  to  every  Ktution,  and  allowed  no  trairns  to  run  at  n:g]\t  or  on  holidays, 
— Iklcmor,  Fin-e  di  un  n'gno,  33S. 


152 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Italian  common-^iense,  the  wunst  of- Italian  mediocrity— all 
swelled  the  volume  of  the  Moderate  party 
-k  From  the  start  it  parted  into  two  currents.  The  fi>'st 
|was  above  all  Catholic.  The  New  Gruelfs,  as  they  called 
'themselves,  were  the  direct  descendants  of  the  Romanticists 
of  Manzoni's  school.  Sentimentalists,  worshippers  of  the 
past,  they  gave  their  reverence  to  Catholicism  and  the 
Papacy  as  its  central  embodiment.  Respect  for  the  priest 
had  to  he  reconciled  with  theR  humanitarianism,  their  very 
real  sympathy  with  the  oppressed.  And  so  they  pictured 
the  Church  released  from  the  bondage  which  Joseph  II.  and 

!his  imitators  had  laid  on  it,  pictured  the  Pope  independent 
and  supreme  as  the  arbiter  of  nations,  the  defender  of 
the  poor,  the  champion  of  Italy.  The  popular  Catholicism 
of  the  Fro'tnessi  Syosi  was  to  be  the  great  feat  of  modern 
Europe.  And  their  deeply  religious  spirit,  dainty  and  want- 
^ ing  in  masculine  fibre  though  it  was,  made  them  moralists, 
i Like  Mazzini,  they  preached  duty,  perseverance,  education, 
q domestic  virtue;  unlike  him,  they  preached  passivity  and 
|resignation.  Wanting  in  moral  courage,  fearful  of  the 
stony  road  of  progress,  tender  to  opponents,  over-sensitive 
in  their  sympathies,  they  painted  an  Utopia  of  class  recon- 
ciliation, Avhere  Pope  and  priests  and  princes,  converted  to 
justice  and  mercy,  were  to  lie  down  with  a grateful  and 
contented  people. 

The  tradition  (which  had  its  .French  counterpart  in 
Montalerabert’s  and  Lamennais’  earlier  writings)  had  been 
nursed  by  the  Paviese  school  of  Romagnosi  and  Cantu,  by 
Raffaello  Lambruschinis  suggestions  of  church  reform,  by 
Capponi’s  and  Carlo  Troya  s historical  rehabilitation  of  the 
I Papacy.  In  1836  Niccold  Tommaseo,  a poet  and  critic, 

I who  had  been  exiled  Ironi  Tuscan^’’  for  his  writings  in  the 
' Antologia,  published  at  Paris  ^ an  appeal  to  priests  and 
princes  to  co-operate  in  the  work  of  national  regeneration, 
and  pointed  to  a reforming  Pope  as  the  pivot  of  the 
movement.  But  Tornmaseo’s  book  was  little  known,  and 
the  new  school  started  into  prominence  with  a work,  per- 
haps in  part  base!  on  his,  wliicli  appeared  seven  years 

^ I'dlc  nuuat  speranze  Italia. 


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'^4.  . 


THE  MODERATES 


^53 

iater  (June  1843).  Moral  and  Civil  Primacy  of  the 

ItalianH  was  tlio  work  of  Gioberfci,  a Turin  priest,  who  had 
been  oxilod  in  the'  early  days  of  Charles  Albert's  reignj 
Eroin  sympathies  with  Young  Itnly  his  vei'vsatilo  interests 
had  passed  to  an  Italian  school  of  metaphysics,  to  church 
reform  and  Jansenism/  and  now  fixed  themselves  on  Italian 
Independence.  His  transcendental  philosophy  created  an 
Italy  of  the  imagination,  and  some  fragmentary  history  and 
a few  ethnological  conceits  blinded  him  to  the  real  Italy 
past  and  present.  With  reasoning  more  conspicuous  for 
patriotism  than  logic,  lie  argued  that,  Italy,  because  it  had 
been  the  fatherland  of  Dante  and  Vico  and  Mapoleon,  must 
for  ever  be  the  country  of  the  “ dynamic men,  the  home  of 
creatiAT-e  genius.  Almost  in  Mazzini  s words  he  declared  that 
because  the  Romans  had  been  the  elect  people  to  propagate 
the  idea  of  justice,  because  Christian  Rome  had  taught  the 
peace  and  love  Avliich  created  modern  civilization,  therefore 
Italy  must  always  bo  the  redeeming  nation,  the  eldest-born 
among  the  peoples,  the  moral  and  spiritual  centre  of  the 
Avx-rld.^  Such  dignity  claimed  as  its  corollary  national  inde- 
pendence, and  independence  alone  was  needed  to  make  his 
country  again  the  first  of  nations.  But  Gioberti  did  not 
believe  in  It.alian  Unity.  Italy,  he  thought,  had  been  too 
long  divided  to  permit  a peaceful  union,  and.  union  by  force 
would  be  a crime.  He  wished  to  see  a federation  of  Italian 
states,  under  the  supreme  authority  of  the  Pope,  which 
Avould  seciux  the  country  against  foreign  invasion,  and  make 
room  for  a national  navy,  national  colonies,  a customs’- 
league,  a common  system  of  administration.'^  The  federa- 
tive idea  Avas  a part  of  the  conservatism,  Avhich  pervaded 
all  his  politic.al  thought.  Like  Locke,  he  uses  first  jHn- 
ciplos  to  justify  the  system  of  his  predilection;  he  often 
fails  to  get  behind  conventions,  and  makes  philosophy  the 
handmaid  of  tlie  e.visting  fact.  The  Italian  genius,  he 
announces,  is  essentially  monarchical  and  aristocratic  and 

^ Eerti,  Oioherti,  15,  23.  He  told  Mazziui  in  iiS47  his  Catholicism  was 
elastic  CTJough  to  include  anybody. 

^ Gioberti,  Prinwto,  14,  19,  27-32.  48. 

^ 57-58  ; ProUyjmnem,  50,  158. 


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tti  • i ■■  |::;vf  ^'fr,;' 

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154 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


fodcralLst.  The  Pope  is  to  keep'  his  Temporal  Power ; ^ the 
Church,  as  lieir  of  the  Jevrish  pricstliood,  must  preservo 
her  ancient  independence;  all  good  Italians  must  love  and 
reverence  their  princes.  His  conservatism,  however,  is  of 
the  best.  Though  there  is  to  be  no  change  in  the  social 
order,  every  class  must  subserve  the  great  national  idea. 
The  times  were  propitious  for  reform,  and  the  princes  were  to 
initiate  consultative  assemblies  and  a moclitied  liberty  of  the 
press.  The  nobles  must  justify  their  title  to  lead,  must  re- 
nounce the  works  of  feudalism,  must  respect  the  lower  orders. 
Priests  must  study,  must  free  themselves  from  suspicion  of 
worldliness,  be  tolerant  to  other  creeds,  use  the  same  frank- 
ness to  princes  as  to  people.  Even  the  Jesuits  are  called  to 
help,  and  the  Avhole  country  bidden  rouse  itself  to  move  the 
dead  weight  of  mediocrity  that  held  the  nation  down. 

The  results  of  Gioberti’s  book  were  great  and  manifold. 
In  common  with  Mazzini,  it  had  a manly  strain  of  en- 
couragement and  hope,  a memory  anti  a prophecy  of  high 
destinies,  sorely  needed  by  a weary  and  disillusioned  genera- 
tion. He  taught,  as  Mazzini  had  done,  that  it  was  craven 
to  despair  of  twenty  millions  of  men.  Like  him,  he  made 
their  hopes  pivot  on  national  independence,  and  federalist 
though  he  was,  he  helped  to  swell  the  stream  that  set  for 
Unity.  But  Gioberti  parted  from  Mazzini,  wlien  he  taught 
Italians  to  look  for  salvation  to  the  Pope  and  the  King  of 
Piedmont.  The  fate  of  Italy,  he  said,  depended  on  the 
alliance  of  Rome  and  Turin.  He  had  all  the  pride  of  a 
Piedmontese,  and  held  that  the  subalpine  kingdom  was  now 
the  chief  seat  of  Italian  arms  and  culture.  Rendering  li])- 
service  to  Charles  Albert,^  he  told  how  the  manly  piety  and 
tenacity  of  the  House  of  Savoy  had  disciplined  its  state, 
and  prophesied  that  it  was  reserved  to  the  Carignano  branch 
to  turn  its  energy  to  laiger  purposes.  But  much  as  he 
caressed  Charles  Albert,  he  reserved  his  highest  honours  for 

1 He  was  already  wavering  as  to  tliis  when  he  wrote  the  Prolegwacni, 
q.  V.  89. 

‘ So  again  in  Prolegomeni,  157.  In  liis  liinnovamento,  1.  507,  he  says  he 
did  not  mean  what  he  said  about  Chaiie.s  Albert.  80  too  he  disclaimed  his 
eulogies  of  Komo,  ih.  I.  20,  11.  144,  and  Eerti,  op.  cit,  151,  187;  but  the  dis- 
claimer was  probably  introduced  to  square  with  his  later  policy. 


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■ i '^’M 


susi'.’-.  ■.•:  ifi4..i  J 


THE  MODERATES 


155 


the  Plope.  The  old  medieval  idea  of  a reforming  Pontiff 
was  revived.  Gregory  (for  even  Gioberti  could  not  idealize 
him)  was  told  not  to  expect  the  joyful  day  himself,  but  he 
mightl  rejoice  in  the  high  destiny  reserved  for  his  successor. 
The  Pope,  as  heir  of  Guelf  traditions,  was  to  free  Italy 
from  the  barbarian ; as  the  true  friend  of  princes  and 
peopk^s,  he  would  hold  the  balance  between  them.  The 
mediating  office  of  the  Papacy  would  champion  right  and 
religion  against  “ Most  Christian  ” kings  and  Holy  Alli- 
ances. And  then  again,  almost  in  repetition  of  Mazzini’s 
words,  Gioberti  foretold  that  from  Italy,  the  seat  and 
court  of  the  spiritual  monarchy,  from  Rome,  the  eternal 
city  independent  of  change  and  time,  would  go  forth  the 
word  that  would  regenerate  the  modern  world. 

The  book  met  with  a splendid  popularity.  It  was  a 
safe  book ; the  timid,  the  devotees,  the  priests  found  in  it 
palatable  doctrine,  that  reconciled  patriotism  and  prejudice. 
The  clergy  were  won  by  its  Catholic  tone ; ^ the  nationalist 
statesmen  by  its  praise  of  the  Savoy  princes.  It  was  in 
vain  that  the  sceptics  and  anti-Papalists  pointed  to  the 
scandals  of  Gregorys  court  and  the  hideous  misrule  of 
Romagna;  it  was  in  vain  that  Niccolini  retorted  that  to 
regenerate  Italy  the  Pope  must  begin  by  unpoping  himself ; 
it  was  in  vain  that  on  the  other  side  the  Jesuits  refused 
to  be  won  by  Gioberti’s  caresses,  and  savagely  attacked  his 
“ Liberal  house  with  the  Papal  scutcheon.”  The  Franciscans 
and  Dominicans  defended  his  orthodoxy,  and  he  became  the 
champion  of  the  Liberal  clergy.  And  when,  stung  by  the 
Jesuit  attack,  and  angered  by  the  Sonderbund^  and  the 
execution  of  the  Bandieras,  he  placed  the  Jesuits  and 
Neapolitan  Bourbons  under  ban  in  his  Prolegomeni  (1845), 
he  only  voiced  the  national  indignation,  and  his  fame  rose 
higher  still. 

But  though  Gioberti  carried  everything  before  him  in 
the  popular  imagination,  there  were  cooler  heads,  who  could 

^ e.g.  Pecci  (now  Leo  XIII.) : Berti,  o'p.  cit.,  157. 

2 The  Sonderbund  was  the  union  of  the  seven  Catholic  cantons  of  Switzer- 
land, formed  in  1843.  When  the  Diet  declared  for  the  expulsion  of  the 
Jesuits,  it  refused  to  obey  (September  1847).  The  eighteen-days’  civil  war 
(November  1847)  ended  in  its  complete  defeat. 


156  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

not  accept  his  version  of  the  Papacy,  and  he  himself 
almost  abandoned  it  in  his  Frolegomeni}  The  fashionable 
Voltaireans  of  Florence  and  Milan,  students  of  Dante  like 
Gabriel  Rossetti,  the  earnest  democrats  of  Mazzini’s  school, 
the  Pope’s  own  wretched  subjects  found  it  impossible  to 
believe  that  any  good  thing  could  come  out  of  Rome. 
Above  all,  the  Liberal  statesmen  of  Piedmont,  however  much 
they  might  welcome  Gioberti’s  panegyric  of  their  country 
and  the  reaction  against  the  democracy  and  conspiracies  of 
Young  Italy,  had  small  hope  that  a Pope  would  lead  the 
cause  of  nationality  and  reform.  It  was  Gioberti’s  belief 
in  the  House  of  Savoy  that  appealed  most^  strongly  to 
them  in  his  doctrine.  This  school  of  nationalist  statesmen 
had  already  found  a voice  in  a very  able  but  little  known 
pamphlet,^  published  at  Paris  in  1841  by  Mamiani,  an 
exiled  leader  of  the  revolution  of  1831.  Mamiani  believed 
that  sooner  or  later  Italy  must  win  her  independence  by 
hard  fighting  under  an  Italian  prince  and  without  foreign 
help.  But  she  must  wait  her  opportunity  in  Austria’s 
embarrassment,  and  years  of  patriotic  education  were  needed 
before  the  masses  could  take  their  part.  His  policy  was 
personal  reform,  the  winning  of  the  clergy  and  the  rich, 
national  education,  church  reform,  and  a thoughtful  pro- 
gramme of  mildly  socialistic  measures  to  raise  the  people 
to  a confidence  and  sense  of  dignity,  that  would  fit  them 
to  co-operate  in  the  work. 

But  Mamiani’s  book,  statesmanlike  as  it  was,  failed  to 
win  notice,  because  it  attached  itself  to  no  existing  political 
fact.^  The  statesmen  found  their  real  voice  in  the  Pied- 
montese school,  which  represented  to  a certain  extent  the 
anti-Papal  and  Ghibelline  tradition.  The  policy  of  the 
Turin  bureaucracy  had  been  to  make  the  Church  a branch 
of  the  civil  government;  it  preferred  a commonplace  and 
docile  clergy,  kept  in  order  under  concordats.  While 
Manzoni’s  followers  had  linked  patriotism  to  fhe  cause  of 

^ Gioberti,  Prolegomeni,  6o.  .....  o 

2 Nosiro  parere  intorno  alle  cose  italiane,  republished  in  his  Scritti.  bee 
Gori,  Rivoluzione,  69.  His  social  programme  is  interesting.  See  below,  p.  274. 

3 So  too  the  Veri  Italiani,  for  whom  see  Mazzini,  Opere,  VII.  143  5 Archivio 
Triennale,  I.  44-45. 


THE  MODERATES 


157 


the  Church,  and  attacked  the  Austrian  government  as 
Jansenist  and  irreligious,  the  Piedmontese  statesmen  put 
small  reliance  in  the  Pope,  and  centred  their  hopes  on  the 
erastian  House  of  Savoy.  They  were  mostly  Piedmontese 
nobles,  proud  of  Piedmont’s  past,  believers  in  her  destinies, 
inheritors  of  the  traditional  hatred  of  Austria.  They  had 
the  bureaucrat’s  love  of  good  government,  the  bureaucrat’s 
horror  of  untried  paths,  his  contempt  for  theories  and  policies 
of  faith.  Some  had  a tincture  of  Liberalism ; a few  wished 
to  copy  O’Connell  and  agitate  within  the  bounds  of  the  law 
for  more  popular  institutions.^  But  none  were  democrats. 
They  wished  to  see  the  Neapolitan  and  Papal  States  better 
governed ; they  were  willing  to  absorb  Lombardy ; they 
favoured  an  Italian  Federation  for  common  defence  and 
customs’ -union.  But  they  were  opposed  to  Unity;  they 
shrank  from  the  struggle,  which  an  attempt  to  realize  it 
might  involve ; they  feared  that  Turin  might  have  to  yield 
its  metropolitan  honours  to  Milan  or  Rome. 

Just  as  the  New  Guelfs  took  as  their  text-book  Gioberti’s 
Primacy,  so  the  Piedmontese  school  had  its  manifesto  in 
Cesare  Balbo’s  Hopes  of  Italy.  ^ He  was  the  son  of  Victor 
Emmanuel’s  reforming  minister,  with  the  record  of  a some- 
what weak  and  inconsistent  career,  but  inheriting  the  ambi- 
tions of  the  subalpine  school,  and  not  untouched  by  the 
wider  national  ideal.  His  book,  a wearisome,  sententious 
treatise,  was  published  at  Paris  in  1843,  a few  months  after 
the  appearance  of  the  Primacy.  Balbo  was  a professed  ad- 
mirer and  follower  of  Gioberti,  but  he  planted  his  hopes  not 
on  Rome,  but  on  Turin.  The  whole  book  is  a veiled  appeal 
to  Charles  Albert,  cringingly  tender  to  his  illiberal  prejudices, 
incentive  to  both  the  baser  and  purer  sides  of  his  patriotism, 
promising  at  once  the  liberator’s  crown  of  glory  and  the  ter- 
ritorial gain  that  would  follow  the  expulsion  of  the  Austrians.^ 
Not  that  he  dangled  the  bigger  ambition  of  the  Italian  crown  : 
the  Kingdom  of  Italy  was  to  him  a dream  of  fanatics,  and 


1 Balbo,  Speranze,  153. 

2 For  the  history  of  the  title,  see  Bianchi,  Santa  Rosa,  30-31  ; Ricotti, 
Balbo,  156. 

^ Balbo,  Speranze,  131,  143-158. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


158 

the  political  future  of  the  country  lay  in  Federation.  But 
Federation  was  neither  possible  nor  desirable  while  the 
Austrian  was  in  the  land.  “ Without  national  independence 
other  good  things  are  as  nought  ” ; and  the  possession  of  a 
single  province  by  the  foreigner  was  fatal  to  the  dignity  and 
prosperity  of  the  others,  fatal  to  Italian  industry  and  litera- 
ture and  art,  degrading  directly  or  indhectly  the  character 
of  the  whole  nation.  Independence,  therefore,  must  be  sought 
before  all  else — before  unity,  before  constitutional  hberty; 
but  its  attainment  would  come  not  by  a war  of  princes,  nor 
by  a war  of  peoples,  nor  by  the  help  of  another  nation,  but — 
impotent  conclusion,  so  it  seemed  to  his  contemporaries — 
from  the  approaching  break-up  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  which 
would  entice  Austria  eastwards,  and  allow  her  “to  make 
Italy  a present  of  her  independence.”  ^ 

But  there  was  another  side  to  Balbo.  Salvagnoli  might 
sathize  the  statesman  who  looked  for  salvation  to  the  Turks. 
Yet  the  preacher  of  quietism,  the  vacillating  politician  had 
a strenuous  gospel.  If  Italy  was  to  be  independent,  her 
character  must  earn  it ; she  must  be  no  longer  “ the  land  of 
the  olive  and  the  orange  ” ; she  must  cast  off  her  native  vice 
of  sloth  ; and  as  Father  Matthews  had  been  O’Connell’s  best 
helper,"  so  in  Italy  character  and  independence  must  advance 
together.  And  all  through  his  book  there  is  a healthy 
optimism.  He  attacks  the  different  schools  of  despair ; his 
theme  is  his  country’s  Hopes.  “ A nation  of  twenty  millions 
is  invincible  if  it  has  union  and  character.”  His  conclusion, 
like  Gioberti’s,  is,  “ Let  every  man  do  his  duty  at  his  post, 
and  leave  the  rest  to  Providence.” 

His  teaching  was  carried  on  by  his  friend  Massimo 
D’Azeoflio,  like  him  born  of  a Piedmontese  noble  stock. 
Destined  to  the  usual  mihtary  career,  he  scandalized  Turin 
society  by  preferring  to  gain  his  living  by  his  brush. 
To  an  artist  the  air  of  Turin  was  mephitic ; and  D’Azeglio 
had  shared  his  life  between  Rome  and  Milan  and  Florence, 
“ the  fii’st  Piedmontese  who  made  himself  practically 
an  Italian.”  He  had  painted  pictures,  written  novels, 

^ Balbo,  Speranze,  127-128.  For  the  subsequent  history  of  the  idea,  see 
below,  Vol.  IL,  pp.  16,  196,  232,  234,  285-6.  ^ 167. 


THE  MODERATES 


159 

studied  society,  done  nothing  very  well.  He  was  a perfect 
gentleman,  an  elegant  and  accomplished  man  of  the  world, 
but  indolent,  wanting  in  strenuousness  and  seriousness, 
unwilling  to  do  disagreeable  work,  the  very  dilettante  of 
politicians.  But  though  he  was  always  an  aristocrat  at  heart, 
and  his  democratic  veneer  came  more  of  ostentation  than 
conviction,  his  slender  purse,  his  frank  manners,  his  obtrusive 
if  shallow  profession  of  progressive  sympathies  won  him 
the  liking  of  the  democrats,  and  his  novels  had  made  him 
a household  word  through  Italy.  But  while  Balbo  shared 
Gioberti’s  tenderness  to  the  Papacy,  D’Azeglio  hardened  his 
face  against  Rome.  In  the  autumn  of  1845  he  received  a 
summons  to  preach  the  Piedmontese  gospel  in  Romagna; 
whether  the  call  came  from  Piedmontese  agents,  who  were  al- 
ready at  work  there,  or  from  natives,  who  feared  that  Gregory’s 
impending  death  might  be  followed  by  a risiug  of  Young 
Italy  and  an  Austrian  occupation,  there  is  nothing  certain  to 
show.  D’Azeglio  went  and  preached  open  agitation  and 
trust  in  Charles  Albert ; and  in  spite  of  the  evil  memories 
that  hung  round  the  King  of  Piedmont,  and  the  inclination 
of  the  younger  Liberals  to  rely  on  their  own  republican 
energies,  he  won  the  adhesion  of  a large  and  influential 
group.  He  was  not  equally  successful  in  destroying  the 
traditions  of  local  revolt.  He  had  hardly  left  Romagna  when 
the  terrorism,  which  followed  the  Muratori  rising,  drove  some 
Liberals  of  Ravenna  to  take  arms  at  Rimini,  where  they  pub- 
lished a manifesto  “ to  the  Princes  and  Peoples  of  Europe,” 
before  they  were  driven  across  the  Tuscan  frontier. 

The  rising  was  in  itself  of  little  moment.  But  it  was 
the  first  public  manifestation  of  the  new  spirit.  Though 
some  of  the  men  who  took  part  in  it  belonged  to  Young 
Italy,  it  was  a fragment  of  a bigger  agitation  prepared  by 
men  like  Mamiani  and  Farini,  who  dissociated  themselves 
from  the  revolutionary  party,  and  the  manifesto,  drafted  by 
Farini,  bore  their  stamp.  D’Azeglio  could  not  prevent  the 
movement,  but  his  influence  was  seen  in  its  language.^  The 

1 Farini,  Roman  State,  1.  115-128;  D’Azeglio,  TJltimi  Casi,  76-98;  Archivio 
Triennale,  I.  48-52  ; Gaiani,  Roman  Exile,  270 ; Guerrazzi,  Appendice,  88 ; 
Gualterio,  Rivolgimenti,  I.  220-221. 


i6o  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

object  of  the  rising  was  to  force  the  Papacy  to  save  itself  U 
reform.  Terrible  indictment  as  the  manifesto  was  of  Papa 
misrule,  it  professed  reverence  for  the  Pope  and  regard  fo; 
the  dignity  of  his  See.  Its  specific  demands  were  bareb 
amplified  from  the  Memorandum  of  the  Powers  in  1831 
It  excused  the  rebellion  as  the  product  of  necessity,  anc 
made  its  appeal  to  public  opinion.  So  threatening  did  th( 
new  spirit  appear,  that  the  Roman  Court  paid  a tribute  t( 
its  strength  by  publishing  an  elaborate  reply.  D’Azeglic 
seized  the  occasion  for  a declaration  in  favour  of  th( 
Piedmontese  forward  policy.  He  published  clandestine!} 
at  Florence  a pamphlet  On  the  Recent  Events  in  Romagna 
in  which  he  drew  a modest,  temperate  analysis  of  the  causes 
and  character  of  the  unfortunate  revolt.  It  was  a scathing 
commentary  on  the  dream  of  a regenerating  Papacy, 
D’Azeglio  professed  veneration  for  the  head  of  the  Catholic 
church,  and  shrank  from  any  schism  that  would  destroy 
the  one  bond  of  formal  unity  in  Italy.  But  he  freely 
attacked  the  utter  variance  between  the  practices  of  the 
Papal  government  and  the  divine  principles  which  it  pro- 
fessed. The  Pope  could  not  be  ignorant  of  the  obstinate 
obscurantism  under  which  the  country  groaned ; the  denial 
of  justice,  the  economic  and  financial  mismanagement,  the 
monopolies  which  strangled  commerce,  the  Swiss  mercenaries 
and  the  Sanfedist  assassins,  the  opposition  to  everything 
that  savoured  of  innovation,  to  education  and  railways,  to 
banks  and  agricultural  societies  and  scientific  congresses. 
The  responsibility,  he  insisted,  must  fall  on  the  Papacy 
itself ; it  must  cease  to  pilot  a ship,  which  would  not  answer 
to  the  helm ; it  must  attack  the  iniquitous  proconsulships 
of  the  Legations,  and  give  at  least  the  civil  justice  that 
Austria  allowed  her  subjects.  The  Papal  government  could 
not  rest  on  coercion ; at  the  present  day  there  was  no  basis 
for  authority  but  public  opinion  and  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  to  this  final  court  the  Pope  himself  must  bow. 

Then  D’Azeglio  turned  to  the  Liberals.  While  recog- 
nizing the  provocation  and  admiring  the  courage,  these 
petty  local  revolts,  he  protested,  were  not  the  road  to  inde- 

1 D’Azeglio,  Ultimi  Cast,  46,  99-100,  104-119. 


THE  MODEEATES 


i6i 


endence.  No  minority  had  a right  to  play  pitch-and-toss 
With  the  fortunes  of  the  people,  and  plunge  the  country ’into 
a contest  which  risked  so  much.  It  tended  to  dwarf  the 
great  national  struggle  down  to  provincial  efforts,  and  lost 
all  sense  of  the  bigger  aim.  When  Italians  fought,  all  must 
fight ; but  the  time  was  not  ripe  for  war,  when  the  Austrians 
stood  ready  to  crush  any  appeal  to  arms.  Italy  must  first 
school  herself  by  masculine  patience,  by  sacrifice,  by  refusing 
to  bow  her  spirit.  Patience  was  difficult  to  men  who  were 
smarting_ under  tyranny;  but  the  true  alternative  to  revolt 
was  public  protest,  peaceful,  but  spirited  and  constant.  It  is 
D Azeglio  s merit  that  he  recognized  the  power  of  public 
opinion,  and  knew  what  it  could  extort  from  the  most 
despotic  of  governments.  He  had  the  cool  judgment  of 
the  statesman,  the  patience  that  laboriously  lays  foundations, 
but  his  theory  made  him  the  servant  of  events,  and  he  had 
little  of  the  faith  that  creates  new  forces  and  falsifies  the 
accumulated  evidences. 

book  at  once  made  a party.  Though  Charles 
Albert  for  the  moment  made  no  sign,  and  his  partisans  were 
discredited  in  Eomagna,  when  their  boasts  of  Piedmontese 
help  ended  in  nothing;  though  D’ Azeglio  himself  con- 
spicuously failed  to  practice  in  Piedmont  his  own 
of  civil  courage  and  agitation ; yet  among  the  prudent  men 
who  had  weighed  the  chances  of  a struggle  with  Austria, 
and  the  timid,  who  wanted  Piedmont  to  do  what  they 
shrank  from  doing  themselves,  D’ Azeglio  became  the 
fuglernan  of  the  “ Albertists,”  who  placed  their  hopes  in 
the  King  of  Piedmont.  The  republicans  found  it  impossible 
to  stand  against  the  current.  Young  men,  who  in  1833 
had  been  republicans,  were  passing  fast  to  the  other  camp.^ 
How  irresistible  was  the  tide  was  shown  by  the  fact  that 
Mazzini,  however  much  against  the  grain,  found  it  necessary 
to  compromise,  and  offer  to  drop,  at  all  events  for  a time 
his  republican  propaganda,  if  on  their  part  the  Moderates 
would  give  up  Federation  and  work  for  Unity.^  Thus  the 


Castelh,  R^coTd^,  sub.  in.;  G.  Torelli,  Ricordi,  xvi. ; Mazrini,  Lettres 
I^ettere,  37,  39;  contra  Ricoiardi,  Conforti. 

n.,r,  155  (April  1846) ; see  also  Gn  Sioiliano,  Senti- 

mento,  22,  35  ; Archivio  Triennale,  II.  xix. 

VOL.  I. 


L 


i62 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

very  numerous  class,  which  cared  greatly  for  Italian  freedom, 
which  was  revolted  by  the  misrule,  but  which,  without 
leaders  or  settled  plan  of  their  own,  rejected  the  programme 
of  Young  Italy,  became  Moderates  and  Albertists.  At  pre- 
sent they  had  little  coherency.  Some  wished  to  associate 
the  Pope  in  the  movement ; others,  like  Giacomo  Durando 
in  his  Italian  Nationality,  and  Luigi  Torelli,  the  author  of 
the  anonymous  Thoughts  on  Italy,  cared  only  to  disarin 
him,  and  would  have  forced  him  to  a practical  surrender  ot 
the  Temporal  Power.^  Some,  like  Balbo,  were  indifferent 
to  civil  liberties ; others  set  constitutional  freedom  as  high 
as  or  higher  than  independence.  Some  were  jealous  of 
Piedmontese  expansion,  or  at  the  best  opposed  any  annexa- 
tion beyond  the  Po  valley;  others,  like  Gioberti,  wished  to 
see  Charles  Albert  “moral  lord  of  Italy,”  or  would  have 
partitioned  the  peninsula  between  Piedmont  and  Naples  and 
perhaps  Tuscany ; and  there  was  a section,  especially  among 
the  half-converted  republicans,  who  hoped  that  Charles 
Albert  would  be  pushed  despite  himself  into  a policy,  Avhich 
could  not  stop  till  the  Kings  of  Piedmont  were  Kings  of 
Italy. 

Meanwhile  Charles  Albert  had  been  to  some  extent 
iustifying  the  hopes  of  his  partisans.  In  the_  first  years  of 
his  reign  he  had  seemed  to  have  lost  his  earlier  and  nobler 
ideals."’  Impressionable,  timid,  in  a way  feminine,  he  had 
allowed  himself  to  fall  at  times  into  the  hands  of  the  clerica 
party.  The  Savoy  Expedition  had  scared  him,  and  its  cruel 
repression  deepened  the  gulf  between  him  and  the  Liberals. 
He  protested  that  he  would  never  compromise  with  them ; 
his  government  helped  Austria  to  coerce  Switzerland  into 
expelling  the  refugees;  even  as  late  as  1837  it  risked  the 
friendship  of  England  and  France  by  its  violent  espousal  ot 
Don  Carlos’  cause  in  Spain.  The  court,  severe  and  hypo- 
critical, was  given  over  to  the  cares  of  etiquette,  and  the 


1 Compare  Castelli,  Saggi,  49,  85,  with  Durando,  Nazionahta, 102, 
Gioberti,  Prolegomeni,  315.  and  Anonimo  Lombardo,  Pensieri,  59,  60.  me 
germs  of  several  of  the  main  ideas  of  the  next  period  are  to  be  found  in 
Durando’s  very  ingenious  book. 


THE  MODERATES 


163 

ministry  was  nearly  wrecked,  because  the  wife  of  an  am- 
bassador wore  a head-dress  sacred  to  royal  princesses.  To 
young  Camillo  Cavour,  returning  home  from  London  and 
Paris,  Piedmont  seemed  ‘‘  a kind  of  intellectual  hell.”  The 
King’s  health  grew  worse ; asceticism  and  a vegetable  diet 
completed  the  wreck,  which  early  excesses  had  begun ; he 
became  the  prey  of  quacks,  who  perpetuated  his  debility, 
and,  incredible  as  the  story  seems,  were  paid,  it  is  said,  by 
Austria.^  The  influence  of  religious  charlatans,  remorse  for 
the  atrocities  of  1833,  a knowledge  of  the  plotting  that 
went  on  steadily  round  him,  increased  his  nervousness  and 
want  of  fibre. 

But  he  never  became  the  blind  tool  of  the  reactionaries. 
Old  memories  had  their  influence ; he  had  for  better  and  for 
worse  a strong  theory  of  conscientious  kingship,  which  made 
him  jealous  of  encroachments  from  Rome,  and  impelled  him 
to  any  step,  which  might  make  him  master  of  more  nume- 
rous or  more  prosperous  subjects.  Not  that  any  big  patient 
scheme  of  constitutional  reform,  such  as  was  read  into  his 
life  in  later  years,  existed  in  fact.  No  doubt  he  would  have 
done  more  but  for  the  fear  of  the  Austrian  army  marching 
on  Turin,  and  for  the  daily  insinuating  pressure  of  the 
Catholic  party.  But  his  ideal  did  not  reach  beyond  an 
enlightened  and  progressive  autocracy ; a strong  personal 
government  was  necessary,  he  believed,  for  the  protection 
of  Piedmontese  nationality.  And  yet  underneath  his  cold, 
reticent,  antique  port  there  lay  a certain  power  of  enthusiasm 
and  sympathy,  aUd  a conscientiousness,  which,  however 
twisted,  was  genuine,  and  made  him  capable  of  higher  things 
when  the  occasion  came. 

However  much  his  difficulties  were  aggravated  by  his 
cowardice,  his  position  almost  compelled  him  to  a middle 
and  dubious  course.  He  stood  (so  the  phrase  was  put  into 
his  mouth)  “ between  the  dagger  of  the  Carbonari  and  the 
poisoned  chocolate  of  the  Jesuits.”  And  this  persistent 
opposition,  which  met  him  at  every  turn,  increased  his  in- 
decision. Never  naturally  frank,  he  became  more  and  more 

^ Bersezio,  Regno,  II.  i8  ; Predari,  Primi  vagiti,  82-83.  He  lived  largely 
on  potatoes  and  spinach. 


1 64  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

tliG  intriguer,  playing  off  one  minister  against  anotlier,  less  for 
miscliief^tlian  statecraft.  Slowly,  almost  shamefacedly,  he 
liberahzed  the  government.  For  a time,  indeed,  the  ministry 
was  ruled  by  Della  Margherita,  a narrow,  tenacious  man, 
tender  of  the  national  independence,  but  anxious  to  keep 
on  good  terms  with  Austria,  and  di’eading  any  forward 
movement  as  dangerous  to  the  narrow  rehgious  discipline, 
which  made  his  pohtical  ideal.  But  as  a counterpoise,  the 
Ivino-  appointed  Villamarina,  a constitutional  minister  of 
1821,  who,  though  no  Liberal,  hated  the  clericahsts.  The 
King,’ iiritated  at  the  persistency  of  the  Jesuit  party,  whose 
powerful  organisation  was  used  to  nullify  his  reforms  in  the 
execution,  gave  his  confidence  to  Yillamarina.  Slowly,  man 
by  man,  the  more  reactionary  elements  were  weeded  out  of 
the  cabinet,  till  Della  Margherita  stood  alone. 

Charles  Albert’s  record  of  administrative  reform  was  a 
remarkable  one.  “ I believe,”  he  said  at  a rather  later  date, 
“that  we  best  please  God  by  utilizing  every  discovery  in  science 
and  art  to  serve  the  greatest  good  of  the  people.  Govern- 
ment must  set  itself  in  the  van  of  progress.”  His  legal 
commissions  published  the  Albertine  Codes  (1837-47),  on 
which,  in  after  days,  the  body  of  Italian  law  was  based. 
Except  that  they  left  Catholic  marriages  subject  to  Canon 
Law,  and  hardly  touched  ecclesiastical  privileges,  they  were 
among  the  most  enlightened  laws  of  Europe.  I eudal 
customs  were  abolished  in  Sardinia,  where  alone  in  Italy 
they  still  had  legal  sanction.  Yillamarina  reorganized  the 
army  on  a territorial  and  short  service  system.  Protectionist 
duties  were  slightly  relaxed  (1835)5  prosperity  of 

Genoa  revived  by  making  it  in  part  a free  port  (1842). 
Abroad  Della  Margherita  concluded  a series  of  fifteen  com- 
mercial treaties.  At  home  government  made  loans  for  the 
development  of  the  silk  industry,  abohshed  guilds,  reformed 
the  Post  Ofiice.  The  King  gave  commissions  to  the  best 
painters  and  sculptors  of  Italy ; new  chairs  were  founded  in 
Turin  University ; historians  were  encouraged,  though  only 

1 Sclopis,  Sardegna,  50  et  seq. ; Portalis,  Code  Civil ; Bianchi,  Diplovuizia, 

III.  193-  . ^ 

- Kubattino  began  to  run  his  packets  in  1841. 


THE  MODERATES 


165 

to  study  the  annals  of  the  royal  house ; copyright  treaties 
were  completed  with  every  Italian  state  but  Naples.  In 
1840  the  second  Scientific  Congress  was  invited  to  Turin. 
Even  towards  the  Church,  devout  son  as  he  was,  .the  King 
showed  a qualified  independence.  In  spite  of  Della  Marg- 
herita  he  supported  the  Galilean  privileges  of  the  bishops 
against  Roman  attacks,  and  refused  to  recognize  the  Trentine 
decrees  in  Savoy.  The  Waldenses  were  more  or  less  pro- 
tected, and  the  government  connived  at  evasion  of  the 
cruel  laws,  which  still  weighed  on  them.  When  the  clergy 
opposed  lay  infant  schools  and  charitable  societies,  the  King 
“ looked  at  these  questions  from  a standpoint  diametrically 
opposed  to  theirs.”  Though  he  supported  the  prelates 
against  the  Pope,  he  allowed  no  evasion  of  the  law  from 
them,  and  the  Jesuits  were  forbidden  to  hold  a service, 
in  which  Hildebrand  was  lauded  for  debasing  the  power  of 
princes.  Above  all,  perhaps,  his  thoughts  were  given  to 
commercial  development.  For  this,  the  country  needed 
railways  first  of  all,  and  the  King  proposed  to  devote  to 
them  the  surplus  that  his  economic  Treasury  had  accumu- 
lated.^ As  early  as  1833  a line  was  projected  from  Genoa 
to  Arona  on  Lago  Maggiore.  The  government  hoped  to 
secure  much  of  the  English-Mediterranean  trade  by  an 
arrangement  with  Switzerland  to  continue  the  line  under 
the  Lukmanier  to  Chur,  where  it  would  connect  with  a 
through  route  to  Ostend.^  The  scheme  aroused  Austria’s 
jealousy,  for  the  command  of  the  Northern  trunk-line  would 
give  Piedmont  a preponderating  commercial  influence  in 
Central  and  Southern  Italy.  The  capitalists  of  Vienna  and 
Trieste  championed  a rival  route  from  Leghorn  through 
Florence  and  Bologna  to  Trieste,  thus  isolating  Genoa ; and 
their  government  patronized  a projected  line  across  the 
Brenner. 

The  railway  controversy  was  the  first  sign  to  the  world 
of  the  growing  tension  with  Austria.  Charles  Albert  had 

^ On  the  question  of  state  versus  private  capital,  see  Cavour,  Lettere, 
I.  78  ; V.  1 16,  122. 

^ Gualterio,  writing  in  1851,  says  that  the  King  wanted  to  enter  into  closer 
relations  with  England,  foreseeing  the  Western  alliance  against  Russia  ; 
Rivolgimenti,  II.  149. 


i66 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

never  forgiven  Metternich.  for  his  supposed  efforts  to  exclude 
him  from  the  throne ; he  was  very  sensible  of  the  historic 
jealousy  between  the  two  states;  he  remembered  that  more 
than  once  public  opinion  had  marked  him  for  the  future 
King  of  North  Italy.  He  knew  that  Metternich  had  in- 
trigued with  his  reactionary  ministers,  that  perhaps  he  had 
prompted  them  to  scheme  for  an  Austrian  occupation,  that 
he  had  his  spies  on  his  correspondence,  on  every  detail  of  his 
life.^  As  early  as  1835  Della  Margherita  had  seen  the  drift 
of  the  King’s  thoughts,  and  done  his  best  to  check  it ; three 
years  later,  in  some  private  reminiscences  of  1821,  Charles 
Albert  wrote  of  “taking  his  musket  on  his  shoulder  for  another 
war  with  Austria.”  And  yet,  either  because  he  was  dissimu- 
lating or  because  he  was  overborne  by  his  premier,  he  allowed 
the  professed  sympathies  of  his  government  to  be  with  her, 
and  married  his  son,  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  to  the  daughter  of 
the  Archduke  Rainerio.  But  even  Deha  Margherita  was 
nettled  by  Austria’s  persistent  claim  to  dictate,  and  in  1843, 
on  the  occasion  of  a frontier  squabble  of  patrols,  the  King 
threatened  “ to  ring  every  bell  from  the  Ticino  to  Savoy  and 
raise  the  cry  of  Lombard  Independence.  He  distributed  a 
medal  with  the  device  of  the  lion  of  Savoy  standing  over  a 
prostrate  eagle  and  the  suggestive  legend,  “ I await  my 
destiny.”  The  cause  of  nationality,  whose  sacredness  he 
based  on  scriptural  authority,^  the  traditional  policy  of  his 
family,  hatred  of  the  rival  power,  a plaintive  longing  to 
atone  for  1821  and  1833  and  become  once  more  the  hope 
of  Italy,  impelled  him  in  his  premature  old  age  to  strike 
one  decisive  blow.  But  that  strange  patience  of  his,  which, 
though  it  flinched  from  facing  obstacles,  never  lost  sight  of 
its  end,  found  him  still  waiting  for  the  great  occasmn.  ^ 

As  his  designs  against  Austria  matured,  he  was  inevitably 
impelled  to  lean  upon  his  people.  Thanks  probably  to  his 
French  education,  he  had  never  shared  the  exclusiveness  of 
his  aristocracy.  He  had  from  the  early  days  of  his  reign 
set  himself  to  break  the  barriers  between  the  nobility 

1 Gualterio,  op.  cit.,  I.  6i8,  625-629  ; III.  176-179  ; Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  IV.  88. 

2 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  IV.  363  ; Metternich,  Mimoires,  IV.  266-267. 

3 Deut,  XVIL  15  : Cibrario,  Missione,  47. 


THE  MODERATES  167 

and  the  middle  classes.  He  patronized  the  sincere  philan- 
thropy which  had  enlisted  the  best  of  both,  promoting 
savings  banks,  infant  schools,  refuges  for  the  destitute.  A 
certain  amount  of  mild  democratic  opinion  dared  to  show 
itself.  Entails  became  rare  in  the  face  of  public  disapproval ; 
the  Jesuits  found  their  schoolrooms  half  empty ; Brolferio, 
a conspirator  in  1 8 3 1 5 founded  the  Messctggero  Torinese  of  a 
Liberal  colour  new  to  Piedmontese  journalism.  The  King 
permitted  (1842)  the  foundation  of  a national  Agricultural 
Society,  whose  meetings  furnished  occasions  where  Pied- 
montese and  Lombards  could  meet  for  public  discussion,  and 
which,  despite  the  royal  bridle,  felt  that  it  had  something 
more  to  do  than  “talk  about  the  cultivation  of  cabbages.” 
Gioberti’s  PriTnacy  was  allowed  to  circulate,  and  the  poet 
Prati  was  paid  to  write  a marching  song  of  daring  allusion ; 

“ All  we  are  of  one  country, 

One  blood  runs  in  our  veins.” 

In  the  meantime  the  strain  with  Austria  grew  more 
threatening.  Early  in  1843  a dispute  arose  over  the  salt 
trade  with  the  Canton  of  Ticino.  By  the  terms  of  an  old 
treaty  Piedmont  had  renounced  the  trade,  but  when  insuffi- 
cient quantities  came  from  Lombardy,  the  Canton  appealed 
to  Piedmont  to  make  good  the  deficiency.  The  salt,  which  was 
a state  monopoly,  was  sent,  and  Austria  denounced  Piedmont 
for  breaking  faith.  The  quarrel  became  a question  of  prestige. 
Austria  tried  to  exclude  Piedmont  from  the  signatories  to  the 
Treaty  of  Florence  (October  1844).  The  treaty  would  in 
time  have  hemmed  in  Piedmont  on  its  south-eastern  frontier 
by  Parmesan  or  Modenese  territory,^  and  Charles  Albert  re- 
taliated  by  sounding  the  Grand  Duke  touching  a defensive 
alliance  of  Italian  princes.  Eighteen  months  later,  when 
Austria  placed  a prohibitory  tariff  on  Piedmontese  wines 
(April  1846),  the  government,  at  Della  Margheritas  advice, 
stigmatised  it  as  an  act  of  reprisals.  The  attempt  to  cow 
Piedmont  had  failed,  and  public  opinion  passionately  ap- 
plauded. Charles  Albert,  well  pleased  with  the  novel  taste 
of  popularity,  told  his  reactionary  councillors  that  “ if  Pied- 
1 See  below,  p.  189. 


i68 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


mont  lost  Austria  she  would  gain  Italy,  and  then  Italy  would 
be  able  to  act  for  herself.”  He  showed  no  disapproval  of 
H’Azeglio’s  mission  in  Romagna,  and  bade  him  tell  his  friends 
there  that  “ when  the  opportunity  came,  his  arms  and  his 
treasure  would  be  spent  for  Italy.”  ^ But  when  a great 
popular  ovation,  a new  phenomenon  in  torpid  Turin,  was 
prepared,  the  King  would  not  be  persuaded  to  show  himself 
until  the  crowds  were  already  dispersing.  Della  Margherita 
formally  protested  against  the  new  policy,  and  worked  hard 
for  a settlement  of  the  commercial  differences.  The  King 
shrank  back  from  war,  when  its  prospect  became  imminent, 
and  proposed  to  refer  the  quarrel  to  the  arbitration  of  the 
Czar. 

At  home,  too,  he  was  still  irresolute,  querulous,  though 
painfully  struggling  in  the  face  of  Jesuit  influence  and  his 
own  moral  cowardice  to  act  up  to  his  position.  It  is  impos- 
sible but  that  the  Primacy  had  its  influence  on  him ; and 
reform,  so  Gioberti  taught,  was  consistent  with  the  interests 
of  throne  and  altar.  The  Kdng  reformed  elementary  educa- 
tion,^ and  encouraged  his  Education  Minister,  Cesare  Alfieri, 
to  make  Turin  University  less  a hotbed  of  clericalism.  He 
had  a bitter  quarrel  with  Fransoni,  the  Archbishop  of  Turin, 
over  the  introduction  of  training  colleges  for  lay  teachers, 
and  he  turned  his  anger  on  Della  Margherita.  He  even  gave 
vague  hints  of  leanings  to  a constitution.^  He  was  more  or 
less  in  communication  with  the  Moderate  Liberals,  who 
wanted  social  freedom,  hut  who  were  as  much  opposed  as  was 
the  King  to  a democratic  movement,  and  at  this  time  were 
barely  anxious  for  constitutional  rights.  Their  leaders  were 
D’Azeglio,  Mamiani,  Camillo  Cavour;  Balbo  at  the  moment 
stood  aloof  from  active  work.  Knowing  the  King’s  defer- 
ence to  foreign  opinion,  they  inserted  encouraging  articles 
in  the  Dehats  and  the  French  reviews.  In  May  Cavour 
published  an  article  in  the  Nouvelle  R^vue  on  the  railway 
question ; though  on  the  face  of  it  a manifesto  against  the 


^ D’Azeglio,  Ricordi,  529;  Brofferio,  Parlamento,  I.  clxi.-clxvi.  ; Archivio 
Triennale,  I.  52  ; II.  xix.  ; Minghetti,  Ricordi,  I.  206. 

- See  above,  p.  47. 

^ Brofferio,  op.  cit.,  I.  Ixxxiv,,  cliii. 


THE  MODERATES 


169 

republicans,  it  angrily  attacked  Austria  for  her  malign 
influence,  and  made  a tolerably  overt  appeal  to  Charles 
Albert  to  take  up  the  cause  of  Independence.  The  King 
was  not  displeased,  though  he  resented  the  attempt  to  force 
his  hand.^  On  one  point,  however,  he  was  proof  against 
Liberal  influence.  The  Jesuits  had  not  lost  their  hold;  he 
gave  his  sympathy  and  help  to  the  Sonderbund,  and  in  the 
midst  of  the  excitement  over  the  wine  duties  he  promised 
that  they  should  never  be  disturbed  while  he  sat  on  the 
throne.^  It  was  still  doubtful  perhaps  whether  patriotism 
or  clericalism  would  have  the  mastery,  when  the  face  of 
Italian  politics  was  changed  by  the  election  of  a new  Pope. 

^ Predari,  op.  cit.,  94 ; Nigra,  Cavour,  64. 

2 Bresciani  e Grossi,  Documenti  . . del  padre  Bresciani^  quoted  in  Tivaroni, 
Dominio  austriaco.  III.  626. 


CHAPTER  IX 

PIO  NONO 

JUNE  1846-DECEMBER  1847 

Pius  IX.  ; the  amnesty  ; the  cult  of  Pius.  Charles  Albert  and  Pius  ; the 
Scientific  Congress  at  Genoa.  The  Austro- Jesuit  opposition.  The 
Liberals  in  the  Curia ; the  Moderates  in  Eomagna ; the  Kadicals. 
Tuscany  : Pisa  and  the  Jesuits  ; the  secret  press  ; the^  Plorentine 
Liberals  and  the  censorship.  The  Eomans  ; the  Council  of  State  ; 
the  “ Great  Conspiracy.”  Metternich  ; Occupation  of  Perrara  ; 
Charles  Albert  promises  to  help  the  Pope.  The  Citizen  Guard  at 
Lucca,  and  Florence ; the  Feasts  of  Federation.  The  three  progressive 
states  ; the  Commercial  League  ; Charles  Albert  in  October.  The 
Lunigiana  question. 

Gregory  had  died  in  the  summer  of  1846  (June  i),  ne- 
glected and  unregretted,  his  end,  it  was  rumoured,  hastened 
by  want  of  care  and  nourishment.  The  Conclave  met  to 
choose  his  successor  on  June  14.  Its  members  were  aware 
of  the  critical  state  of  affairs;  Romagna  was  known  to  be 
on  the  point  of  revolt,  and  petitions  for  reform,  signed  by 
thousands,  came  to  warn  or  encourage  them.  The  majority 
of  the  Sacred  College  hated  Lambruschini  and  his  Austrian 
friends,  and,  to  exclude  him  from  the  Papacy,  were  wilhng 
to  side  with  the  small  section  of  Liberal  and  nationalist 
cardinals.!  Eager  to  anticipate  the  arrival  of  Gaysruck,  the 
Archbishop  of  Milan,  who  was  hearer  of  the  Austrian  veto,^ 
eager,  too,  to  escape  from  the  sultry  Roman  air,  the  coalition 
sank  its  personal  differences,  and  elected  Cardinal  Mastai- 

1 The  facts  given  in  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  V.  9,  support  the  view  that  Mastai 
owed  his  election  more  to  the  feeling  against  Lambruschini,  than  to  any 
Liberalism  in  the  Conclave.  See  also  Chaillot,  Souvenirs,  27.  Cardinal  Micara, 
is  said  to  have  observed  to  Lambruschini,  “If  God  makes  the  election,  Mastai 
will  be  chosen  ; if  the  Devil  gets  his  finger  in,  it  will  be  you  or  1.” 

“ See  above,  p.  72. 


70 


PIO  NONO 


171 

Ferretti  (June  17).  With  utmost  shrinking  and  reluctance 
he  was  proclaimed  as  Pius  IX.  The  new  Pope  came  of  an 
old  and  decayed  family  of  Sinigaglia,  long  famous  down  to 
their  cats,  so  the  proverb  went,  for  nationalist  sentiment. 
In  early  life  he  had  been  destined  for  the  army ; an  impres- 
sionable, delicate,  disingenuous  youth, ^ afterwards  a fashion- 
able but  pure  man  of  the  world.  Epilepsy  dashed  his  hopes 
of  military  life ; he  took  orders,  and  acquired  the  melo- 
dramatic fame  of  an  Italian  revivalist  preacher.  As  bishop 
at  Spoleto  and  Imola,  he  had  dealt  mercifully  with  the 
Liberals ; though  a patron  of  the  J esuits,  and  too  much  all 
things  to  all  men,  he  won  a name  for  graciousness  and  kind- 
ness and  success  in  reconciling  the  opposing  factions.  He 
had  read  Gioberti  and  D’Azeglio ; he  had  marked  with 
indignation  the  political  persecutions,  the  stifling  of  trade, 
the  foolish  obscurantism  of  the  government;  he  believed, 
with  such  enthusiasm  as  he  was  capable  of,  in  the  future  of 
Italy.  Cultured  and  liberal,  kindly,  sensible,  with  consider- 
able acuteness  and  a clear,  forcible  oratory,  he  might  have 
succeeded  in  quieter  times.  An  epileptic  of  delicate  health, 
with  more  sensitiveness  than  depth  of  feeling  or  affection, 
absolutely  devoid  of  genius,  superstitious,  unserious,  little- 
minded,^  he  was  no  hero  to  steer  a revolution.  He  was  too 
intelligent  to  be  altogether  weak ; in  youth  he  had  been 
known  for  his  proud  temper,  and  he  still  had  an  introspec- 
tive obstinacy,  which,  though  he  never  met  opponents  man- 
fully, rarely  let  him  yield.  But  he  was  a coward  morally 
and  intellectually ; he  pined  for  applause,  he  shrank  from 
responsibilities ; there  was  always  in  him  something  of  the 
supple,  cringing  ecclesiastic.  He  loved  a half-genuine,  half- 
humorous  self-depreciation ; “ My  God,”  he  said,  “ they 
want  to  make  a Napoleon  of  me,  who  am  only  a poor 
country  parson.”  He  never  fronted  the  situation,  so  long 
as  he  could  drift  and  throw  the  responsibility  on  Providence. 
Feebly  optimistic,  with  no  master-grasp  or  foresight  or 

^ Trollope,  Pius,  8.  He  was  said  to  be  of  Jewish  descent : Chaillot,  op. 
cit,  29  ; as  to  whether  he  had  been  a Freemason,  see  Arthur,  The  Pope,  I.  13  n. 

2 Liverani,  II  papato,  74-75  ; Salvagni,  Corte  romana.  III.  245  ; Castelli, 
Ricordi,  240. 


172  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

caution,  he  refused  to  look  below  the  surface,  and  provided 
for  the  moment. 

Such  was  the  man,  who  was  called  to  decide  the  future 
destinies  of  the  Papacy.  He  recognized  at  once  that  it 
must  ally  itself  with  Liberal  Europe.  He  could  not  fail 
to  contrast  Russian  persecution  of  Cathohc  Poland  and 
evangelical  intolerance  in  autocratic  Prussia  with  the  free- 
dom of  the  Church  in  constitutional  England  and  France 
and  Belgium,  or  the  fervid  Catholicism  of  democratic 
Ireland.  He  inherited  the  traditional  Roman  jealousy  of 
Austria,  and  the  Galician  massacres  completed  the  aliena- 
tion. He  had  studied  the  Primacy,  and  though  far  from 
rising  to  the  fulness  of  Gioberti’ s conception,  he  wished  to 
see  the  Papacy  leading  in  the  path  of  moderate  reform. 
But  he  did  not  in  the  least  realize  all  that  lay  in  the 
Liberal  movement ; of  the  desire  for  political  and  intellectual 
freedom  he  had  little  comprehension;  it  seemed  to  him 
sufficient  to  abolish  the  crying  grievances  of  the  old  order, 
and  allow  free  play  to  trade.^  He  was  indeed  anxious  to  I 
prove  himself  no  obsciu’antist ; he  promised  to  support  | 
Scientific  Congresses,  and  appointed  a commission  on  rail- 
ways; he  marked  his  condemnation  of  Gregory’s  reign  by 
granting  an  amnesty  for  political  offences  (July  17).  But 
though  he  had  decided  on  this  from  the  first,  he  delayed  its 
publication  for  a month,  and  clogged  it  with  an  oath,  which 
seemed  a pledge  to  abstain  from  political  action. 

But  in  spite  of  its  defects,  the  amnesty  was  hailed  I 
through  Italy  with  wildest  acclaim.  There  had  been  ! 
amnesties  before,  but  never  one  that  seemed  so  spontaneous 
or  harbinger  of  so  much  besides.  Public  opinion,  steeped  in 
Gioberti’s  dreams  of  a reforming  Pope,  had  carefully  watched 
the  election ; it  grew  keener  when  it  saw  Gaysruck  outwitted, 
and  a Pope  elected  of  Liberal  family  and  creditable  ante- 
cedents. When  the  new  reign  opened  with  the  amnesty, 
and  700  exiles  and  prisoners  returning  home  spread  the 
fame  of  their  deliverer,  it  saw  in  Pius  the  long-expected 
reformer,  the  creator  of  the  new  Italy,  the  mediator  between 
Catholicism  and  democracy.  To  the  religious,  impulsive, 

^ Gualterio,  Hivolgimenti,  III.  48. 


PIO  NONO 


173 

ill-educated  average  Italian  a Pope’s  sympathy  meant  more 
than  all  the  philosophy  and  idealism  of  Young  Italy.  Pius’ 
presence  had  a magnetism  on  the  thousands  that  crowded 
to  Kome.  He  had  a fine  person  and  magnificent  voice ; in 
contrast  with  Gregory’s  coarse  and  sordid  appearance,  he 
was  a gentleman  in  bearing  and  manners.  His  simple 
informal  habits,  his  interest  in  every  social  and  educational 
scheme,  his  lavish  and  theatrical  charity,  the  hundred  stories 
of  his  wit  and  kindness,  strung  to  fever-pitch  the  adoration 
of  the  people.  Applauding  thousands  followed  him  through 
the  streets ; festive  demonstrations  commemorated  each  day 
connected  with  his  life ; torchlight  processions  would  march 
to  the  Quirinal  in  the  warm  summer  nights,  and  the  Pope 
from  his  balcony  would  bless  the  kneeling  multitude. 
Hymns  were  written  to  him;  the  men  wore  scarves,  the 
women  ribbons  of  his  colours;  Rossini  wrote  a cantata  in 
his  honour;  tokens  of  esteem  came  from  every  nation  of 
Europe  and  America;  even  the  Sultan  sent  his  presents. 

Pius,”  wrote  Gioberti  in  his  Modern  Jesuit,  “ has  reconciled 
men  to  religion  by  proving  himself  a friend  of  civilization,” 
his  reign  “ begins  a new  era  for  Italy  and  the  world.”  All 
men  bowed  before  the  conception  of  a reforming  Pope ; and 
when  the  amnestied  exiles  crowded  to  receive  the  sacra- 
ments, it  seemed  a symbol  of  the  dawning  time,  when 
liberty  and  social  redemption  would  go  hand  in  hand  with 
religion  and  moral  reform.  There  was  a boyish  enthusiasm 
that  hoped  and  believed  all  things.  The  air  was  thick  with 
schemes  of  charity  and  education,  with  projects  of  railways 
in  which  everybody  should  have  shares,^  with  universal 
fraternity  and  optimism.  Bologna  sent  to  Rome  its  symbols 
of  reconciliation;  old  trade  feuds  disappeared;  there  were 
solemn  peace-makings  between  police  and  people.  The 
guilds  of  Romagna  converted  themselves  into  mutual 
benefit  societies,  and  large  subscriptions  were  collected  to 
found  schools.  Even  in  slow  Piedmont  big  schemes  of 
social  construction  were  in  the  air,  and  a “ grand  Italian 
association”  appeared  on  paper  to  reclaim  the  uncultivated 
lands  of  the  peninsula. 

^ Spada,  Rivoluzione,  I.  83,  and  Progetto  nazionale  . . Conti. 


174  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

To  Charles  Albert  a reforming  Pope  was  the  strongest 
of  encouragements.  His  conscience  was  at  rest,  now  that 
he  was  progressing  on  the  same  road  as  the  Head  of  the 
Church, 1 and  could  set  the  Pope’s  example  against  the 
warnings  of  confessor  and  Jesuits.  He  defied  Archbishop 
Fransoni  to  do  his  worst.  “ In  spite  of  the  tiny  Austrian 
party,”  he  wrote,  “ I am  firmly  determined  not  to  stop  on 
the  road  of  progress.”  Austria  was  threatening  to  occupy 
Romagna,  and  religion  and  patriotism  made  him  hail  the 
chance  of  championing  Pius  against  her  attacks.  “ The 
moment  that  Austria  or  Naples  interferes  in  the  Papal 
States,”  he  said  in  October,  “ I shall  raise  the  cry  of  inde- 
pendence and  religion.”  Promises  of  support  poured  in 
from  the  richer  and  middle  classes  of  Piedmont.  Vercelli, 
followed  by  other  cities,  congratulated  him  on  his  spirited 
foreign  policy,  and  hinted  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  consti- 
tutional liberty.  The  Agricultural  Society,  smarting  under 
the  retaliatory  Austrian  tariff,  and  touched  by  the  patriotic 
current,  was  absorbed  by  the  topic  at  its  annual  meeting 
(September  7).  A week  later  the  Scientific  Congress  met 
at  Genoa,  and,  encouraged  by  the  King,^  speech  was  free 
and  bold.  As  if  in  national  parliament,  the  associates  dis- 
cussed independence  and  liberty  and  the  Italian  revival. 
In  December  the  government,  giving  itself  head,  allowed 
the  Genoese  to  celebrate  the  centenary  of  their  expulsion  of 
the  Austrians  (December  5);  and  men’s  thoughts  turned  to  i 
the  near  future,  when  Milan  and  Venice  in  their  turn  might  ! 
drive  the  foreigner  out.  The  line  of  bonfires,  which  blazed  I 
along  the  Apennines  into  Tuscany  and  Romagna,  was  a new 
gage  of  defiance  to  Austria.  1 

But  though  for  the  moment  the  Jesuits  and  reactionaries 
had  not  attempted  to  stem  the  flood,  though  some  of  them 
had  themselves  barely  escaped  the  contagion,  they  quickly 
rallied.  In  Naples  and  Modena  and  the  Austrian  provinces 
reform  had  not  dared  to  show  its  head.  In  Piedmont  and 
Tuscany  and  Rome  they  were  still  a powerful  and  dangerous 
party,  filling  the  public  offices,  controlling  a large  section  of 

^ Della  Margherita,  Memorandum^  542. 

2 Promis,  Memorie,  75,  quoted  in  Gori,  Rivoluzione.  See  i&.,  159.  * 


PIO  NONO 


175 


the  aristocracy  and  clergy,  strong  in  their  world-wide  organi- 
zation and  influences,  secret  or  overt,  in  every  Italian  Govern- 
ment. At  Rome  Pius  found  himself  opposed  by  the  Jesuits, 
the  majority  of  the  Cardinals,  the  great  mass  of  at  least  the 
higher  clergy,  and  practically  the  whole  civil  service.  In 
his  anxiety  to  offend  no  party  he  had  decorated  notorious 
Centurions  and  confirmed  Gregory’s  most  reactionary  officials. 
It  was  a fatal  error ; in  vain  Rossi,  the  French  minister  at 
Rome,  urged  that  a purging  of  the  civil  service  must  precede 
all  reform ; the  Pope  replied  that  nothing  but  the  clearest 
evidence  of  guilt  would  induce  him  to  dismiss  an  official. 
He  paid  the  penalty  of  his  ill-timed  leniency.  Orders  from 
the  Quirinal  were  disobeyed ; the  Sanfedists  talked  of  civil 
war,  and  libelled  him  in  their  secret  press.^  The  more  saga- 
cious of  them  knew  that  Pius  was  “ straining  his  voice,”  and 
waited  till  they  could  persuade  him  that  reform  was  a sin 
against  the  Church,  and  make  him  throw  himself  into 
their  arms. 

Fortunately  there  were  more  wholesome  influences  at  the 
Quirinal.  The  Pope’s  brother  was  an  old  rebel  and  a Liberal. 
Father  Ventura,  a brave,  frank,  puzzled  man,  who  had 
scandalized  Gregory’s  court  by  his  friendship  for  Lamennais, 
held  up  his  ideal  of  the  Church’s  mission  for  liberty  and 
social  regeneration.  Rossi,  whose  Italian  blood  and  repute 
of  philosophic  Liberalism  combined  with  Jesuit  hatred  to 
win  him  the  respect  of  the  reformers,  was  Pius’  trusted 
adviser.  Corboli-Bussi,  the  Pope’s  private  secretary,  had, 
like  Ventura,  vague  socialist  enthusiasms,  and  was  fighting 
the  worst  corruptions  of  the  government.  In  August  the 
Pope  had  appointed  Cardinal  Gizzi  to  be  Secretary  of  State. 
Gizzi  was  looked  to  as  the  leader  of  the  Liberal  churchmen, 
and  had  been  the  popular  candidate  for  the  Papacy.  In 
fact  there  was  more  easy  tolerance  than  principle  in  his 
LiberaSm:  his  years  (he  was  nearly  90),  his  municipal 
ignorSm^2S^  timidity  unfitted  him  for  a statesman’s  work. 
The  demon^ations  frightened  him;  and  in  October  he 

^ Gualterio,  op.  cit,  IV.  74,  102-107  ; Safii,  Scritti,  II.  36  n.  ; Gioberti, 
Gesuita  moderno,  V.  102;  Farini,  Roman  State,  I,  184;  II.  74;  Gori,  op.  cit., 
142,  152. 


176  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


issued  a secret  circular  against  “the  noisy  rejoicings  of 
the  populace,”  which  was  soon  in  everybody’s  hands  and 
finally  undid  his  brief  popularity.  The  puzzled  Pope  tried  to 
“ reform  without  offending  anybody.”  He  refused  to  allow 
Bologna  to  invite  the  next  Scientific  Congress.  He  gave 
a general  authorization  of  railways,  and  promised  legal  and 
municipal  reforms  (November),  but  at  the  same  time  he 
anathematized  secret  societies  and  doctrines  subversive  of 
the  Temporal  Power,  attacking  “ modern  progress  ” with  all 
the  artillery  of  pontifical  abuse.  With  a nonagenarian 
Secretary,  a vacillating  Pope,  a demoralized  administration, 
the  inevitable  result  was  anarchy.  The  Centurions  were 
still  on  their  old  footing,  and  as  autumn  drew  on,  the 
Romagnuol  Liberals  felt  the  assassin’s  knife  in  the  unlit 
streets.  For  self-protection  they  demanded  a citizen  guard, 
and  at  Bologna  and  Ferrara  they  patrolled  the  streets 
without  waiting  for  the  government’s  reply.  Gizzi  obstin- 
ately refused  his  sanction,  and  made  his  tenure  of  office 
conditional  on  non-surrender. 

The  government  was  growing  daily  weaker,  Gizzi  more 
irritated,  the  Pope  more  puzzled.  “ This  winter,”  said  Rossi, 

“ the  Roman  government  died  of  inertia.  It  had  lost  the 
authority  of  a settled  government  without  gaining  the  vigour 
of  a new  one.  It  had  brought  none  of  the  problems  nearer 
solution.  Had  it  frankly  allied  itself  with  the  Moderate 
Liberals,  it  might  have  been  irresistible.^  But  this  m^nt 
the  purging  of  the  civil  service  and  the  granting  a 
citizen  guard ; and  the  reactionaries,  working  on  the  Pope  s 
scruples,  were  able  to  stave  both  off.  The  Moderates  for 
their  part  seemed  struck  with  ineffectiveness.  Over-con- 
fidence from  the  seeming  triumph  of  their  programme, 
trust  in  the  Pope  and  unwillingness  to  force  his  hands 
prevented  them  from  driving  their  policy  hom^®[hey 
had  been  frightened  by  the  Radicals.  They 
the  rough  vigour  of  the  new  demo||fcAjd^^  ^ ^ 
friar’s  attacks  on  capital  and  VenturaSBWnciations  of 
the  wealthy  alarmed  them.  Fearful  oij^^obinism,  they 
shrank  from  touching  one  stone  of  the  social  edifice.  Iheii 

1 Guizot,  Mtmoires,  VIII.  35°  > Farini,  op.  cit.,  I.  217- 


PIO  MONO 


177 


programme  was  ludicrously  insufficient  for  the  present  need : 
a reorganization  of  the  police,  the  formation  of  a bank  at 
Bologna,  University  reform,  a Council  of  State.  They  gave 
banquets  to  Cobden  and  D’Azeglio ; founded  clubs  and 
newspapers.  But  papers  and  clubs  alike  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  Kadicals;  and  a projected  movement  on  the 
lines  of  the  Irish  Kepeal  agitation  died  still-born. 

While  the  governments  gave  no  sign,  and  the  Moderates 
played  at  programme-making,  the  more  strenuous  Liberals, 
seeing  their  hopes  as  far  as  ever  from  accomplishment,  grew 
restless.  Mazzini,  angry  as  he  was  at  the  enthusiasm  for 
the  Pope  and  Charles  Albert,  recognized  that  his  best  policy 
was  to  join  in  the  new  movement  and  turn  it  to  his  ends. 
He  was  still  prepared  to  sacrifice  his  republicanism  if  neces- 
sary, and  accept  any  leader,  be  he  Pope  or  King,  who  would 
declare  for  Unity.  He  instructed  his  friends  to  give  the 
demonstrations  a more  definite  nationalist  colour ; ^ and 
though  his  own  personal  following  was  small,  there  were 
many  Liberals  who  joined  in  the  Pius  cult  from  a hope 
that  the  Pope  and  princes  would  come  freely  or  perforce 
into  a democratic  movement,  with  constitutional  government 
and  a war  with  Austria  as  its  eventual  goal.  They  were 
half  sincere  or  less  in  their  adulation,  their  judgment  was 
almost  overborne  by  the  enthusiasm;  but  they  were  de- 
t(^rmined  to  force  the  pace,  and  use  each  concession  to 
extqjt  new  ones.  Perhaps  they  had  never  faced  the  possi- 
bility that  they  must  soon  choose  between  throwing  over 
the  princes  or  surrendering  their  own  ideals. 

Tuscany  was  now  the  focus  of  discontent.  But,  in 
Giusti  s phrase,  though  she  had  her  feet  out  of  bed,  she  still 
Had  the  government  been  true  to  its 
ions,  it  would  have  needed  much  to 


intry.  ^ But  Corsini  was  dead  (November  1845), 
|k^^kemier,  alone  preserved  the  policy  of 


Mere,  168-169,  175-177,  235,  240;  Mario,  Mazzini, 


309,  31 1.  The  instructions  published  in  Spada,  Rivoluzione,  I.  120-124,  seem 
genuine,  though  their  socialist  colouring  proves  that  they  did  not  emanate 
from  Mazzini  himself. 


VOL.  I. 


M 


1/8 


HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


Fossombroni’s  school.  Renzi,  the  leader  of  the  Rimim 
rising,  was  extradited  (January  1846),  and  unwarned  by  the 
signs  of  rising  storm,  the  reactionary  cabinet  decided  to 
admit  the  Jesuits.  Nothing  could  have  touched  Tuscan 
susceptibilities  nearer  the  quick,  and  the  traditional  abhor- 
rence of  the  Society  had  been  intensified  by  their  aggressive 
attitude  in  Switzerland.  Defeated  in  an  attempt  to  intro- 
duce  them  into  Florence,  the  court  tried  to  prepare  the  way 
for  them  at  Pisa  by  inviting  -their  inevitable  forerunners, 
the  Sisters  of  the  Sacred  Heart.  But  Montanelh,  a professor  . 
at  the  University,  roused  the  students,  and  the  si^terh  , 
retreated  before  their  threats  X^ebmary  21,  1846). 
tanelli  organised  the  secret  press  into  a powerful  political  , 
force  Though  often  juvenile  and  exaggerated,  its 
verve,  it'  «klful  appei  to  all  sections  of  Liberals,  its  bold 
and  defiant  circulation  made  it  a vast  and  insidious  in  u - 
ence  The  police  tried  in  vain  to  track  it  down;_  and  ts 
“bulletins”  went  through  the  post  were  thrown  into  the  , 
Grand  Duke’s  carriage,  and  showered  in  the  theatres.  Then 
came  the  news  of  Pius’  accession  and  the  Papal  amnesty. 
Tuscany  was  traditionally  suspicious  of  Rome,  but  the  cult,  - 
sedulously  preached,  seized  on  it,  leaving  Niccolmi  to  com- 
plain that  4 friends  had  been  dipped  in  holy  waten  The 
demonstrations,  that  followed,  found  their  mod  m the  ^ 
content,  as  much  economic  as  political,  which  was  spread  .g 

r“,gi  .k.  B,.»l  g."  tk.  — 

a pretext  to  intrigue  for  an  Austrian  occupation but  Lec- 

pofd,  tender  of  his  independence,  s®*  ^s  face  against  mei- 

vention  The  government  tried  to  frighten  the  well-to  d 

Ilasses  by  raising  the  cry  of  communism;  but  the  cooler 

heads  scoffed,  afd  the  Liberal  nobles  of  Florence,  though 

not  endorsing  all  the  demands  of  the  secret  press,  were  as 

insistent  as  the  Radicals  for  reform  of  local 

the  civil  service.  But  they  failed  to  agree  on 

the  one  hand  stood  the  more  cautious  sectim^l^  ^ ^ 

poni  and  Ridolfi,  the  leaders  of  the  Geor^^^ m the  other, 

a small  knot  of  men,  who,  though  very 

crats,  looked  beyond  administrative  reform 

social  liberty  and  constitutional  government.  Their  chiet 


PIO  NONO 


179 

was  Bettino  Ricasoli,  an  austere  country  noble,  who  knew 
his  end  and  went  straight  for  it.  They  were  a manly  patri- 
otic group,  but  too  exclusive  for  a time,  when  compromise 
and  discipline  were  all-necessary  to  fuse  the  Liberals  into  a 
solid  and  practical  party.  Both  sections  joined  hands  in 
demanding  a relaxation  of  the  censorship ; both  wished  to 
see  the  secret  press  superseded  by  public  journalism.  But 
while  Capponi  asked  for  the  license  of  a single  privileged 
paper,  which  should  be  almost  non-political,  Ricasoli  knew 
that  this  would  satisfy  nobody,  and  urged  the  necessity 
of  allowing  full  freedom  of  the  press.  Cempini  slowly 
brought  the  ministry  to  the  lore  Liberal  policy ; the  secret 
press  suspended  its  issues  to  give  the  government  free  play, 
and  both  Liberal  parties  seized  the  occasion  of  Cobden’s 
visit  to  Florence  (May  1847),  as  the  pretext  of  a great 
demonstration.  The  Georgofils  naturally  gathered  to  do 
honour  to  the  great  Free-trader,  and  even  the  ministry  was 
forced  to  take  a part.  Four  days  later  (May  6),  the  govern- 
ment published  the  new  press-law,  and  in  a few  weeks  it 
promised  a Council  of  State  and  reforms  in  law  and  local 
government.  But  the  hampering  provisions  of  the  press-law 
only  proved  how  unequal  the  ministry  was  to  its  task.  Con- 
cessions, grudgingly  and  tardily  made,  though  welcomed  with 
noisy  insincerity,  failed  to  win  real  gratitude,  and  encouraged 
further  agitation.  The  middle  classes  were  calling  for  power 
to  organize  a national  guard  that  would  protect  property 
against  bread  riots  and  possible  anarchist  outbreaks.  Bal- 
dasseroni,  the  Minister  of  Justice,  a sincere,  hard-working 
official,  was  masking  himself  behind  the  projects  of  reform, 
and  probably  intended  to  stultify  them  in  the  execution.^ 
The  people  grew  more  and  more  suspicious,  and  when  a law 
appeared  early  in  June  to  regulate  public  demonstrations, 
their  contemptuous  disregard  made  it  a dead  letter. 

Meanwhile  the  Pope’s  subjects  in  their  turn  were  grow- 
ing impatient.  Dimly  conscious  of  what  was  going  on,  they 
alternated  between  depression  and  fresh  bursts  of  enthusiasm 
and  hope.  Their  reverence  for  the  Pope  was  indeed  un- 

1 Montanelli,  Memorie,  I.  282 ; Zobi,  Storia,  V.  106. 


1 80  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

shaken.  His  reactionary  Encyclicals  passed  hardly  noticed  ; | 
the  old  loyalty  and  new  radicalism  of  the  Romans,  and  the 
calculated  praise  of  their  leaders  had  raised  him  to  a 
pedestal,  from  which  it  was  impossible  for  him  at  once  to 
displace  himself.  His  cosmopolitan  fame  threw  a reflected 
lustre  on  the  city.  The  Sultan’s  envoy,  the  English  Queen  s 
letter,  the  thanks  of  the  famine-stricken  Irish  stirred  its 
pride.’  But  expectations  were  high,  and  reforms,  which 
would  have  satisfied  a year  ago,  were  scorned  as  unequal  to 
the  times.  There  was  keen  disappointment  at  the  rejection 
of  the  prayer  for  a citizen  guard,  at  the  delays  in  legal  re- 
form and  railway  construction.  In  Romagna  the  old  threats 
of  secession  were  heard  again.  The  Romans  fixed  the 
responsibility  of  the  delay  with  accuracy  enough  on  the 
Cardinals  and  Jesuits,  and  in  the  spring  ommou8_  cheers 
were  heard  for  “ Pius,  but  not  the  others.”  The  Jesuits,  they 
believed,  were  plotting  the  Pope’s  death;  and  when  he 
visited  their  college,  the  crowd  shouted,  “ Holy  Father,  don  t 
take  their  chocolate.”  The  demonstrations  were  changing 
their  character.  Though  still  with  more  or  less  sincerity 
made  in  honour  of  the  Pope,  they  were  becommg  clamorous 
for  reform  and  war.  The  leaders  intended  them  to  mtimi- 
date  the  government.  The  prime  mover  was  a seh-confident, 
o-enial  blacksmith,  Angelo  Brunetti,  mcknamed  Ciceruacchio, 
who  posed  as  the  Pope’s  personal  friend,  and  whose  braivny, 
genuine  personality  marked  him  out  for  a popular  leader. 
He  preached  unity  and  virtue  in  honest  melodrama;  and 
though  the  nobles  flattered  him,  and  Lord  Minto  compared 
him  to  Horatius,  the  pride  of  the  Roman  artisan  saved  him 
from  being  spoilt.  There  was  need  of  such  a man,  for  every 
day  it  was  more  difficult  to  prevent  impatience  from  degen- 
erating into  disorder.  Pius  was  alarmed,  and  dearly  as  he 
loved  his  popularity,  was  disposed  to  draw  back.  He  was 
irritated  at  the  opposition  of  the  court,  but  lacked  courage 
to  cow  it  down.i  The  work  of  reform  dragged  slowly  along  ; 
and  new  promises,  procrastinated  in  their  turn,  only  quick- 
ened hopes  that  were  not  intended  to  be  realized,  fetill 
some  progress  was  made.  In  March  (1847).  a press  law 

1 Guizot,  Mimoim,  VIII.  357-358;  Cibrario,  -VoO'iic,  61. 


PIO  NONO 


8i 


abolished  the  preventive  censorship,  which  had  for  some 
months  past  been  practically  in  abeyance,  but  it  limited 
criticism  of  contemporary  politics,  and,  like  its  Tuscan  coun- 
terpart, satisfied  nobody  and  became  a dead  letter.  In 
April  the  Pope  promised  a Council  of  State,  to  be  nominated 
by  the  Provincial  Councils  and  have  a considerable  voice  in 
legislation  and  finance.  In  June  a ministerial  cabinet  was 
appointed  in  place  of  the  old  irregular  system,  and  though 
it  was  composed  exclusively  of  ecclesiastics,  it  seemed  an 
advance  towards  popular  institutions.  But  the  government 
wrecked  any  chance  of  recovering  ground  by  coupling  its 
■reforms  with  irritating  freaks  of  coercion.  Gizzi  protested 
officially  against  anti- Austrian  theories,  which  forgot  that  the 
Pope  was  “ father  of  all  Christians,  to  whatever  part  of  the 
world  they  belonged.”  Ventura  was  assailed  for  his  funeral 
oration  on  0 Connell  (who  had  died  at  Genoa  on  his  way  to 
Rome),  in  which  he  condemned  passive  obedience,  and  held 
up  for  model  the  “ amorous  and  legal  agitation  ” of  the 
great  Irishman.  Gavazzi,  a Barnabite  friar,  who  had  been 
preaching  somewhat  incendiary  sermons,  was  forbidden  to 
mention  the  name  of  Italy. 

But  the  Moderates  under  D’Azeglio  s leadership  were  at 
last  agitating  with  some  vigour ; and  the  ministry,  following 
too  late  Rossi  s advice,  hoped  to  win  them  by  a decree  to 
form  a citizen  guard  (June  30),^  though  the  resolution  en- 
tailed Gizzi  s resignation.  They  probably  thought  that  an 
armed  middle  class  was  their  best  bulwark  against  popular 
pressure  on  the  one  hand,  and  Austrian  or  Sanfedist  plots 
on  the  other.  For  the  moment  the  latter  seemed  more 
imminent.  Sanfedist  intrigues  had  long  been  busy  both 
at  Rome  and  in  the  Legations.  There  had  been  apparently 
concerted  attacks  on  the  Liberals  at  Parma  and  Lucca  and 
Siena;  and  some  of  the  bolder  partisans  talked  of  a cou'p 
detat.  Whether  there  was  any  substance  in  it  may  be 
doubted ; but  real  or  pretended  disclosures  made  even  level- 
headed men  believe  in  a “ great  conspiracy,”  ^ and  Rome  was 

^ D Azeglio,  L' Italic,  11-16;  Coppi,  Annali,  IX.  104-107. 

Jarini,  op.  cit.,  I.  229,  235-241  ; Spada,  op.  cit.,  I.  256;  Guizot,  op.  cit., 

359;  Saffi,  op.  cit.,  II.  84-88;  D’Ideville,  Rossi,  168;  Gabussi,  Mcmoric, 


1 82  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

frenzied  with  terror  and  suspicion.  Austria,  it  was  thought 
not  without  ground,  was  behind  the  Sanfedists,  and  visions 
of  massacre  scared  the  citizens.  Ciceruaochio  and  his  men 
were  masters  of  the  city  and  issued  hysterical  versions  ot 
the  plot.  The  Pope,  though  sceptical,  hurried  on  the 
organization  of  the  citizen  guard,  ordered  the  disbanding 
of  the  Centurions,  and  arrested  such  of  the  Sanfedist  sus- 
pects as  did  not  liy.  Cardinals  and  priests,  infected  with 
the  enthusiasm  or  bowing  to  the  storm,  collected  subscrip- 
tions for  the  patriotic  cause.  The  ranks  of  the  citizen 
guard  filled  rapidly,  and  Rome  was  too  serious  or  frightened 
to  laugh  at  their  odd  semi-civil  equipment.  Cardmal 
Ferretti,  who  had  succeeded  Gizzi,  sealed  their  enthusiasm 
by  appealing  to  them  to  “ show  Europe  that  we  can  manage 
by  ourselves.”  Ferretti,  who  was  the  Pope’s  cousm  had 
been  an  Austrian  spy,  and  his  sincerity  may  be  doubted. 
But  his  brother  Pietro  had  played  an  honourable  part  in 
the  Revolution  of  1831,  and  now  moulded  his  policy  to 
Liberalism.  For  the  moment  the  Cardinal’s  popularity  was 
unbounded,  and  the  government’s  decree  to  form  a camp 
of  observation  at  Forli  seemed  to  show  that  for  the  moment 
it  and  the  people  were  reconciled. 


A week  before  there  had  been  a possibility  that  in  the 
constitutional  struggle  the  national  question  might  be  for- 
gotten.  Now  Austrian  impatience  once  more  brougnt 
government  and  people  into  line  in  defence  of  Italian 
Independence.  Metternich  bad  watched  the  course  ot 
events  with  disquietude.  In  his  system  “a  Liberal  Pope 
was  an  impossibility”;  now  fronted  by  one, _ he  declared 
it  “ the  greatest  misfortune  of  the  age.”  Austrian  influences 
had  failed  to  stem  the  Italian  movement,  and  Metternich, 
at  last  realizing  the  strength  of  the  ideal  that  faced  him, 


I 75  ; La  Farina,  Storw.,  III.  43-44  ; De  Boni,  Congiura  di  Umia,  49  et  alibi  ; 

Gol  Rivolu^ione,  2,2  ; Correspondence-Italy,  I 6^6.  ; N^colm,  Pon^oa  . 

i6  ; Gaiani,  Roman  Exile,  355  ; Campanella,  My  Life,  217  ; ^ Azegho 
10  Saffl  in  his  History  of  the  Roman  RepuUio  (op.  cit.,  II.  5»-59).  asserts 
relations  between  Gizzi  and  the  Sanfedist  conspirator  Alpi,  but  I know  of  no 
evidence  to  support  it. 

1 Archivio  Triennale,  I.  8 ; Safti,  op.  cit.,  II.  81-82. 


PIO  NONO 


183 

confessed  that  it  was  “ a sorry  task  to  fight  with  un- 
substantial things.”  ^ In  vain  he  had  tried  to  frighten 
the  Pope  with  the  phantasm  of  Protestantism,  and  the 
Grand  Duke  by  predictions  that  the  national  movement 
must  end  in  a republic.  After  endeavouring  equally  in 
vain  to  attach  Charles  Albert  by  a promise  of  support 
against  his  own  subjects,  he  set  his  agents  at  work  to  libel 
the  King.^  When  the  promise  of  a citizen  guard  at  Kome 
was  followed  by  a renewed  agitation  in  Tuscany,  he  wrote 
an  angry  note,  threatening  occupation  if  the  guard  were 
conceded,  and  sent  a copy  to  the  Turin  court.  At  the  time 
of  the  Conclave  he  had  only  been  prevented  by  French 
threats  from  occupying  Romagna,  and  now  again  he  hinted 
at  intervention,  if  the  Liberal  movement  went  further,  pro- 
voking Palmerston  into  a threat  to  send  the  English  fleet 
to  Trieste,  and  even  drawing  from  Guizot  a warning  that 
he  would  land  French  troops  in  the  Papal  States.^  But 
Metternich  threw  prudence  to  the  winds.  Had  he  had  his 
own  way,  he  would  have  made  a strong  military  demon- 
stration on  the  Po,  as  a threat  to  Rome ; ^ defeated  in  this 
by  his  colleagues,  he  was  driven  back  on  a smaller  move. 
On  the  very  day  for  which  the  Sanfedist  conspiracy  was 
supposed  to  have  been  planned,  the  Austrians,  with  much 
offensive  parade,  poured  a large  reinforcement  into  the 
citadel  of  Ferrara,  which  they  garrisoned  by  treaty  rights. 
After  a curt  refusal  from  Rome  to  allow  them  to  enter 
Romagna,  the  Ferrara  garrison,  acting  on  a forced  interpre- 
tation of  a treaty  clause,  patrolled  the  streets  of  the  city 
itself  (August  6),  and  a week  later  definitely  occupied  it. 
A thrill  of  indignation  ran  through  Italy  at  the  insult 
offered  to  the  Pope,  and  the  plain  proof  of  Austria’s  in- 
tention to  veto  the  hopes  of  the  nation.  The  Liberals 
closed  up  their  ranks.  Moderates  like  D’Azeglio  and  Balbo 

^ He  was  still  in  August  1847  talking  about  Italy  being  a geographical 
expression. 

Correspondence — Italy,’  I.  34 ; Gualterio,  op.  cit.,  IV.  283 ; Bianchi, 
Diplomazia,  V.  58. 

^ Correspondence — Italy,  I.  89,  157-158,  178,  240;  Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  V.  61, 
81 ; Metternich,  M6moires,  YII.  415-422. 

^ Bianchi,  op.  cit,  V.  399  ; Hiibner,  Une  annie,  18. 


1 84  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

called  for  resolute  measures.  Far  away  in  Montevideo, 
Garibaldi,  whose  legion’s  heroism  had  rung  through  the 
world,  wrote  to  the  Pope,  offering  its  services  in  his  defence. 
Wrath,  panic,  the  fear  of  invasion  loosed  the  tide,  and 
swept  the  princes  more  or  less  reluctantly  with  it.  The 
Pope,  whose  fixed  idea  (save,  perhaps,  in  rare  moments  of 
Liberal  expansion^),  was  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  his 
dominions,  was  indignant  at  the  infringement  on  his  in- 
dependence and  hinted  at  excommunication.  At  the  same 
time  he  sent  a messenger  to  Charles  Albert,  to  ask  whether 
he  could  count  on  his  protection. 

All  through  the  spring  and  summer  Charles  Albert  had 
been  gravitating  to  the  Liberal  camp.  He  had  steadily  de- 
veloped his  economic  policy,  preparing  the  ground  for  the 
Lukmanier  railway,  and  negotiating  for  the  Anglo-Indkn 
mail.  Though  inconsistent  as  ever,  he  was  still  subsidising 
the  Sonderbund,  the  railway  convention  with  republican 
Switzerland  was  hailed  as  an  earnest  of  his  growing  Liberal- 
ism. Irritated  by  Austrian  intrigues  with  the  Cantons, 
angry  and  indignant  at  her  note  on  the  citizen  guard,  he 
drew  nearer  to  the  nationalists.  Their  books  and^  papers 
were  allowed  to  circulate ; the  Torinese  were  permitted  to 
subscribe  to  the  sword  of  honour,  which  was  to  be  presented 
to  Garibaldi  on  his  expected  return ; the  King  himself  had 
interviews  with  the  conspirators  of  Milan."  When  the  news 
came  of  the  occupation  of  Ferrara,  even  Della  Margherita 
bowed  to  the  storm  of  indignation  that  swept  in  from  the 
other  states.  The  King  could  not  be  deaf  to  the  national 
voice,  which  hailed  him  “ sword  of  Italy  ; he  more  than 
responded  to  the  outburst,  and  when  the  Pope’s  message 
came,  wrote  back,  that,  come  what  might,  he  would  never 
part  his  cause  from  that  of  Pius.  When  the  Agricul- 
tural Society  met  at  Casale  on  the  anniversary  of  the  Pope’s 
amnesty,  he  sent  an  open  letter,  proclaiming  himself  the 
champion  of  the  Guelf  cause,  and  declaring  that  “ if  God 
permitted  a war  for  the  freedom  of  Italy,  he  would  place 
himself  at  the  head  of  his  army.”  ^ It  was  his  first  public 

1 Rusconi,  Memorie,  28  ; Leopardi,  Narrazioni,  84. 

2 See  below,  p.  194.  Bianchi,  Carlo  Alberto,  ; Ricasoli,  Lettere,  I.  277. 


PIO  NONO  185 

allusion  to  war ; and  the  associates,  Piedmontese,  Genoese, 
Lombards,  Parmesans,  Romans,  replied  with  enthusiastic 
promises  of  help  and  pleadings  for  a citizen  guard.  The 
whole  country  was  stirred  to  a fervour  strange  to  Piedmont, 
and  all  classes  vied  in  offering  life  and  substance  for  the 
national  cause. 

In  Tuscany  and  Lucca  the  excitement  tooj^  form  in  an 
ever  angrier  demand  for  a citizen  guard.  Probably  every 
revolution  since  the  Irish  movement  of  1779  has  recognized, 
that  when  it  has  put  arms  in  the  people’s  hands,  it  has 
triumphed  more  certainly  than  by  winning  representative 
institutions.  The  Italians  knew  well  that  the  arming  of  a 
citizen  guard  made  despotism  henceforth  impossible.  To 
the  piopertied  classes,  too,  it  was  a guarantee  against  pos- 
sible anarchy  and  all  the  turbulence  that  was  working  below 
the  surface.  But  at  this  moment  it  was  neither  as  a weapon 
against  despotism  nor  against  socialism  that  the  people  called 
for  it.  They  wanted  arms  to  defend  their  country ; visions 
of  an  arrned  people  driving  the  Austrians  before  them  came 
into  men’s  minds.  Tuscany  was  as  exposed  as  Romagna  to 
an  Austrian  invasion,  and  the  occupation  of  Ferrara  gave 
point  to  Metternich  s threats.  W^hile  Florence  answered  by 
a small  but  angry  demonstration,  Lucca  took  a stronger  line. 
The  Lucchese  had  been  closely  watching  the  course  of 
events  in  Tuscany,  but  the  whimsical,  dissolute  Duke 
had  learnt  nothing  from  the  omens.  Deaf  to  the  warnings 
of  Ward,  who  had  learnt  the  ways  of  courts  and  proved 
himself  a sagacious  and  cautious  adviser,  he  met  the  outcry, 
that  came  from  every  class,  with  the  boast  that  Bourbon 
princes  sacrifice  their  thrones  rather  than  their  principles.” 
But  the  exasperation,  which  followed  the  arrest  of  some 
popular  Liberals,  frightened  him  into  permitting  the  enrol- 
ment of  a citizen  guard  (September  i),  and  a few  days  later 
he  fled  from  the  Duchy.  Early  in  October,  rejecting  the 
Duke  of  Modena’s  advice  to  call  in  the  Austrians,  he  sold 
his  life-interest  to  Tuscany,  and  abdicated. 

The  Tuscan  government  realized  that  when  the  guard 
was  once  permitted  at  Lucca,  it  was  no  longer  safe  to  refuse 
it  in  Tuscany,  and  the  Grand  Duke,  touched  by  the  wave 


i86 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


of  national  enthusiasm  and  half-impatient  of  Austrian  tute- 
lage, granted  it  on  September  4,  though  a few  days  latei 
the  feeble,  puzzled  man  wrote  to  assure  the  Emperor  of  his 
unalterable  attachment.^  But  nothing  was  c^n  o 
letter,  and  a flood  of  fervid  patriotism  swept  over  the  country, 
bursting  doivn  the  old  local  rivalries.  Florence  sent  back 
to  Pisa  the  harbour  chains,  which  for  over  200  years  ha 
huno-  before  the  Baptistery  as  the  sign  of  victory  over  her 
ancient  enemy.  The  tricolor  ^ had  floated  at  Lucca,  and  the 
people  took  it  for  a sign  that  they  had  reached  some  _pro- 
fnised  land  of  reconciliation  and  freedom.  The  enthusiasm 
seized  on  all— old  and  young,  priests  and  soldiers,  nobles 
and  people.  Each  city  had  its  “ federal  festival  ; the 
country  towns  followed,  and  from  the  villages  men  and 
women  and  children  trooped  in  with  songs  and  flymg  ban- 
ners then  priests  at  their  head,  fervid  agamst  the  sacii- 
legious  invader  of  Ferrara.  At  Florence  a monster  poccssion 
defiled  before  the  Pitti  Palace,  and  cried  for  death  to  the 
Austrian  and  alliance  with  Rome.  But  behmd 
siasm  for  the  Pope  and  the  national  cause  lay  a deep  distrust 
of  the  government,  which  made  the  festivities  easily  lapse 
into  disorder.  Leghorn  was,  not  for  the  first  time,  in  no 
(September  22),  and  so  impressed  had  its  ^ 

yotmger  Corsini,  been  by  the  temper  of  the  city,  that  he 
urged  in  the  cabinet,  that  nothing  less  than  a constitution 
could  lay  the  discontent.  Corsini’s  boldness  cost  nmi  his  seat 
in  the  ministry,  but  the  Grand  Duke  saw  that  he  must  wm 
the  Moderate  Liberals ; and  dismissing  tLe  most  unpopular  « 
the  old  ministers,  he  gave  portfolios  to  Ridolfi  and  Seiristo  . 


Thus  the  occupation  of  Ferrara  had  gone  far  to  reheve 
the  strain  in  the  three  progressive  states.  By  the  strange 


I am  a little 


I La  Varenne,  Vltalk  Centrale,  49.  quoting  from  Guerrazzi. 

'“?'“ThritL*nr“Laidtohave  been  derived  from  Masonic  colours, 
and  to  have  been  adopted  as  early  as  1796. 

“ II  verde,  la  speme  tant’  anni  pasciuta  ; 

II  roseo,  la  gioia  d’averla  compiuta  ; 

II  bianco,  la  fede  fraterna  d’a.mov."—Berchet. 

See  Mrs.  Browning,  Casa  Guidi  Tlindoit’s. 


PIO  NONO 


187 


alchemy  of  circumstances  the  Liberal  movement  had  come 
for  the  moment  to  appear  as  the  champion  of  the  Tem- 
poral Power ; the  reform  and  nationalist  causes  were  even 
more  indissolubly  blended,  and  both  wore  the  halo  of  the 
Church’s  blessing.  To  a cool  observer  indeed  the  situation 
must  have  appeared  full  of  peril.  Confidence  and  distrust 
still  struggled  for  mastery.  The  friends  of  the  old  system 
filled  the  civil  service,  and  threw  a thousand  obstacles  in 
the  working  of  the  new  laws.  The  popular  demands  were 
growing  in  ever  increasing  ratio,  and  the  press,  which  had 
leapt  into  active  life  in  Tuscany  and  the  Papal  States,  was 
likely  to  force  the  pace  still  more ; while  the  riots  at  Leg- 
horn and  Ciceruacchio  s demonstrations  at  Rome  pointed  to 
forces,  already  dimly  seen  and  feared,  which  might  hurry 
reform  into  revolution.  Already  civil  blood  had  been  spilt 
in  Calabria.^ 

• But  on  the  surface  Italy  seemed  as  one  against  Austria. 
Everything  pointed  to  an  early  war.  The  agitation  had 
begun  at  Milan  and  Venice,  and  the  only  question  was 
whether  the  governments  or  the  revolution  would  lead  the 
nation  to  the  field.  The  shadow  of  the  coming  struggle 
impelled  the  Liberals  to  draw  the  three  progressive  states 
together  in  some  form  of  alliance.  A steady  growth  of 
belief  in  Free  Trade  ^ suggested  a Commercial  League  after 
the  precedent  of  the  German  Zollverein,  and  such  a league, 
if  not  yeCoktensibly  political,  would  be  a warning  to  Metter- 
nich,  and  pledge  the  three  governments  yet  further  to  a 
nationalist  policy.  Pius,  still  smarting  at  the  occupation  of 
Ferrara,  eagerly  took  up  a scheme  which  would  relieve  him 
of  much  of  his  responsibility,  and  assure  him  the  protection 
of  the  Piedmontese  army,  should  the  Austrians  again 
threaten  to  occupy  Romagna.  To  propose  its  formation,  he 
sent  Corboli-Bussi  to  Turin,  where  he  was  enthusiastically 
welcomed,  while  the  Grand  Duke  sent  word  that  he  would 
not  be  slow  to  ally  himself  with  Rome  and  Piedmont  in  the 
defence  of  Italian  nationality. 

Corboli-Bussi  was  ably  seconded  by  Lord  Minto,  whom 

^ See  below,  p.  203. 

2 Mitfcermeier,  Condizioni,  60 ; see  Salis-Schwabe,  Richard  Cobden. 


1 88  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


Palmerston,  strongly  in  sympathy  with  the  Liberal  move- 
ment, had  sent  on  a roving  commission  to  observe  how 
matters  were  developing.  Minto,  while  insisting  t a 
England  would  sanction  no  territorial  changes,  encouraged 
the  governments  to  persevere  in  a policy  of  reform  and 
independence.  He  found  Charles  Albert  once  more  para- 
lyzed by  indecision.  As  was  habitual  with  him  after  any 
decided  step,  he  was  exhausted  and  ill  after  t^  Casale 
letter.  The  government  was  not  ready  for  war.  ihe 
was  still  entangled  in  the  Jesuit  netJ  Alarmed  lest  t e 
excitement  and  disorder  of  Tuscany  should  spread  to 
Piedmont,  he  had  allowed  his  police  to  charge  a crow 
which  had  met  to  hear  Rossini’s  Hymn  to  Pius  sung  in 
public.  A formal  complaint  against  their  conduct,  thoug 
few  dared  to  sign,  marked  the  beginning  of  g.ibhc  agitatwn 
Villamarina  added  his  protest,  and  lost  his  office  for  it.  Put 
the  King  still  gave  him  his  confidence,  and  Della  Margherita,, 
after  much  disingenuous  treatment  from  the  Kmg,  was  forced 
to  follow  him  into  retirement  (October  9)-  The  same  uncer- 
tainty marked  the  King’s  attitude  to  the  Commercial  League. 
To  accede  to  it  seemed  the  pendant  of  his  message  to  the 
Pope  in  August,  but,  though  he  was  still  forward  to  chainpion 
Pius,  he  appeared  indifferent  to  the  League,  except  so  far  as 
it  would  promote  the  political  lead  of  Piedmont,  and  he  asked 
for  terms  to  which  neither  Tuscany  nor  Rome  could  agree. 
In  vain  Minto  urged  the  completion  of  a simple  defensive 
alliance;  it  was  not  till  November  that  even  the  principles 
of  a commercial  treaty  were  agreed  upon,  and  meanwhile 
Charles  Albert’s  obstinacy  had  implanted  in  the  Pope  a 

prejudice  which  never  left  him.  ^ . * i 

But  the  King  was  already  veering  again.  A popu  ar 
sonc^  on  the  Rd  Tentenna  (the  Wobbling  King)  fell  into  his 
hands;  he  was  roused  and  shamed,  and  returned  to  his  old 
attitude.  He  saw  that  the  temper  of  the  people  was  too 
hi<^h  to  be  trifled  with ; he  was  anxious  to  forestall  any 
forcing  of  his  hands.  And  however  fearful  he  may  still 
have  been  of  the  ultimate  outcome  of  the  movement,  he  ha 


1 Cantti,  Cronistoria,  II.  757*  , , . r 

2 Correspondence— Italy,  I.  193  ; rtsor<j.,  I.  263. 


PIO  NONO 


189 

1 10  rooted  prejudice  against  administrative  reforms,  which 
night  be  regarded  merely  as  the  complement  of  his  earlier 
mrk.  At  the  end  of  October  a decree  was  published  with 
, long  list  of  reforms  in  law  and  local  government  and  police, 
1 public  health  and  the  censorship,  followed  soon  after  by 
he  organisation  of  an  Education  Department,  and  the  civil 
mancipation  of  the  Protestants.  The  reforms,  extensive  as 
hey  were,  fell  short  of  what  the  times  needed,  but  they  were 
'elcomed  with  a delirium  of  joy.  Festivities  on  the  Tuscan 
lodel  were  held  in  every  town  and  village.  Old  hatreds, 
)cal  rivalries,  the  cares  of  business  went  forgotten;  even 
balwart  radicals,  who  remembered  1833,  could  not  resist 
he  intoxication,  and  staid  Piedmont  abandoned  itself  to  a 
lillennium  of  effusive  fraternity.  A great  demonstration  was 
rganised  at  Turin  (November  3),  and  the  King,  after  hesita- 
on,  rode  through  the  cheering  crowds,  silent,  pale,  appar- 
atly  untouched.  His  annual  journey  to  Genoa  was  one 
)ries  of  ovations,  and  there  a yet  more  imposing  reception 
ivaited  him.  But  the  temper  of  the  Genoese  was  clear, 
hey  prayed  for  amnesty  for  the  Mazzinians  and  the  expul- 
on  of  the  Jesuits;  cries  were  heard  of  “Cross  the  Ticino, 
jad  we  will  all  be  with  you.”  The  King  took  fright  again ; 
plow  the  cheers  for  himself  he  fancied  he  could  hear 
iiurmured  applause  of  Mazzini,  and  he  cooled  the  ardour 
f the  city  by  an  order  discountenancing  public  meetings, 
inother  great  reception  was  prepared  for  his  return  to 
:urin,  but  the  King,  wretchedly  ill,  and  dreading  petitions 
l^r  further  reforms,  drove  rapidly  through  the  streets  in  a 
I osed  carriage,  and  made  the  disappointed  crowds  a grudging 
'id  hurried  acknowledgment  from  his  palace  balcony. 

I But  he  was  still  resolved  to  fight,  if  Austria  made  a for- 
[ard  move,i  and  in  the  general  unrest,  with  the  occupation 
|.  Ferrara  galling  all  Central  Italy,  an  accident  nearly  pre- 
pitated  the  struggle.  The  Duchess  of  Parma,  Napoleon’s 
idow,  had  died  (October  17),  and  by  the  terms  of  the 
reaty  of  Florence,  the  Duke  of  Lucca  succeeded  to  her 
irone,  while  Lucca  passed  to  Tuscany,  and  the  outlying 
uscan  districts  of  the  Lunigiana,  west  of  the  Modenese  and 
^ Eicasoli,  Letiere,  I.  276. 


>r 


jO  A HISTOEY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Parmesan  Apennines,  were  to  be  divided  between  the  tw. 
contiguous  Duchies.  The  reluctance  of  their  inhabitants  t^ 
exchange  the  mild  rule  of  Tuscany  for  despotism  won  th 
strong  sympathy  of  Tuscans  and  Lucchese.  ' The  Florentin 
government  delayed  cession,  till  the  young  Duke  Francis  ^ 
of  Modena,  who  had  succeeded  his  father  a year  before,  gre^ 
impatient,  and  occupied  Fivizzano  early  in  November  (No^ 
ember  5).  There  was  fatal  fighting  in  the  streets,  and  th 
excitement  at  Florence  nearly  drove  Tuscany  into  war.  Bu 
cooler  counsels  prevailed,  and  an  arrangement  was  patche 
up,  which  saved  Tuscan  dignity.  Austria  was  apparentl 
anxious  to  avoid  the  conflict,^  the  Duke  of  Modena  talked  c 
joining  the  Commercial  League,  and  after  countless  protocol 
and  notes,  Metternich  yielded  to  the  threatening  signs  an 
Palmerston’s  strong  pressure,  and  withdrew  his  troops  froi 
the  city  of  Ferrara  (December  16). 

1 Metternich,  op.ycit.,  VII.  473”474'j  Ricasoli,  op.  cit,  I.  274. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 
1847 MARCH  1848 


Europe  at  the  beginning  of  1848.  Schemes  of  war  in  Italy  Lombard 

revival;  the  railway  question;  Lombardy  m 1847; 
demonstration  ; Nazari’s  petition  ; Manin  at  Venice  ; Kadetzky  ; the 
Tobacco  Kiots.  The  constitutional  question  ; the  economic  question  ; 
the  bread  riots  ; revolt  of  Leghorn.  The  Constitutionalists ; m 
Tuscany  ; in  Piedmont ; Cavour.  Naples  and  Sicily  ; the  rising  m 
Calabria  ; Moderates  and  Radicals  at  Naples  ; Sicilian  Revolution. 
The  Constitution  in  Naples  ; in  Piedmont ; in  Tuscany  ; at  Rome  ; 
the  “ Statutes  ” ; theocracy  and  constitution  at  Rome. 


The  year  1848  opened  through  all  Europe  with  the  pre- 
sentiment of  coming  change.  The  Home  Eule  agitations  m 
Hungary  and  Bohemia  and  the  feud  between  Magyars  and 
Croatians  threatened  the  Austrian  Empire  with  disruption. 
The  summoning  of  the  Prussian  Diet,  its  hot  quarrel  with 
the  government  and  speedy  dissolution  had  roused  all 
Germany  to  a constitutional  struggle.  In  France  the  fiasco 
of  the  Spanish  marriages  and  the  daily  evidence  of  Orleamst 
corruption  had  discredited  Louis  Philippe  and  Guizot,  and 
encouracred  Liberals  and  Socialists  to  an  attack,  which  was 
to  prove°  victorious  sooner  than  they  dreamt.  England  had 
iust  seen  the  victory  of  the  Anti-Corn-Law  League,  looked 
up  to  as  a model  by  the  Liberals  of  all  Europe,  and  was 
still  agitated  to  its  depths  by  the  Chartists.  In  ItMy, 
Austria  was  making  treaties  with  the  Duchies  of  the  Po, 
which  would  reduce  them  to  practical  dependence.  On  the 
other  hand  Piedmont,  Tuscany,  and  Eome  were  pledged  to  a 
policy  that  meant  defiance  to  the  Empire.  No  reform  was  safe 
till  the  Austrians  were  driven  from  Lombardy  and  Venetia ; 
and  even  Naples,  occupied  with  its  own  special  problems,  and 

191 


192 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


feeling  the  Austrian  influence  comparatively  slightly,  had 
put  its  Liberals  in  line  with  those  of  the  rest  of  Italy. 
Much  had  happened  lately  to  drive  home  the  conviction 
that  Austria  must  be  fought ; Metternich  s notes  to  Tuscany 
and  Piedmont,  the  events  of  Ferrara,  the  Duke  of  Modena’s 
boast  that  he  had  an  army  at  call  across  the  Po  were  so 
many  precursors  of  battle.  That  war  would  come,  and  that 
the  Austrians  would  be  expelled,  was  a belief  almost  uni- 
versal, whether  it  came  by  the  help  of  a foreign  power,  or 
by  the  armies  of  the  Italian  princes,  or  by  a great  uprising 
of  the  people. 

Of  foreign  help  indeed  there  was  small  expectation  at 
the  moment.  Louis  Philippe  had  taken  Metternich  for  his 
pedagogue,  and  warned  Charles  Albert  not  to  count  on  \ 
French  assistance;  and  though  he  would  tolerate  no 
Austrian  intervention  in  the  Papal  States,  he  was  indignant 
at  Palmerston’s  patronage  of  the  nationalists.^  English 
sympathy  was  warm  for  Italy,  but  Palmerston,  though  he 
genuinely  shared  in  it,  would  give  no  more  than  the  vaguest 
hints  of  alliance,  and  was  doing  all  he  could  to  hold  back 
Piedmont  from  war.^  There  was  indeed  little  inclination  to 
look  abroad  for  help.  Young  Italy  and  the  Piedmontese 
statesmen  were  at  one  at  least  in  this,  and  Charles  Albert 
had  voiced  the  feeling  of  the  nation,  when  he  endorsed 
the  phrase  that  “ Italy  would  do  her  own  work.”  ^ In  spite  ' 
of  English  influence  and  Austrian  intrigues,  his  better  j 
instincts  for  national  redemption  and  his  poor  cares  for 
the  safety  of  his  crown  made  him  face  closer  and  closer  the 
contingency  of  war.  The  Italians  believed  that  the  other 
princes,  except  in  Modena  and  Parma,  would  join  their 

^ Guizot,  Memoires,  Ylll.  402-403  ; Id.,  Histoire  parlementaire,  IV.  555  ; V. 
542,  552  ; D’Haussonville,  Politique  exterieure,  II.  233-244 ; Bianchi,  Diplo-  ' 
mazia,  V.  33,  404.  I think  that  Poggi  {Storia,  II.  538-539)  has  shown  reason 
to  doubt  the  accuracy  of  the  secret  treaty  between  France  and  Austria 
(March  1847),  referred  to  in  Hillebrand  Geschichte  Frankreichs,  II.  682-683. 

It  is  probable  that  there  were  pourparlers,  but  that  nothing  was  concluded  ; 
its  principal  provision  was  that  France  consented  to  the  sole  intervention  of  ■ 
Austria,  if  complications  took  place  in  Italy.  See  above,  p.  183. 

2 Ashley,  Palmerston,  I.  64  ; Martin,  Prince  Consort,  I.  429 ; Bianchi,  op. 
cit,  V.  81,  92. 

2 Italia  fard  da  se ; see  Leopardi,  Narrazioni,  230. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 


193 


armies  to  his.  The  belief  was  born  of  the  unthinking 
ojptimism  of  the  time.  The  Pope  was  declaring  even  now 
tjhat  he  would  have  no  war  on  any  terms.  Ferdinand  of 
isfaples  was  too  remote,  too  jealous  of  Piedmont,  too  sym- 
pathetic with  Austrian  despotism,  to  be  a willing  partner  in 
tliie  struggle.  Only  the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany,  who  was  at 
tlie  mercy  of  the  popular  tide  and  had  his  small  grievances 
against  Austria,  was  likely  to  fight  by  the  side  of  the  King 
o|f  Piedmont.  But  the  enthusiasm  took  little  count  of  the 
enemy’s  strength  or  its  own  apparent  weakness.  Memories 
of  the  past,  faith  in  the  future  of  Italy,  confidence  that  the 
I ’opes  blessing  would  descend  on  the  Italian  hosts  gave  the 
fejirvour  of  a crusade  to  the  coming  struggle. 

1 All  eyes  were  fixed  on  Lombardy  as  the  seat  of  the 
cbming  war;  and  the  Lombards  themselves,  impatient  for 
kjbe  fight,  were  already  in  a state  of  semi-revolt.  For  some 
yiears  past  the  educated  classes  had  been  slowly  weaning 
themselves  from  the  unreal  epicurean  life,  which  had  stifled 
tpeir  political  interests.  Some  of  the  younger  nobles, 
i:|mitating  the  Georgofils,  threw  themselves  into  mild  philan- 
thropic schemes,  and  their  literary  organ,  the  Eivista  Europea, 
cjlared  to  speak  of  the  brotherhood  of  Italians  and  the 
ijmpotence  of  coercion  to  crush  the  spirit  of  freedom.  More 
cir  less  distinct  from  them,  a more  thoroughgoing  and 
. jj>opular  school  gathered  round  Correnti  and  Cattaneo,  the 
editor  of  the  Politecnico.  Correnti,  in  a clandestine  pamphlet,^ 
\ challenged  the  government  on  the  treatment  of  its  Italian 
^provinces,  and  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  countrymen 
bhat  they  had  unjust  measure  meted  them  in  their  share  of 
Imperial  taxation.^  Cattaneo  was  less  advanced  on  the 
nationalist  question  than  the  Liberal  nobles ; but  in  social 
, and  industrial  matters  his  review  was  bold  and  outspoken, 
fearlessly  analyzing  the  industrial  conditions  of  the  country, 
knd  giving  voice  to  theories  of  reform  and  freedom,  that 
'were  incompatible  with  Austrian  despotism.  But  Cattaneo’s 
timidity  on  the  point  of  independence  could  not  satisfy 
the  mass  of  young  lawyers  and  doctors,  who,  though  they 
had  discarded  the  ritual  of  Young  Italy,  accepted  Mazzini’s 

^ U Austria  e la  Lombardia.  ^ See  above,  p.  53. 

VOL.  I.  N 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


194 


nationalist  programme.  Men  like  these  did  their  best  in  j 
dark  hour  to  keep  alive  the  flame  by  clandestine  publicjj) 
tions  of  liberal  books,  by  organizing  a polemic  of  wall  writ 
ings,  by  quiet  work  among  the  artizans  and  peasants.  j 
But  it  was  the  Piedmontese  school  that  gave  Lombaitt 
patriotism  its  bottom.  Some  of  the  Milanese  nobles  ownc^c 


properties  in  Piedmont,  and  divided  their  lives  betwe^-  * 
Turin  and  Milan.  The  tradition  of  a North  Italian  kingdo^^. 
under  the  House  of  Savoy  had  survived  the  discomfiture:, 
of  1814  and  1821,  and  it  only  needed  Charles  Albertj 
signal  to  give  it  life  again.  The  tariff  war  of  1846  brougli: 
the  occasion,  and  the  nobles  made  cautious  overtures  to  tl|i 
King,  which  at  all  events  were  not  entirely  rejecteQi 
Torelli  wrote  of  the  Kingdom  of  North  Italy,  and  tried  \t 
rouse  Charles  Albert  with  the  tempting  bait.  Home  quej; 
tions  helped  to  stir  the  public.  In  1837  the  governme^ 
had  sanctioned  the  laying  of  a railway  between  Milan  anj 
Venice;  and  an  angry  controversy  arose  whether  the  Milaij; 
Brescia  section  should  pass  by  Bergamo  or  Treviglio.  Th 
majority  of  the  Italian  shareholders  favoured  the  moi' 
direct  route  by  Treviglio ; and  the  eloquence  of  a youn; 
Venetian  barrister,  Daniel  Manin,  brought  the  dispute  intj, 
national  prominence,  and  made  it  a battleground  betweej: 
government  and  people.  Manin,  who,  like  Disraeli,  canj. 
of  a Venetian  Jew  stock,  took  as  his  motto  that  it  is  “ pelj 
haps  never  right  for  a nation  to  resign  itself  to  misfortunei 
and  found  his  political  model  in  the  legal  agitations  c: 
O’Connell  and  the  Anti-Corn-Law  League.  It  was  impos 
sible,  he  believed,  to  fight  Austria,  except  in  the  event  0. 
an  European  upheaval ; and  meanwhile  organized  oppositio: 
would  train  the  people  and  secure  respect  for  Italy.  Hi- 
opportunity  had  come,  and  he  fearlessly  bearded  th« 
Imperial  Commissioner.  Encouraged  by  his  novel  boldness 
the  Milanese  and  Venetian  shareholders  came  into  line,  anc 


after  years  of  controversy  their  united  vote  carried  the  day 
It  was  the  beginning  of  revolution ; the  government  had  itj 
first  check,  and  Venice  and  Milan  at  last  joined  hands.“ 

1 Gualterio,  Rivolgimenti,  I.  445-447  ; Bonfadini,  Mezzosecolo,  227  ; Senior 
Journals,  1.  297  ; Pinelli,  Storia,  III.  179. 

2 Before  1848  the  line  was  finished  from  Milan  to  Treviglio  and  fron 

Mestre  to  Vicenza.  It  was  not  open  throughout  till  1857.  ! 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 


195 


It  was  now  the  summer  of  1847*  Lombardy  and 
Vicnetia  had  been  stirred  to  their  depths.  The  fervour 
wliich  Pius  had  called  out,  the  outcry  at  the  occupation 
of/  Ferrara,  the  call  for  Independence  had  their  echoes  in 
the  down-trodden  Austrian  provinces.  In  the  country  the 
peasants  Avere  at  last  beginning  to  stir ; in  the  towns  the 
Lbles  and  Radicals  were  drawing  together.  The  priests 
dragged  forward  their  differences  with  the  government,  the 
cc)mmunal  councils  stood  up  to  the  officials,  the  mountain 
pt^asantry  defied  the  forest  laws.  The  Austrians  were  boy- 
co\tted  in  high  society,  and  not  even  an  Archduke  could  find 
an  Italian  partner  at  a ball.  At  the  Scientific  Congress, 
wlaich  met  this  year  at  Venice  (September  1 847),  nationalist 
sentiment  cropped  up  from  each  discussion  on  railways  or 
industry  or  literature.  But  something  bigger  and  more 
ol|)vious  was  needed  to  take  the  public  eye.  Archbishop 
G,aysruck  had  died,  and  the  government  hoped  to  win 
p'bpularity  by  appointing  an  Italian  to  the  vacant  see. 
Their  nominee,  Romilli,  had  little  to  recommend  him  either 
af4  patriot  or  prelate,  but  it  sufficed  that  he  Avas  an  Italian, 
a|nd  Milan  gave  him  a reception  Avorthy  of  the  Ambrosian 
see  (September  5).  Its  enthusiasm  and  unanimity  mad- 
dened the  authorities,  and  when,  three  days  later,  the 
festivities  Avere  repeated,  the  police  dreAV  their  SAvords  on 
the  peaceful  holiday  croAvd,  and  for  days  the  troops  patrolled 
the  streets,  hustling  and  provoking  the  citizens.  The 
bloodshed,  the  insult  to  church  and  city  finally  won  the 
masses  of  Milan  to  the  cause;  and  even  the  magistrates, 
scandalized  by  the  brutal  effrontery,  acquitted  the  men  Avho 
"had  been  arrested  at  the  demonstrations.  The  government 
realized  that  it  was  face  to  face  with  a serious  movement, 
but  it  entirely  miscalculated  its  strength ; and  Metternich, 
though  he  Avas  intending  to  make  considerable  reforms, 
thought  that  the  main  grievance  against  the  government 
Avas  that  it  “ had  bored  ” the  Milanese. 

He  found  himself  fronted  by  another  and  more  em- 
barrassing phase  of  opposition.  However  comatose  the 
Congregations  might  seem,  they  were  still  the  one  exist- 
ing fragment  of  representative  institutions,  the  one  hope  of 


196  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

those  who,  while  deprecating  separation  from  the  Empir  e 
wanted  administrative  reform  and  some  measure  of  Home 
Ruled  Nazari,  the  delegate  of  Bergamo,  presented  to  the 
Central  Congregation  of  Lombardy  a petition  which,  takino 
the  general  discontent  for  its  text,  asked  for  the  appointmern 
of  a Commission  to  inquire  into  its  causes  and  draft  a 
memorial  to  the  Emperor.  The  petitions  which  came  m 
its  wake  from  the  Provincial  Congregations  were  careful  to 
disclaim  disloyalty;  nothing  was  said  of  constitutional 
changes  ; they  asked  for  only  the  most  obvious  and  neces- 
sary reforms.  Tommaseo  at  Venice  claimed  freedom  of  the 
press,  in  virtue  of  the  unrepealed  law  of  1815  ; and  though 
Manin,  outstripping  the  Lombards,  petitioned  the  Venetian 
Congregation  to  claim  Home  Rule  and  “ a genuine  national 
representation,”  the  whole  movement  kept  ’within  the  boun<L 
of  strict  legality. 

The  government  was  puzzled  how  to  act,  and  had  th  e 
matter  rested  with  the  Congregations  and  the  civil  authori- 
ties, compromise  might  have  been  possible.  But  the  control 
of  events  was  fast  slipping  from  both.  The  police  and  mili- 
tary, stung  by  the  new  spirit  of  defiance,  were  eager  to  brino 
the  crisis  to  a head.  Radetzky,  the  commander-in-chief,  a 
hale  veteran  of  eighty  years,  was  a true  type  of  the  brutal 
pretorian  spirit  of  the  Austrian  army.  “Three  days  oi 
blood,”  he  is  reported  to  have  said,  “ will  give  us  thhty  years 
of  peace.”  Rainerio,  the  Viceroy,  and  Spaur,  the  Governor 
of  Milan,  pleaded  for  gentler  methods  ; but  the  former  was  an 
amiable  cypher,  and  neither  was  a match  for  the  military 
party,  which  had  won  the  Viennese  cabinet  to  its  views. 
If  only  the  Milanese  could  be  goaded  into  violence,  Radetzky 
would  have  a case  for  demanding  reinforcements,  and  hold 
the  country  down  under  an  overpowering  force.  The  Milanese 
gave  him  the  excuse  he  wanted.  The  bloodshed  in  Septem- 
ber had  only  roused  them,  and  all  through  the  autumn  the}” 
had  carried  on  a half-jocular  game  of  bluff  with  the  police. 

^ Bonfadini,  op.  cit.,  242  ; Indirizzo  de^li  Italiani,  8 (according  to  Gori, 
written  by  Correnti) ; Gori,  Rivoluzione,  116.  Compare  the  sudden  importance 
given  to  the  French  parlcments  before  the  Revolution,  and  to  the  Provincial 
Estates  of  Lower  Austria  in  March  1848. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS  i97 

ActrGSSGS  worG  ribbons  or  bouquGts  of  tho  colours  of  tbo  tri- 
color; the  strGGt-boys  chaffed  the  soldiers;  the  Hymn  to 
Pius  was  sung  or  whistled  at  every  corner.  By  Christmas 
the  leaders  thought  the  time  was  ripe  to  pit  the  city  openly 
against  the  government.  They  remembered  the  Boston  tea- 
vfots,  and  two  similar  incidents  in  the  history  of  their  own 
ciity.’  If  they  could  stop  the  use  of  tobacco,  they  would  deal 
a 5 serious  blow  to  Austrian  finance,  and  prove  to  what  sacri- 
ff'ces  the  cigar-loving  Italian  was  prepared  to  go.  They 
appealed  to  the  Milanese  to  cease  smoking  with  the  New 
¥ear,  for  ‘Tobacco  ill-mated  the  sweet  odours  of  Italian 
flowers.”^  On  the  first  two  days  of  January  the  streets  of 
l^^ilan  were  almost  innocent  of  smoke,  and  the  few-  who 
aippeared  with  cigars  were  hooted  or  hustled.  The  military 
saw  their  chance.  Huge  distributions  of  cigars  were  made, 
id  is  said,  to  the  garrison,  and  officers  and  soldiers  puffed 
t)heir  abundant  smoke  in  the  faces  of  passers-by.  When  the 
^rim  joke  was  resented,  Badetzky  showed  his  teeth.  Cavalry 
c^jharged  at  the  unarmed  crowd ; workmen  returning  to  their 
nomes  were  bayoneted ; several  citizens  were  killed,  over 
pfty  wounded.  Milan  replied  with  one  voice  to  the  outrage  , 
^ven  the  nobles  and  civil  servants  could  keep  silence  no 
longer;  high  officials  protested  or  resigned,  and  the  Arch- 
loishop  prayed  in  the  Cathedral  that  their  rulers  might  learn 
humanity.  The  Viceroy  tried  to  throw  oil  on  the  troubled 
waters ; but  the  Emperor  published  a threatening  edict,  and 
Badetzky  expanded  it  into  an  inflammatory  appeal  to  his 
troops.  The  day  for  compromise  had  passed , there  was  no 
^more  play  in  the  movement ; army  and  people  stood  at  bay. 

; The  Tobacco  Biots  sent  an  angry  thrill  through  Italy;"' 
[but  it  was  felt  that  the  time  for  war  was  still  not  come,  and 
Ithe  indignation  failed  to  distract  attention  from  the  consti- 
tutional question.  All  through  this  period  the  nationalist 
and  reform  movements  are  inextricably  bound  together, 
incessantly  reacting  on  one  another,  each  sympathizing  with 
the  other’s  every  advance  or  rebuff.  hill  lately,  though 
Gioberti  had  spoken  guardedly  of  representative  institutions 

^ Correspondence — Italy,  II.  lo. 


198  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


m his  Prolegomeni,  the  reformers  had  asked  only  for  admini 
strative  change.  Nothing  marks  more  the  conservative 
character  of  the  movement,  or  differentiates  it  more  vddely 
from  the  Carbonaro  Revolutions,  than  the  silence  which  had 
hitherto  been  kept  as  to  parliamentary  government.  The 
Moderates  had  made  it  their  first  axiom  to  work  with  tin 
princes;  down  to  the  occupation  of  Ferrara  there  seem(3c 
no  hope  of  vdnning  a constitution  from  Pius  or  Leopold  br 
Charles  Albert,  and  little  had  been  thought  and  less  said 
about  one.  The  Liberals  had  concentrated  themselves  dn 
the  three  points  of  liberty  of  the  press,  a citizen  guard,  anV 
a Council  of  State.  They  had  now  won  these  in  Tuscanj) 
and  the  Papal  States ; and  though  Piedmont  still  had  no  citii- 
zen  guard,  everybody  knew  that  it  could  only  be  for  a shorn 
time.  Apparently  the  country  was  satisfied  with  these  cor*.- 
cessions.  The  Mazzinians  were  more  intent  for  the  moment 
on  war  with  Austria  than  on  j^opular  government.  Th^ 
masses  were  inclined  to  demonstrate  in  honour  of  reformjs 
gained  lather  than  agitate  for  new  ones.  Despite  the  scarcity^, 
ever  fresh  rejoicings  made  honour  to  the  Pope.  To  merl! 
bred  under  despotism  it  seemed  that  for  a government  wiR 
and  accomplishment  were  one,  and  the  easy  Italian  natur^^ 
turned  to  play.  [ 

But  everything  was  tending  to  bring  the  constitutional 
question  to  the  front ; and  the  half-heartedness  of  thej 
government  in  their  reforms  might  at  any  moment  force  itj 
into  prominence.  The  executives  were  paralyzed,  or  feebl}!' 
trying  to  neutralize  the  new  liberties  in  practice.  And  while!, 
the  breach  between  government  and  Liberals  was  slowlyj 
widening,  there  had  been  ugly  incidents  that  made  the^ 
mass  of  law-abiding  men  doubt  the  ability  of  their  rulers  to| 
cope  with  revolutionary  outbreaks,  and  drove  them  to  look' 
for  safety  in  a middle  - class  parliament.  Thej^  had  been ' 
scared  by  an  angry  and  swelling  note  from  men  who  cared 
little  for  politics,  but  felt  the  cruel  pressure  of  the  social 
system.  There  was  little  theoretic  socialism ; there  was  a 
good  deal  of  practical  economic  discontent.  The  winter  had 
been  very  severe,  and  had  even  killed  many  of  the  olives. 
The  freeing  of  the  English  and  Irish  markets  had  diverted 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 


199 


c^orn  to  tliem,  and  raised  its  price.  At  Genoa  there  was 
s^harp  distress  and  acute  feeling  of  the  workmen  against 
fheir  masters;  at  Florence  the  artizans  in  the  tenement- 
lliouses  struck  against  the  prepayment  of  rent.  Bread-riots 
increased  in  frequency  and  intensity.  At  Como  and  Laveno 
fhere  were  scenes  that  recalled  the  Promessi  Sposi.  In  the 
j’ural  districts  of  Tuscany  the  depression  fell  heavily  on  the 
pmall  farmers  and  their  labourers,  and  agitators  of  whatever 
(5amp  were  not  slow  to  turn  it  to  their  uses.  At  Cortona, 
Pistoia,  Prato,  and  across  the  Apennines  into  Eomagna, 
leakers’  shops  were  plundered,  while  the  police  looked  on. 
The  riots  were  universally  believed  to  be  the  work  of  Aus- 
trian or  Sanfedist  agents,^  and  the  well-to-do  feared,  or 
professed  to  fear,  a repetition  of  the  Galician  massacres.^ 
There  was  more  serious  business  at  Leghorn.  The  city 
had  always  kept  its  distinctness  from  Tuscany ; and  its 
vigorous,  tenacious  people,  restless  with  fluctuations  of  trade, 
had  learnt  a passionate  democracy  from  Guerrazzi  and  his 
ally,  the  pork-butcher,  Bartelloni.  The  latter  was  the  cun- 
ning and  audacious  “ cat  ” of  the  popular  admiration,  the 
enthusiastic  hatcher  of  a scheme  for  tumbling  the  Italian 
thrones.^  Guerrazzi  had  scented  the  coming  fray,  and 
thrown  himself  again  into  the  political  life,  which  he  had 
left,  with  all  his  uncompromising  vigour.  The  idol  of 
the  people,  to  the  middle  classes  he  was  the  sinister 
herald  of  revolution  and  communism,  and  he  reciprocated 
their  hatred  with  more  dignity,  but  equal  intensity.  All 
through  the  autumn  the  excitement  had  grown  at  Leghorn, 
as  the  Lunigiana  question  raised  the  spectre  of  invasion,  and 
the  government  delayed  to  arm  the  citizen  guard.  Two 
days  after  the  Tobacco  Biots  the  crowd  seized  the  city. 
Guerrazzi  was  called  in  to  still  the  storm  he  had  helped 
to  raise,  and  became  dictator  of  what  was  to  all  intents 

^ Gualterio,  op.  cit.,  III.  302  ; Coppi,  Annali,  IX.  122  ; Saffi,  Scritti,  II.  40  ; 
Gori,  op.  cit.,  176. 

^ In  1846  the  peasants  of  Galicia  massacred  their  landlords  and  the 
well-to-do.  The  landlords  had  threatened  revolt,  and  it  was  generally  believed 
that  the  government  had  instigated  the  peasants.-  * 

^ Montanelli,  Memorie,  I.  47,  251  ; Coppi,  op.  cit.,  IX.  24.  Was  he  or  “B.  G.” 
of  Dandolo’s  Italian  Volunteers  the  original  of  Meredith’s  Barto  Kizzo  ? 


200 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

an  insurrectionary  movement.  But  there  was  little  sym- 
pathy for  it  in  the  rest  of  Tuscany.  At  Leghorn  itself  the 
separatists  were  in  a minority ; and  Ridolfi,  knowing  he 
had  public  opinion  behind  him,  refused  to  compromise 
and  advanced  Avith  a force  which  frightened  dowr 
opposition. 

The  Leghorn  revolt  emphasized  the  instability  of  a 
rule,  which  courted  disturbances  and  had  little  strength  to 
resist  them.  The  cry  for  parhamentary  government  rapidly 
gained  force.  In  the  Papal  States,  indeed,  even  men,  Avh(( 
were  afteiuvards  democrats,  saw  all  the  difficulty  of  reconcil-- 
ing  representative  institutions  and  the  theocracy In  Tus- 
cany there  Avas  no  such  problem,  and  already  at  the  time 
of  the  Florence  demonstration  there  had  been  a certair 
feeling,  though  apparently  not  a strong  one,  in  favour  of  i 
constitution.  The  demand  came  chiefly  from  thoughtfu 
politicians  like  the  younger  Corsini  and  Guerrazzi,  AAffic 
realized  much  sooner  than  the  masses  did  the  impossibilit} 
that  reform  should  stop  at  any  half-way  house  of  adminis- 
trative change.  The  question  had  been  overshadowed  bj 
the  Lunigiana  troubles,  and  during  the  Avinter  the  anxiety 
had  been  to  arm  the  citizen  guard  and  put  the  country  in 
a state  of  defence.  None  the  less  there  was  a steadily  grow- 
ing belief  that  only  a constitution  would  loose  the  bonds 
that  tied  the  executive  to  incapacity. 

The  same  development  of  thought  was  going  on  in  Pied- 
mont, Avhere  lines  of  cleavage  betAveen  the  conservative  and 
advanced  reformers  had  long  been  apparent.  The  Agricul- 
tural Society  had  for  the  past  tAvo  years  been  rent  by  dis- 
putes between  the  Liberal  nobles,  led  by  Camillo  Cavour,  and 
the  democratic  section,  which  folloAved  Valerio,  the  Society’s 
secretary^  The  quarrel  shifted  its  ground  to  the  press. 
Balbo,  pedantic  and  timid,  deprecated  any  active  agitation, 
while  there  A\"as  no  O’Connell  or  Cobden  to  lead  it.  D Azeglio, 
more  opportunist,  was  Avilling  to  meet  the  democrats  half- 
Avay^ ; and  he  and  Farini,  the  author  of  the  Rimini  manifesto, 
set  themselves  to  reconcile  the  tAvo  parties  by  exchange  of 
1 Saffi,  op.  cit.,  I.  223. 


201 


( THE  CONSTITUTIONS 

flattery.  It  was  becoming  increasingly  clear  that  nothing 
ishort  of  a constitution  would  satisfy  the  country,  and  even 
Balbo  memorialized  the  King  to  consider  it.  But  the  real 
Impulse  came  from  the  man  who,  of  all  the  moderates,  was 
^ost  hated  and  suspected  by  the  democrats. 

Camillo  Cavour,  the  son  of  one  of  Charles  Albert  s most 
reactionary  ministers,  was  now  thirty-seven  years  old.  In 
early  youth  he  had  been  a Radical,  but  before  1833  had 
sobered  down  to  a worshipper  of  the  juste  milieu,  a believer 
the  English  land  system  and  the  mutual  dependance  of 
blasses,  an  avowed  opportunist  in  the  wake  of  Peel  and 
i^asimir-Perier,  with  a conscience  more  robust  than  scru- 
pulous ; none  the  less  a thoroughgoing  patriot,  angrily  sen- 
isitive  to  Austrian  and  Papal  dictation,  fretting  under  the 
piisrule  at  home,  which  frowned  on  commerce  and  “ snuffed 
out  every  generous  instinct  as  sacrilege  or  high -treason.” 
He  had  travelled  much  in  England  and  France,  and  brought 
back  a hatred  of  clericalism,  a vehement  belief  in  free  trade, 
;in  social  liberty,  in  healthy  political  activity.  An  aristocrat 
by  birth  and  surroundings,  and,  despite  himself,  in  many  of 
his  prejudices,  the  plebeian  face  and  dress  of  “ the  little 
man  ” marked  his  scorn  for  the  trappings  of  rank,  his  con- 
viction that  aristocracy  was  destined  to  wither  in  modern 
society.^  Almost  barren  of  literary  or  artistic  tastes,  he  was  a 
keen  political  and  social  student  * thorough  and  methodical, 
with  a devouring  love  of  work,  he  threw  himself  into  business, 
speculating  in  wheat  and  rice,  promoting  steam-mills,  sugar 
factories,  chemical  works,  railway  companies.  His  passion 
for  agriculture  ^ had  made  him  one  of  the  founders  of  the 
Agricultural  Society.  At  home  he  was  “ the  most  amusing 
of  men,”  with  a satisfied  smile  ever  on  his  big  face,  somewhat 
careless  of  the  smaller  moralities,  still  more  so  of  his  own  repu- 
tation, with  a boyish  expansiveness  and  confident  good-humour 
that  carried  him  with  a jest  over  the  roughest  roads  of  life. 
And  though  his  geniality  was  the  crust  that  hid  a deep, 
even  passionate  nature,  and  there  were  moments  when 

' 1 Cavour,  Lettere,  I.  12;  La  Rive,  Cavour,  124. 

2 “Agriculture,”  however,  he  confessed,  “is  the  art  of  disillusions  and 
d|isappointments.” 


202 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

enthusiasm  or  indignation  swept  away  his  self-control,  ii, 
ordinary  times  he  was  a brave,  level-headed,  though  im-. 
pressionable  country  gentleman,  whom  Cobden  had  already - 
marked  as  the  ablest  man  he  knew,  with  a strong  common- 
sense  that  had  no  pettiness  or  egotism  in  it,  as  indifferent  td 
tradition  as  he  was  to  abstract  speculation  or  the  distant, 
future,  but  resolute  to  secure  what  was  possible  in  th(:i 
present  of  justice  and  tolerance  and  sober  liberty.  ' 

Naturally  he  at  once  made  his  mark  in  the  moderatej 
nationalist  movement;  he  had  no  faith  in  a reforming  Pope' 
but  Balbo’s  doctrine  of  Piedmontese  leadership  found  id 
him  a ready  believer,  and  his  article  in  the  Noumlle  Revul 
had  done  much  to  fix  the  thoughts  of  the  nationalists  ot 
Charles  Albert.  He  had  fought  the  democrats  in  the  Agrd 
cultural  Society,  but  he  was  too  big-minded  for  the  narrow 
school  of  Moderates,  and  he  had  worked  hard  to  form^  a 
wider  party,  which  should  open  its  borders  to  all  who,  while 
accepting  the  existing  social  system,  would  fight  for  nationa. 
independence  under  the  House  of  Savoy.  But  with  his  cleai 
common-sense  he  saAv  that  a constitution  was  necessary  to  guar- 
antee good  government,  and  open  the  field  to  healthy  ambitions 
like  his  own.  His  opportunity  soon  came.  After  the  King  e 
visit  to  Genoa  the  impatience  there  led  to  another  and  morf 
threatening  agitation  against  the  Jesuits,  and  the  Municipaj 
Council  prayed  the  government  to  sanction  the  formation  of 
a citizen  guard  that  would  guarantee  order.  A monster  peti- 
tion (men  no’w  dared  to  sign)  backed  their  demands,  and  the 
editors  of  the  leading  Turin  papers,  Cavour,  Valerio,  Giacomo 
Durando,  Brofferio,  met  to  consider  how  best  to  support 
them  (about  January  i6,  1848).  Cavour,  always  suspicious 
of  (iharles  Albert,  and  fearing  that  the  new  concessions 
would  be  whittled  away  in  practice,  boldly  recommended 
the  meeting  to  pronounce  for  a constitution;  and  though 
Valerio,  thinking  that  no  good  thing  ^ could  come  from 
Cavour  the  aristocrat,  urged  that  a citizen  guard  should 
be  the  first  demand,  the  other  editors  ranged  themselves  on 
the  side  of  the  bigger  policy.^  The  decision  of  the  meeting 

1 Saraceno,  Sa7ita  Rosa,  159-162;  Predari,  Primi  vagiti,  249;  Tavallini, 
Lanza,  I.  52  ; Cavour,  Nouvelles  lettres,  167,  174. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 


203 

brought  the  question  to  the  front,  and  it  only  needed  some 
occasion  to  create  an  irresistible  cry  for  a constitution. 

But  the  first  strong  and  effective  demand  was  to  come 
from  the  South.  In  Rome  and  Tuscany  and  Piedmont  there 
(was  more  or  less  of  belief  in  the  government ; in  Naples  and 
Sicily  nobody  trusted  it.  Naples  had  in  theory  much  of 
what  the  other  states  were  striving  for;  but  there  was  no 
hope  that  the  theory  would  become  a fact  till  a parliament 
controlled  the  executive.  When  the  other  princes  began  to 
meet  the  Liberals  half-way,  it  threw  into  yet  blacker  contrast 
Ferdinand’s  blind  unyielding  obscurantism.  The  King  an- 
nounced in  the  Gazette  that  he  would  “ follow  no  fashionable 
political  puppet,”  and  told  his  sons  to  pray  for  the  Pope, 

' “who  did  not  know  what  he  was  doing.”  Years  had  only 
sharpened  his  instinct  for  personal  government,  his  cruelty 
and  suspiciousness;  and  Moderates  and  Democrats,  nobles 
and  middle  classes,  Neapolitans  and  Sicilians  made  common 
cause  against  him.  In  the  previous  July  a young  lawyer, 
Settembrini,  published  his  Protest  of  the  People  of  the  Two 
Sicilies,  and  the  hideous  picture  of  misrule  it  drew  laid 
bare  the  boast  that  Naples  enjoyed  good  institutions.  “ The 
only  remedy,”  so  it  concluded,  “ is  arms.”  It  was  in  vain 
that  the  government  published  its  apologies  and  made 
remissions  of  taxation  ; Settembrini  had  voiced  the  universal 
feeling,  and  his  appeal  to  rebellion  soon  found  its  echo.  The 
revolutionary  committee  of  Calabria,  after  trying  in  vain  to 
concert  a rising  with  the  Liberals  of  Naples  and  Palermo, 
decided  to  act  for  itself,  and  on  September  i Reggio  and 
Messina  rose.  The  insurgents  intended  to  march  rapidly  on 
Naples,  but  they  found  little  support,  and  were  driven  back 
on  Aspromonte,  where  the  government  easily  crushed  the 
immature  movement,  and  shot  forty-seven  of  the  insurgents 
in  cold  blood. 

The  cruel  repression  only  quickened  the  demand  for  a 
constitution.  But  while  the  Radicals  believed  that  they 
must  fight  for  it,  the  Moderates  still  hoped  that  the  King’s 
fears  or  ambitions  might  push  him  to  concession.  They 
wanted  a constitution  with  a Second  Chamber  and  a limited 


204 


history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 


I 


itself  in  empty  appeals  to  the  ^mg-  spokesmen, 

“lio..;;  .1.  ”*  °UeL 

a joint  revolution  early  m the  ne\  y Homd, 

rise  first  and  demand  the  constitution  . . 1820^ 

f““”  JHirJ  Et.  «.i.e  d^^^' 


Nisco, -FercZmando  II.,  88.  Tnrrearsa  • Montanelli,  op.  cit., 

- Bertolini,  JlfmoHe,  225.  q™‘“g  *7“  o?'  ‘ 

II,  186  ; Ri^--  «*'>»■•  rtsorg.,  II.  393  . > _ EpistoUrio,  I.  4^2  ; 

Rivolgimenti,  35-  See  also  La  Farma,  Slor.a,  III.  .26  , 2 P 

Correspondence — Naples,  49. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 


205 

of  the  constitution  of  1812;  nobody  trusted  a Bourbon’s 
promises  without  guarantees,  and  however  unsuited  the  old 
charter  might  be  to  present  needs,  it  wore  the  halo  of 
prestige,  and  made  a war-cry  round  which  all  would  rally. 
But  the  court  would  have  no  constitution ; Ferdinand  replied 
to  Louis  Philippe’s  warnings  that  he  “would  be  a King, 
always  a King,”  and  it  was  obvious  that  only  force  could 
decide  the  issue.  The  government  probably  did  not  know 
how  weak  its  position  at  Palermo  was,  but  De  Sauzet,  the 
commander,  was  short  of  food  or  frightened,  and  when  his 
attempt  to  negotiate  an  armistice  failed,  he  suddenly  retreated 
(January  27),  and  retiring  along  the  coast  embarked  for 
Naples.  The  other  cities  had  risen,  and  by  the  end  of 
January  the  Neapolitans  had  no  footing  left  in  all  the  island 
except  the  citadel  of  Messina  and  three  other  forts. 

The  Sicilian  rising  was  the  overture  to  the  revolutions, 
that  ran  through  Europe  in  the  spring  of  1848.  The 
temerity  of  the  handful  of  men  who  attacked  a powerful 
garrison,  their  dramatic  triumph,  the  sudden  fall  of  the 
Bourbon  rule  made  a deep  sensation  in  Italy  and  Europe. 
And  while  even  the  Moderates  were  obliged  to  hail  Fer- 
dinand’s defeat,  it  was  recognized  on  all  hands  that  the 
bloodshed  had  quickened  the  pace,  that  there  must  be 
radical  changes  if  the  princes  were  to  keep  their  thrones, 
that  the  struggle  in  the  streets  of  Palermo  was  a prelude  to 
barricades  at  Milan  and  Venice.  Naples  was  the  first  to  feel 
the  effects.  The  Neapolitans  had  failed  to  keep  their 
promise  to  Palermo,  for  Carlo  Poerio,  the  leader  of  the  more 
active  conspirators,  was  in  prison,  and  in  his  absence  the 
Liberals  seemed  more  paralyzed  than  ever.  The  sober, 
poverty-stricken  peasants  of  Cilento  rose,  true  to  their 
revolutionary  traditions;  but  it  was  not  till  the  rising 
spread  through  the  province  of  Salerno,  and  a report  that 
the  insurgents  were  advancing  spread  panic  through  the  city, 
that  its  feeble  Liberals  showed  signs  of  moving  (January  25). 
The  court  was  frightened  by  the  exaggerated  news;  and 
though  Delcarotto  failed  in  a plot  to  extort  a constitution^ 
and  was  banished,  there  were  others  who  like  him  hastened 

1 D’Ayala,  Memorie,  98-101  ; Nisco,  op.  cit.,  iii  ; Leopardi,  op.  cit.,  69,  76,  86. 


2o6  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

to  make  tkeir  peace  with  the  revolution.'  Poerio  was 
released,  and  his  followers,  at  last  bestirring  themselves, 
organized  a demonstration  to  alarm  the  King  (January 
27).  Ferdinand  found  that  his  troops  were  wavering,  and 
before  nightfall  took  his  generals’  advice  a,nd  gra,nted  a 
constitution.  It  is  said  he  showed  a malign  delight  at 
outbidding  the  reforming  princes;  “they  have  driven  me 
to  this  I will  push  them  down.”  It  is  more  probable  that 
pure  fear  dictated  his  surrender.  The  old  ministers  and  the 
Jesuit  confessor  left  the  palace;  Bozzelli  was  entrusted  with, 
a draft  of  a constitution ; and  though  it  bore  all  the  marks 
of  his  timid  and  pedant  mind,  the  people  recked  little  of 
the  defects  and  dangers,  with  which  his  proposals  bristled. 
When  the  King  rode  through  the  city,  and  swore  fidelity  to 
the  statute,  he  seemed  once  more  the  darling  of  his  people. 

The  news  of  the  Neapolitan  constitution  unlocked  all 
the  unsatisfied  aspirations  of  advanced  Libera,ls  throughout 
the  peninsula.  Everywhere  it  was  hailed  with  the  joy  of 
men  who  had  been  holding  themselves  back  and  now  felt 
free  to  march.  A constitution  suddenly  became  the  uni- 
versal prayer.  Piedmont  was  the  first  to  feel  the  wave. 
The  Radicals  took  up  the  cry,  and  D’Azeglio,  on  sppor- 
tunist  grounds,  urged  the  Moderates  to  accept  it.  So  strong 
did  the  pressure  suddenly  become,  that  on  the  morrow  of 
the  news  from  Naples  (February  2)  the  ministers  recom- 
mended the  King  to  give  way.  Charles  Albert’s  preposses- 
sions were  all  against  a constitution;  he  thought  himself 
bound  by  his  old  oath,'  of  which  Mettermch  had  not  failed 
to  remind  him;  he  distrusted  parliamentary  government, 
hated  its  publicity,  its  roughness,  its  party  struggles,  its 
possible  corruption.  Quite  recently  he  had  protested  that 
he  would  never  have  it.'’  But  he  saw  that  it  was  dangerous 
to  resist,  that  at  all  events  it  would  win  English  sympathy 
and  spell  defiance  to  Austria.  He  allowed  his  ministers  to 
privately  draft  a constitution,  and  thought  of  solving  his 


^ V.  63,  70;  M.  Carlo  Aaerto,.o-,  Predan. 

vanili  260  ; Costa  de  Beauregard,  Derniera  annces,  82 ; Cibrario,  JVotiM,  75  , 
ZXticelclo,  22s  ■,  Cavour,  LcUcre,  I.  cxx.  70;  eonlra  Saraceno,  op.  crb, 

167. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS 


207 

personal  dilemma  by  abdicating,  as  his  predecessor  had  done 
in  1821.  But  while  he  delayed,  the  impatience  grew.  At 
the  King  s own  prompting,  resolutions  asking  for  a statute 
were  voted  in  the  Municipal  Councils  of  Turin  and  Genoa 
(February  7).  Even  many  of  the  reactionaries,  frightened 
by  the  storm  and  hoping  to  get  the  majority  in  an  Upper 
House,  swelled  the  cry.  The  Council  advised  the  King 
that  there  was  no  alternative  but  a violent  civil  struggle, 
which  might  end  in  revolution.  His  conscience  was  set 
at  ease  by  a patriot  bishop,  and  he  contented  himself  by 
stipulating  that  the  first  article  of  the  charter  should  con- 
firm Catholicism  as  the  religion  of  the  state.  On  February  8 
he  promised  that  a constitution  should  be  granted. 

The  torch  was  passed  on  to  Tuscany,  where  the  govern- 
ment had  lost  all  power  to  stand  against  popular  pressure. 
The  sbirri  had  been  hunted  into  hiding  (October  25,  1847), 
and  the  ministers  had  no  force  behind  them  except  the 
citizen  guard,  themselves  the  foremost  to  demand  reform. 
The  cabinet  itself  was  fussy  and  irresolute,  and  the  victory 
of  the  constitutionalists  in  Piedmont  broke  down  its  guard. 
On  February  1 1 the  Grand  Duke  proclaimed  a constitution. 
Capponi  and  Bidolfi  still  hoped  to  stop  short  at  a consulta- 
tive assembly ; the  Eadicals  at  the  other  extreme  called  for 
a single  chamber.  The  majority  of  the  cabinet  decided 
for  a middle  course,  and  pronounced  for  the  proposals  of 
Ricasoli  and  the  Florence  municipality,  who  advocated  a 
modification  of  the  French  statute  of  1830. 

After  the  Liberal  triumph  in  Piedmont  and  Tuscany  it 
was  no  longer  possible  to  refuse  a constitution  at  Rome. 
The  Pope  had  long  since  ceased  to  guide  events.  By  fits 
he  looked  not  unkindly  on  the  Liberal  movement.  Bruited 
conspiracies  of  “ Gregorians  ” still  alarmed  him ; he  could 
not  forget  the  insult  of  Ferrara,  and  was  irritated  anew, 
when  in  January  the  Austrian  government,  eager  to  stamp 
out  Liberalism  at  Naples,  asked  leave  to  send  troops  through 
Papal  territory.  With  all  the  milder  side  of  the  new  move- 
ment Pius  was  in  full  sympathy.  He  assisted  education, 
patronized  schemes  for  the  reclamation  of  the  Agro  Romano, 
^ave  concessions,  that  proved  almost  still-born,  to  railway 


208 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


companies.  He  disclaimed  sympathy  with  obscurantism, 
hopeful  that  his  reforming  fame  would  bring  Protestants  to 
the  fold ; but  he  was  painfully  sensitive  to  the  charge  that 
he  was  siding  with  revolution,  and  was  beginning  to  realize 
what  combustible  materials  he  was  handling.^  He  resented 
keenly  the  agitation  against  the  Jesuits,  the  jubilations  at 
the  defeat  of  the  Sonderbund,  the  newspaper  attacks  on  the 
Belgian  Catholics.  He  was  growing  very  uneasy  lest  he 
should  be  forced  to  do  things  contrary  to  his  conscience ; he 
was  apt  to  get  violently  excited  about  the  fancied  growth  of 
scepticism,  and  suffered  terribly  from  alternations  of  hope 
and  disappointment.  Mazzini  had  written  him  an  open 
letter  (September  1847),  urging  him  in  too  transparent  flattery 
“ to  be  a believer  and  unite  Italy.”  The  letter  was  far  from 
expressing  Mazzini’s  permanent  feelings,  and  its  only  effect 
on  Pius  was  to  thoroughly  alarm  him.^  He  regarded  the 
Temporal  Power  in  all  its  plenitude  as  a sacred  trust,  which  it 
Avas  sin  to  surrender ; and  at  the  opening  of  the  new  Council 
of  State,  he  had  hinted  that  they  would  at  their  cost  inter- 
fere with  his  prerogative.  He  began  to  see  hoAV  irreconcilable 
Avere  the  claims  of  Italian  prince  and  Catholic  pontiff,  and  as 
the  father  of  foreign  princes  ” he  Avould  not  hear  of  Avar. 

So  after  his  Avont  he  refused  to  face  the  situation.  His 
fussy  expectations  of  gratitude  blinded  him  to  the  real 
temper  of  the  people.  So  far  as  appearances  went  indeed, 
he  Avas  at  times  their  idol.  The  Liberal  leaders  set  to  his 
credit  each  unwilling  concession ; his  reactionary  pronounce- 
ments Avere  not  reported  in  the  papers,  and  the  inconsis- 
tencies and  procrastinations  of  the  government  Avere  charged 
to  the  Cardinals.  But  he  had  lost  his  spell.  The  Pius  cult 
had  groAvn  artificial,  and  his  popularity  hung  on  his  readi- 
ness to  satisfy  the  people’s  ever  Avidening  demands.  In  the 
autumn  the  Council  of  State  had  been  opened,  and  Rome 
Avas  given  a municipal  charter.^  Municipality  and  Council 

1 Leopardi,  op.  cit. , 84  ; Guizot,  Memoires,  VIII.  392. 

2 Mazzini,  Oper€,Yl.  156-163;  Aventura,  Pei  ?nor^^,  xxxiv.  For  the  inten- 
tion of  the  letter,  see  Mazzini,  Opere,  VII.  159,  IX.  244;  Id.,  Duecento  lettcre, 
250-252. 

3 One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  new  municipality  was  to  vote  a considerable 
sum  for  the  erection  of  labourers’  houses. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS  209 

were  hailed  with  the  usual  rejoicings,  but  they  were  regarded 
as  steps  to  fresh  victories.  Rossi  had  urged  the  Pope  to 
secure  the  support  of  the  Moderates  and  isolate  the  Radicals 
by  conceding  a lay  ministry  and  some  form  of  representa- 
tive institutions.  So  far  from  this,  however,  the  Moderates 
who  formed  the  majority  of  the  Council,  found  themselves' 
thwarted  by  the  government  at  every  turn.  Their  thouo-ht- 
ful  and  laborious  endeavours  in  educational  and  civil  service 
and  army  reform  were  sterilized,  and  after  a bitter  strugo-Ie 
with  the  Pope,  they  gave  up  the  attempt  in  disgust,  and  left 
the  field  to  the  Radicals.  In  parts  of  Romagna  things  were 
little  removed  from  anarchy.  The  old  bitter  feuds,  the  fear 
of  invasion,  perhaps  the  work  of  Sanfedist  agents,  led  to  in- 
evitable excesses;  and  at  Imola  and  Forli,  and  to  a slight 
extent  elsewhere,  political  assassination  was  rife  under  plea 
of  exterminating  the  Centurions.  Rome  was  free  from  poli- 
tical crime,  but  seething  with  agitation.  The  Democrats 
had  organised  themselves  into  a “People’s  Club”;  there 
was  a revolutionary  committee,  and  Mazzini,  despite  his  dis- 
ingenuous letter,  was  urging  his  friends  to  discredit  the  Pope.' 
But  the  Democrats  were  not  alone  in  their  dissatisfaction, 
and  when  the  Council  found  itself  paralyzed,  all  sections  of 
Liberals  were  agreed  that  both  reform  at  home  and  prepara- 
tion for  war  hinged  on  the  appointment  of  a lay  ministry. 

I he  Conservative  nationalists  were  ready  to  join  the  Radicals 
in  forcing  the  Pope’s  hands,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  national 
iefence  they  determined  once  for  all  to  be  rid  of  the  in- 
lompetence  of  an  executive  of  ecclesiastics.  The  pressure 
lecame  too  strong  for  the  Pope,  and  after  an  attempted 
Jompromise,  he  appointed  a new  cabinet  with  a majority  of 
aymen  under  Cardinal  Antonelli  (March  ii).  But  it  was 
ilready  too  late  to  content  the  country  with  lay  ministers  • 
■rom  Romagna,  from  Umbria,  from  Rome,  from  Democrats 
ind^  Moderates,  petitions  were  coming  in  for  representative 
nstitutions.  Pius  and  the  government  parried  the  demand 
ill  the  news  of  the  French  Revolution  made  the  excitement 
00  intense  to  allow  of  more  delay.  Pius,  perhaps  for  the 

' The  letters  in  Bianchi,  Mazzinianismo,  137,  and  Correspondence— Italy 
. 223,  seem  genuine. 

VOL.  I. 


O 


2 10  A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

moment,  had  visions  of  democracy  reconciled  to  Catholicism, 
and  new  converts  won  for  the  Church.'  The  Cardinals  re-  . 
iected  a constitution  drafted  by  Rossi,  but  they  adopted  ; 
another  of  their  own,  and  took  the  tricolor  for  the  national  1 
flag  (Marcli  15). 

Apart  from  that  of  Piedmont,  the  “Statutes”  of  1848  ^ 
were  too  short-lived  to  test  effectually  their  value  and  . 
capacity  of  development.  They  were  all  more  or  less  | 
modelled  on  the  French  constitution  of  1830,  which,  with  , 
evil  omen  for  their  success,  was  at  this  very  moment  ; 
tumbling  into  ruin.  It  was  impossible  in  a country  where  ! 
there  had  been  no  free  political  life,  that  they  should  grow 
out  of  the  practical  experience  of  generations.  They  were 
necessarily  mere  bundles  of  constitutional  maxims,  based 
more  or  less  on  untested  theories.  And  drafted  as  they 
were  by  men  whose  knowledge  of  constitutional  working 
came  from  books,  put  out  in  the  hurry  of  the  moment: 
to  satisfy  an  imperious  popular  cry,  it  was  perhaps  un- 
avoidable that  they  should  retain  many  of  the  defects,  ot 
their  French  original,  and  of  the  American  precedents  trom 
which  it  in  turn  was  drawn;  that  they  bore  the  impress 
of  official  and  middle  class  timidity,  that  they  attempted 
a divorce  of  executive  and  legislature,  a balance  of  power, 
which  threatened  to  clog  the  wheels  of  administration  and 
make  strong  government  difficult.  They^  contained  the 
elementary  guarantees  of  liberty:— security  of  person  and 
property,  equality  before  the  law,  ministerial  responsibility, 
a fL  press,  a citizen  guard,  the  right  of  petition,  parha^ 
mentary  control  of  taxation.  To  these  Tuscany  adde 
freedom  of  commerce  and  industry,  and  Piedmont  a modn 
fied  right  of  public  meeting.  But  the  power  of  the  Churo 
was  shown  in  the  provisions,  which  in  every  Statute  sub 
jected  religious  publications  to  a preventive  censorship,  whict 

1 Minghetti,  Rimrdi,  I.  3^9  : Leopardi,  op.  cit.,  84  : Gori,  op.  ct(.,  471 

quotingfromGavazri,  45- 

2 Texts  with  translations  in  Correspondence  Italy,  . 5»  5;  . 

Correspondence-Naples,  131.  The  electoral  laws  of  Naples  and 
Correspondence-Italy,  II.  165,  237 1 those  for  Tuscany  and  the  Papal  Stat 
in  La  Farina,  Storia,  V.  244;  "VI.  1367  268. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONS  21 1 

declared  Catholicism  to  be  the  religion  of  the  State,  which 
at  Rome  implicitly  and  at  Naples  explicitly,  excluded  tolera- 
tion of  other  creeds.  Each  parliament  had  an  Upper  Cham- 
ber, nominated  by  the  sovereign,  it  being  recognized  on  all 
hands  that  a hereditary  house  was  out  of  the  question.^ 
Th^e  was  no  payment  of  members,  except  in  special  cases 
m luscany;  and  in  Naples  and  Rome  there  was  a rather 
high  property  qualification  for  deputies.  The  franchise 
everywhere  excluded  the  bulk  of  wage-earners ; “ we  want,” 
said  Cavour,  “ to  bring  the  suffrage  down  to  the  shopkeeper, 
who  has  a little  competency  of  his  own  and  a good  mt-au-fm 
every  day.  But  it  included  the  great  mass  of  occupiers  of 
land;  and  this,  in  the  wide  diffusion  of  farms  prevalent  in: 
Italy,  meant  the  majority  of  rural  householders.  Illiterates' 
were  excluded  in  Piedmont  but  not  elsewhere.  In  every 
case  there  were  fancy  franchises  for  officials  or  men  of  educa- 
tional status.  Voting  in  more  than  one  constituency  was 
illegal  everywhere. 

Constitutions  drawn  on  these  lines  were  intended  as 
Cavour  speaking  for  the  Moderates  avowed,  to  checkmate 
the  Democrats.  A large  number  of  the  working  men  in 
the  towns,  who  had  helped  to  fight  the  constitutional  battle 
found  themselves,  like  their  French  and  English  brothers  in 
1830-31,  left  outside.  Still  in  Piedmont  and  Tuscany  and 
Naples  the  constitutions,  assuming  loyalty  both  in  crown  and 
people,  might  have  quietly  developed  on  to  broader  lines. 

ne  Papal  Statute,  on  the  other  hand,  had  from  the  first 
tatal  seeds  of  decay.  Some  of  the  Liberal  churchmen  con- 
scious of  Its  inherent  diificulties,  had  wished  to  have  very 
wide  local  liberties  as  the  substitute  for  a parliament.^  But 
their  policy  was  impossible  in  the  cry  for  parliamentary 
institutions,  and  an  alternative  was  chosen,  which,  as  Kossi 
ivas  reported  to  have  said,  “ legitimized  war  between  sovereign 
md  subject.”  It  was,  as  events  proved,  impossible  to  graft 
•epresentative  government  on  a theocracy;  it  was  not 
practicable  to  put  a Foreign  Office,  whose  business  related 


^ E.g.  Cavour,  Lettere,  V.  169  ; Eosmini,  Costituzione,  2 
iie  tune  opposed  to  any  Second  Chamber. 


Cavour  was  at 


2 I 2 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

chiefly  to  the  sphitual  relations  of  the  Holy  See  with  foreign 
powers,  into  the  hands  of  a layman,  or  to  make  it  m®ponsib  e 
to  a lay  and  possibly  hostile  Chamber.  The  Papal  Statute 
tried  to  provide  for  the  dilemma  by  laying  vague  disabihtie 
on  parliament;  and  above  the  two  Chambers  sat  the  College 
of  Cardinals  as  a kind  of  third  House.  But  a deadlock  ^\a 
sooner  or  later  inevitable,  and  it  took  only  a few  weeks  to 
prove  that,  while  the  Pope’s  Temporal  Power  lasted,  a 
constitution  could  never  march  at  Rome. 


CHAPTEE  XI 

THE  NATIONAL  RISING 

FEBRUARY MARCH  I 848 

The  French  Revolution  of  1848.  The  Jesuits.  Military  rule  in  Lombardy. 
Preparations  for  war  in  Piedmont.  The  Five  Days  of  Milan.  The 
National  Rising  at  Venice  ; in  the  Lombard  cities  ; in  the  Duchies, 
Tuscany,  Papal  States,  Naples  5 character  of  the  rising.  Piedmont  and 
the  rising  ; Charles  Albert  declares  war. 

The  constitutional  question  was  settled  for  a time,  and  the 
country  could  give  all  its  thoughts  to  war.  The  French 
Revolution  (February  24)  had  changed  the  face  of  European 
politics,  and  the  prestige  of  success  had  passed  to  the  side  of 
progress.  To  Austria  the  Revolution  was  a direct  blow,  for  the 
Republic  was  certain  to  give  its  sympathies  to  a war  for  free- 
dom in  Italy,  and  might  not  improbably  lend  its  arms.  Palmer- 
ston hinted  that  Austria  might  find  herself  at  war  both  with 
France  and  England,  if  she  invaded  the  free  Italian  states.^ 
The  Milan  massacres  had  sent  a thrill  of  rage  through  Italy, 
and  there  was  an  earnest  looking  for  the  coming  fight! 
Outside  Sicily,  absorbed  in  its  own  problems,  every  week 
added  to  the  impatience  for  war.  But  it  was  recognized 
that  the  signal  must  come  from  Lombardy  or  Piedmont. 
All  that  the  eager  patriots  could  do  meanwhile  was  to  secure 
their  rear,  and  for  this  they  turned  on  the  Austrians’  best 
friends,  the  Jesuits.  It  was  an  irony  that  the  Society  had 
been  brought  to  range  itself  with  the  Power  that  had  been 
so  untender  to  Ultramontanism.  But  the  struggle  now  was 
between  despotism  and  democracy,  and  the  Jesuits  natur- 
ally found  themselves  in  the  Austrian  camp.  Gioberti,  in 
his  Prolegomeni  and  Modern  Jesuit,  had  signalled  out  the 

^ Ashley,  Palmerston,  I.  64. 


2 14  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

• 

Austro-Jesuit  league  as  the  great  obstacle  to  reform,  and  had 
lashed  the  Society  with  his  ponderous  dialectics  as  “ the 
great  enemy  of  Italy.”  And  however  unfair  it  may  have 
been  to  set  the  whole  clerical  opposition  to  their  charge, 
they  had  frankly  acknowledged  their  alliance  with  Austria,^ 
and  were  the  strength  of  the  reaction  at  Rome,  if  not  else- 
where. Slowly  and  steadily  they  had  been  winning  back 
the  ground  they  had  lost  in  the  eighteenth  century ; and  in 
proportion  as  they  won  it,  the  jealousy  and  suspicion  of  the 
people  had  turned  to  hate.  Tuscany  had  successfully  re- 
sisted their  introduction  ; Gregory,  not  long  before  his  death, 
had  consented  to  their  suppression  in  France ; the  defeat  of  - 
the  Sonderbund  at  the  end  of  1847  had  been  hailed  with 
public  rejoicings  even  at  Rome.  Now  the  popular  rage 
could  no  longer  be  restrained,  and  the  governments  threw 
the  Society  as  a prey  to  the  public  hue  and  cry.  The  hos- 
tility had  been  perhaps  strongest  in  Genoa,  and  before  the 
end  of  the  past  year,  the  agitation  had  grown  so  dangerous 
that  the  Fathers  left  the  city  for  a time.  The  news  of  the 
constitution  gave  the  signal  for  the  final  attack.  The  Sar- 
dinians drove  them  from  their  island ; they  fled  again  from 
Genoa ; Turin,  and  Alessandria,  and  Spezia  expelled  them  a 
few  days  later.  In  the  capital  feeling  was  so  intense,  and 
the  threats  against  the  Jesuitesses  of  the  Sacred  Heart  so 
loud,  that  the  government  at  last  gave  way  over  the  citizen 
guard,  and  sanctioned  its  formation  to  save  the  trembling 
Sisters  from  outrage.  Early  next  month  the  Fathers  fled 
from  Naples,  to  return  in  a few  days  in  disguise.  Three 
weeks  later  (March  21),  when  the  news  of  the  Viennese 
revolution  reached  Rome,  the  first  impulse  of  the  crowd 
was  to  demand  their  expulsion.  It  was  in  vain  that  they 
hoisted  the  tricolor,  that  Pius  threw  his  shield  over  them ; 
the  government  had  to  bow  to  the  storm,  and  consent  to 
close  their  College.  Even  in  Sicily,  where  the  Society  had 
shown  enlightenment  and  patriotism,  a mild  law  of  semi- 
suppression was  carried  a few  months  later. 

Lombardy  meanwhile  was  preparing  for  the  greater 

^ Gioberti,  Gesuita  moderno,  IV.  515- 


THE  NATIONAL  RISING 


215 

struggle.  1 There  was  no  pause  in  the  demonstrations  ; the 
January  massacres  had  only  stirred  the  people’s  blood, 
though  Lombard  mildness  showed  itself  still  in  a hundred 
good-humoured  fancies  to  outwit  the  police.  As  the  word 
was  passed  round,  crowds  appeared  and  vanished  at  fixed 
points;  thousands  packed  the  Cathedral  to  give  silent 
thanks  for  the  Neapolitan  Constitution ; at  Venice  the 
Carnival  was  abandoned,  and  the  money  saved  for  the 
wounded  of  the  Tobacco  Riots.  Elsewhere  the  people  were 
less  in  hand,  and  at  Padua  and  Pavia  the  friction  between 
University  and  garrison  led  to  fatal  fighting  in  the  streets. 
In  the  government  the  party  of  no  concession  kept  the 
upper  hand.  Rainerio  tried  by  double  play  to  keep  the 
favour  of  both  army  and  people,  but  the  “ old  women  ” of  the 
civilian  party  had  thrown  up  the  game.  At  Venice  Tommaseo 
and  Manin  were  arrested  and  charged  with  high  treason, 
acquitted  after  a brilliant  defence,  but  kept  in  prison.  At 
Milan  the  police  paraded  all  the  fussiness  of  a government 
that  felt  itself  ridiculous  or  impotent.  But  though  they 
proclaimed  the  gmdizio  statario  ^ (February  1 1 ),  no  mere 
police  measures  would  satisfy  Radetzky.  He  saw  insurrec- 
tion and  war  with  Piedmont  looming  in  the  near  future, 
and  though  he  had  over  70,000  troops,  more  than  half  of 
them  were  Italians  of  doubtful  loyalty.  He  sent  pressing 
messages  for  reinforcements  to  Vienna ; troops  were  already 
beginning  to  collect  at  Goritz,  and  Rainerio  and  Spaur  left 
Milan.  The  army  had  more  than  ever  got  the  government 
into  its  hands.  On  their  side  the  Milanese  leaders  suspended 
the  demonstrations,  knowing  that  they  had  done  their  work. 
Business  was  almost  at  a standstill ; foreigners  began  to  leave 
the  city.  The  French  Revolution,  though  it  scared  a faint- 
hearted section,  only  made  the  mass  of  the  people  more 
impatient ; ‘‘  cross  the  Ticino,”  they  sent  word  to  Charles 
Albert,  “ or  we  proclaim  the  Republic.”  It  was  clear  that 
the  revolution  might  be  precipitated  at  any  moment,  and 
the  leaders  decided  to  wait  no  longer  for  the  King.  Before 
March  16  it  had  been  decided  to  rise  in  a few  days.^ 

Piedmont  for  its  part  was  watching  with  ever-increasing 

^ See  above,  p.  58.  2 Archivio  Triennale,  I.  510. 


2i6  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

intensity  of  interest.  The  Tobacco  Riots,  the  massacre  of 
students  at  Pavia  on  its  very  frontier,  the  iniquities  of  the 
giiidizio  statario  piled  fuel  for  their  indignation.  D Azeglio 
published  a pamphlet  on  “ The  Sorrows  of  Lombardy,”  in 
A which  the  Moderate  rivalled  the  angriest  of  Radicals  in  his 
denunciation  of  Austria.  A new  ministry  had  come  into 
power  under  Balbo  and  Pareto,  the  leader  of  the  Genoese 
Liberals,  but  though  the  Austrians  thought  that  theh  taking 
office  meant  “ almost  a declaration  of  war,”  the  government 
showed  the  irresolution  of  a time  of  transition,  when  old 
timidity  and  the  newer  nationalism  were  still  contending 
for  mastery.  Balbo  meant  to  fight,  if  it  proved  absolutely 
necessary ; but  more  than  he  feared  Austria,  he  dreaded 
French  designs  on  Savoy  and  an  inrush  of  revolutionary 
propagandists  across  the  Alps ; and  instead  of  concentrating 
troops  on  the  Lombard  frontier,  he  had  left  them  scattered 
through  the  kingdom.^  Attacks  on  Austria  in  the  press 
were  rigorously  put  down,  but  at  the  same  time  the  papers 
were  permitted  to  talk  of  the  coming  war,  and  three  classes 
of  array  contingents  were  called  out.  It  was  probably  to 
keep  their  hands  free  for  an  offensive  movement,  that  the 
ministry  blew  cold  on  fresh  proposals  from  Tuscany  and 
Rome  for  a defensive  political  alliance.  Charles  Albert, 
despite  the  alarm  he  felt  at  the  French  Revolution  and  the 
attacks  on  the  Jesuits,  was  intervieving  agents  from  Milan, 
and  assuring  them,  that  if  the  city  “ rose  in  earnest,  he  and 
his  people  would  rush  arms  in  hand  to  its  help.”  ^ 

On  March  1 7 startling  news  reached  Milan.  The 
Hungarian  agitation  had  come  to  a head,  and  found  its  echo 
in  the  German  provinces  of  the  Empire.  Vienna  had  risen 
in  insurrection — Vienna,  which  to  Italians  had  been  the 
very  seat  and  strength  of  Austrian  tyranny.  Metternich 
had  been  compelled  to  resign,  and  the  Emperor  had  pro- 
mised to  all  his  subjects  liberty  of  the  press,  a national 


1 Ricotti,  BaJho,  263  ; Costa  de  Beauregard,  Dernieres  annees,  114-115. 

^ Archivio  Triennalc,  I.  4S3,  508,  510  ; Torelli,  Rirordi,  108  ; Casati.  Milano, 
153  ; Cavour,  Lettere,  L cxxxix.;  Bonfadini,  Mezzosecolo,  265  ; Costa  de  Beaure- 
gard, loc,  cit.;  contra,  Archivio  Triennale,  I.  480. 


THE  NATIONAL  RISING  217 

I guard,  an  early  convocation  of  the  Estates  of  the  Empire 
I On  the  following  morning  the  Milanese  found  the  Emperor’s 
edict  (omitting,  however,  mention  of  the  national  guard) 

: posted  on  all  the  walls.  But  the  news  had  leaked  out  on 

the  previous  evening,  and  the  leaders  had  been  busy  through 
• t e night,  giving  orders  for  a demonstration  and  preparing 
) proclamations.  The  people  needed  little  urging-  thev 
recognized  that  their  chance  had  come,  and  over  the’  copies 
of  the  edict  pasted  the  words  “Too  late.”  A great  crowd 
wi  h Casati,  the  reluctant  and  timorous  Podesta,'  at  their 
head,  marched  to  the  office  of  the  Vice-governor,  O’Donnell. 

, e sentineR  were  killed,  the  house  invaded,  and,  in  a wild 
scene  of  disorder  O’Donnell,  threatened  of  his  life  and 
unnerved,  signed  the  decrees  which  Casati  presented  to  him 
disbanding  the  police  and  authorizing  the  municipality  to 
. enrol  a citizen  guard.  So  far  the  movement  had  worn  an 
ostensibly  legal  colour,  and  O’Donnell’s  decrees  were  only 
: the  corollary  of  the  Imperial  Edict.  But  the  soul  of  the 
movement  was  in  the  Radicals;  and  while  Casati  wished  to 
come  to  terms  with  Radetzky,  or  at  least  wait  till  Charles 

- Albert  moved,  the  popular  leaders  refused  any  compromise 
! short  of  instant  and  absolute  independence.  It  seemed  a 

esperate  resolve  to  pit  an  unarmed  populace  against  a 
disciplined  army  of  13,000  men.  But  there  was  no  hesita- 

i 1^°’  if  li,  soldiers,  as  they  marched 

' rough  the  streets,  were  attacked  with  tiles  or  stones,  with 
I croc  ery  an  boiling  water  or  oil ; a battalion  was  driven 
back  by  showers  of  empty  wine  bottles;  the  few  guns  that 
ad  been  collected  were  brought  out,  the  armourers’  shops 
were  ransacked;  here  and  there  barricades  were  thrown  up 
It  took  the  troops  six  hours  of  desperate  struggle  to  cut 
•their  way  to  the  Municipal  Palace  of  the  Broletto  and 
capture  its  scantily- armed  defenders.  All  through  the 
: mght  the  young  Radicals,  who  had  directed  the  crowd  in ' 

- the  day,  were  throwing  up  hundreds  of  barricades,  and 
nex  morning  (March  19)  m the  bright  spring  sunshine  the 
hghtmg  was  renewed  with  double  vigour.  The  intoxication 

Cas'atf  ""tw  I-  483,  485  ; II.  16,  183  ; Mario,  I.  74  7,  . 

Ca.,at.,  Jt^vela^^on^,  II.  100;  contra,  lb.  II.  124;  Vimercati, 


2i8  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

of  the  struggle  had  fastened  on  the  city.  There  was  a 
stratum  of  brag  and  cowardice,  but  the  mass  fought  with 
reckless  and  triumphant  bravery.  All  that  came  to  hand 
was  given  to  make  the  barricades;  furniture,  carriages, 
pulpits,  school  benches,  pianofortes,  scenery  from  the  theatres 
were  heaped  pell-mell.  Behind  them  the  few  hundred  who  ^ 
had  guns  kept  at  bay  the  best  troops  of  Austria  ; at  one 
barricade  two  youths  held  back  a company  for  all  a day ; 
women  and  young  boys  fought  and  were  killed.  Above  the 
roar  and  rattle  of  cannon  and  musketry  the  bells  clanged 
out  from  every  steeple,  heartening  the  citizens,  maddening 
the  Austrians.!  all  through  the  fight  the  Lombard 

good-temper  and  mildness  showed  bright.  The  rich  opened 
Their  palaces  to  the  poor  whose  homes  had  been  wrecked. 
There  was  no  crime  in  the  confusion  beyond  a few  tntiing 
thefts,  and  the  poor  brought  in  the  gold  found  in  the 
<rovernment’s  coffers.  The  unspeakable  brutalities  ot  the 
Austrians  met  no  retaliation;  their  prisoners  were  carefully 
tended;  the  hated  police  were  put  in  safety;  and  when 
once  the  crowd  surged  dangerously  round  an  unpopular 
official,  a few  tactful  words  from  Cattaneo  saved  him._ 

Meanwhile  the  Austrians  were  losing  heart.  Reinforce- 
ments had  raised  Radetzky’s  force  to  nearly  20,000  men. 
They  occupied  the  Castle,  the  whole  circuit  of  the  walls, 
and  some  fifty  outposts  in  the  city ; from  the  roof  of  t e 
Cathedral  his  Tyrolese  sharpshooters  picked  oft  all  who 
showed  themselves.  But  the  weather  had  changed,  and 
the  half-starved  soldiers  shivered  in  the  drenching  ram. 
They  could  make  no  head  against  the  barricades  or  tj!® 
showers  of  missiles  that  rained  from  the  house-tops.  The 
din  of  the  bells  crushed  their  spirits ; an  eclipse  frightened 
the  superstitious  Croats.  Demoralization  set  m ; some  ot 
the  Italian  troops  wavered ; others,  especially  the  Moravians 
and  Bohemians,  savage  with  despair,  took  reveng  itroci 

ties  that  recalled  a medieval  sack,  and  Badetz  xs  no 

ashamed  to  tell  his  men  to  massacre  their  priS'  . 'Jd 


1 L Torelli,  5 giornate,  181  ; Meredith,  Vittoria,  309  (ed.  of 

2 Casati,  op.  cit.,  II.,  106  ; Baracchi,  Lutti,  92  ; Archivio  T' 
456  ; Cauth,  UUimi  5 giorni,  68  ; Correspondence— Italy,  II.  2 


e,  II.  444 


THE  NATIONAL  KISING  219 

the  20th  he  was  obliged  to  evacuate  the  Cathedral,  and 
post  after  post  was  stormed  by  the  victorious  citizens,  till 
the  whole  centre  of  the  city  was  free.  He  realized 
that  his  position  was  growing  desperate.  If  the  Pied- 
montese were  to  advance  rapidly,  his  retreat  would  be 
cut  off;  even  if  they  did  not  move,  his  troops  would  be 
starved.  After  an  empty  threat  to  bombard  the  city  (he 
was  not  in  a position  to  do  it  much  damage),  he  proposed 
an  armistice. 

His  letter  came  before  a mixed  body  sitting  at  the  Casa 
Taverna,  which  included  among  others  the  two  uncaptured 
members  of  the  Municipal  Council,  and  the  popular  leaders, 
who,  as  a “Council  of  War,”  had  organised  the  fighting. 
Several  would  have  accepted  his  proposals,  but  the  majority, 
led  by  Cattaneo,  urged  that  whatever  decision  they  came  to,' 
the  people’s  blood  was  up,  and  no  authority  could  make 
them  desist.  ^ They  decided  to  reject  Badetzky’s  terms, 
and  dared  him  to  do  his  worst.^  But  uglier  questions 
remained  behind  to  disturb  the  unity  of  the  movement. 
Should  the  Milanese  appeal  to  Charles  Albert  for  help? 
Though  the  issue  of  the  fight  was  hour  by  hour  less  doubt- 
ful, the  shrewder  heads  saw  that  it  was  only  the  beginning 
of  a long  struggle  in  the  field.  Others  with  less  patriotic 
motives  looked  to  the  Piedmontese  monarchy  to  shelter 
them  from  the  democratic  legislation  of  a republic.  But 
the  majority  of  the  men,  who  had  made  the  movement,  were 
republicans,  who  looked  beyond  Independence  to  a rule  of 
equality  and  large  social  reform;  and  they  were  loath  to 
prejudice  their  cause  by  placing  themselves  under  obliga- 
tion to  a prince  of  Charles  Albert’s  antecedents.  Cattaneo 
narrowed  the  conflict  down  to  a struggle  between  the 
Milanese  democracy  and  the  Austrian  army,  and  hated 
the  Piedmontese  with  all  the  intensity  of  his  factious  and 
intractable  spirit.  But  already  in  the  first  moments  of  the 
struggle  a message  had  been  sent  to  the  King,  and  he  had 

The  evidence  as  to  what  took  place  at  the  Casa  Taverna  is  very  conflict- 
ing; I am  inclined  here,  as  elsewhere,  to  distrust  Cattaneo.  See  his  Insur- 
rezione  52  62  ; Torelli,  ’op.  cit.,  115  ; Casati,  Milano,  409  ; Casati,  Rivelazioni, 
11.158-160;  Bonfadini,  op.  cit.,  322;  Hubner,  Une  annie,  99;  ArcUxio 
1 riennale,  II.  342  ; Tivaroni,  Dominio  austriaco,  I.  434. 


220 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

f 

replied  promising  liis  assistance,  on  condition  that  a formal 
request  came  from  men  of  position  at  Milan,  and  that  some 
pretext  of  violated  territory  could  be  found.  It  was  im- 
possible now  to  refuse  the  offer,  for  outside  the  Casa  Taverna 
political  questions  were  hushed  in  the  single  passion  to 

crush  the  Austrians.  . i ' 

It  was  now  the  eve  of  victory.  Volunteers,  who  had 
hurried  up  from  Monza  and  Como  and  Bergamo,  were 
attacking  the  gates  outside,  and  by_  the  morning  of  the 
22  nd  the  Austrians  had  nothing  left  but  the  Castle  and 
the  walls.  The  Milanese  turned  their  attacks  on  the  gates, 
and  towards  evening,  led  by  the  heroic  young  Manara,  they 
captured  the  Porta  Tosa,  and  allowed  the  volunteers  to  pour 
in.  During  the  night  the  cannon  from  the  Castle  furiously 
bombarded'^the  city;  but  it  was  the  last  effort  of  despairing 
revenge.  For  two  days  past  Radetzky  had  decided  to 
evacuate ; famine  and  demoralization  had  made  his  position 
untenable,  and  even  had  the  Piedmontese  not  stirred,  they 
would  have  driven  him  to  retreat.^  The  despised  and  in- 
sulted populace  of  Milan  had  accomplished  a seemingly 
impossible  thing.  An  undisciplined  crowd,  at  first  almost 
destitute  of  arms  and  always  short  of  powder,  had  routed 
a veteran  army ; and  though  many  things  had  helped  them, 
the  “Five  Days  of  Milan”  were  won  by  hard  fighting  hand- 
to-hand.  No  such  glory  had  come  to  Italian  arms  since 
the  Moscow  campaign. 

Meanwhile  the  whole  country  was  ringing  with  victory. 
Venice  had  freed  herself  almost  without  blood,  and  pro- 
claimed the  Republic  of  St.  Mark.  On  March  17  the  news 
from  Vienna  reached  the  city.  The  crowd  forced  the  prison, 
where  Manin  and  Tommaseo  were  lying,  and  set  them  free. 
Manin  s policy  changed  quick  with  changing  circumstances ; 
the  time  for  legal  methods  had  gone  by,  and  Italy  must 
fight.  The  one  thing  necessary  at  the  moment  was  to  get 
the  Austrians  out  of  the  city  without  a bombardment,  and 

1 Easily  recognizable  as  the  Luciano  Romara  of  Meredith’s  Vittoria. 

2 Austrian  evidence  in  Archivio  Triennale,  II.  45 L 45^,  4^9  I Correspond- 
Italy,  II.  333-334  ; contra,  Schcinhals,  Campagnes,  S5-87. 


THE  NATIONAL  RISING  221 

preserve  order  till  a government  could  be  formed.  The 
task  seemed  well-nigh  hopeless.  The  Austrians  had  7000 
troops  at  call,  and  ships  off  the  Molo,  that  could  reduce  half 
Venice  to  ruins.  But  the  appearances  of  their  strength 
were  deceptive;  half  the  troops  and  most  of  the  sailors 
were  Italians  or  Dalmatians,  and  the  civil  authorities  were 
bewildered  by  Metternich’s  fall  and  the  unknown  at  Vienna. 
Manm  had  no  need  to  rouse  the  people,  for  their  blood  was 
up,  when  on  the  17th  and  again  next  morning  the  troops 
on  the  Piazza  fired  into  the  crowd.  The  tocsin  rang  from 
bt.  Mark’s ; the  tricolor  was  run  up  one  of  the  flagstaffs,  and. 
Its  cords  cut,  hung  mocking  the  Austrians.  Manin  knew 
that  he  could  count  on  the  Venetian  populace,  that  the 
cynics,  who  distrusted  them,  were  bad  measurers  of  human 
forces.  “ You  do  not  understand  them,”  he  answered  • “ my 
one  rnerit  is  that  I do.”  The  cry  for  reprisals  was  adroitly 
turned  to  a demand  for  a citizen  guard  (March  18)  and 
when  the  Governor’s  tardy  authorization  arrived  in  the 
afternoon,  4000  had  been  already  enrolled.  But  the  leaders 
still  paused  before  they  broke  with  the  government.  The 
Municipal  Council  professed  the  strictest  loyalty;  there  was 
a party  for  accepting  the  new  Austrian  constitution.  But 
Manm  and  his  friends,  encouraged  by  the  news  from  Milan 
were  preparmg  to  proclaim  the  Republic  of  St.  Mark.  All’ 
the  tendencies  of  the  age,  he  thought,  made  for  a republic ; 
when  Italian  Unity  came,  Venice  would  bow  to  the  will  of 
the  nation,  but  in  the  meantime  she  was  free  to  take  her 
own  line,  and  Manin  knew  that  the  title,  that  recalled  her 
days  of  greatness,  would  rally  the  populace.  The  immediate 
need,  however,  was  to  seize  the  Arsenal,  and  he  was  already 
making  his  plans  to  capture  it,  when  the  revolution  was 
precipitated  (March  22)  by  the  murder  of  its  hated  Governor 
Marmovich.  Prompt  action  was  needed  to  save  Venice’ 
from  Austrian  revenge,  perhaps  from  anarchy ; and  Manin, 
elated  by  excitement  and  illness  above  common  prudence,’ 
told  the  astonished  Council  that  he  intended  to  drive  the’ 


^ Planat  de  la  Faye,  Documents,  I. 
277-283;  Errera  e Finzi,  Manin, 

I.  71. 


127,  132-133,  149;  La  Forge,  Manin,  I. 
cxxix.  342 ; Tommaseo,  Secondo  esilio. 


222 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


Austrians  out.  With  a few  score  of  citizen  guards  he  hurried  . 
to  the  Arsenal;  he  knew  that  he  had  the  sympathy  of  the 
workmen  there,  and  of  the  hulk  of  the  marines  on  guard. 
Their  attitude  and  Manin’s  self-confidence  frightened  t e 
officer  in  command  into  surrendering  the  keys,  and  the 
greatest  naval  store  in  Italy  was  in  his  hands  With  timid 
men  all  round  him  the  one  strong  man  easily  had  his  will.  | 
He  forced  the  hesitating  councillors  to  follow  his  policy ; he 
made  the  meek  Austrians  promise  to_  evacuate  the  city. 
And  when  they  slunk  away,  he  proclaimed  the  Republic, 
and  became  in  all  hut  name  Dictator. 

All  through  Venetia  and  Lombardy,  as  the  news  from  ^ 
Vienna  passed  from  city  to  city,  it  was  the  sipal  of  revolt. 
Here  and  there  some  of  the  official  and  middle  classes  were 
disposed  to  merge  their  lot  in  the  freer  destinies  that  seemed 
dawning  for  the  Empire.  But,  with  the  one  exception  of 
Lodi  the  masses  hesitated  nowhere.  At  Udine,  Palmanuova 
Treviso  Vicenza,  the  Italian  troops  went  over,  and  except 
Verona  and  Legnago,  all  Venetia  was  free  from  the  Isonzo  to 
the  Adige.  In  Lombardy,  Como  and  Monza  and  Bergamo 
by  hard  street  fighting  forced  the  garrisons  to  capitulate  or 
retire:  at  Cremona  and  Brescia  the  native  regments  frater- 
nized, and  helped  to  drive  out  the  aliens;  Pavia  was  evacu- 
ated ; the  garrison  of  Pizzighittone  went  over  with  its  guns. 
The  scattered  outposts  in  the  valleys  were  helpless  and  the 
mountaineers  seized  every  pass  from  Carniola  and  Cadore 
to  the  Valtelline.  Even  the  Southern  Tyrol  was  on  the 
point  of  revolt,  and  Trent  was  only  saved  to  the  Austrians 
by  stern  repression.'  The  fortresses  of  the  Quadrilatera 
t^mselves  were  all  but  lost.  At  Mantua,  at  Verona  most 
Austrian  of  Italian  cities,  the  troops  wavered,  and  only  the 
timidity  or  treachery  of  the  municipal  authorities  and  the 
Mantuan  bishop  saved  their  garrisons  froni  a doubtful  or 
hopeless  struggle.^  Across  the  Po  Comacchio  siiiTendered 
to  volunteers  from  Ravenna;  the  Papal  government  refused 


. Schonhals,  cp.  cit,  .27:  Cattaneo,  op.  cit.,  154;  contra,  Massarani,  Cor- 

""‘'’schonhals,  0,.  cit.,  too-toy,  ArchH-io  TriennaU,  II.  .3..  2.3-2.7,307- 
309,  541-552;  Polari,  Tazzoh,  19. 


THE  NATIONAL  RISING  223 

to  allow  an  attack  on  Ferrara;  but  outside  its  citadel  and 
the  four  fortresses  of  the  Quadrilateral  no  single  palm  of 
Italian  land  remained  in  Austrian  hands. 

T 1 of  tlie  Five  Days  went  reverberating  through 

taly  Parma,  as  soon  as  the  Austrian  garrison  withdrew 
forced  Its  Duke  to  grant  a constitution,  and  join  the  Italian 
League  with  effusion  of  patriotic  sentiment;  but  concession 
came  too  late,  and  a few  weeks  later,  under  pressure  from 
the  provisional  government,  he  left  the  country.  Piacenza 
drove  the  Jesuits  into  hiding,  and  installed  a government  of 
Its  own.  At  Modena  the  Duke,  frightened  by  the  advance 
of  volunteers  from  Bologna,  fled  with  the  Austrian  garrison 
while  Fivmzano  seized  the  opportunity  to  secede.  At 
Florence  the  crowd  burnt  the  arms  of  the  Austrian  embassy 
and  800  volunteers  started  for  the  field.  The  government’ 
unable  or  unwilling  to  resist,  declared  war,  the  Grand  Duke 
magniloquently  proclaiming  that  “ the  hour  of  Italy’s  resur- 
rection  had  struck,”  and  excusing  himself  to  the  Austrians 
that  he  had  done  it  to  save  his  throne.'  The  volunteers 
from  Bologna,  careless  whether  the  government  permitted 
or  no,  crossed  the  Po  into  Venetia,  where  Zucchi  had  esoaned 
from  imprisonment,  and  was  collecting  a force  of  volunteers 
and  Austrian  deserters.  Three  days  after  the  news  reached 
Rome,  2000  volunteers  were  starting,  and  the  whole  army 
was  ready  to  march.  From  the  cities  of  Romagna,  from  the 
priest-ridden  villages  of  Umbria,  from  the  secluded  valleys  of 
he  Apennines  the  volunteers  poured  in ; 12,000,  it  was  said 
went  now  or  later  from  the  Papal  States.^  Naples  sent  its 
volunteers,  and  the  government,  unable  to  resist  the  pressure 
prepared  to  send  16,000  regulars  under  the  veteran  Pepe’ 

A month  later  even  Sicily  sent  a small  contingent. 

The  national  uprising  carried  all  before  it.  Sicily  in- 
deed was  almost  engrossed  with  its  own  struggle,  and  most 
of  the  peasants  were  little  touched.  But  Pope  and  princes 
statesmen  and  clergy  and  nobles,  students  and  artisans,  all 
classes  in  the  towns,  all  the  middle  classes  alike  in  town  and 
country  were  swept  into  the  mighty  flood  of  patriotism  ; 

' Correspondence— Italy,  II.  209,  314,  346. 

2 Farini,  Roman  State,  II.  25  ; Saffi,  Scritti,  II.  214. 


2 24  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  | 

some  because  they  could  not  resist  the  contagion,  some  I 
with  little  intention  to  sacrifice  their  interests,  some  with 
purpose  to  betray,  but  the  mass  with  the  crusaders’  endiu-  ,! 
siasm  to  free  Lombardy  and  Venetia  from  alien  rule.  There  j 
have  been  greater  risings  to  defend  hearth  and  home  from 
an  invader,  or  where  a government  has  marshalled,  the 
national  forces ; but  few  have  been  popular  and  spontaneous  j 
as  this.  And  in  face  of  its  noble  purpose,  in  face  of  the 
readiness  of  thousands  to  sacrifice  life  and  home,  the  critic 
wUl  pass  lightly  over  the  tearful  fraternising,  the  careless 
optimism,  the  want  of  discipline,  the  easy  discouragement 
and  factiousness,  that  followed.  Students  and  artisans  went, 
leavino-  family  and  study,  to  suffer  and  fight  in  distant  fields ; 
boys  ran  away  from  school  to  the  war,  novices  drilled  in  the 
seminaries;  law,  business,  love  yielded  to  the  passion  for 
arms,  till  Radetzky  exclaimed  that  the  Italian  nature  had 
changed  as  if  by  magic.  Voluntary  gifts  for  the  war-funds 
poured  in  at  the  appeal  of  patriot  priests ; the  rich  broug  t 
cash  and  jewels,  the  poor  their  ornaments,  a young  giid  at 
Bologna,  touched  by  Bassi’s  preaching,  cut  off  her  wealth  ot 
hair  A hallowing  breath  swept  over  the  nation,  brief  as 
such  impulses  must  be,  but  leaving  its  residuum  of  lasting 
gain.  Moralists  appealed  to  the  people  to  give  up  the  lottery, 
to  work  instead  of  begging,  to  live  lives  worthy  of  their 
uprisen  country.  The  priests  blessed  the  flags,  and  with  the 
crusader’s  cross  upon  their  breasts  the  volunteers  went  out 
to  fight  in  a holy  causG. 

But  the  Italians  had  the  common-sense  to  remember  that 
enthusiasm  alone  was  a poor  match  for  bayonets.  Radetzky 
was  leading  to  the  Quadrilateral  a shaken  but  still  redoubt- 
able army,  and  only  Piedmont  could  send  a disciplined  force 
to  cope  with  it.  Turin  responded  quickly  to  the  call  horn 
Milan  On  the  second  of  the  Five  Days  the  roads  to  the  Ticino 
were  already  crowded  ivith  people  hurrying  to  the  fight;  in 
some  towns  the  whole  able-bodied  population,  it  is  said 
pressed  to  be  enrolled.  Civilians  and  soldiers  demonstrated 
Lcitedly  at  Turin ; Cavour  publicly  and  privately  urged,  “ the 
war,  the  war,  and  no  delay.”  It  was  a moment  for  prompt 


THE  NATIONAL  RISING 


225 

a considerable 


action.  A few  hours  would  have  brought  a considerable 
orce  m rent  o Milan;  and  though  the  strength  of  the 

ijZ  Tt  7;  demanded  that 

Riedmont  should  at  once  range  itself  by  the  side  of  Lom- 

Albert  to 

W off  lb ambitions  to  wreak  his  revenge  on  Austria,  to 

' 7 ^ y®ars  and  show  himself 

in  truth  the  “sword  of  Italy,”  the  “great  captain  ” of  his 
lourtiers  praises.  The  French  Revolution  had  given  its 

•vMrPd‘7'‘“'^  ^7  iiot  without  cause,  that  if  he 

waited,  he  would  find  the  Republic  in  Lombardy,  and  even 

ns  OTO  throne  shaken  beyond  recovery.^  He  lent  his  ear 
^o  a Savoyard  nun  who  wrote  of  celestial  visions  and  the 
glory  that  awaited  if  he  chose  the  patriot’s  part.  He  saw 

toh“7T'‘^  “‘I  bis  people,  and  with  big 

teith  m the  popular  voice  held  that  “a  whole  people  could 

ot  desire  an  evil  thing.”  And  yet  he  paused;  he  shrank 

Mm-  he  r^7Tb  democratic  tempest  that  called 

urn,  he  feared  the  rebuke  of  European  diplomacy  the 

reproac  that  he  had  allied  himself  with  revolution  The 

/’hreatT  or^l  P^®dge  to  Austria, 

.hreats  of  Palmerston  s supreme  displeasure,  stood  up  to 

hold  him  back.  War,  he  realized,  perhaps  he  hoped,  must 

come;  but  it  must  be  war  on  the  old  precedents,  conforming 

-anction  m the  people’s  rights,  and  recked  not  of  custom 

o'lb  T-f ^ conditions  of  his  promise 

to  the  Milanese  were  satisfied,  and  he  had  assured  himself 
that  their  movement  was  not  republican.  But  his  ministers 
7 «‘dl  irresolute.  The  two  Genoese, 

w^r  an7  1 b®  immediate 

^ar  and  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that  their  colleagues 

brous-7!b°''^'''  morrow  messengers  from  Milan 

5?  “d  the  King,  wearing  the 

hat  7 7®  ‘°ben  to  the  crowd 

,hat  he  had  given  himself  to  the  nation’s  cause.  Two  days 


: Bonfadini,  op.  cU.,  290 ; Cavour 
MiJio  Triennale,  uT'os  ''  ’ ®"'’«^P‘>“<ieDce-ItaIy,  II.  ,84; 

VOL.  I. 


226  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

later  lie  issued  his  proclamation  to  the  “ Peoples  of  Lombardy 
and  Venetia.”  offering  in  the  name  of  God  and  the  Pope 
the  help  that  “ brother  expects  from  brother  and  fnen 
from  friend.”  And  yet  with  "i“®a,ning  and  useless 
duplicity  Pareto  protested  to  Ausma  and  England  that  th> 
King  had  only  intervened  to  avoid  a republican  rnovemem 
in  Lombardy  and  Piedmont.^  If  Charles  Albert  knew  the 
diplomatic  trick,  it  augured_  ill  for  the  future  that  he  wen 
to  the  war  with  a lie  upon  his  lips. 


1 Bia.nc\xi,  Di'plomazia,^.  172;  Correspondence- 
Bastide,  RepuUique  francaise,  38. 


-Ttaly,  II.  i85s  292, 


CHAPTER  XII 

the  war 

march MAY  1848 

Radetzky’s  retreat;  tlie  Milanese  after  the  Five  Days;  Piedmontese 
advance  ; the  two  armies  ; the  Volunteers  ; Santa  Lucia.  Beginnings 
of  dmsion ; Albeetism  ; Piedmont  and  the  League.  The  Pope  and 

BozJir  ’ T®  29-  Napfes:  Ferdinand  and 

Bozzelh;  Troya  ministry;  the  Counter-Revolution  Charles 

L near'd  “*7“  I^o“bardy : question  Fusion 

plebiscite!  “ the  Provisional  Government;  the 

While  Charles  Albert  was  making  up  his  mind,  Radetzky 
was  dragging  his  slow  retreat  along  the  Lombard  roads  He 
was  following  the  recognized  rules  of  strategy,  which  bade 
Him  retreat  to  the  Quadrilateral.  But  with  an  alerter 
enemy  the  march  would  have  been  full  of  danger  His 
retreating  column  was  fifteen  miles  long,  his  soldiers  ex- 
hausted and  demoralized ; between  the  Po  and  lower  Adige 
stretched  “the  net”  of  irrigated  country,  with  its  intricacies 
ot  canals  and  rice-marshes  and  plantations.  Had  a few 
well-generalled  guerilla-bands  cut  the  roads  and  harassed 
ihe  enemy  s long  trail  with  sharpshooters,  Radetzky’s  march 
would  have  been  sufficiently  delayed  for  the  Piedmontese  to 
get  between  him  and  Verona  and  gain  an  easy  victory  over 
his  weary  and  dispirited  troops.  But  the  Milanese  were 
Uruck  with  a strange  paralysis.  Exhausted  after  the  five 
days  strain,  they  and  their  leaders  thought  that  the  war 
was  at  an  end,  or  that  at  least  the  responsibility  might  be 
safely  shifted  to  the  Piedmontese.  The  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, which  had  been  formed  at  the  end  of  the  Five  Days 

f vf  property,  which  was  in  no  danger,’ 

I hd  dreaded  the  Volunteers  as  a possibly  republican  force. 


22  8 A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Only  a few  hundreds  started  for  the  field  and  the  men,  who 
Ld^een  heroes  in  the  Five  Days,  now  preferred  to  caricature 
Sdetzky  rather  than  pursue  him.  The  Austrian  rule  was 
bearing  L fruit;  incapacity  in  the  leaders,  want  of  sacrifice 
in  the^masses  were  the  inevitable  results  of  a tyranny  that 

sucked  out  the  virility  of  the  people.  Charles 

The  Piedmontese  in  their  turn  lost  their  chance.  Charles 

Albert  with  all  his  superb  courage  m the  field,  carried  h 
3 fViP  rmmcils  of  War,  and  was  obsessed  by 

«.v™.  iu  hi.  ..^1  H«1  tta 

Pi&Jmontese  possw,..!  a commander  of  genius,  e ^ 

hurried  a f«reo  down  ik*  f 

before  reinforcements  reached  it  (March  3 )• 
sion  of  Mantua  would  have  carried  with  it  the  fall  o 
Leona^ro  and  Ferrara,  and  Radetzky,  driven  back  on  Verona 
and  Peschiera,  with  the  Tyrol  held  by  the  Volunteei-s  and 
nerhaps  in  full  revolt,  would  have  been  surrounded  and 
starved  into  surrender.  But  the  splendid  ^ ^ 

missed  The  main  army,  23,000  strong,  crossed  the  Iicino 
at  Pavia  on  the  25  th,  hut  it  was  nine  days  before  h re^aj^ed 

Cremona  five  more  before  it  was  on  t i n j 

was  easily  taken  (April  8),  and  most  of  the  force  had  crossed 
the  river^  by  the  i ith.  Radetzky,  well-nigh  despairmg  of 
succ^sr  and  expecting  to  be  recalled  to  defend  the  Emperor  s 
pers^’  withdrew  wLin  Verona,  after  inflicting  severe 
Leeks’  on  the  Volunteers  both  to  east  and  west.  As  t _ 

g«i.o..  cm.  in,  k.  >“^T'‘^"°C°urP.‘s° 

the  great  Quadrilateral  fortresses  of  Verona,  Mantua, 
‘'^'®His“iRioT*ough  far  from 

one  vLna  and  Mantua  were  fortresses  of  the  first  order 
and  the  road  to  the  Tyrol  was  still  open.  With  a perversio 
of  national  enthusiasm  all  Austoian  parties  “ 

keepina  their  heel  on  the  Italian  provinces  and  the  ve  y 
VieLe°se  students,  who  had  overthrown 
volunteered  to  fight  against  the  cause  of  liberty  m Italy. 

1 Ufficiale  Piemontese,  Memorie,  451. 

2 Ib.  454 ; Bava,  ReLazione,  10 ; Pepe,  Events,  I.  301- 

3 Sordello’s  birthplace. 


THE  WAR  229 

The  Austrian  army,  strange  compound  as  it  was  of  half-a- 
dozen  nationalities,  had  its  strong  cementing  esprit-de-corps. 
Even  most  of  the  Italian  troops  that  still  remained  with 
their  colours  proved  their  loyalty  of  the  staunchest;  and 
while  the  ill-pieced  Empire  seemed  falling  into  ruin,  the 
clash  of  nationalities  was  unknown  here,  where  Czech  and 
German,  Magyar  and  Slav  and  Italian,  stood  shoulder  to 
shoulder,  a mighty  testimony  to  the  power  of  discipline 
to  weld  discordant  elements  into  one. 

The  Piedmontese  army  had  now  45?ooo  men  encamped  on 
both  banks  of  the  Mincio.  On  their  extreme  right,  in  front 
of  Mantua,  were  12,000  more,  Tuscans  and  Neapolitans  and 
Modenese.  Four  thousand  volunteers  were  in  the  Tyrol,  and 
in  Venetia,  or  about  to  enter  it,  were  some  30,000,  Romans, 
Venetians,  and  deserters  from  the  Austrian  army.  The 
Piedmontese  troops  were  of  fine  calibre,  their  artillery  and 
cavalry  superior  to  the  Austrian,  the  men  throughout  more 
than  a match  for  the  enemy  in  courage,  its  inferior  in  train- 
ing and  equipment;  the  officers  as  brave  as  their  men, 
though  often  moved  only  by  their  loyalty  to  the  King  to 
fight  for  a cause  they  suspected  or  disliked.  The  generals, 
except  perhaps  Bava  and  the  King  s second  son,  the  Duke  of 
Genoa,  had  small  experience  or  talent ; least  capable  of  all 
was  the  unhappy  King,  who,  tortured  by  scruples,  ill  at 
ease  even  in  fulfilling  his  ambitions,  planned  his  campaign 
m the  inspiration  of  prayer  or  the  counsels  of  a visionary 
nun,  and  made  his  troops  march  late  to  battle  rather  than 
let  them  miss  Mass.  He  had  the  weak  man’s  fault  of 
neither  asserting  nor  suppressing  himself,  and  confusion 
reigned  in  the  Councils  of  War.  The  commissariat  and 
ambulance  services  were  unorganized,  and  food  accumulated 
in  magazines  while  the  troops  were  sometimes  starving. 

While  Charles  Albert  kept  his  army  for  a fortnight  in 
gloomy  inaction  in  front  of  Verona,  the  Volunteers  were 
pushmg  vigorously  forward.  They  were  a strangely  mixed 
collection  of  every  age  and  rank  and  province ; young  men 
of  education  and  sometimes  of  high  birth,  students  and 
artizans,  veterans  who  had  fought  at  the  Borodino  or  at 
Waterloo,  middle-aged  gold-spectacled  professors,  peasants. 


2 30  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Austrian  deserters,  smugglers,  the  flower  and  the  dregs  of 
society;  some  moved  by  patriotism,  some  by  love  of  excite- 
ment and  action,  a few  by  hope  of  license  and  plunder. 
They  were  brave,  though  liable  to  panics,  the  best  with 
plenty  of  dash;  on  the  whole  a rough,  impatient  crew,  who 
would  swim  a river  under  the  enemy’s  guns  to  pick  wild 
flowers  for  their  captain,  but  would  as  readily  mutiny,  it 
crossed.  Men  of  rough  life  were  among  them  and  some- 
times lawless  deeds  disgraced  them.  Often  the  first  en- 
thusiasm vanished  in  the  face  of  hunger  and  exposure. 
But  there  were  many  who,  at  Curtatone  and  on  the  btelvio, 
at  Vicenza  and  Venice,  showed,  in  despite  of  discourap- 
ment  and  disillusion,  that  enthusiasm  could  be  a match 
for  the  discipline  of  veterans.  The  bulk  of  tpm  ^eje  m 
Venetia.  The  4000  who  composed  the  “Army  of  the 
Alps”  the  volunteers  from  Milan  and  Genoa  and  Parma, 
had  they  had  a few  regulars  to  support  them,  might  have 
kept  the  insurrection  alive  in  the  Tyrol,  and  harassed  or 
cut  off  Radetzky’s  communications.  They  had  “amp 
straight  to  the  Lago  di  Garda,  where  Manara  cptured  the 
Austrian  steamers  at  Said  (April  3);  and  severely  punished 
at  Castelnuovo,  they  converged  on  the  Tyrol  pushing  on  as 
far  as  the  Val  di  Non.  But  Welden,  hastily  collectmg  a 
small  force  in  the  German  Tyrol,  crushed  an  mcipient  replt 
at  Trent,  and  drove  back  their  whole  line  to  the  Tonale  Pass 
and  the  lower  Chiese  (April  20).  A wise  policy  would  hap 
linked  a few  regulars  to  give  them  steadiness , pt  Ghar  e 
Albert,  ostensibly  afraid  to  weaken  his  mam  force,  more 
really  because  he  feared  the  diplomatic  complications  which 
might  follow  an  invasion  of  the  Tyrol,  and  not  unwillmg  to 
see  the  Volunteers  discredited,  ordered  them  to  retire  to 
Brescia  and  Bergamo  to  be  incorporated  m the  newl^formed 
Lombard  regiments.  A few  only  were  left  under  Giacomo 

Durando  to  hold  tliG  Tonale. 

Meanwhile  the  army  had  been  wasting  its  chancp  m use- 
less manoeuvres  and  empty  demonstrations  against  pppera 
and  Mantua.  At  the  end  of  April  its  lines  exten^d  from 
the  south-east  bank  of  Garda  to  Villafranca,  spthof  Verona 
with  the  heights  of  Sommacampagna  for  their  key,  thus 


231 


THE  WAR 

isolating  Pesohiera,  siege-guns  to  attack  which  were  coming 
up.  To  the  south  the  Tuscans  and  Neapolitans  were  watch- 


Plan  to  Illustrate  Campaigns  of  1848,  1859,  1866. 
" Railways  in  working  in  June  1859. 


Scale  in  English  Miles. 


ing  Mantua  at  Curtatone  and  Montanara.  Radetzky’s  only 
outlet  was  through  the  Tyrol,  and  after  a victory  at  Pas- 


232  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

trengo  (April  30),  the  Piedmontese  might  have  occupied  the 
historic  position  of  Rivoli,  and  ringed  him  in  till  want  of 
supplies  drove  him  to  offer  battle.  But  the  political  situa- 
tion made  it  almost  imperative  to  gain  a speedy  and 
decisive  victory.  The  Veronese  sent  word  to  the  King 
that  an  assault  on  the  suburbs  would  be  followed  by  a 
rising  in  the  city  itself;  and  he  attacked  the  low  chain  of 
hills,  which  lay  between  his  lines  and  the  city,  covered  by 
the  gardens  and  mulberry  plantations  of  Santa  Lucia  and 
other  villages  (May  6).  In  spite  of  the  difficult  ground,  the 
plan  might  have  succeeded  but  for  the  accustomed  faults 
of  tactics.  The  Piedmontese  artillery  was  as  usual  well 
served;  and  though  their  left  was  badly  checked,  the 
splendid  rush  of  the  centre  carried  Santa  Lucia,  and  cut  the 
enemy’s  line  in  two.  The  object  of  the  battle  had  been 
gained,  when  the  King,  with  his  fatal  timidity  of  judgment, 
decided  to  evacuate  the  village  and  retire  to  his  hnes.  It 
was  an  almost  irreparable  blunder.  It  lost  the  Italians  their 
last  chance  of  capturing  Verona  before  Radetzkys  reinforce- 
ments arrived ; worse  than  that,  it  destroyed  the  prestige  of 
victory,  which  had  hitherto  been  theirs.  Splendid  as  had 
been  the  courage  of  the  great  majority  of  the  troops,  the 
patent  incapacity  of  the  generals,  the  cowardice  of  a few 
regiments,  the  sense  of  virtual  defeat  robbed  the  army  of  its 
confidence ; and  though  the  Piedmontese  soldier  was  made 
of  stuff  too  tenacious  to  be  soon  demorahzed,  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  situation,  alike  military  and  political,  rapidly 
thickened. 

What  Mazzini  had  always  foreseen  was  coming  to  pass. 
It  was  impossible  for  one  prince  to  become  the  leader  of 
the  national  movement  without  exciting  the  jealousy  of  the 
others.  Every  Italian  throne  had  its  petty  territorial  ambi- 
tions ; Rome  had  claims  on  Parma  and  Rovigo,  Naples  on  An- 
cona ; 1 Tuscany  and  Piedmont  had  rival  designs  to  annex  the 
Lunigiana  and  Massa-Carrara.  Perhaps  already  both  Charles 
Albert  and  Leopold  were  dreaming  of  bringing  the  Sicilian 

1 Minghetti,  Ricordi,  II.  212;  Gualterio,  Rivolgimenti,  II.  226  n. 


THE  WAR 


233 


crown  into  their  families.^  Nor  were  these  provincial  jeal- 
ousies confined  to  the  courts.  Alike  in  Tuscany  and  Rome 
and  Naples  there  were  important  sections  who  dreaded  above 
all  things  annexation  to  Piedmont.  Their  fears  were  not  un- 
grounded ; there  were  Unitarians,  who  would  have  liked  to 
see  Charles  Albert  King  of  all  Italy,  just  as  there  were  a few 
who  would  have  egged  on  Leopold  or  Ferdinand  to  bid  for 
the  Italian  crown  ; in  some  of  the  cities  there  were  Maz- 
zinians,  who  still  aspired  to  a republic  of  united  Italy And 
though  the  avowed  friends  of  Unity  of  whatever  shade  were 
weak  at  present,  a powerful  constitutional  kingdom  in  North 
Italy  would  form  a magnet  to  which  at  all  events  Bologna 
and  Florence  would  gravitate.  The  Albertists  had  been 
aggressively  imprudent,  and  there  was  a wide-spread  sus- 
picion that  Piedmontese  agents  were  at  work  throuo-hout 
the  peninsula.  No  doubt  since  D’Azeglio’s  mission  to 
Romagna  there  had  been  a group  of  men,  who  had  preached 
salvation  through  Charles  Albert.  Agents,  authorized  or  un- 
authorized, had  been  fixing  the  ideas  that  Balbo  and  D’Azeglio 
had  suggested, 3 and  since  the  war  broke  out  they  had  been 
especially  busy  in  the  Lunigiana  and  at  Modena  and  Parma, 
balvagnoli  and  Berchet  at  Florence,  Spaventa  at  Naples,  to 
a certain  extent  Mamiani  at  Rome,  favoured  a strong  Italian 
kingdom  under  the  House  of  Savoy.^  How  far  the  Albertists 
were  aiming  at  annexation  it  is  hard  to  say.^  No  doubt 
some,  at  all  events  in  the  Legations  and  at  Leghorn,  would 
have  liked  to  force  Charles  Albert’s  hand  by  a plebiscite  for 
union  to  Piedmont;'’  but  though  the  Statute  spoke  of  the 
Kings  “ Italian  crown,”  there  is  little  evidence  to  show  how 


nn  "I'’  II-  543-546  ; D’ADCona,  Amari,  I.  255  ; see  below, 

PP.  250,  314. 

J Tivaroni,  Dominio  amtriaeo,  II.  32,  40;  Nisco,  Ferdinands  //.,  88  : Farini 
Lettere  75  ; Orsim  etc.,  Lettere,  77,  82,  186,  191  ; Gori,  Rivoluzione,  92,  95.  ’ 

Archzvw  Trier^,  I.  56-60,  109 ; Ricasoli,  Lettere,  I.  231-232,  235  ; Saffl 
Scritti,!.  125;  Indirizzo  degli  Italiani.  ^ 

07>ereS“l!°7i°^’  '^48,  25-28,  37;  Gioberti, 

eit  f ^rnarei;  Id.,  Operette,  I.  85-89;  Ricasoli,  op. 

TinH  5 > Gremelli,  Sicilia,  8;  Bosio,  ViZlamarina,  80-81  ; with  (ii) 

.nclS’t!!  «9  ; Ventura,  Essal,  608  (r;hich  I am 

inclined  to  disbelieve).  See  below,  p.  2<;c. 

® See  below,  p.  240. 


2 34  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

far  lie  knew  or  approved  their  plans.i  There  can  be  no  doubt 
however  that  visions  of  expansion  had  floated  before  the  eyes 
of  his  statesmen,  and  prompted  their  mysterious  attitude 
towards  the  League.  After  the  French  Revolution  they  had 
aaain  thrown  every  difficulty  in  its  way,  on  the  pretence  that 
a°lea<^ue  without  Naples  in  it  was  valueless ; and  when  Naples 
announced  its  adhesion  (March  1 5),  Tuscany  had  m its  turn 
grown  suspicious  of  Piedmont.  As  soon  as  war  was  declared, 
the  Pope,  anxious  for  anything  to  which  he  could  shift  his 
responsibility,  again  picked  up  the  threads  of  the  negotia- 
tions, and  found  Tuscany  and  Naples  willmg  to  fall  m ; but 
Pareto  brusquely  replied  that  the  war  was  all-important,  and 
put  in  a counter-scheme  of  an  offensive  alliance,  io  this 
Naples  at  all  events  was  willing  to  adhere ; hut  the  Pope  s 
reluctance  gave  Pareto  his  opportunity  to  break  out  ot  any 
arrangement  which  might  tie  his  hands.  He  sent  his  flnal 
refusal  to  join  the  league  on  April  i8,  and  the  Popes  disap- 
pointment at  missing  a peaceful  solution,  his  anger  at  the 
loss  of  Parma,  his  suspicions  that  Piedmont  was  aiming  a,t 
Romagna  and  Naples  at  the  Marches,  fell  in  only  too  well 
with  other  tendencies  to  turn  him  from  the  cause. 

The  war  was  supremely  distasteful  to  him.  In  the 
moment  of  enthusiasm  indeed  he  had  attributed  the  events 
of  March  to  Providence.  He  was  patriot  enough  to  wish 
to  see  Italy  victorious,  provided  he  escaped  responsibility  m 
the  eyes  of  Germany.  But  he  was  less  patriot  than  Pope ; 
he  cared  perhaps  less  for  national  independence  than  tor 
the  recovery  of  those  Italian  territories,  to  which  the  Papacy 
treasured  shadowy  titles.  He  feared  that  the  war  might 
prove  a crucible,  from  which  Italy  would  emerge  in  trans- 
muted form,  perhaps  with  little  room  for  even  a reformed 
Papal  government.  And  so  he  blessed  the  flags  when 
the  troops  started  for  the  war,  but  he  ordered  Giovanni 
Durando,  their  general,  not  to  cross  the  frontier,  except  to 

^ I.  ; Bianchi, 

177-180  472-477;  D'Azeglio  e Gualteno,  Carteggw,  25,  Farmi,  Homan 
state  n 96-98  ; Costa  de  Beauregard,  Derniires  armies,  181 ; Gioberti,  RmM- 
22S;  Massari.  Casi  di  Napoli.  ..9,  133  5 Leopardi,  Narrazroru. 

167,  170.  See  above,  pp.  i88,  216. 


THE  WAR  235 

Mcupy  Rovigo,  at  which  his  claims  of  possession  aimed. 
He  was  troubled  too  by  the  temper  of  Rome.  When  the 
Jesuits  were  attacked,  he  paraded  his  sympathy  for  his 
“unwearied  fellow-workers  in  the  vineyard  of  the  Lord” 
and  threatened  to  leave  the  city  if  the  disturbances  con- 
tinued. Fretful,  ill  at  ease,  clinging  to  his  popularity,  but 
ever  less  in  sympathy  with  the  new  democratic  and  nation- 
alist developments,  he  had  already  lent  his  ears  to  sinister 
counsels.  Always  oblique  in  his  methods,  he  had  learnt  to-^ 
hght  his  ministers  by  ruse  or  inaction;  or  sometimes  he 
would  fortify  himself  in  the  obstinacy  of  his  narrow  con- 
science, and  startle  them  with  some  sudden  and  perverse  re- 
solution.  The  condition  of  Rome  grew  worse.  The  needs  of 
the  war  had  driven  the  government  to  issue  a forced  cur- 
rency. The  pauper  classes  rioted  for  bread,  and  Ciceruacchio 
threatened  to  levy  toll  on  the  rich  unless  they  contributed 
to  the  war  fund.  The  limitations  of  the  franchise  dissatisfied 
even  some  of  the  Moderates,  and  a vigorous  section  was  agi- 
tetmg  for  a wider  suffrage  and  the  convocation  of  an  Italian 
Hiet  at  Rome.  The  provinces,  more  intent  on  the  war,  cared 
less  for  political  refoms,  but  were  resolute  that  the  state 
should  take  its  part  in  the  struggle  on  the  Mincio.  The 
ministry  tried  in  vain  to  extract  an  explicit  pronouncement 
from  the  Pope.  He  angrily  repudiated  an  order  of  the  day 
in  which  Durando  had  told  his  soldiers  that  the  Pope  blessed 
their  swords ; but  a few  days  later  he  spoke  of  “ obeying  cir- 
cumstances,” and  gave  his  implied  consent  that  the  troops 
^ould  cross  the  Po.  Acting  on  this,  the  ministry  ordered 
Durando  to  advance  (April  i8).i  But  the  Pope  would  not 
see  his  name  Imked  with  Charles  Albert’s  in  the  battle-cry 
of  the  new  crusade.  Threats  of  schism  came  from  the 
Cerman  bishops,  and  he  was  prepared  to  sacrifice  anything 
rather  than  be  the  cause  of  such  scandal  to  the  Church 
When  his  ministers  defended  Durando,  he  took  refuge  in 
seclusion.  Suddenly,  with  the  spasmodic  energy  of  a weak 
man  who  feels  his  hands  being  forced,  he  broke  silence  with 


62  , ‘’P-  I-  366,  421 ; Pasolini,  op.  cit.,  60;  Farini,  op.  cit.,  II 

respond:nc;-14l“^  “ '' 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


236 

an  Allocution,^  which  marked  his  final  secession  from  the 
nationalist  camp  (April  29). 

The  Allocution  was  an  apology  to  the  German  Catholics. 
War  with  Austria,  it  declared,  was  “wholly  abhorrent  from 
the  counsels  ” of  a Pope,  who  “ regarded  and  loved  with  equal 
affection  all  peoples,  races,  and  nations.”  It  was  the  logical 
statement  of  his  position  as  Catholic  pontiff;  it  marked 
none  the  less  his  impotence,  as  an  Italian  prince,  to  take 
a side  in  the  bigger  problems  which  distracted  Europe.  At 
Rome  it  exploded  his  dwindling  popularity;  for  two  or  three 
days  the  state  was  practically  without  a government,  and  a 
considerable  party  called  for  his  deposition  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  a Provisional  Government.  Pius  was  frightened ; 
he  had  not  realized  how  completely  the  Encyclical  would 
sunder  him  from  the  Liberals ; he  had  even  thought  that 
its  implicit  sanction  of  the  Volunteers  would  please  them. 
He  was  grieved  that  it  should  be  interpreted  as  an  anti- 
nationalist manifesto ; he  was  willing  even  to  promise  to 
take  part  in  the  war  in  the  capacity  of  an  Italian  prince.  But 
Antonelli,  despite  the  irritation  he  professed  against  the  Pope, 
suppressed  his  intended  eirenicon,  and  substituted  a memorial 
confirming  the  worst  interpretations  of  the  Encyclical.^  The 
Pope  tried  in  his  good  feeble  way  to  repair  the  mischief. 
He  wrote  to  the  Emperor,  asking  him  to  surrender  his 
Italian  provinces,  and  promised  Charles  Albert  to  allow 
the  Papal  troops  to  march,  if  Austria  refused  the  olive- 
branch.^  But  this  was  not  known  to  the  public,  and  he  was 
forced  to  see  that  the  appointment  of  a popular  ministry 
was  the  only  means  of  laying  the  storm.  He  dismissed 
Antonelli,  and  commissioned  Mamiani  to  form  a cabinet. 

The  Encyclical  was  followed  by  the  defection  of  Naples. 
Between  a disloyal  king  and  a nerveless  people  the  country 
had  sat  ill  in  its  constitutional  dress.  Bozzelli  paralyzed  the 
cabinet — already  the  second  since  the  granting  of  the  Con- 


^ According  to  Finali,  Conteraporanei,  265,  the  Pope  professed  that  a 
celestial  visitor  dictated  it.  It  is  generally  called  an  Encyclical. 

2 Pasolini,  op.  cit,  69-71  ; Minghetti,  op.  cit.,  I.  372,  380. 

^ Costa  de  Beauregard,  op.  cit.,  206. 


THE  WAR  237 

i stitution — and  Saliceti,  the  one  strong  man  in  it,  resigned. 
The  King  had  taken  Bozzelli’s  measure,  and  knew  that  he 
could  fascinate  and  mould  to  his  liking  the  pedant,  whose 
theoretic  belief  in  firm  government  was  only  the  cover  of  an 
unstable  courtier  spirit.  Even  a stronger  ministry  would 
^ have  found  its  path  strewn  with  difficulties.  The  press 
gave  no  light,  and  lent  itself  to  violent  and  undignified 
I abuse.  The  country  tossed  with  chronic  unrest,  and  the 
I masses  were  finding  that  liberty  did  not  necessarily  mean 
bread.  The  old  police  had  vanished  without  any  force  to 
take  their  place,  and  some  of  the  provinces  were  in  a state 
of  mild  anarchy.  The  peasants,  who  cared  little  or  nothing 
for  a constitution,  divided  up  the  commo-ns,  or  appropriated 
land  to  which  they  had  old  claims.  The  Radicals  were  dis- 
contented with  the  Statute,  its  narrow  franchise  and  its  “House 
of  Peers”;  and  Saliceti  voiced  their  demands  by  calling 
tor  an  extension  of  the  suffrage,  an  elective  Second  Chamber 
and  immediate  hostilities  with  Austria.  The  agitation  forced' 
the  ministry  to  resign,  and  for  the  moment  the  King  was 
inclmed  to  bow  to  the  storm  and  commission  Pepe  to  form  a 
ministry.  But  Pepe  asked  for  as  much  as  Saliceti  (April  i ), 
and  the  King,  quickly  recovering,  determined  to  fight  his 
ground  inch  by  inch.  Carlo  Troya,  the  historian,  was 
made  premier  (April  4),  a gentle,  honourable  man,  but 
more  at  home  m literature  than  politics,  a poor  pilot  in  such 
stormy  times.  His  ministry,  whether  willingly  or  not  was 
obliged  to  compromise  with  the  Radicals,  and  extend  the 
franchise  slightly,  leaving  the  question  of  the  Upper  House 
with  other  modifications  of  the  constitution  for  Parliament 
to  settk  And,  however  halting  on  matters  of  domestic 
reform,  Troya  declared  frankly  for  war  and  adhesion  to  the 
Italian  League.  A regiment  was  despatched  at  once  to  Lom- 
ba,rdy  to  fight  for  “ the  common  country,”  and  Pepe  was  to 
follow  with  the  main  army.  But  the  cabinet  had  no  courage 
to  bear  down  the  difiiculties  that  thickened  on  it,  from  King 
and  officials  on  one  hand,  from  republicans  and  socialists  on 
the  other.  The  reactionaries  were  probably  fomenting  agra- 
rian troubles,  and  a priest  near  Salerno  preached  communism 
from  the  pulpit.  Official  circulars  encouraged  the  peasants 


2 38  A HISTOBY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

to  hope  for  partitions  of  demesne  land,  and  spoke  of  “ the 
intolerable  obligation  on  agriculturists  to  work  for  a master.” 

The  King  saw  his  opportunity.  After  the  French  Bevolu- 
tion  he  had  lost  heart  and  drifted,  schemed  perhaps  to  use 
the  Liberals  to  win  back  Sicily  and  partition  Italy  between 
Charles  Albert  and  himself.'  But  he  had  no  scruples  about  , 
playing  the  traitor,  and  he  now  saw  with  glee  that  the  dread  I 
of  socialism  and  the  weakness  of  the  government  were  givmg  7 
the  reactionaries  their  chance  of  recovery.  The  Encychoal  i| 
had  rallied  the  clergy  to  their  cause ; threatened  with  attack 
from  the  civil  power,  the  priests  spread  the  cry  that  religion 
was  in  danger,  and  the  sacristies  of  Naples  were  so  many 
nests  of  treason.  San  Gennaro’s  blood  refused  to  liquefy, 
till  the  national  guard  frightened  the  archbishop  and  made 
the  miracle  work.  An  active  camarilla  of  courtiers  and  officers 
was  preparing  for  a blow.  Believing,  with  reason,  that  the  ^ 
Liberals  wanted  to  send  the  army  to  the  north  to  have  a 
free  hand  at  home,  they  agitated  against  the  war  and  raised 
the  spectre  of  Albertism.  The  King  himself  probably  took 
no  active  part  in  the  plot,  but  was  careful  that  it  had  free  play. 

Meanwhile  the  elections  had  taken  place,  but  so  indif- 
ferent was  the  mass  of  the  people,  that  only  one-fifth  of  the 
electors  went  to  the  poll.  Moderate  Liberals  were  returned 
almost  everywhere,  and  save  for  a handful  of  reactionaries 
and  a score  of  Kadicals,  the  deputies  were  of  the  same 
featureless,  compromising  cast  as  the  ministers.  Parlia- 
ment was  to  meet  on  May  i 5 ; two  days  previously  most 
of  the  deputies  were  in  Naples,  holding  a semi-official  con- 
ference in  the  ward  of  Monteoliveto.  They  came  ready  to 
suspect,  and  a seemingly  inoffensive  incident  fed  then- 
humour.  From  the  official  programme  for  the  coming 
ceremony  it  transpired  that  they  would  be  asked  to  ti^e 
an  oath  to  maintain  the  existing  constitution.  Probably 
it  originated  in  Bozzelli’s  pedantry,  and  no  subterfuge  was 
intended ; but  the  deputies  regarded  it  as  a ruse  to  pledge 
them  against  the  democratic  reforms,  which  the  go^^n- 
ment  had  promised  that  they  should  consider.  The 

1 Leopardi,  op.  cit.,  96,  115,  122;  « documenti,  141-144;  Tivaroni,  op. 

cit.,  III.  198. 


THE  WAR  239 

ministers  and,  with  some  hesitation,  the  King  offered  to  waive 
the  formula,  and  even  make  specific  allusion  to  reform  ^ 
But  there  were  forces  at  work  on  both  sides  to  make  com- 
promise impossible.  Extremists  from  Calabria  and  Salerno, 
together  with  some  national  guards,  were  preparing  for  civil 
war,  and  in  the  tension  and  uncertainty,  before  the  King 
gave  way,  some  barricades  had  been  thrown  up.  It  was  a 
fatal  error,  so  palpable  in  the  retrospect,  that  after-efforts 
were  made  to  charge  it  to  the  plottings  of  the  Camarilla 
But  though  Its  agents  may  have  been  at  work,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  it  was  the  republicans  who  raised  the 
barricades,  apparently  with  some  strange  encouragement 
from  the  French  fleet  in  the  bay.s  The  shrewder  of  the 
Liberals  endeavoured  to  repair  the  mischief,  but  part  of  the 
national  guard  was  out  of  hand,  and  the  barricades  were  left 
The  King  was  frightened,^  and  the  Camarilla  saw  how  the 
mad  manoeuvre  played  into  its  hands.  Twelve  thousand 
troops  were  massed  in  front  of  the  royal  palace  (May  15) 
and  nothing  remained  to  the  Liberals  but  to  fight  and  con- 
quer. The  national  guard  of  Salerno  was  advancing  on  the 
capital,  and  had  the  deputies  thrown  themselves  into  the 
smuggle,  the  great  mass  of  the  national  guard  and  Liberal 
citizens  would  have  followed,  and  not  impossibly  might  have 
repeated  the  victories  of  Palermo  and  Milan.  None  knew 
who  fired  the  first  shot;  from  morn  to  nightfall  a fierce 
hand-to-hand  struggle  raged  down  the  Toledo,  but  the  few 
hundred  defenders  had  no  chance  against  such  odds.  The 
troops,  both  native  and  Swiss,  gave  no  mercy,  massacred  and 
pillaged  and  burnt,  while  Ferdinand  egged  them  on  from  his 
palace  balcony,  and  the  deputies  passed  resolutions  at  Monte- 
ohveto,  till  the  troops  drove  them  out.  The  next  morning 
dawned  on  a scene  of  desolation.  Dead  bodies  and  wrecked 


' Leopardi,  op.  cit,  450-457,  467;  Santoro,  Rivolgimenti,  177-188-  Atti  e 

crx  kpo«.’.5  "it:  ^ 

See  '5th. 


240 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


houses,  outrage  and  rapine,  marked  the  progress  of  the  troops. 
The  lazzaroni  and  their  priests  filed  before  the  palace,  and 
shouted  “ death  to  the  nation.”  Their  cries  meant  that  the 
South  of  Italy  was  lost  to  the  national  cause.  An  express 
was  sent  to  recall  Pepe  and  his  troops.  The  message  found 
him  at  Bologna,  where,  contrary  to  his  instructions,  he  was 
preparing  to  cross  the  Po.  Had  he  promptly  pushed  on  he 
might  have  taken  his  men  with  him ; but  he  hesitated  long 
enough  for  intrigue  to  work,  and  when  the  old  veteran  at 
last  decided  to  press  on,  he  found  only  2000  willmg  to 
follow  him. 


It  lay  with  Charles  Albert  to  say  whether  the  defection 
of  the  Pope  and  King  of  Naples  should  weaken  the  national 
cause.  Though  it  lost  him  soldiers,  it  simplified  his  position. 
For  the  few  who  desired  an  united  Italy,  for  the  many  w o 
stopped  short  of  unity  but  wished  to  see  the  whole  strenph 
of  the  nation  put  into  the  war,  there  were  now  hut  two 
possible  alternatives— Albertism,  or  the  republic.  And  the 
republicans  were  a minority-little  knots  of  students  and  a 
few  thoughtful  artizans  in  the  larger  chies,— and  many  ot 
them  led  by  Mazzini  himself,  were  willing  to  drop  their 
propaganda,  if  only  Charles  Albert  would  frankly  adopt  the 
Lmocratic  and  nationalist  programme.  A strong  man  would 
have  taken  it  and  won  by  it.  Sicily  was  offering  her 
crown  to  his  son.^  In  Romagna  there  was  a powerful  sepa- 
ratist party,  which  only  waited  his  signal  to  throw  itself  into 
his  arms.^  Everywhere  outside  Italy  the  popular  forces  held 
the  field.  The  Republic  was  strong  in  France ; the  Viennese 
students  were  driving  out  the  Imperial  court  (May  17), 
Hungary  and  Bohemia  had  won  their  short-lived  m epen  - 
ence  the  German  National  Assembly  was  meeting  (May  1 8). 
At  no  time,  not  even  in  1830,  had  democracy  been  so 
triumphant.  There  was  a moment  when  Charles  Albert 
mi-ht  have  anticipated  1 860.  But  the  King  was  no  genius 
to  "seize  the  great  occasion.  He  was  fighting  a military 


» Torre!  ; BegheWi,  Xepubblka,  I.  136; 


129;  Gabussi,  Memorie,  II.  I5- 


THE  WAR  241 

campaign  with  all  respect  to  the  conventionalities  of  regular 
warfare.  His  treatment  of  the  volunteers  had  shown  his 
distrust  and  dislike  of  the  popular  forces.  He  would  coun- 
tenance no  designs  on  the  Temporal  Dominions  of  the  Pope 
and  sent  Gioberti  to  Rome  to  win  back  Pius’  favour.  He 
had  ever  the  fear  of  European  diplomatists  before  his  eyes ; 
anxiety  to  humour  Palmerston  and  conciliate  the  German 
Confederation  made  him  shy  of  aggression  in  the  Tyrol,  and 
restrained  him  from  hostilities  at  sea,  where  his  fleet  might 
have  made  an  easy  prey  of  Trieste  and  paralyzed  Austrian 
commerce.  He  refused  the  aid  of  the  Swiss  volunteers;  he 
broke  off  the  friendly  relations  with  the  Hungarians,  which 
the  Milanese  had  initiated.  He  belittled  the  great  Italian 
movement  down  to  a struggle  for  North  Italy;  he  did 
enough  to  alienate  the  other  princes  and  excite  the  jealousies 
of  France,  and  stopped  short  of  what  would  have  drawn  the 
patriots  of  all  Italy  to  his  side. 

In  North  Italy  itself  he  showed  the  same  lack  of  con- 
sistency and  masterfulness.  The  national  rising  had  been 
followed  m Lombardy  by  a period  of  quietude.  Within 
a week  the  whole  fabric  of  Austrian  rule  had  fallen,  and  the 
energies  of  the  country  were  absorbed  in  filling  the  void  of 
governrnent  and  in  feebler  efforts  to  raise  a Lombard  army. 
The  political  question  had  been  postponed  by  general  con- 
sent. Every^  one  expected  that  the  war  would  be  short,  and 
in  the  meantime  the  burning  questions  of  monarchy  or  re- 
public, of  union  or  federation  were  best  left  unstirred 
“ When  the  cause  has  won,  the  nation  will  decide,”  was  the 
oft-repeated  formula  of  compromise.  Ostensibly  at  least, 
even  those  who  wanted  to  see  Charles  Albert  king  at  once- 
subscribed  to  the  sla^us  quo^  and  he  for  his  part  had  dis- 
couraged his  extremer  partisans.  Anxious  as  he  was  to 
g.ve  the  republicans  no  chance  and  unite  Lombardy  to 
Piedmont,  he  had  urged  that,  if  the  question  could  not  be 
left  alone,  it  should  be  decided  at  once  by  a plebiscite  on  the 
broadest  possible  sufirage.  The  republicans  on  their  side 


^ Casati,  Rivelaztoni,  II.  185  ; Casati,  Milano,  415  ; Archivio  Triennale,  III. 

'33;  Casati, 

VOL.  I. 


Q 


242  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

were  equally  Avilling  to  defer  the  question.  Though  at 
Milan  they  included  at  this  time  the  active  if  not  the 
numerical  majority  of  the  middle  and  working  classes,  they 
were  weak  outside.  Mazzini,  who  had  arrived  there  early 
in  April,  promised  to  support  Charles  Albert,  so  long  as  his 
ambitions  made  for  Unity.  He  scorned  the  miserable  in- 
trigues of  Cattaneo’s  small  anti-Piedmontese  faction  ; the 
one  thing  needful  was  to  drive  the  Austrians  out,  and  till 
that  was  done,  domestic  questions  must  wait.  On  these 
terms  he  promised  to  give  loyal  support  to  the  Provisional 
Government. 

But  it  was  impossible  to  keep  the  political  question  in 
the  background.  The  fraternal  embracings  of  Lombards 
and  Piedmontese  soon  broke  down  under  the  strain  of  ill- 
success  and  disappointment.  As  the  army  halted  feeble  and 
irresolute  before  Radetzky  s lines,  suspicion,  only  suspended 
for  the  moment  by  the  victory  of  Pastrengo,  steadily  grew ; 
and  when  Nugent  overran  Venetia,^  the  Lombards,  solicitous 
for  the  sister-province,  hinted  angrily  at  treachery  and  a new 
Campoformio.  And  in  every  class  there  were  fainthearts, 
whose  lukewarm  patriotism  ill  bore  the  difficulties  and 
dangers  of  the  war,  and  looked  askance  at  the  Piedmontese, 
as  little  better  than  Croats,  preying  on  the  country.  The 
army  for  its  part,  writhing  under  the  insults  of  the  bitter, 
restless  Milanese  press,  daily  witnesses  of  the  apathy  of  the 
rural  population  round  the  Mincio,  were  little  disposed  to 
fight  without  compensation,  and  angry  words  passed  to  and 
fro  between  Turin  and  Milan. 

The  Provisional  Government,  too,  was  losing  public  con- 
fidence. The  Republicans  on  it  had  been  pliable  to  a fault, 
and  the  Moderates,  who  came  to  control  it,  possessed  in  a 
supreme  degree  the  timidity  and  incapacity  of  their  party. 
The  finances  were  in  complete  disorder.  The  war  was  costing 
the  province  heavily ; the  government  had  abolished  many 
of  the  most  unpopular  burdens,  it  was  difficult  in  the  gene- 
ral unsettlement  to  collect  the  indirect  taxes,  and  neither 
the  heavy  land-tax  nor  the  patriotic  offerings,  considerable 
though  they  were,  filled  the  void.  The  financial  mismanage- 

1 See  below,  p.  249. 


243 


THE  WAE 


ment  However  would  have  been  forgiven,  had  the  govern- 
ment made  better  provision  for  the  war.  It  is  probable  indeed 
that  the  Piedmontese  commissariat  was  responsible  for  the 
army’s  short  supplies  of  food ; for  more  than  sufficient  was 
sent  to  the  front,  and  the  magazines  were  gorged.^  But  for 
the  slackness  in  forming  a Lombard  contingent  the  blame 
must  go  to  the  government  at  Milan.  In  spite  of  fair  words 
it  discouraged  and  mismanaged  the  Volunteers,  cooling  their 
enthusiasm  with  unsympathetic  generals  and  orders  that 
breathed  distrust.  It  was  impossible  of  course  to  improvise 
an  army  of  trained  soldiers,  but  there  were  60,000  in  the 
country , who  had  passed  through  the  Austrian  ranks,  and  no 
serious  attempt  was  made  to  enlist  them.  It  was  July 
before  some  10,000  raw  conscripts  were  able  to  take  the 
eld.  It  weighed  little  against  such  sins  of  omission,  that 
the  government  showed  a little  reforming  activity;  the  war 
overshadowed  all  else,  and  its  laxity  in  this  wrecked  its 
popularity. 

Everything  tended  to  bring  to  the  front  the  question  of 
“fusion”  with  Piedmont;  and  small  blame  can  attach  to 
the  fusionists  that  they  forced  the  government  to  find  an 
issue  from  a position  that  contented  nobody.  The  Pied- 
montese had  to  be  satisfied  by  some  tangible  mark  of  grati- 
tude ; above  all  more  vigour  must  be  thrown  into  Lombardy’s 
^are  of  the  war.  The  formation  of  a powerful  North  Italian 
Kingdom,  whatever  its  drawbacks,  would  at  least  shield  Italy 
from  Austrian  aggression.  Less  worthy  motives  had  their 
influence;  the  dread  of  a socialist  republic,  sycophancy  to 
f to  see  Milan  once  more  the  seat  of  a 

brilliant  court.  The  honester  patriots  of  the  opposition, 
though  republicans  in  principle,  were  willing  to  sacrifice  their 
theories  to  so  big  a step  towards  Unity,  provided  that  a 
democratic  constitution  preserved  the  republic  in  its  sub- 
stance ; and  pressing  appeals  came  from  the  republicans  of 
Uenoa  to  form  one  family,  in  which  democratic  Genoa  and 
Milan  would  be  more  than  sufficient  counterweight  to  Turin. 
The  conservative  fusionists  organised  an  active  and  unscrupu- 


’’V  : Kestelli  e Miestri,  Fatti  di 

Mtlano,  7,  13 , Corsi,  1844-1879,  131.  See  Della  Eocca,  Autobiografia,  I.  1S5. 


244  ^ HISTOEY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

lous  ao-itation.  Overtures  were  made  to  Mazzini  and  Cattaneo ; 
others"  were  won  by  promise  of  office  or  promotion.  For  a 
time  the  Provisional  Government  stood  by  its  first  promise 
of  neutraUty;  it  even,  it  seems,  in  curious  content  to  its 
general  policy,  intrigued  at  Venice  agamst  fusion.  But  soon 
forgetting  its  pledges,  blind  to  the  complications  that  loomed 
in  ie  ffiture,  E thought  only  of  the^  present  necessity  and 
gave  way  to  the  growing  pressure  without  Early  m May- 
it  announced  a plebiscite  on  the  issue  whether  ^ould 

take  place  at  once,  or  the  question  be  postponed  to  the  end 
of  the  war.  Mazzini  bitterly  taunted  it  with  breakmg  faith 
and  the  excitement  at  Milan  compelled  it  to  promise,  that 
whatever  the  issue  of  the  plebiscite,  the  rig  ° 
meeting,  freedom  of  the  press,  and  a citizen  guard  should 

be  of  the  month.  _ Later 

experience  has  shown  how  untrustworthy  a plebiscite  may 
be  how  with  a people  untrained  in  political  life  a vote  on  a 
single  issue,  taken  hurriedly  without  free  and  full  discussion, 
may  be  far  from  representing  the  real  feelings  of  a peop  . 
Royalist  agents  had  been  at  work,  and  the  idea  abroad, 
that  if  the  vote  went  against  Charles  Albert,  he  would  with- 
draw from  the  war.  Gioberti  was  brought  to  Milan  to  act 
as  a counterpoise  to  Mazzini,  and  his  theme  of  Char  es 
Albert  or  Austria”  was  sung  in  every  key.  The  republicans 
divided  and  irresolute,  many  of  their  leaders  away  at  th 
war,  ill-at-ease  in  opposing  a movement  that  told  umtj’ 
for  the  most  part  abstained.  Villagers  voted  under  the  eyes 
of  the  priest,  soldiers  at  their  officers  biddmg;  forgery 
pressure,  coercion  were  freely  used.  Still  the  result  mus 
Lve  surprised  all  parties.  Five  hundred  and  sixty 
or  84  per  cent,  of  the  electorate,  gave  them  votes,  and  baie  y 
seven  hundred  were  recorded  for  postponing  the  questiom 
Makino'  every  allowance  for  the  unworthy  arts  of  one  party 
and  the  disorganization  of  the  other  it 
whelming  preponderance  in  favour  of  fusion.  At  Baim. 

and  Piafenzaand  Modena  the  plebiscites  showed  majorities 

proportionately  as  great. 


CHAPTEE  XIII 

THE  WAR  (Continued) 

MAY AUGUST  I 848 

Fusion  in  Venetia,  and  at  Venice;  Piedmont  and  fusion;  results  of  fusion 
The  war  in  Venetia;  NugenPs  advance;  Cornuda;  Thurn’s  attacks  on 
Vicenza.  Piedmontese  inaction ; Curtatone ; second  battle  of  Goito  • 
loss  of  Vicenza,  and  Venetia.  Palmerston’s  negotiations.  Piedmont 
and  the  war.  Sommacampagna ; Custozza  ; Volta;  the  retreat  • the 
defence  of  Milan  ; the  Sukkender  op  Milan. 

In  Venetia  the  question  of  fusion,  was  complicated  by 
Manin’s  proclamation  of  the  republic.  His  political  faith 
was  republican,  he  had  no  liking  for  “ a half-revolution,  that 
needed  another  to  complete  it.”  He  feared  that  an  over- 
preponderancy  of  Piedmont  would  wreck  any  scheme  of 
federation.  But  he  had  no  wish  to  prejudice  the  future 
settlement  of  the  nation;  he  repudiated  any  municipal 
sentiment,  looking  forward,  as  he  did,  to  the  federation, 
perhaps  to  the  complete  unity  of  Italy,  and  wishing  to  leave 
her  final  destiny  to  be  decided  by  a Diet  at  Kome.^  It  is 
probable  that,  despite  his  natural  leanings,  he  would  not 
have  proclaimed  the  republic,  had  he  not  thought  that 
Venice  could  be  best  won  to  the  national  cause  by  reviving 
the  name  of  her  great  past,  whose  sins  had  been  forgotten, 
and  whose  memories  were  so  dear.  Whether  he  was  wise 
may  be  doubted.  It  is  impossible  not  to  think  that  his 
own  prestige  would  have  been  enough  to  win  the  populace ; 
It  IS  certain  that  his  action  created  difficulties.  It  offended 
the  Lombards  and  Genoese  by  seeming  to  run  counter  to 
the  general  understanding  not  to  consider  the  form  of 
government  till  after  the  war ; it  gave  France  an  excuse  to 

1 Planat  de  la  Faye,  Documents,  I.  145,  189,  264,  316,  391-392,  422;  Kestelli’s 
reports  in  Casati,  Milano. 


245 


246  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

set  up  the  sister  repubUc  against  the  monarchical  patriotism 
of  Piedmont.  On  the  Venetian  mainland,  ^here  Manms 
government  had  but  a nominal  authority,  the  old  jealousy 
of  Venice  blazed  up  afresh ; Padua  and  Vicenza  and  Treviso 
had  no  grateful  memories  of  the  republic  that  had  only  been 
a tyrant  to  them.  Towards  the  middle  of  April  the  news 
of  Nu<rent’s  advance  ^ and  the  absence  of  any  adequate 
defence  increased  then-  impatience ; and  with  the  reluctant 
consent  of  Venice,  they  determined  to  annex  themselves  to 
Lombardy  and  Piedmont.  Their  sympathies  were  for  t e 
former.  Fusion  with  Lombardy  sooner  or  later  was  the 
prayer  of  every  Venetian  patriot;  for  Charles  Albert  there 
was  little  or  no  enthusiasm.  But  when  the  Milanese 
government  decreed  the  plebiscite,  fusion  with  Lombardy 
imphed  fusion  with  Piedmont;  and  the  urgent  danger,  that 
threatened  from  Nugent’s  rapid  march,  made  the  pro-mces 
fly  for  help  to  the  King,  who,  it  was  bruited,  had  httle  desue 
to  succour  repubhoans.  When  the  ^ plebiscite  was  taken 
(.June  4),  three  provinces  were  occupied  by  the  Austrians , 
the  remaining  four,  Treviso,  Padua,  Vicenza,  Royigo,  ^ 

overwhelming  majority  for  immediate  annexation  with  the 
proviso,  as  in  Lombardy,  that  a Constituent  Assembly  elected 
by  manhood  suffrage  should  draw  up  the  constitution. 

The  fusionists,  successful  on  the  mainland,  transferred 
their  energies  to  Venice.  ^Alhertist  agents  had  been  m- 
trioiiing,  perhaps  bribing;  insinuating  that  the  repub  c 
stood  in  the  way  of  Unity,  and  that  Vemce  ran  the  risk 
of  isolation.  But  they  found  no  more  personal  regard  tor 
Charles  Albert  than  on  the  mainland.  "V  enice,  safe  m her 
lacTunes,  was  not  exposed  to  any  imminent  attack  from  the 
enemy.  Manin’s  objections  to  fusion  were  strong  as  ever  ; 
he  disliked  what  looked  like  the  perversion  of  a national 
to  a dynastic  war,  the  ahenation  of  France,  the  tolly  ot 
raisinc.  political  debate  in  the  face  of  an  advancmg  toe. 
But  it  seemed  a step  towards  Unity ; friends  were  scarce, 
for  Palmerston’s  sj-mpathies  were  cold,  the  French^  Govern- 
ment was  ready  to  see  Venice  sacrificed  to  Austria,-  and  the 
opinion  grew  apace  that  only  Charles  Albert  could  save 

> See  below,  p.  249-  ' Biaachi,  Diplomazia,  V.  270. 


THE  WAR  , 247 

her  from  another  Campoformio.  The  government  still 
^^hised  to  hold,  a plebiscite,  but  it  was  forced  to  order 
the  election  of  an  Assembly  to  decide  on  the  political 
future  of  the  city  (June  3).  The  small  polls  showed  the 
indifference  of  the  masses,  and  the  fusionists  carried  all 
before  them.  When  the  Assembly  opened  (July  3),  the 
adroit  manoeuvring  of  the  Piedmontese  agent  secured  an 
easy  victory,  and  Manin,  seeing  that  the  cause  was  lost, 
was  anxious  only  to  avoid  division ; let  us  forget  parties 
to-day,’’  he  said,  “ and  be  neither  republicans  nor  royalists 
but  Italians.”  By  an  almost  unanimous  vote  the  Assembly 
decided  for  immediate  annexation  to  Piedmont.  Manin 
and  Tommaseo  resigned,  and  a month  later  the  Piedmontese 
flag  floated  in  the  Piazza. 

The  question  passed  to  Piedmont.  Parma  and  Modena 
had  dedicated  themselves  without  reserves,  but  elsewhere 
the  question  was  complicated  by  the  conditions,  which  had 
been  stipulated  for  in  the  plebiscites,  and  both  Lombardy 
and  Venetia  had  already  taken  steps  for  the  election  of 
a National  Assembly.  Thus  the  fusion  bristled  sufiiciently 
with  difficulties,  and  above  them  there  was  hot  debate 
whether  Milan  or  Turin  should  be  the  future  capital.  The 
Piedmontese  ministry  was  divided  on  the  acceptance  of  the 
conditions.  The  conservative  section  swerved  at  their 
democratic  colour,  especially  as  they  implied  universal 
suffrage  in  Piedmont  too.  A national  assembly  might  even 
wreck  the  throne,  and  the  transfer  of  the  capital  to  Milan 
meant  the  downfall  of  Piedmontese  hegemony.  Pareto  and 
Ricci,  Liberals  and  Genoese,  welcomed  the  opportunity  of 
destroying  the  supremacy  of  Turin  and  merging  Piedmont 
in  a wider  Italian  power.  Balbo,  a man  of  generous  loyal 
nature,  but  angular  and  hot-tempered,  made  a bad  premier 
of  a discordant  ministry.  The  quarrel  was  transferred  from 
the  Cabinet  to  the  Chamber.  The  majority  of  the  Deputies 

were  Moderate  Liberals  of  the  middle  and  noble  classes 

lawyers,  landowners,  civil  servants— men  of  high  character, 
but  necessarily  lacking  in  experience.  Reflecting  the  gener- 
ous patriotism  of  the  country,  they  were  ready  to  meet  the 
Lombards  more  than  half-way,  and  though  the  vested  interests 


248  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

at  Turin  fought  hard  to  pledge  the  government  not  to  move  i 
the  capital,  many  even  of  the  stricter  Piedmontese  school  | 
felt  that  it  was  too  dangerous  play  to  alienate  the  Lombards, 
and  perhaps  throw  them  into  the  arms  of  the  French 
Republic.  Pareto,  backed  by  Rattazzi,  defeated  the  con- 
servative section,  and  saving  a condition  that  the  monarchy 
should  not  be  left  an  open  question.  Parliament  agreed  to 
the  Lombard  terms  and  carried  the  Law  of  Union  by  a 
very  large  majority. 

It  is  not  easy  to  balance  the  wisdom  and  unwisdom  of 
the  fusion.  Had  Charles  Albert  been  a great  general,  and 
the  forces  of  North  Italy,  as  seemed  probable  at  the  time, 
sufficient  to  defeat  Radetzky ; or  had  the  King  thrown  him- 
self on  the  nation,  and  drawn  round  him  the  patriots  of 
all  Italy,  the  fusion  would  have  been  a big  step  to  Unity, 
and  the  work  of  i860  might  have  been  anticipated  in  part 
by  twelve  years.  As  it  was,  the  fusion  proved  a great  political 
blunder.  The  Piedmontese  army  was  not  sufficient  of  itself ; 
the  one  hope  of  victory  lay  in  keeping  old  allies  or  winning 
new  ones.  But  fusion  angered  France  and  Switzerland, 
both  jealous  of  a strong  monarchy  in  North  Italy;  it  com- 
pleted the  alienation  of  the  Pope  and  King  of  Naples,  and 
increased  the  suspicions  of  the  Tuscan  government.  And 
the  haste  and  indecorum  of  the  plebiscite,  which  appeared 
to  place  the  dynastic  interests  of  Savoy  above  the  hopes  of 
Italy,  damped  what  enthusiasm  was  left  to  the  Democrats, 
and  robbed  the  national  struggle  of  half  its  moral  force. 

“While  Charles  Albert  was  collecting  votes,  Radetzky 
was  collecting  men,”  and  Nugent  was  hurrying  to  his  help 
with  a force  14,000  strong.  In  the  early  days  of^  the 
revolution  the  whole  of  the  Venetian  mainland  had  risen; 
corps  of  students  and  volunteers  had  hurried  from  its 
towns  towards  the  Quadrilateral,  till  a severe  defeat  at 
Montebello^  sent  them  discouraged  back.  At  first  the 
Venetians  had  looked  more  to  Rome  than  Piedmont  for 
help,  and  the  Papal  troops  were  hurrying  up.  But  the 

1 Not  to  be  confused  with  Montebello,  where  the  battle  of  1859  took 
place. 


THE  WAR 


249 

necessary  organizing  power  and  nucleus  of  reliable  troops 
could  only  come  from  Piedmont,  and  with  strange  careless- 
ness Charles  Albert  and  his  generals  had  done  nothing  for 
Venetia  beyond  sending  a few  artillerymen  to  Zucchi  at 
Palmanuova,  indifferent  that  the  provinces  lay  directly 
exposed  to  attack  from  Austria,  fancying  perhaps  that  she 
was  too  exhausted  to  make  another  effort.  The  brief  period 
of  security  soon  passed.  The  loyalty  of  the  Croatian  Ban, 
Jellalich,  allowed  Nugent  to  muster  a respectable  force  of 
Croat  regiments,  and  with  these  he  crossed  the  Isonzo  on 
April  16.  Palmanuova  was  masked,  and  Udine  captured 
after  a brave  resistance.  A few  thousand  men  might  have 
easily  defended  the  Tagliamento ; the  country  people,  un- 
assisted, destroyed  the  bridges,  and  the  mountaineers  drove 
back^  Welden,  who  tried  to  cross  the  Alpine  passes  from 
Carniola.  But  there  were  no  regulars  to  help  them ; 
Nugent  crossed  the  Tagliamento  on  pontoons  (April  27), 
and  finding  the  bridges  again  broken  on  the  Piave  turned 
northwards  to  Belluno.  Meanwhile  the  Venetians,  realising 
their  danger,  had  sent  pressing  messages  to  Charles  Albert 
to  allow  the  Roman  forces,  now  placed  under  his  command, 
to  advance.  ^ Bitter  charges  were  brought  against  him  that 
he  was  deliberately  sacrificing  Venetia.  But  there  was  no 
treachery  the  King  was  probably  overruled  by  his  generals, 
and  their  inaction,  wise  or  unwise,  was  due  to  military  con- 
siderations.^ At  last  (April  24)  unable  longer  to  resist  the 
appeals,  he  allowed  the  Roman  generals  to  march  forward. 
While  Giovanni  Durando  with  the  regulars,  strangely  dila- 
tory, refused  to  advance  beyond  Bassano,  Ferrari’s  volunteers, 
impatient  and  tumultuous,  followed  by  peasants  with  forks 
and  scythes,  their  priests  with  pistols  at  their  head,  pushed 
up  the  right  bank  of  the  Piave  to  the  northern  border  of 
the  plain  at  Cornuda.  Here  Ferrari  was  attacked  in  a 
disadvantageous  position  (May  8) ; his  volunteers  fought 
bravely  for  two  days  against  superior  numbers,  while 
Durando,  who  might  easily  have  relieved  them  and  crushed 
the  outnumbered  Austrians,  sent  only  a few  troops.  His 

^ Revel,  1847,  22;  Planat  de  la  Faye,  op.  cit.,  1.  205;  Ufficiale  Pie- 
naontese,  Memorie^  136  > Riv.  stor.  del  risorg.,  I.  271. 


2 50  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

strange  manoeuvre  became  afterwards  the  subject  of  a 
fierce  polemic ; and  it  is  so  difficult  to  excuse  it  by  any 
plea  of  error,  that  it  seems  probable  that  suspicious  of  the 
republicanism  of  Ferrari  and  his  troops,  prompted  by 
Piedmontese  intrigues  or  anxious  to  please  the  Pope  by  , 
keeping  his  Swiss  troops  intact,  he  sacrificed  the  Roman 
volunteers  to  the  miserable  partisanship  of  his  chiefs.^ 

Ferrari’s  men  retreated  tow'ards  Treviso,  and  the  retreat 
became  a rout.  The  news  of  the  Encyclical  reached  the 
camp,  and  the  volunteers  feared  that,  as  their  government 
had  not  formally  declared  war,  they  were  liable,  if  captured, 
to  be  shot  as  filibusters.  But  Thurn,  who  had  succeeded 
to  the  invalided  Nugent,  received  orders  to  leave  Treviso, 
and  hurry  on  towards  Verona.  After  an  ineffectual  attempt 
on  Vicenza  he  marched  on,  but,  before  he  reached  Verona, 
Radetzky,  angry  at  the  repulse  and  realising  aU  the  import- 
ance of  Vicenza,  ordered  the  footsore  troops  to  return  and 
attack  it  again.  But  Durando  had  brought  up  the  bulk  of 
his  force ; and  Thurn’s  troops,  driven  back  from  the  Benoi 
Hills  and  caught  among  the  flooded  ditches  round  the  city, 
were  forced  to  retreat  once  more  with  heavy  loss. 

It  was  May  25  when  he  reached  Verona.  ^ During  the 
fortnight,  which  had  passed  since  Santa  Lucia,  the  Pied- 
montese army  had  relapsed  once  more  mto  ^ maction. 
Reactionary  and  timid  men  surrounded  the  King,  an 
confidence  in  eventual  victory  combined  with  the  torren- 
tial rains  to  discourage  any  decisive  step.  Had  a htt  e 
more  energy  been  shown,  Nugent’s  advance  might  have 
been  stopped,  the  passes  of  Rivoli  and  Schio  seized,  and 
Radetzky  hemmed  in  to  Verona  and  its  barren  neighbour- 
hood. He  on  his  side  was  only  waiting  for  Nugent’s  tiwps 
to  take  the  field.  He  determined  to  make  a final  effort 
to  save  Peschiera,  but  apparently  despairing  of  breaking 
throu<rh  the  Piedmontese  lines,  conceived  a darmg  stroke. 
His  plan  was  to  transfer  the  bulk  of  his  force  to  Mantua, 
overpower  the  isolated  wing  in  front  of  the  fortress,  and 

1 Pinelli,  Storia,  III.  396,  1092;  Monteocbi,  Fatti;  D’Azeglio,  Relaziow; 
Marescotti,  Guerre.  The  Ufficiale  Piemontese  shows  a strong  animus  against 
Ferrari. 


THE  WAR 


251 

advancing  up  the  right  of  the  Mincio  attack  the  Piedmon- 
tese rear,  destroy  their  magazines,  and  spread  panic  in 
Lombardy.  He  executed  his  dangerous  flank  march,  un- 
perceived by  the  sluggish  enemy  (May  27-28),  and  at 
Mantua  found  himself  in  face  of  the  small  detachment  of 
Tuscans  and  the  few  remaining  Neapolitans,  who  held  a line 
of  ten  miles  between  Goito  and  Montanara.  Next  day 
5000  Tuscans  under  De  Laugier  were  attacked  by  35,000 
Austrians  (May  29).  It  was  a forlorn  hope;  but' the 
students  fought  with  careless  and  desperate  bravery,  and  it 
was  not  till  after  six  hours’  fighting,  and  when  the  Austrians 
had  brought  more  than  half  their  men  into  action,  that  their 
position  at  Curtatone  was  stormed.  Bava  might  easily 
have  sent  reinforcements  forward  in  time,  and  bitterly  he 
and  the  King  were  attacked  for  the  desertion  of  their  allies. 
But  he  had  learnt  the  enemy’s  strength,  and  while  he  sent 
messages,  which  arrived  too  late,  ordering  De  Laugier  to 
retire,  he  was  concentrating  every  available  man  for  a 
second  line  of  defence  at  Goito.  It  was  a critical  moment, 
for  were  he  defeated,  he  would  have  been  driven  back  on 
Brescia,  and  the  road  would  have  been  open  to  Milan.  The 
heroic  resistance  of  the  Tuscans  saved  him,  and  gave  him 
time  to  take  up  a strong  position  on  the  right  of  the  Mincio. 
Here  on  the  afternoon  after  Curtatone  the  Austrian  van 
made  a confused  attack;  and  after  a short,  sharp  fight 
between  equal  forces,  the  Austrians  fell  back,  well  pursued 
till  nightfall.  While  the  King  was  on  the  field,  the  news 
reached  him  that  Peschiera  had  fallen.  The  double  victory 
seemed  the  end  of  the  weary  struggle,  and  the  troops 
acclaimed  Charles  Albert  King  of  Italy.  And  had  the 
Piedmontese  possessed  a general  of  any  genius,  Radetzky’s 
position  would  have  been  very  critical.  He  had  retired  preci- 
pitately to  Mantua,  losing  large  numbers  of  deserters  from 
his  Italian  troops,  and  leaving  his  left  wing  under  D’Aspre 
isolated.  The  Piedmontese  were  flushed  with  victory,  and 
had  recovered  the  confidence  they  had  lost  at  Santa  Lucia. 

A bold  advance  would  have  driven  back  D’Aspre  on  the 
Oglio,  and  forced  him  to  surrender ; or  a rapid  march  across 
the  high  ground  to  the  east  would  have  cut  off  Radetzky’s 


2 52  A HISTORY  OF.  ITALIAN  UNITY 

retreat  and  perhaps  have  captured  Verona.  But  Charles 
Albert  went  to  sing  a Te  Deum  at  Peschiera,  and  the 
precious  moment  was  lost.  It  was  perhaps  his  contempt 
for  the  enemy’s  generalship  that  decided  Radetzky  to 
another  perilous  manoeuvre.  On  June  3,  while  the  heavy 
rains  still  kept  him  at  Mantua,  he  received  the  news  of  the- 
new  revolt  at  Vienna ; he  might  at  any  time  be  recalled  to 
defend  the  throne,  perhaps  even  an  order  to  retire  was  actu- 
ally sent.^  It  was  all  important  to  secure  a retreat  to  the 
Tyrol  by  the  Schio  pass,  and  for  this  to  seize  Vicenza, 
though  his  absence  left  Verona  at  the  enemy’s  mercy. 

He  reached  Verona  on  June  9 with  a force  double  the 
strength  of  Durando’s  garrison.  The  attack  on  the  city  failed, 
but  the  Berici  Hills  were  carried,  and  from  them  at  nightfall 
Radetzky  bombarded  the  city.  The  citizens  would  still  have 
held  out,  but  Durando,  shrinking  from  useless  slaughter, 
surrendered  to  the  easy  terms  that  the  Austrians  offered. 
Radetzky  gladly  gave  them  that  he  might  return  in  time  to 
save  Verona.  But  for  the  extraordinary  supineness  of  the  Pied- 
montese, he  would  have  been  too  late.  They  had  had  two 
brilliant  alternatives,  either  to  take  up  a strong  position  to  the 
east  of  Verona,  and  fall  on  the  Austrian  flank  on  its  return ; 
or  to  make  a direct  attack  on  the  city  itself,  where  the  inhabi- 
tants would  have  risen  and  made  its  fall  almost  certain. 
But  timid  counsels  or  the  hidden  works  of  diplomacy 
prevailed.  Nothing  was  done  for  five  days ; then  Rivoli 
was  occupied,  but  its  value  was  gone  now  that  the  Austrians 
could  open  up  the  Schio  road  to  the  Tyrol.  When  at 
length  the  attack  on  Verona  was  prepared  for  the  14th, 
Radetzky  had  reached  the  city  by  forced  marches  on  the 
preceding  evening,  and  another  great  opportunity  had  passed. 

The  loss  of  Vicenza  was  a greater  blow  than  Santa 
Lucia.  It  carried  with  it  the  loss  of  the  whole  Venetian 
mainland  except  one  little  mountain  fortress ; worse  still,  it 
widened  the  gulf  between  Piedmontese  and  Lombards  b}? 
suggesting  grave  doubts  as  to  the  King’s  sincerity.  The 
fate  of  the  Venetian  cities  touched  the  Lombards  very  nearly 

^ Schbnhals,  Campagnes,  206;  Military  Events,  1405  Pinelli,  op.  cit.,  III.  45^ 


THE  WAR 


253 

and  they  bitterly  reflected  that,  while  the  King  was  alienat- 
ing Tuscany  by  sending  troops  to  the  Lunigiana,  he  had 
lost  Venetia  by  inaction  so  perverse  as  to  suggest  deliberate 
design.  The  cry  of  treachery  drew  fresh  colouring  from  the 
uncertainty  of  the  negotiations,  which  were  known  to  be 
proceeding  through  the  medium  of  the  English  government. 
Palmerston  had  done  his  best  to  hold  back  Charles  Albert 
from  war ; but  he  had  no  love  for  Austria,  and  when  hostilities 
broke  out,  he  shared  the  general  belief  that  her  cause  was 
doomed.^  His  policy  was  to  keep  the  French  out  of  Italy, 
and  secure  peace  as  soon  as  Italy  was  free.  Meanwhile  the 
Austrian  statesmen,  despairing  of  saving  more  than  a frag- 
ment of  their  Italian  dominions,  had  sent  Count  Hartig  to 
the  seat  of  war  in  the  forlorn  hope  of  rescuing  something 
from  the  wreck.  Hartig  was  probably  prepared  to  concede 
the  practical  independence  of  Lombardy,  but  he  was  timid 
and  indefinite,  and  the  excitement  of  the  time  made  the 
Italians  unwilling  to  accept  any  solution  short  of  complete 
evacuation.  When  May  brought  fresh  troubles  to  the 
Austrians  at  Vienna  and  in  Bohemia,  the  need  for  a settle- 
ment in  Italy  became  still  more  urgent,  and  Hummelauer 
was  sent  to  London  to  enlist  Palmerston’s  mediation  (May 
23).  He,  like  Hartig,  would  no  doubt  have  consented  to 
the  evacuation  of  Lombardy,  but  his  actual  proposals  were 
a scheme  of  very  thorough  Home  Rule  for  both  Lombardy 
and  Venetia,  and  Palmerston,  thinking  that  the  Austrians 
only  wanted  to  gain  time,^  and  still  confident  of  the  eventual 
triumph  of  the  Italians,  was  unwilling  to  lend  his  name  to 
any  proposals  short  of  evacuation.  Even  when,  after  the 
second  Viennese  rising,  the  Austrians  lowered  their  terms 
and  offered  independence  to  Lombardy  and  a very  Liberal 
constitution  to  Venetia,  he  still  refused  to  mediate,  unless 
Austria  surrendered  her  territory  at  least  to  the  Piave.  The 
Viennese  government  itself  had  no  more  trust  in  its  own 
fortunes  than  Palmerston  had,^  but  it  made  a new  effort  to 

1 Ashley,  Palmerston,  I.  56;  Walpole,  Russell,  II.  41,  The  Queen  and  Prince 
A.lbert  were  then,  as  generally,  hostile  to  Italy:  Ib.  II.  46;  Vitzthum,  St.  Peters- 
burg, I.  109. 

2 C.  D’Azeglio,  Souvenirs,  333;  Ashley,  op.  cit.,  I.  98. 

2 Stockmar,  Memoirs,  II.  356 ; Minghetti,  Ricordi,  II.  98. 


2 54  ^ HISTOEY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

save  Venetia  by  directly  approaching  the  Milanese  govern- 
ment (early  in  June)  with  the  same  offer  of  independence 
for  Lombardy,  as  the  bribe  for  leaving  Venetia  in  Austrian 
hands.  The  Milanese,  ever  loyal  to  the  Venetians,  replied 
that  the  fortunes  of  Lombardy  and  Venetia  were  insepar- 
able, and  that  they  would  never  desert  the  sister  province.^ 
The  Piedmontese  ministry,  apparently  with  the  exception  of 
Balbo,  were  equally  determined  to  accept  no  compromise.^ 
But  while  the  two  governments  stood  loyal  to  their  engage- 
ments, the  King,  though  he  had  promised  the  Milanese  that 
he  would  never  lay  down  his  arms  till  Italy  was  free,  was 
secretly  preparing  to  sacrifice  Venetia.  Already  early  in 
June,  in  the  midst  of  his  protestations  to  the  Milanese,  he 
was  ready  to  accept  the  line  of  the  Adige,  though  willing  to 
fight  on,  if  his  ministers  decided  otherwise.  A month  later  ! 
he  had  thrown  scruples  to  the  winds,  and  weary  of  the  war, 
privately  invited  Austria  to  a treaty  of  partition.  His 
action  may  have  had  some  justification  in  the  lower  ex- 
pediencies, but  the  same  moral  obliquity,  which  ^ betrayed 
him  in  youth,  stained  his  chivalry  again,  and  made  him  for  the 
moment  traitor  to  the  cause  for  which  he  had  dared  so  much. 

Certainly  the  King  saw  nearer  the  truth  than  Palmerston. 
Only  too  much  its  early  glamour  was  fading  from  the  war. 
Again  and  again  victory  had  been  in  the  grasp  of  the  Italians, 
but  Charles  Albert  and  his  generals  had  thrown  away  the 
splendid  chances.  The  Neapolitans  had  gone,  the  Tuscans 
were  too  demoralized  to  be  kept  at  the  front ; Durando  s 
troops  were  under  parole  not  to  fight  for  three  months. 
The  volunteers  could  barely  hold  their  owm ; the  Lombard 
troops  were  slow  in  coming  up.  All  Lombardy  was  honey- 
combed with  suspicion  and  intrigue  ; Mazzini  s paper  ^ was 
bitterly  attacking  the  King ; Austrian  agents  were  actively 
mining  underground.  The  burden  of  the  war  fell  more  than 
ever  on  Piedmont,  and  here  too  enthusiasm  was  cooling. 
The  campaign  had  proved  far  other  than  a triumphal  pro- 

1 Raccolta  dei  decreti,  II.  355  ; Massarani,  Correnti,  586. 

2 Correspondence— Italy,  II.  515  ; ^albo,  Sommario,  479. 

3 Correspondence— Italy,  II.  516;  III.  63;  Raccolta  del  deer eti,  II.  251; 
Dair  Ongaro,  V n Agosto,  52  ; Kevel,  op.  cit.,  29  ; Ufficiale  Piemontese,  op.  cit, 
183  ; see  Bianchi,  Carlo  Alberto,  61-62. 


THE  WAR 


255 

gress ; Piedmont  was  irritated  at  its  slow  course,  and  startled 
when  she  realized  that  the  little  kingdom  stood  alone  fronting 
the  great  Empire.  The  average  citizen  angrily  resented  the 
attacks  of  the  foolish  Milanese  press  on  King  and  army,  and 
contrasted  the  lukewarmness  of  the  Lombards  in  the  war 
with  their  overreaching  claims  in  the  negotiations  for  fusion. 
Within  Piedmont  itself  the  harmony  of  the  spring  was  fast 
passing.  Many  of  the  nobles  had  learnt  again  to  fear  demo- 
cracy more  than  they  loved  their  country ; the  clergy  fell 
away  after  the  Encyclical,  the  middle  classes  were  scared  by 
French  socialism  and  unsubstantial  phantoms  of  the  red 
republic.  The  peasants  struggle  for  life  was  too  severe  to 
leave  much  place  for  patriotism,  and  agents  of  reaction 
waved  the  Pope’s  defection  and  the  stagnation  of  trade 
before  their  eyes.  The  Democrats  themselves  were  often 
more  absorbed  in  social  questions  than  in  the  war.  The 
Chamber  frittered  away  its  time  in  barren  resolutions 
and  hot  interminable  debates  on  the  suppression  of  the 
Jesuits  and  the  dismantling  of  the  Genoese  forts.  The 
ministry  had  been  beaten  in  the  debates  on  fusion,  and 
was  only  temporarily  holding  office.  A cabinet  was  being 
slowly  made  under  Casati  and  Gioberti,  but  the  Piedmontese 
had  little  enthusiasm  for  a ministry,  which  represented  every 
province  of  the  North  Italian  Kingdom,  and  placed  Lombards 
and  Genoese  in  a majority.  The  same  provincial  spirit  had 
prompted  Pareto  to  again  reject  overtures  from  Rome  for 
what  was  practically  an  offensive  alliance,  though  the  King 
welcomed  them,  and  their  acceptance  might  even  now  have 
reconciled  Pius  to  the  war  (June).  Gioberti  had  been  sent 
on  an  unofficial  mission  to  Florence  and  Rome,  to  rouse 
sympathy  for  Charles  Albert  and  the  cause ; and  though  he 
preached  respect  for  the  Grand  Duke  and  tender  loyalt}^  to 
the  Pope,  he  only  gave  fresh  colour  to  the  old  suspicions 
of  Piedmontese  ambition.^  Though  the  King  was  innocent 
of  any  designs  on  Romagna,  it  is  not  equally  certain  that 
ais  ministers  were  clear ; ^ and  Charles  Albert  himself  was 

1 Contrast  Gioberti’s  utterances  at  Leghorn  and  Florence  in  Zobi,  Storia 
V,  (Documents),  See  above,  p.  233,  n.  5.  ’ 

Minghetti,  op.  cit.,  II.  90 ; Pasolini,  Memoirs,  73*  See  above,  p,  234. 


256  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

half  disposed  to  accept  the  Sicilian  crown  for  his  son,  the 
Duke  of  Genoa.^ 

However  maladroit  her  statesmen,  the  army  of  Piedmont 
was  staunchly  maintaining  the  struggle,  and  even  now  but 
for  the  farce  of  generalship  the  probabilities  of  success  still 
leaned  to  her.  The  loss  of  Vicenza  had  been  followed  by 
another  period  of  inaction.  Radetzky  was  waiting  for  more 
reinforcements,  and  Charles  Albert  had  no  plans  of  offensive. 
The  Volunteers  had  been  sent  to  the  Tyrol  frontier  and  for- 
gotten, and  Garibaldi’s  services,  which  might  have  been  of 
priceless  value,  had  been  curtly  rejected.  Ten  thousand 
regulars  were  in  hospital,  and  though  the  Lombards  had 
arrived,  they  were  sent  to  sicken  in  the  swamps  round  Mantua. 
The  army  was  weary  of  the  inglorious  monotony  and  priva- 
tions of  the  war,  and  felt  less  and  less  disposed  to  fight  for 
a people  whose  press  insulted  and  libelled  them.  At  last 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  gave  the  Austrians  superiority 
in  numbers  as  well  as  in  prestige,  and  it  became  impossible 
for  the  Piedmontese  to  take  the  oftensive.  For  want  of 
better  tactics,  the  Kiug  decided  to  blockade  Mantua  on  both 
sides,  and  captured  Governolo  to  the  south-east  ( J uly  13). 
This  necessitated  a great  lengthening  of  the  Piedmontese 
lines ; Rivoli  was  retained  on  account  of  its  historic  associa- 
tions or  from  fear  of  the  criticism  that  might  follow  its 
abandonment ; and  from  Rivoli  to  Governolo  ran  forty 
miles  without  a railway.  To  cover  this  the  King  had  barely 
60,000  men  in  the  field,  and  it  was  obvious  strategy  for  the 
Austrians  to  attack  the  feeble  centre  and  cut  the  Piedmon-i 
tese  lines  in  two.  Radetzky  captured  Rivoli  with  some 
difficulty,  and  was  ready  for  the  decisive  attack.  Between 
Verona  and  the  Mincio  the  hills  of  Sona,  Sommacampagna, 
and  Custozza  describe  a segment  from  north  to  south-west. 
The  Piedmontese,  though  they  had  occupied  them  for  three 
months,  had  done  little  to  fortify  what  might  have  been 
made  into  an  almost  impregnable  position;  and  only  8000 
men  held  the  key  of  the  whole  line.  On  the  night  of  July  22, 

^ Bianchi,  D{plomazia,y.  218-220;  CuriosiUldistor.  sub.,  Yl.  141 ; D’ Ancona, 
Amari,  1.  262-263. 


THE  WAR  257 

in  a terrible  storm,  40,000  Austrians  left  Verona.  Next 
morning  the  Piedmontese,  surprised  and  quite  outnumbered, 
were  driven  back  m spite  of  their  splendid  defence,  and  by 
midday  the  whole  Austrian  army  was  on  the  plateau.  But  the 
Italian  losses  had  been  small,  and  while  De  Sonnaz  collected 
the  troops  of  the  left  brigade  under  Peschiera  and  advanced 
down  the  right  of  the  Mincio  towards  Valleggio,  the  King 
and  Bava  hurried  up  the  centre  to  Villafranca,  though  with 
strange  blindness  to  the  position,  they  neglected  to  bring  up 
the  troops  round  Mantua.  Still,  had  Bava  and  De  Sonnaz  on 
the  morning  of  the  24th  attacked  both  Austrian  flanks, 
Radetzky’s  position  would  have  been  critical.  But  De 
Sonnaz  was  ignorant  of  Bava  s movements,  and  a breakdown 
of  the  commissariat  prevented  Bava  from  attacking  till 
afternoon.  Then  under  a tropical  sun,  under  which  men 
dropped  by  the  score,  the  Dukes  of  Savoy  and  Genoa 
stormed  the  heights  at  Staffalo  and  cut  Radetzky’s  line. 
And  though  he  retrieved  his  defeat  in  part  by  taking  Val- 
leggio  (the  key  connecting  the  plateau  with  the  line  of  the 
Mincio),  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  recapture  the  heights 
at  any  cost.  Again  the  failure  of  the  commissariat  pre- 
vented the  Dukes  from  catching  the  enemy  while  on  the 
march  and  divided.  When  they  came  under  fire  at  noon 
(July  25),  their  brigades  fought  with  the  same  heroism  as 
at  Staffalo,  holding  their  own  against  heavy  odds,  and  even 
storming  the  heights  between  Custozza  and  Valleggio.  Five 
times  4000  men  drove  back  with  the  bayonet  twice  their 
number  of  Austrians.  But  heat  and  exhaustion  gradually 
told;  and  De  Sonnaz  sent  word  from  Borghetto  that  his  troops, 
who  had  been  starving  for  three  days,  could  not  attack  till 
3venmg.  The  Dukes  had  no  choice  but  to  retreat,  though 
Fe  Austrians  had  suffered  too  heavily  to  follow  up  their 
dctory.  ^ 

The  battle  of  Custozza  was  an  epitome  of  the  war.  The 
nagnificent  courage  of  the  Piedmontese,  far  more  than  a 
natch  for  equal  numbers  of  Austrians,  and  the  brilliant 
.actics  of  the  Dukes  were  wasted,  when  the  blunders  of  the 
)ther  generals  kept  half  the  army  unengaged,  and  the  fatal 
)reakdown  of  the  commissariat  clogged  every  operation  The 

VOL.  I.  ^ ■ 


2 58  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

position  now  was  full  of  danger.  Forty  thousand  Piedmon- 
tese were  concentrated  before  Villafranca  on  the  evening  of  the 
2 5 th,  in  danger  of  being  surrounded.  During  the  night  and 
following  morning  they  retreated  to  Goito,  where  De  Sonnaz, 
having  through  some  mistake  in  his  instructions  evacuated 
Volta^  had  already  arrived.  If  the  Austrians  occupied  the 
heights  near  Volta,  Goito  would  he  untenable,  and  the  King 
ordered  him  to  retrace  the  three  miles  to  Volta,  and  re- 
occupy it  before  the  enemy  arrived.  De  Sonnaz  with  his 
scant  and  weary  troops  reached  Volta  in  the  evening,  just 
too  late  to  forestall  the  Austrian  van.  Till  midnight  and 
again  at  dawn  a fierce  hand-to-hand  fight  raged  through  the 
streets,  till  De  Sonnaz  found  the  odds  too  heavy,  and  after 
one  of  the  most  bloody  battles  of  the  campaign,  made  an 
orderly  retreat. 

It  was  impossible  now  to  hold  Goito,  and  the  generals, 
hopeless  of  further  resistance,  asked  for  an  armistice ; hut 
Radetzky’s  terms  were  the  surrender  of  the  Duchies  and  the 
withdi-awal  of  the  army  behind  the  Adda,  and  the  King 
“ preferring  to  sacrifice  Piedmont  rather  than  Italy,  refused 
them.  Plunged  in  sudden  disaster,  weary  and  starving, 
suffering  fearfully  from  thirst,  for  the  timid  peasants  of  the 
lowlands  had  removed  the  ropes  froin  the  wells,  the  army 
sullenly  drew  back.  It  had  two  practicable  alternatives , tc 
defend  the  line  of  the  Adda,  or  retreat  beyond  the  Po  and 
threaten  Radetzky's  flank.  Unluckily  the  King  chose 
neither.  His  impulsive  chivalry  prompted  him  to  wait  anc 
defend  Cremona,  which  had  shown  much  hospitality  to  hn 
wounded  during  the  war.  The  troops  fought  bravely  in  from 
of  the  city,  but  they  were  outnumbered,  and  the  delay  hac 
allowed  the  enemy  to  reach  the  Adda  first.  Now  that  i 
was  impossible  to  defend  the  river,  it  was  elementary  strateg; 
to  retreat  to  Pavia  or  Piacenza,  flood  the  irrigated  countr 
between  Milan  and  the  Adda,  and  summon  Garibaldi  witl 
the  Lombard  levies  to  threaten  the  Austrian  right.  But  th 
King’s  sensitive  chivalry  again  betrayed  him.  Represents 
tions,  made  apparently  by  the  nobles  or  the  Provisions 
Government,  had  reached  him  from  Milan,  that  the  city  wa 
well  provisioned  and  prepared  for  defence ; and  despite  th 


THE  WAR 


259 

warnings  of  the  new  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  the  King 
determined  not  to  abandon  it.  So  to  Milan  the  painful 
march  went  on  under  the  torrential  rains,  while  the  Lom- 
bard division  melted  to  a handful.  The  panic-stricken  city 
was  ill  prepared  to  receive  its  defenders.  The  Committee 
of  Public  Safety,  appointed  at  Mazzini’s  prompting  on  the 
first  news  of  defeat,  did  what  was  possible  in  the  brief  space, 
collected  money  and  provisions,  threw  up  earthworks,  de- 
creed a levy  in  mass  of  the  national  guard.  The  inhabitants 
showed  some  of  the  spirit  of  the  Five  Days ; and  the  sudden 
and  imminent  peril,  that  within  a short  week  had  changed 
their  destinies,  shook  them  roughly  from  their  indifference. 
But  well  as  the  Committee  had  risen  to  the  occasion,  the 
King  had  lost  none  of  his  distrust  of  the  Milanese  authori- 
ties, and  superseded  it  by  supine  commissioners.  Next  day 
the  army  arrived  (August  3),  and  the  Milanese,  annoyed  at 
the  supersession  of  the  Committee,  and  looking  in  vain  for 
some  stirring  message  from  the  King,  stinted  the  welcome 
that  they  would  have  lavished  before.^  On  the  following 
afternoon  the  Austrians  came  up,  and  their  immense  supe- 
riority in  numbers  forced  back  the  Piedmontese  within  the 
walls.  At  the  sight  of  danger  the  Milanese  threw  off  their 
momentary  lethargy ; barricades  rose  in  the  streets,  and  food 
and  comforts  were  supplied  in  abundance  to  the  troops. 
There  was  still  perhaps  a chance  of  success  in  a desperate  de- 
fence ; Garibaldi  andD’Apice  had  25,000  men  in  the  Berga- 
mese  and  Brescian  uplands,  and  could  have  seriously  harassed 
the  enemy’s  rear.  But  food  and  ammunition  were  probably 
rather  scarce ; ^ the  bulk  of  the  artillery  had  by  some  inex- 
plicable blunder  been  sent  to  Piacenza;  and  the  generals, 
ignoring  the  temper  of  the  people  and  perhaps  exaggerating 
the  scarcity,  decided  that  it  was  impossible  to  resist.  And 
though  the  King  told  the  national  guard  next  morning 

^ 1 Belgiojoso,  U Italia,  71-72.  Cantu,  Cronistoria,  II.  940,  and  Castelli, 
Ricordi,  285,  probably  refer  to  another  day. 

2 The  evidence  is  too  conflicting  to  allow  of  any  certain  conclusion.  See 
Restelli  e MsBstri,  Fatti  di  Milano,  12,  16—17  5 Cattaneo,  Insuvrezione,  218  ; 
Pinelli,  op.  cit.  III.  647  ; Bava,  op.  cit.,  92  ; Correspondence— Italy,  III.  194  ; 
Belgiojoso,  op.  cit.,  74;  Canth,  op.  cit.,  II.  923;  La  Farina,  Storia,  III.  130; 
Eevel,  op.  cit.,  40  ; Mazzini,  Opere,  VI.  449. 


260  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

(August  5)  that  he  intended  to  defend  the  city,  he^  had 
already  exchanged  messages  with  Radetzky  for  a capitula- 
tion.i  The  news  leaked  out,  and  the  people,  frenzied  with 
suspicion,  rushed  to  the  Greppi  Palace,  where  (lharles  Albert 
was  lodging.  The  unhappy  King,  dramed  of  mental  and 
moral  strength,  yielded  to  each  successive  influence  that  was 
brought  to  bear  on  him,  promised  to  shed  his  last  drop  of 
blood  for  the  city,  then  a few  hours  after  gave  his  tacit 
approval  to  a message  that  confirmed  the  earlier  negotia- 
tions with  Radetzky.^  By  6.0  p.m.  the  capitulation  had  been 
finally  decided  on.  Its  announcement  was  the  signal  for 
anarchy ; the  angry  mob  fired  at  the  palace ; and  the  troops  in 
the  other  quarters,  dimly  conscious  of  the  King’s  danger,  were 
hardly  restrained  from  attacking  the  people.  His  position 
was  indeed  critical,  and  the  crowd  was  at  the  point  of  firing 
the  palace  gates,  when  just  before  midnight  some  regiments 
arrived  and  rescued  him.  The  army  evacuated  the  city 
during  the  night.  A few  desperate  men  fired  on  the  soldiers, 
as  they  sadly  defiled  through  the  streets.  But  disaster  had 
broken  down  the  misunderstanding;  more  than  half  the 
population,  it  was  estimated,  fled  with  the  army,  indignant 
of  Austrian  rule;  and  tenderly  assisted  by  the  soldiers,  the 
terror-stricken  citizens  thronged  the  roads  to  Piedmont. 


1 Ufficlale  Piemontese,  op.  cit.,  126  ; Eestelli  e Mffistri,  op.  cit.,  30-31 : 
Correspondence-Italy,  III.  128  ; Canti,  op.  «(.,  II.  94®- 

2 Restelli  e Mastri,  op.  cit.,  31 ; Cantu,  op.  cit.,  II.  94M54 . mno, 
Souvenire,  252  ; L.  Torelli,  5 giorrmU,  325  ; 

Carandini,  knti,  84-86,  which  does  not  entirely  agree  with  the  other  authorl 
ties.  I have  only  seen  extracts  from  Anelli,  Storia  d Italia,  II.  224. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS 

MAY DECEMBER  I 848 

The  Salasco  armistice.  France  and  Italy.  “The  People’s  War;”  the 
Austrians  at  Bologna.  Moderates  and  Democrats.  Piedmont  ; 
Pinelli  ministry  ; negotiations  for  peace  ; the  war  party  ; fall  of  the 
ministry.  Tuscany  : Kidolfi  ministry ; the  Democrats ; Capponi 
ministry  ; Leghorn  revolt ; Montanelli-Guerrazzi  ministry.  Papal 
States  ; Mamiani  ministry  ; Fabbri  ministry  ; Eossi  ministry. 


Piedmont  could  liardly  realize  the  swift  and  terrible  series 
of  disasters,  which  had  sent  her  army  back  crushed  and 
demoralized.  She  had  no  power,  hardly  any  wish,  to  repair 
the  blow.  The  new  ministry  had  no  authority ; the  country 
was  weary  and  exhausted ; and  the  only  hope  of  continuing 
the  war  lay  in  a French  alliance.  The  ministry  opened 
negotiations  at  Paris,  but  in  the  meantime  Radetzky  was 
threatening  the  frontier ; the  Conservatives  dreaded  above 
all  things  the  advent  of  a republican  army  from  France; 
and  Charles  Albert,  taking  the  responsibility  upon  himself, 
authorized  General  Salasco  to  sign  a six  weeks’  armistice 
(August  9).  By  its  terms  not  only  Peschiera  but  the 
Duchies  and  Venice  were  to  be  evacuated,  and  Piedmont 
with  one  voice  declared  against  conditions,  that  involved  for 
a time  at  least  the  surrender  of  the  national  cause.  For  a 
moment  party  feuds  were  silent,  and  all  classes  vied  in  wel- 
coming the  Lombard  refugees  and  preparing  for  a fresh 
struggle.  But  the  power  or  the  will  to  make  a great  effort 
failed,  and  a renewal  of  the  war,  it  was  more  than  ever 
evident,  depended  on  France. 

It  was  impossible  for  France  to  be  an  indifferent  spectator. 
Traditions,  too  strong  for  any  government  to  break,  interested 
her  in  the  relations  of  Italy  and  Austria.  Guizot’s  Italian 

261 


262  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

policy  had  been  to  maintain  the  status  quo;  but  the  Repubhc 
was  more  likely  to  attack  despotism  in  its  Austrian  stronghold, 
and  free  the  Italians,  whether  they  wished  its  help  or^  not. 
YTien  war  broke  out,  Lamartine  made  large  offers  to  private 
individuals  like  Mazzini  andPepe,^  and  asked  leave  of  the  Turin 
government  to  send  a corps  of  observation  across  the  Alps. 
But  feehng  in  Italy  was  almost  unanimous  against  accepting 
French  help.  Manin  indeed,  more  far-seeing  and  less  confident, 
would  have  hked  at  least  to  have  it  secured  in  case  of  need ; 
but  even  he  dared  go  no  farther  than  request  the  presence  of 
French  vessels  in  the  Adriatic.  The  royahsts  di’eaded  a re- 
publican ally,  the  repubhcans  wished  to  see  Italy  win  her 
own  laurels.  None  believed  that  France  was  singlehearted 
in  her  offer,  all  were  confident  that  the  national  resources 
were  sufficient  for  victory.  Hence  it  became  very  difficult 
for  France  to  interfere,  though  had  she  crossed  the  Alps,  the 
Austrians  would  have  evacuated  Venetia  without  a further 
effort.^  Lamartine  indeed  sometimes  urged  action  in  despite 
of  Italian  wishes.  He  was  suspicious  of  a North  Itahan 
Kingdom,  and  thought  that  French  intervention  might  en- 
courage the  repubhcans  of  Lombardy  and  \ enetia,  and  claim 
its  reward  in  the  cession  of  Savoy  and  Nice.^  But  the 
majority  of  the  Executive  Committee  at  Paris  were  opposed 
to  interference,  unless  the  Itahans  asked  for  it ; and  Lamar- 
tine, either  because  his  hands  were  tied,  or  that  his  grandilo- 
quent programmes  melted  away,  returned  nothing  but  empty 
promises  to  Manin’s  appeals,  and  perhaps  secretly  agreed  to 
let  Austria  have  Venetia.^  After  the  Parisian  revolt  in  June, 
the  Executive  Committee  retired,  and  Bastide,  who  was  now 
Foreign  Minister,  was  as  reluctant  as  Lamartine  to  help  a 
power,  which  he  distrusted  both  as  repubhcan  and  French- 
man, for  he  realized  how  easily  a Kingdom  of  North  Italy 
might  become  the  ally  of  Austria  against  France.^  But 
though  France  was  pledged  to  give  her  help  if  formally 

1 Mazzini,  Opere,  X.  66 ; Pepe,  Events,  I.  39. 

2 Correspondence — Italy,  II.  470-471. 

3 Lamartine,  Trois  mois,  232,  316  ; Gamier-Pages,  Revolution,  1.  439.  445  5 
Bianchi,  Eiplomazia,  V.  278-281,  292;  Zini,  Storia,  Documents  I.  658-662. 

* Planat  de  la  Faye,  Documents,  I.  197,  21 1-2 14. 

5 Bastide,  Repuhlique  francaise,  12;  Bianchi,  op.  cit,  V.  298-300;  Corres- 
pondence— Italy,  III.  6i. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS  263 

demanded,  there  was  nothing  up  to  Custozza  to  test  her 
loyalty.  Now  when  all  other  hope  seemed  gone,  the  appeal 
came  both  from  Milan  and  Turin.  But  Piedmont  coupled 
its  request  with  conditions  that  precluded  any  republican 
propagandism  or  cession  of  Savoy.  This  gave  the  French 
government  the  excuse  it  wanted  to  break  from  its  engage- 
ments, and  Cavaignac  cloaked  its  dishonour  with  the  taunt 
that  “ Italy  must  pay  the  penalty  of  her  own  follies.”  ^ 

The  refusal  of  the  French  government  made  further 
resistance  quixotic.  But  there  were  still  a few  patriots, 
more  brave  than  level-headed,  who  would  not  accept  defeat. 
After  the  Salasco  armistice  Correnti  and  the  more  active 
spirits  of  the  Provisional  Government  still  hoped  to  carry  on 
the  war  with  the  Lombard  troops  and  the  volunteers  round 
Brescia.  “Now  we  are  our  own  masters,”  said  Cattaneo, 
and  his  words  echoed  the  feelings  of  many  republicans  who 
traced  their  misfortunes  to  the  Piedmontese  alliance.  But 
the  reasoning  was  as  absurd  as  it  was  factious.  The  bulk 
of  the  volunteers  had  retreated  into  Switzerland  or  Pied- 
mont ; alone  among  their  leaders  Garibaldi  still  hoped  on. 
When  he  had  arrived  from  Buenos  Ayres  in  June,  he  had 
tried  in  vain  to  obtain  a commission  in  the  Piedmontese 
army.  The  King  and  his  ministers,  who  might  have  roused 
all  the  Italian  Tyrol  with  his  name,  repulsed  with  frigid 
courtesy  the  republican  hero ; and  Garibaldi,  transferring 
his  offer  of  service  to  the  Lombard  government,  was  given 
the  command  of  the  volunteers  round  Bergamo.  He  was 
at  Monza,  hurrying  up  to  attack  the  Austrians,  when  the 
news  of  the  capitulation  reached  him.  He  retreated, 
Mazzini  with  him,  to  Arona,  where  the  Piedmontese  govern- 
ment ordered  him  to  disband  his  followers  and  leave  the 
country.  It  was  perhaps  this  gratuitous  insult  that  roused 
him.  Though  he  had  promised  to  religiously  observe  the 
armistice,^  he  raised  the  Mazzinian  standard  at  Luino,  and 

1 Bianchi,  op.  cit,  V.  287-293,  303-31 1 ; Bastide,  op.  cit.,  7-8,  46-47; 
Planat  de  la  Faye,  op.  cit.,  I.  335;  Correspondence — Italy,  III.  117  ; Monta- 
nelli,  Memorie,  II.  480-483 ; Berti,  Aljieri,  103 ; Ottolenghi,  Collegno,  99  ; Zini, 
op.  cit.,  Documents  I.  663-664 ; Gioberti,  Rinnovamento,  I.  323,  353  ; Ashley, 
Palmerston,  1. 106;  Cavour,  Lettere,  II.  305-306,  3 1 2 ; Pallavicino,  Memorie,  II.  15. 

2 Society  Archeologica  di  Novara,  Documenti,  23. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


264 

proclaimed  the  “ People’s  War.”  But  he  was  no  longer  in 
South  America  with  its  improvized  armies  and  guerilla 
fighting.  Radetzky  scented  the  danger,  and  hastily  pushed 
on  a large  force ; Garibaldi’s  ranks  had  been  thinned  by 
desertions,  and  after  spirited  manoeuvring  in  face  of  over- 
whelming numbers,  he  was  compelled  to  retreat  into 
Switzerland.  In  one  quarter  only  the  Austrians  were 
repulsed.  In  the  first  days  of  August,  Welden  with  6000 
men  had  pushed  on  into  Romagna,  careless  of  the  Pope’s 
indignation,  and  occupied  Bologna.  Next  day  the  citizens, 
theii’  enthusiasm  roused  by  the  Pope’s  angry  protest,  and 
maddened  by  the  insults  of  the  soldiers,  attacked  the  troops 
in  the  streets,  and  though  they  had  few  arms  but  knives, 
decimated  them  in  Wo  hours  of  hand-to-hand  fighting  and 
drove  them  back  in  rout. 

Except  for  this  one  small  reverse,  Austria  stood  trium- 
phant. Windischgratz  had  crushed  the  Bohemian  revolt 
in  June ; the  breach  between  Serbs  and  Magyars  was 
placing  into  the  hands  of  their  common  tyrant ; and  the 
newly-met  Austrian  Assembly  had  shown  its  loyalty  by 
begging  the  Emperor  to  return  to  Vienna.  Austria’s 
position  in  Italy,  which  a month  ago  seemed  desperate, 
had  been  recovered  by  a series  of  splendid  and  unbroken 
victories.  The  Itahans  were  for  the  moment  hopelessly 
Tvorsted  ; royalists  and  repubhcans  had  alike  tried  and 
failed.  But  it  was  recognized  that  the  final  struggle  was 
only  postponed,  that  a nation  could  not  accept  defeat  in 
a fortnight.  Piedmont  had  her  army  still  intact,  the 
nationalist  current  might  again  range  the  forces  of  Tuscany 
and  Rome  and  Naples  with  her,  or  a French  alliance  place 
her  in  a position  of  unquestioned  superiority.  Or,  as  the 
republicans  dreamed,  a great  popular  rising  of  twenty-two 
millions  of  men  might  sweep  the  Austrians  from  the  land. 

But  the  struggle  had  lost  its  freshness.  Disappointment 
had  succeeded  to  the  extravagant  hopes  of  the  early  days 
of  the  war ; the  enthusiasm,  the  effusiveness,  the  unity  of 
classes  had  gone ; failure  had  brought  in  its  w^ake  suspicion 
and  recrimination;  the  glamour  of  the  national  crusade, 
which  had  veiled  dark  places  in  the  social  structure,  had 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS  265 

gone  and  left  them  bare.  To  the  ruined  tradesman,  the 
ill-paid  artizan,  the  rack-rented  peasant  social  and  financial 
reform  might  well  seem  as  pressing  as  the  expulsion  of  the 
Austrians.  In  Piedmont,  indeed,  the  war  question  still 
absorbed  all  interest.  Though  now  and  again  political  and 
social  questions  were  keenly  debated  in  Parliament,  it  was 
the  preparation  for  another  struggle  which  divided  parties. 
But  outside  Piedmont  and  Venice,  the  question  of  war  had 
even  before  this  sunk  on  the  whole  into  the  backgi-ound. 
The  fight  for  Independence  had  been  only  a part  of  the 
Italian  revival ; and  its  twin  movement  for  social  emancipa- 
tion had  now  to  run  its  course.  Aspirations,  which  had 
found  imperfect  voice,  while  the  eyes  of  the  nation  were 
fixed  on  the  Mincio,  now  clamoured  for  satisfaction.  The 
Moderate  Liberals  might  be  satisfied  with  reforms  already 
won  or  the  slow  evolution  of  constitutional  government. 
But  the  masses,  who  felt  the  still  half-living  tyranny  of 
the  police,  who  wanted  popular  finance,  new  land  laws, 
better  education,  who  hoped  that  all  the  long  arrears  of 
legislation  might  be  cleared  off  in  a few  months,  looked  to 
the  parliaments  to  sweep  away  the  old  autocracy  root  and 
branch,  and  bring  Italy  at  least  up  to  the  level  of  France 
or  England.  In  all  the  large  cities  the  Clubs  had.  gamed 
an  influence  even  beyond  their  real  strength,  which  was 
considerable.  There  were  more  dangerous  elements  of  dis- 
order in  the  out-of-work  labourers  and  the  baser  sort  of 
volunteers,  which  easily  lent  themselves  to  reactionary 
intrigue.  And  yet  the  Democrats  were  truer  to  the  national 
cause  than  their  opponents.  Too  many  of  the  Moderates 
smothered  their  love  of  country  with  their  fears.  The 
crudity  and  impatience  and  intolerance  of  a young  demo- 
cracy, the  pretence  of  patriotism  that  often  sheltered  roguery, 
the  invertebrate  mismanagement  of  untried  men  drove  hosts 
of  tepid  patriots  into  the  ranks  of  reaction.  It  was  men 
like  these,  as  well  as  the  propertied  classes,  the  priests,  the 
peasants,  who  looked  askance  on  any  resumption  of  the 
war  and  another  opening  of  the  floodgates.  But  in  the 
democratic  camp,  behind  its  crude  and  often  factious  home 
policy,  loomed  the  national  question,  never  quite  forgotten. 


266 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

The  princes,  they  argued,  had  betrayed  or  misdirected  the 
nation;  before  war  broke  out  again,  power  must  be  put  in 
the  hands  of  those  who  would  he  loyal  to  it.  There  were 
not  very  many  republicans  in  theory,  not  many  advocates 
of  political  unity.  But  there  was  a stern  resolve  that  t 
errors  and  treacheries  of  the  summer  should  not  be  repeated, 
that  if  the  princes  continued  to  reign,  at  al  even  s e 
patriots  should  govern. 


In  Piedmont  the  Salasco  armistice  sealed  the  fate  of  the 
Casati  ministry.  For  a week  the  country  had  been  practi- 
cally under  two  governments;  the  ministry  refusing  o 
recognize  the  armistice,  while  Revel,  only  a minis  er- 
desimate,  was,  with  frank  disregard  for  the  constitution 
negotiating  for  the  mediation  of  the  Western  Powers,  and 
the  King  was  issuing  orders  to  the  frontier  to  oppose  any 
advance  of  French  troops.  The  new  ministry  (August  20) 
was  dominated  by  Pinelli,  the  leader  of  the  “municipal 
party  in  the  Chamber;  but  it  dared  no  more  than  its 
predecessor  accept  the  political  portion  o t e a as 
armistice,  and  it  was  determined  to  fight  again,  with  or 
without  French  help,  if  a fairly  honourable  peace  could  not 
be  obtained;  it  opened  up  relations  with  the  Hungarians 
and  disaffected  Slavs,  it  welcomed  the  Lombard  refugee 
organizations,  and  asked  Garibaldi  to  hold  himself  m rea  1- 
ness.i  But  it  hoped  to  secure  a peace,  which  would  content 
the  patriots,  through  the  offices  of  an  Anglo-French  media- 
tion. So  long  as  Austria  did  not  cross  the  Ticino,  the 
French  government  was  resolute  not  to  go  to  war,  an 
cared  little  at  what  price  Piedmont  purchased  peace. 
Palmerston,  still  believing  that  Austria  would  suiren  er 
Lombardy,  proposed  the  Hummelauer  memorandum  as  a 
basis  of  negotiation,  and  the  Turin  government,  wRh  some 
scruples  at  abandoning  Venetia,  accepted  it.  But  tne 
Austrians,  elate  with  victory,  were  determined  to  give  up 
no  inch  of  territory;  they  were  willing  indeed  to  grant 
some  form  of  Home  Rule  and  a Liberal  constitution  to  both 


1 Saraceno,  Santa  Rosa,  203-206,  214-215  ; Bianchi,  Cavour,  15. 

2 See  above,  p.  253. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS 


267 

provinces,  perhaps  to  allow  Piedmont  to  take  Parma;  but 
beyond  this  nothing  less  than  French  or  English  arms  would 
make  them  yield.  The  French  government,  after  many 
blustering  threats,  accepted  the  Austrian  terms,  and  played 
with  the  petitions  for  alliance  that  came  again  from  Turin. 
Palmerston  was  half-disposed  to  threaten  war,  and  rained 
homilies  on  Vienna.  But  not  one  step  would  the  Austrians 
move  from  their  position.^ 

The  failure  of  the  negotiations  gave  fresh  strength  to 
the  war  party  in  Piedmont.  Austria  seemed  eager  to  goad 
her  into  another  struggle.  Radetzky  was  harrying  the 
Lombards  with  his  ruthless  tyranny.^  In  defiance  of  the 
armistice  (which  had  been  prolonged),  the  Viennese  govern- 
ment detained  the  guns  at  Peschiera,  and  with  more  excuse 
prepared  to  attack  Venice;  and  Piedmont  in  retaliation 
ordered  her  fleet  to  the  Adriatic.  As  soon  as  parliament 
met  at  Turin  (October  16),  the  war  party  grew  clamorous. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  government  had  legally  suppressed 
the  Jesuits,  that  it  promised  to  recognize  no  peace  which 
did  not  recognize  Italian  nationality  and  renew  the  war  if 
the  negotiations  broke  down.  It  was  not  trusted.  Revel, 
it  was  bruited,  had  said  that  the  kingdom  of  North  Italy 
was  a fine  dream,  and  that  Piedmont  must  take  care  of 
itself.  His  colleagues,  it  was  correctly  surmised,  had 
thwarted  Rosmini’s  efforts  to  cement  a league  with  Tuscany 
and  Rome.^  Gioberti,  though  a Conservative  by  tempera- 
ment, led  the  attack,  moved  by  a personal  bitterness  against 
Pinelli  and  an  itch  to  play  the  demagogue.  The  reaction- 
aries, he  said,  had  resolved  on  peace  at  any  price,  and  this 
“ ministry  of  two  programmes  ” was  secretly  supporting 
them.  Exaggerated  as  his  attack  was,  he  carried  all  before 
him.  The  armistice  humiliated  the  country ; the  armed 
peace,  as  costly  as  war,  was  exhausting  it ; the  second  revolt 
of  Vienna  (October)  gave  it  new  hopes,  for  the  Emperor, 
deserted  by  well  nigh  all  but  his  Croat  subjects,  might  be 

1 Correspondence — Italy,  III.  225,  248,  261,  360,  362;  Walpole,  iZwsseZZ,  II. 
49;  La  Gorce,  Seconde  Repuhlique,  II.  61  ; Planat  de  la  Faye,  op.  cit.,  II.  45  ; 
Bastide,  op.  cit.,  102,  109,  118;  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,Y . 336,342-345;  Bonghi, 
Pasini,  554. 

2 See  below,  p.  301. 


2 See  below,  p.  286. 


268  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

compelled  to  transform  his  rule  into  a Slav  Empire,  which 
would  care  little  for  Italian  provinces.  The  army  had  been 
increased  by  50,000  men,  though  pitiful  accounts  came  in 
of  their  want  of  discipline.  And  though  the  ministers  com- 
plained that  “ Piedmont  was  not  stuff  that  you  could  make 
enthusiastic,”  on  the  whole  war  was  popular.  Even 
D’Azeglio,  wildly  fearful  as  he  was  of  democracy,  wanted  to 
fight,  not  from  any  hope  of  success,  but  to  secure  Piedmontese 
liberty  and  hegemony.^  Articulate  public  opinion  in  the 
clubs  and  press  warmly  supported  Gioberti  and  Rattazzi  in 
their  noisy  and  persistent  attacks.  The  Lombard  refugees, 
25,000  in  number,  naturally  lent  the  weight  of  their  active 
propaganda.  Genoa  was  in  a state  of  semi-revolt,  which  at 
bottom  was  a protest  for  the  national  cause  against  the 
narrower  interests  of  Turin.  The  King  too  wanted  war , 
adversity  had  purged  the  dross  from  his  nature,  and  his 
prayers,  if  they  made  him  a bad  general,  made  him  a good 
King.  Though  reluctantly  drawn  along  the  democratic 
path,  he  was  loyal  in  all  sincerity  to  his  people,  and  thhsted 
to  give  happiness  and  life  for  his  country  s cause.  Tortured 
by  physical  suffering,  schooling  his  imperious  nature  to 
suffer  the  calumny  that  poured  on  him  and  the  petty 
affronts  of  his  ministers,  his  one  ambition  was  to  see  Italy 
free,  and  then  lay  down  his  crown.  For  this,  for  the  mystic 
sense  of  a mission  that  possessed  him,  he  was  ready  to 
sacrifice  all  his  prepossessions ; he  resigned  the  command  of 
the  army  in  obedience  to  the  popular  clamour;  he  gave 
secret  audience  to  radicals ; he  intrigued  with  them^  to 
upset  his  ministry,  and  substitute  a democratic  war  cabinet 
under  Manin  and  Brofferio.^ 

Pinelli  realised  that,  unless  the  mediating  Powers  could 
effect  a speedy  settlement,  war  must  inevitably  come  soon. 
A resolution  for  immediate  hostilities  was  defeated  only  by 
a rather  small  majority.  The  vote  resulted  in  tumults  at 

1 Spaventa,  J)al  1848,  48. 

2 Planat  de  la  Faye,  op.  cit.,  I.  435  ; Costa  de  Beauregard,  Dernikrcs  annies, 
382,  389,  395,  572;  Pallavicino,  op.  cit.,  II.  36;  Misley,  Memoire,  II.  174; 
Bianchi,  Matteucci,  161  ; Leopardi,  Narrazioni,  318.  The  King  had  already  in 
the  spring  and  summer  talked  of  abdicating.  For  an  unfavourable  view  of 
the  King,  see  Cavour,  Nouvelles  lettres,  214,  217,  266. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS  269 

Genoa  and  a small  rising  in  the  Val  dTntelvi  near  the 
Lake  of  Como.  In  Piedmont  the  war-fever  was  steadily 
mounting.  It  was  in  vain  that  Pinelli  tried  to  appease  it 
by  calling  out  a fresh  levy  of  12,000  men.  His  majority, 
in  spite  of  Cavour’s  vigorous  championship,  gradually  melted 
away.  The  deputies  were  frightened  by  demonstrations  in 
the  galleries  of  the  Chamber;  the  Right  regarded  the 
ministers  as  poor  trucklers  to  the  democrats  and  Genoese ; 
the  Left  turned  on  them  with  fresh  venom,  when  they  tried 
to  check  the  importunate  and  seditious  section  of  the 
refugees.  Defeated  on  a catch  vote,  Pinelli  resigned 
(December  4);  and  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  form 
a cabinet  under  D’Azeglio,  the  King  was  reluctantly  com- 
pelled to  send  for  Gioberti. 

Tuscany  had  witnessed  the  same  struggle  between 
Moderates  and  Democrats.  Enthusiasm  for  the  war  had 
rapidly  cooled;  the  clergy  made  industrious  use  of  the 
Encyclical,  and  the  peasants,  fearing  conscription  and  heavy 
taxes,  lapsed  into  their  natural  conservatism.  The  majority, 
who  had  applauded  the  Revolution,  while  it  meant  proces- 
sions and  demonstrations,  turned  away  when  it  called  for 
sacrifice.  Ridolfi,  who  had  become  Premier  in  June,  was  a 
genial,  hardworking  man,  but  weak  and  compromising,  quite 
unaware  what  big  steps  the  times  required.  His  cabinet 
was  a coalition  of  Moderates  and  Reactionaries,  in  which 
longer  experience  of  office  gave  the  latter  a natural  pre- 
ponderance. And  though  Ricasoli  and  the  Left  Centre 
vigorously  assailed  it  for  its  lukewarmness,  there  was  little 
difference  of  principle  between  the  two  Moderate  wings. 
They  had  the  same  exclusiveness  and  timidity,  the  same 
pedantic  belief  in  their  theories,  without  any  vigour  or  un- 
selfishness to  put  them  into  practice.  The  Assembly  wasted 
its  time  in  recriminations,  and  the  real  power  passed  to  the 
Democrats  outside.  But  the  best  of  them  had  fallen  at 
Curtatone  or  were  still  encamped  on  the  Lombard  plains, 
and  those  who  remained  at  home  were  as  selfish  and  un- 
statesmanlike as  the  Moderates.  The  whole  state  seemed 
drifting  helplessly  into  anarchy,  and  some  disturbances  at 


2 70  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Florence,  whicli  followed  tlie  news  of  Custozza  (July  3o)> 
showed  how  rotten  was  the  fabric.  The  ministry,  afraid  to 
face  the  situation,  tamely  resigned.  Public  opinion,  perhaps 
some  faint  patriotism  of  his  own,  forced  the  Grand  Duke  to 
protest  the  steadfastness  of  his  alliance  with  Charles  Albert, 
and  entrust  the  premiership  to  Ricasoli.  But  Ricasoli  was 
suspected,  though  wrongly,  of  a wish  to  absorb  Tuscany 
in  Piedmont,  and  the  other  Moderate  sections  refused  to 
join  him.^  The  country  had  been  three  weeks  without  a 
government,  when  Capponi  succeeded  in  reconciling  the  two 
Moderate  wings.  His  creed  was  a lofty  Liberalism,  and  his 
breadth  of  view,  if  it  helped  to  make  him  ineffective,  saved 
him  from  the  exclusiveness  of  the  other  Moderates.  His 
age  and  blindness,  his  stainless  name,  his  descent  from  the 
great  Florentine  who  bearded  Charles  VIII.,  had  won  him 
the  respect,  almost  the  veneration  of  all  Tuscany.  Like 
Ruggiero  Settimo  in  Sicily,  he  seemed  a majestic  figure 
lifted  above  the  strife  of  party.  But  he  was  irresolute  and 
unpractical  5 his  temperament  unfitted  him  for  the  rough 
play  of  a time  of  revolution  ; his  blindness  made  it  impossible 
for  him  to  keep  a grip  on  the  administration.  He  promised 
thoroughness  and  war,  if  the  negotiations  for  peace  broke 
down;  he  made  some  effort  to  strengthen  the  army,  and 
earnestly  pushed  forward  the  League  with  Rome  and  Piedmont. 
But  he  had  troubles  enough  to  busy  him  at  home.  The 
dread  of  an  Austrian  occupation  nursed  the  excitement ; the 
country  was  full  of  demoralized  soldiers,  of  disbanded  volun- 
teers, of  unemployed  labourers ; and  while  reactionary  priests 
and  nobles  fanned  sedition  in  the  country  districts,  the 
volunteers  and  demagogues  in  the  Clubs  agitated  for  a 
People’s  War. 

The  government  passed  a Coercion  Act  and  closed  the 
Clubs,  and  outside  Leghorn  this  produced  a momentary 
quiet.  But  there  things  had  gone  too  far  to  be  calmed  by 
empty  threats  of  force.  Nothing  had  healed  the  deep 
divisions  between  the  middle  classes  and  the  unarmed  and 
unenfranchised  populace  ; and  Guerrazzi’ s imprisonment  after 

1 Guerrazzi,  Apologia,  117  ; Capponi,  Scritti,  II.  67  ; Ricasoli,  Lettere,  I.  363, 
365  ; La  Cecilia,  Cenno,  17. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS 


271 


the  riots  of  January  had  increased  the  bitterness  of  his 
partisans.  After  Custozza  the  city  was  ripe  for  revolt ; and 
when  Capponi  a few  days  after  taking  office  arrested  Gavazzi, 
who  had  landed  in  defiance  of  an  order  of  expulsion,  the 
people  broke  up  the  railway  and  seized  the  magazines  of 
arms  (August  23).  But  again,  as  in  January,  the  power  lay 
with  the  citizen  guard,  and  the  separatists  were  in  a minority; 
and  when  Capponi  sent  troops,  they  were  welcomed  with 
acclaim.  Everything  seemed  in  train  for  a settlement,  when, 
apparently  at  the  instigation  of  the  rich  merchants,  the 
government  foolishly  turned  to  coercion.  Cipriani,  the 
masterful  and  unpopular  commander  of  the  garrison,  tried 
to  disarm  the  populace ; and  the  mob  attacked  and  worsted 
the  troops,  till  Capponi,  in  despair,  sent  Guerrazzi  with  in- 
structions to  bribe  the  city  into  quiet.  Guerrazzi  soon  made 
the  disorderly  elements  feel  his  hand,  but  the  exasperation 
was  intense,  and  it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  he 
could  prevent  the  proclamation  of  a separatist  republic. 
The  ministry,  too  weak  and  divided  to  be  consistent,  repudi- 
ated its  promises,^  and  tried  to  cow  the  “ nest  of  pirates  ” by 
a show  of  force.  The  citizen  guards  of  Tuscany  were  sum- 
moned to  a great  camp  near  Pisa ; but  few  responded,  and 
those  who  came  were  readier  to  fraternize  with  the  Livornese 
than  act  against  them.  Coercion  expired  in  ridicule,  and 
thanks  to  Guerrazzi’s  strong  hand  the  city  returned  to  its 
normal  condition.  But  Capponi  still  refused  to  acknowledge 
him,  and  turning  to  the  one  possible  alternative,  appointed 
Montanelli  governor  of  the  city. 

It  was  the  last  humiliation  of  the  tottering  ministry. 
Montanelli  accepted  office  only  on  condition  that  he  might 
preach  his  favourite  panacea  of  a democratic  “ Constituent  ” 
parliament.  And  though  Leghorn  welcomed  him  and  his 
programme,  he  too,  like  Guerrazzi,  could  hardly  dissuade 
the  city  from  proclaiming  the  Republic.  It  was  clear  that 
only  a Democratic  ministry  could  preserve  Leghorn  to 
Tuscany,  or  restore  authority  in  the  rest  of  the  country. 
Capponi  resigned  on  October  15,  and  every  Moderate  com- 

1 Capponi,  Lettere,  II.  441  ; Id.  Scritti,  II.  133;  Guerrazzi,  op.  cit.,  93-96; 
Correspondence — Italy,  III.  393. 


272  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  \ 

bination  to  form  a cabinet  broke  down.  The  Grand  Duke  f 
summoned  Montanelli,  and  Montanelli  refused  to  take  office 
without  Guerrazzi.  And  reluctant  as  the  Grand  Duke  was 
to  accept  him,  the  agitation  at  Leghorn  and  Florence  and 
the  advice  of  the  English  minister  convinced  hm  that  it 
was  the  only  alternative  to  anarchy  and  perhaps  to  civil  waiA 

The  two  men,  who  had  the  fate  of  Tuscany  in  their 
hands,  had  little  in  common.  Montanelli  ^ was  a genial, 
lovable  man,  vain  but  transparently  sincere;  somewhat 
nebulous  in  his  theories,  with  a mischievous  incapacity  for 
statesmanship  and  a lack  of  insight  that  made  him  sometimes 
timid,  sometimes  rash;  but  atoning  for  much  by  his  candour 
and  the  impression  that  his  enthusiasm  and  real  intellectual 
power  produced.  When  it  was  rumoured  that  he  had  died 
among  his  students  at  Curtatone,  all  Tuscany  wept  for  the  | 
fallen  professor.  The  Moderates  respected  him  for  his 
courtesy  and  scholarship ; the  clergy  looked  kindly  on  the 
man  who  wished  to  free  the  Tuscan  church  from  state 
control;  the  students  of  Pisa,  the  artisans  of  Leghorn 
loved  him  for  his  persistent  advocacy  of  democracy.  As  the 
champion  of  the  cry  for  a “ Constituent,”  he  was  at  the 
moment  one  of  the  most  prominent  men  in  Italy.  Guerrazzi 
was  cast  in  another  mould.  Though  he  plays  a small  part 
in  Italian  politics,  he  stands  out  as  one  of  the  strongest 
and  most  original  among  his  contemporaries.  Fed  on  Vol- 
taire and  Byron,  hard  pressed  to  earn  a livelihood,  thrice 
imprisoned  before  he  was  thirty,  the  man  s whole  being  was 
at  war  with  society.  He  was  quarrelsome  and  opinionative, 
suffering  from  acute  nervous  disorder,  too  full  of  hate  of 
wrong  to  have  room  for  love  of  good.  “Vengeance  for  great 
crimes,”  he  said,  “delights  the  soul  of  God.”  The  object  of 
his  novels  had  been  to  awake  Italy;  he  despised  the  oppressed 
almost  as  much  as  he  hated  the  oppressor ; “ quiet,”  he  said, 

“ is  not  life,”  “ little  matter  if  God  curse  or  bless  us,  so  He 
make  us  live.”  The  success  that  came  to  him  in  after  life 
softened  his  nature,  and  made  political  struggle  always  dis- 

1 Capponi,  Scritti,  II.  46.  • • c r 

2 His  chair  of  philosophy  at  Pisa  must  have  been  a sinecure ; in  i»4i 

there  was  one  student  in  that  school. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS  273 

tasteful  to  him  at  bottom.  And  though  he  never  forgot  his 
enemies,  and  longed  to  have  the  classes  who  had  wronged 
him  at  his  feet,  he  craved  for  the  good  opinion  of  respecta- 
bility, he  wished  to  show  himself,  the  branded  demagogue, 
as  champion  of  law  and  order,  who,  if  he  relished  popularity, 
slightly  scorned  it  too.  But  he  found  few  friends,  few  who 
really  trusted  him.  Adversity  had  left  something  twisted 
in  his  nature.  The  lawyer’s  insight  into  the  seamy  side 
of  life  weakened  yet  more  his  scanty  faith  in  humanity. 
Despite  bursts  of  generosity,  he  was  disingenuous  and  un- 
chivalrous,  easily  sliding  into  casuistry.  His  love  of  power 
was  patriotic  in  the  main,  but  he  was  ready  to  cling  to  it  at 
some  expense  of  principle,  and  willing  to  shape  principle  too 
easily  to  the  possibilities  of  the  moment.  But  as  the  obverse 
of  his  moral  roughness,  he  had  the  instinct  of  the  statesman. 
Fearless,  ambitious,  master  of  himself,  he  had  a practical 
grip  of  things,  strange  to  the  academic  theorists  of  Florence. 
“ The  business  of  the  world,”  he  said,  “ when  it  cannot  be 
done  as  we  would  like  it,  must  get  done  as  it  can.” 

Rome  witnessed  in  more  tragic  catastrophe  the  same 
decline  and  fall  of  the  Moderates.  In  the  crisis,  that  fol- 
lowed the  Encyclical,  the  democratic  party  forced  the  Pope 
to  accept  Mamiani  as  Premier ; and  the  Radical  leader  took 
office  on  condition  that  the  Foreign  Ministry  should  be  left 
in  the  hands  of  a layman.  Mamiani  had  been  a member 
of  the  Provisional  Government  of  Bologna  in  1831;  in  his 
French  exile  he  had  been  known  as  a poet  and  metaphysician, 
and  his  political  writings,  though  they  attracted  little  atten- 
tion at  the  time,  had  been  the  precursors  of  the  Moderate 
School.^  After  his  return  to  Rome  in  the  autumn  of  1847, 
he  had  won  repute  and  popularity  as  a speaker  and  journa- 
list, and  the  programme  of  social  reform,  which  he  drafted, 
became  the  authorized  exposition  of  radical  policy.  Radical 
though  he  was,  he  wished  to  preserve  the  Temporal  Power, 
and  hoped  to  save  it  by  drawing  a sharp  line  between  the 
Pope’s  spiritual  and  temporal  authority.  Like  Mazzini, 
though  in  another  sense,  he  thought  that  Rome  would  bless 

^ See  above,  p.  156. 

VOL.  I.  c 


2 74  A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

the  modem  world  by  giving  a religious  sanction  to  democracy. 
But  to  keep  his  spiritual  influence  pure  and  unassailed,  the 
Pope  must  have  no  part  or  responsibility  m the  secular 
policy  of  the  state.  He  was  to  accept  the  English  formula 
“ to  reign  but  not  to  govern  ” to  “ live  in  the  serene  peace  of 
doctrine,  to  pray  and  bless  and  pardon.”  ^ Mamiani  was  a 
passionate  enthusiast  for  Italian  Independence;  he  intended 
that  Rome  should  help  to  her  utmost  in  the  national  war; 
and  he  told  the  Pope  that  he  would  have  no  negotiations 
with  Austria,  while  one  of  her  soldiers  remained  in  Italy. 
But  he  was  a federalist,  believing  federalism  to  be  the 
highest  form  of  union  attainable  at  present,  and  he  earnestly 
pushed  on  the  projects  of  a League.  His  enemies  accused 
him  of  wishing  to  annex  Romagna  to  Piedmont;  but  thougH 
he  was  certainly  in  communication  with  the  separatists  m 
the  Legations,  there  is  no  proof  that  he  abetted  their  plans, 
and  his  suspicions  of  Charles  Albert’s  designs  made  him 
accept  with  some  misgivings  the  need  of  a powerful  Nor 

Italian  state.^  . , 

Mamiani  was  dearest  to  the  democrats  as  a socia. 

reformer.  “ I will  do  my  best,”  he  promised,  “to  heal 
the  wounds  that  poverty  and  ignorance  have  inflicted  on 
the  poorer  classes.”  He  gloried  in  the  historic  democracy 
of  Italy,  and  the  “humble  people”  were  always  in  his 
thought.  He  wished  to  show  them  that  their  material 
interests  as  well  as  their  sentiments  were  involved  m the 
national  movement.  As  soon  as  the  civU  service  and  local 
government  had  been  reformed,  he  promised  to  devote  him- 
self to  social  measures,  and  he  projected  a “ mmistry  o 
public  beneficence,”  to  protect  and  educate  the  poor.  In 
education,  though  he  was  willing  for  the  present  to  corn- 
promise  with  the  priests  by  permitting  voluntary  schools 


1 Mamiani,  ScrUti,  317.  339.  378  ; Piscours  de  C L. 

RMuzione,  II.  353-  By  the  end  of  the  year  he  had  realized  how  difficult, 

not  impossible,  it  was  : Scritti,  335-  tt  ^ ATino-ViP+ti 

ZGabussi,  Memorie,  II.  15;  Farini,  Roman  State,  II.  160,  312,  Minghet  , 

'^"'"’"Maiffianrop.' ri(.,  340,  386-387.  It  was  to  have  the  care  of  hospitals, 
public  oharities,'public  health,  Ma  and  refuges,  friendly  societies,  savings- 
banks,  monts-de-piM,  and  the  poorer  schools. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS  275 

and  leaving  religious  teaching  in  their  hands,  he  planned 
an  elaborate  national  system.  Complete  social  equality,  free 
trade,  free  land,  a progressive  income-tax,  railways  and  tele- 
graphs, reform  of  charities  and  public  health  made  up  the 
most  sensible  and  advanced  social  programme  yet  put  for- 
ward in  Italy.  But  between  a hostile  court  and  an  impatient 
people  there  was  little  chance  for  quiet  thoughtful  reform ; 
and  Mamiani  was  no  Mirabeau.  He  was  wordy,  placable, 
big-minded ; strictly  honourable  at  bottom,  but  with  a cer- 
tain want  of  directness  and  over-noisy  parade  of  honesty. 
He  tried  to  carry  the  people  with  him,  but  he  had  none 
of  the  audacity,  that  will  force  a policy  on  the  masses  and 
make  them  accept  it  as  their  own.  A stronger  man  might 
have  cowed  the  Pope;  Mamiani  tried  to  humour  and  win 
him.  It  was  an  impossible  task ; the  Pope  hated  him,  sus- 
pected him,  wrongly,  as  a sceptic  and  an  Albertist.  It  was 
clearer  than  ever  that  it  was  impossible  for  a Pope  to  per- 
form the  duties  of  an  Italian  prince,  that  constitutional 
government  could  never  work  under  the  Temporal  Power. 
It  was  intolerable  to  the  Papal  court  that  the  corre- 
spondence with  the  Nuncios  should  be  in  the  hands  of  a 
lay  Foreign  Secretary;  and  Pius,  disregarding  his  promise 
to  his  premier,  appointed  a Cardinal  to  the  post.  Mamiani, 
in  spite  of  infinite  provocation,  did  everything  short  of  sur- 
rendering his  principles,  to  win  Pius ; bowed  himself  to  “ a 
policy  of  subterfuges  and  reticences,”  hid  the  Pope’s  faults 
from  the  public,  showed  the  utmost  long-suffering  with 
his  tortuous  ways.  But  Pius  and  the  coterie,  to  whom  he 
had  surrendered  himself,  had  determined  to  wreck  him. 
The  interests  of  the  Church,  the  Pope  thought,  overrode 
any  constitutional  rights.  He  encouraged  civil  servants 
to  insubordination,  and  drafted  laws  without  consulting  his 
ministers. 

The  great  battlefield  between  the  Pope  and  Mamiani 
was  the  question  of  the  war.  The  Papal  Government  had 
never  explicitly  declared  war,  and  after  the  Encyclical  it 
had  been  necessary  to  put  Durando’s  troops  more  or  less 
under  Charles  Albert’s  orders  to  prevent  their  being  treated 
as  filibusters.  It  was  not  till  the  middle  of  May,  that  there 


276  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 
•was  any  official  rupture.  The  Pope  was  not  yet  dead  to  all 

national  enthusiasm;  there  was  perhaps  a moment  after  a 
violation  of  his  territory  by  the  Austrians  (J™®  ^7^’ ^ 
he  was  disposed  to  declare  war  frankly  ; and  had  Par 
accepted  the  League,  he  might  have  allowed  Mamiani  to 
recruit  with  a free  hand  for  its  army.  But  Paretos  rejec- 
tion of  his  proposals  made  him  more  than  ever  suspicious 
of  Piedmontese  ambition ; he  felt  that  it  ill  became  a p 
to  be  at  war  with  a Catholic  nation,  and  there  was  strong 
suspicion  that  he  had  been  making  secret  overtures  of 
friendship  to  Austria.^  Mamiani  tried_  m ® ^ 

Rim  to  an  acceptance  of  the  national  principle;  Pms  would 
not  endorse  his  commonplace  that  “by  differences  of  an- 
guage  and  race  and  customs  God  has  appointed  each  naUon 
to  lead  an  independent  existence.”  More  irresolute  and  irri- 
table than  ever,  he  saw  in  everything  an  attack  on  religion, 
a^afraid  to  loosen  one  stone  of  the  edifice.  Conscious 
of  good  intentions,  he  fretted  at  the  widening  plf  between 
himself  and  his  people,  but  did  not  see  tliat  he  must  pay 
the  inevitable  forfeit  of  his  own  weakness  and  disingenuous- 
ness.  It  was  impossible  after  the  Encyclical  to  charge  the 
shortcomings  of  the  government  to  sinister  cardinal^ 
ideal  of  a democratic  Papacy  had  proved  a figment,  and 
disappointment  was  already  passing  into  resentment.  The 
Mod^emtes  were  almost  extinct  for  the  time  as  a ^ica 
force  The  Encyclical  had  strengthened  the  Democrats  by 
removing  the  Pope’s  moderating  influence  from  the  Liberal 
movement;  and  though  many  of  them 

there  was  an  extremer  section  workmg  for  a lepublic  or 
provisional  government,  and  in  Romagna  the  separatists 
Lre  strong.  Something  that  was  almost  anarchy  was 
infesting  some  of  the  provinces;  the  political  assassina- 
tions spread  to  Sinigaglia  and  Ancona,  and  “ 
to  Rome.  Mamiani  had  to  content  himself  with  ram  g 
circulars  on  the  slack  authorities.  Without  an  army  or  a 
loyal  civil  service  behind  him,  it  was  impossible  to  teach 
respect  for  the  law  to  a people  long  living  under  despotism, 

1 Spada,  op.  cit,  II.  388-390  5 ^affi,  Scritti,  II.  320. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS 


277 

but  impatient  of  servitude,  and  ignorant  of  rights  and  duties.  • 
Mamiani  felt  power  slipping  from  him,  and  the  news  of 
Custozza  brought  the  final  blow.  Parliament  and  the  citizen 
guard  were  prepared  to  force  the  Pope’s  hands ; but  he  felt 
his  position  untenable  and  resigned  (August  3). 

Fabbri,  who  succeeded  him,  had  been  a conspirator  in  the 
’20s,  he  was  honest  and  a patriot,  but  too  old  and  feeble  to 
be  a match  for  the  court  or  keep  the  confidence  of  the 
country.  The  new  cabinet  endorsed  Mamiani’s  war  policy, 
but  it  was  unable  or  unwilling  to  protect  Bologna  from  the 
Austrians  or  the  gang  of  criminals,  who  for  a few  days 
terrorized  the  city  after  their  departure.  The  Pope,  though 
he  was  indignant  at  the  invasion  and  threatened  Welden  to 
raise  the  country  against  him,  threw  off  almost  his  last 
shreds  of  constitutionalism.  He  hurriedly  prorogued  the 
Chamber  (August  26),  and  unknown  to  his  ministers, 
appealed  to  Piedmont,  to  Naples,  to  France,  to  protect  him- 
self alike  against  the  Austrians  and  his  own  subjects.  Fabbri, 
indeed,  he  regarded  as  a stop-gap,  till  he  could  find  a still 
more  obsequious  minister ; and  after  six  weeks  of  ofiice,  he 
forced  him  out  to  make  room  for  the  ex-French  ambassador, 
Pellegrino  Rossi. 

Rossi  was  a native  of  Carrara.  At  thirty  years  of  age 
he  had  been  barrister  and  professor  at  Bologna,  had  been 
compromised  in  Murat’s  rising,  and  was  an  exile  in  Switzer- 
land, where  he  drafted  the  still-born  constitution  of  1833. 
Removing  to  Paris,  he  succeeded  J.-B.  Say  in  his  chair  in 
the  University  of  France.  His  lectures  won  him  the  dislike 
of  the  democrats,  and  the  affectionate  regard  of  Guizot,  who 
sent  him  to  Rome  in  1845  to  negotiate  for  the  suppression 
of  the  French  Jesuits.  Here  he  had  become  the  new  Pope’s 
friend  and  adviser,  using  his  influence  to  cement  a frank 
alliance  between  him  and  the  Moderates.  Rossi  was  a re- 
former and  a nationalist,  in  many  points  a Liberal.  He  had 
gone  with  the  Italian  movement,  so  long  as  it  aimed  at 
Independence,  at  honest  and  progressive  administration  and 
a middle-class  constitution.  But  as  a true  follower  of  Guizot, 
he  regarded  it  his  mission  to  school  the  democracy ; he  had 
a diplomatist’s  horror  of  the  complications  that  would  follow 


278  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

the  attainment  of  Italian  Unity,  or  any  attack  on  the  Tern-  j 
poral  Power.^  He  preferred  the  sham  constitutionalism  of 
Naples  to  the  fervid  and  irrepressible  democracy  of  Tuscany.  | 
He  saw  the  need  of  a brave  and  strong  government,  that 
would  deal  rigorously  with  the  had  elements  in  the  state ; he  | 

did  not  equally  recognize  the  need  of  sympathy  to  draw  out  j 

the  good.  In  the  Papacy,  “ the  one  great  thing  that  was  left  | 

to  Italy,”  he  saw  the  only  possible  fulcrum  of  a respected 
executive.  But  he  was  no  friend  of  the  hierarchy,  and  they 
repaid  double  hatred  to  the  old  enemy  of  the  Jesuits,  who 
had  married  a Protestant  wife,  and  whose  books  were  on  the  I 

Index.  On  the  national  question  Bossi  felt  as  strongly  as  I 

Mamiani ; during  the  summer  he  had  written  passionately 
in  praise  of  Italy ; he  had  advised  the  Pope  to  go  resolutely 
into  the  war ; and  as  soon  as  he  took  office,  he  promised  to 
forward  the  League  and  planned  the  strengthening  of  the 
army.  But  he  shared  the  Pope’s  deep-rooted  suspicions  of  i 
Piedmont ; his  eulogy  of  the  Papacy  was  a gage  of  defiance 
to  Turin ; and  when  Rosmini’s  negotiations  for  the  League  ^ 
were  wrecked  by  Piedmontese  self-seeking,  he  broke  out  in 
the  official  Gazette  into  bitter  invective  against  the  subalpine 
government. 

His  home  policy  was  one  of  wise  economic  and  adminis- 
trative reform.  He  made  his  strong  hand  felt  throughout 
the  corrupt  civil  service ; he  raised  the  financial  credit  of 
the  state,  laid  down  telegraphs,  tried  to  push  on  the  railway 
schemes.  But  the  people  forgot  his  reforms  in  their  hatred 
of  his  coercion  policy.  Much  of  it  was  not  unneeded  to 
restore  discipline  in  the  army  and  police,  to  control  the  dis- 
orderly elements,  which  had  thriven  under  the  slackness  of 
the  preceding  administrations.  But  Rossi  made  no  attempt 
to  win  the  turbulent  and  perfervid  but  honest  democrats, 
who  would  have  been  the  strength  of  a popular  government. 

He  paraded  his  contempt  for  the  noisy  politicians,  who 
crowded  the  galleries  of  the  Chamber ; he  threatened  Rome 


1 Guizot,  Memoires,  VIII.  383  ; De  Mazade,  Rossi,  737;  Ottolenghi,  CoUegno, 
83  ; BonCompagni,  Chiesa,  7-10.  For  his  earlier  belief  in  Unity,  see  Rossi, 
Cours  du  droit  constitution^,  I.  xliii. 

2 See  below,  p.  286. 


MODERATES  AND  DEMOCRATS 


279 


with  military  occupation;  he  harassed  Garibaldi,  and  sur- 
rendered political  fugitives  to  Ferdinand.  But  he  might 
have  lived  down  his  unpopularity,  as  the  people  came  to 
realize  his  real  worth.  He  was  the  only  man,  if  there  were 
any  such,  who  could  make  a constitutional  government 
possible  under  the  Pope,  and  preserve  it  for  a more  durable 
structure  in  the  future.  But  his  work  was  ruined  by  his 
want  of  tact.  Rude,  proud,  taciturn,  he  chilled  or  crossed 
all  who  came  in  contact  with  him.  Callous  to  attack  him- 
self, he  loved  to  fling  sarcasms  that  could  never  be  forgiven. 
An  economist  of  the  old  school,  a materialist  in  his  philo- 
sophy, he  had  little  patience  with  sentiment  that  ran  athwart 
his  plans,  and  his  narrow  finance-minister  policy  made  him 
intolerant  of  aspirations  that  soared  beyond  the  region  of 
the  obviously  practicable.  And  so  his  enemies  thickened. 
The  Albertists  had  long  ago  denounced  him  as  a public 
enemy.  The  officials  whom  he  made  work,  the  clergy  whom 
he  taxed,  the  ruffians  whom  he  tried  to  keep  in  order,  all 
swelled  the  cry  against  him.  He  might  have  defied  them, 
strong  in  the  Pope’s  protection,  had  he  won  anything  less 
than  hatred  from  the  people.  But  they  could  never  forgive 
the  man  who  wrote  bitter  diatribes  against  democracy,  and 
missed  no  occasion  to  spurn  their  cherished  ideals. 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER 

NOVEMBER  I 848  FEBRUARY  I 849 

Eossi’s  DEATH  ; the  Pope  flies.  The  Papal  Question  : the  Pope  at  Gaeta ; 
Antonelli ; Gioherti  and  the  Catholic  Powers  ; France  and  the  Papacy. 
The  League ; the  Federative  Congress ; the  Constituent.  Kome  in 
November ; demand  for  a Constituent ; Muzzarelli  ministry  ; the 
Moderates  in  Romagna ; the  Roman  Constituent ; the  Republic 
PROCLAIMED.  TuscANY  : Montanelli  and  Guerrazzi ; the  Tuscan 
Constituent ; the  Grand  Duke’s  flight ; the  Provisional  Government ; 
the  Grand  Duke  goes  to  Gaeta. 

The  tragic  sequel  showed  how  difl&cult  it  was  to  stem  the 
democratic  tide.  Rossi  had  failed  to  restore  quiet  by  coercion. 
The  People’s  Club  was  clamouring  for  war,  and  others,  it  was 
said,  were  weaving  a republican  plot.  The  Trasteverine 
quarter,  hitherto  so  sturdily  Papal,  had  gone  over  to  the 
popular  party.  The  democrats  at  Bologna  had  organised 
themselves  under  Gavazzi’s  leading,  and  had  been  disarmed 
by  Zucchi,  who  dreaded  their  relations  with  Garibaldi,  and 
unjustly  suspected  them  of  sympathy  with  the  sansculottes. 
The  Clericals  were  looking  abroad  for  help,  the  Radicals  were 
agitating  for  a Constituent  Assembly,  that  might  tumble  half 
or  all  the  thrones  in  Italy.  There  was  a general  sense  of 
approaching  crisis,  when  parliament  met  again  (November  15). 
Rossi  had  been  warned,  and  though  he  affected  carelessness, 
he  ostentatiously  brought  troops  to  Rome,  and  tried  to  cow 
the  populace  by  a military  demonstration.  A letter  written 
to  him  by  Zucchi,  proposing  to  disperse  the  Romagnuol 
patriots  and  destroy  Garibaldi’s  regiment  with  grapeshot, 
was  intercepted  and  published.^  The  newspapers  hotly 

1 Niccolini,  Pontificate,  73,  quoting  from  the  Contemporaneo  of  November  14  ; 

I cannot  find  that  its  authenticity  was  denied. 

280 


THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER 


28 1 

assailed  the  minister,  and  he  tried  in  vain  to  curb  them ; 
the  majority  of  the  Assembly  were  prepared  to  oppose,  and 
would  probably  have  insisted  on  his  resignation.^  He  had 
drafted  a speech  for  its  opening,  patriotic,  roseate,  wanting 
in  definiteness;  but  the  chance  to  deliver  it  never  came. 
The  belief  spread  that  he  had  brought  up  the  troops  to 
dragoon  Rome  into  submission,  and  when  he  drove  to  the 
Palazzo  della  Cancellaria,  where  the  Chamber  sat,  the  crowds 
groaned  the  hated  premier.  As  he  ascended  the  staircase, 
an  unknown  hand  struck  him  dead.  The  motives  of  the 
deed  were  never  certainly  discovered.  General  opinion  set 
it  to  the  account  of  the  democrats,  and  the  democrats  retorted 
that  the  Jesuits  had  made  others  of  their  enemies  feel  the 
assassin’s  knife.  There  was  almost  certainly  no  widespread 
plot ; it  may  have  been  the  deed  of  an  isolated  fanatic.  But 
the  evidence  on  the  whole  leans  to  the  belief,  that  it  was  the 
work  of  a small  section  in  the  Clubs,  who  hoped  to  do  their 
country  service  by  slaying  the  supposed  arch-enemy  of 
freedom,  who  was  preparing,  they  thought,  to  copy  Ferdi- 
nand’s butchery  in  the  streets  of  Rome.^ 

Rome  received  the  news  very  coolly.  The  deputies,  fond 
of  playing  at  Roman  Senators,  thought  their  dignity  best 
sustained  by  doing  nothing,  and  lost  for  ever  the  popular 
respect.  The  police  fraternized  with  the  populace,  and 
together  they  defiled  through  the  streets  in  public  proces- 
sion. A small  crowd  shouted  approval  of  the  murder  under 
Rossi’s  own  windows,  but  were  silenced  by  the  citizen  guard.^ 
The  cold-blooded  reports,  that  appeared  in  the  newspapers, 
reflected  the  general  sense  of  relief  and  satisfaction.  Rossi 
left  no  friends,  and  democrats  and  reactionaries  alike  saw 
their  opportunity  in  his  death.  But  the  democrats  were  the 
immediate  gainers ; the  practical  abdication  of  the  Chamber 
left  the  People’s  Club  master  of  Rome,  and  with  the  help  of 
the  police  it  restored  absolute  order  in  the  streets.  But  they 

^ Gabussi,  Memorie,  II.  21 1 ; Galletti,  Memoria,  16 ; Gaiani,  Roman  Exile,  410. 

2 See  Vol.  II.,  Appendix  D. 

® Gabussi,  op.  cit,  II.  214;  Correspondence— Italy,  III.  608;  Niccolini,  op. 
cit.,  79;  Gaiani,  op.  cit.,  413;  Farini,  Roman  State,  II.  412.  Farini  draws  a 
picture  of  anarchy,  which  Gabussi  says  is  imaginary,  but  which  is  corrobo- 
rated by  Leopardi,  also  an  eye  witness. 


282 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNIT^ 

were  determined  to  make  their  victory  secure.  - great 
crowd  of  soldiers  and  civilians,  headed  by  officers  and  citi- 
zens of  rank,  demonstrated  outside  the  Quirinal  (November 
1 6),  and  demanded  the  Pope’s  acceptance  of  the  democratic 
programme.  Pius  had  already  commissioned  Galletti,  a 
Radical  leader  and  minister  of  police  in  the  constitutional 
cabinets,  to  form  a ministry.  But  the  crowd,  refusing  to  he 
satisfied  without  positive  pledges  from  the  Pope,  grew  more 
menacing.  Lambruschini,  sighted  in  the  street,  had  to  take 
refuge  in  a hay-loft;  and  Pius,  indignant  and  excited,  de- 
clined to  “ treat  with  rebels.”  In  vain  Galletti  urged  him  to 
yield,  but  he  harped  on  the  people’s  ingratitude  and  deside- 
rated the  martyr’s  crown.  It  is  probable  that  no  serious 
violence  had  been  intended  by  the  majority  of  the  crowd; 
hut  on  Galletti’s  report  of  his  ill-success,  they  displayed 
their  firearms,  and  when  in  the  afternoon  the  Swiss  Guards, 
exasperated  by  their  threats,  fired  a few  shots,  the  attack 
began.  The  native  troops,  who  had  gone  over  to  the 
people,  and  the  citizen  guards  kept  up  a hot  fire  at  the 
palace,  and  killed  a prelate.  The  court  was  panic-stricken ; 
the  Pope,  who  had  alternated  between  moods  of  fear  and 
obstinacy,  protested  that  he  yielded  to  force,  and  promised 
to  leave  the  popular  programme  to  the  decision  of^  the 
Chamber,^  commissioning  Sterbini,  the  most  uncompromising 
and  unstatesmanlike  of  the  Radical  leaders,  to  form  a Cabinet. 
On  an  instant  the  tumult  turned  to  rejoicing;  but  the 
momentary  calm  deceived  nobody.  The  Moderates,  recog- 
nizing their  own  impotence,  seized  the  opportunity  to  escape 
from  the  responsibilities  of  a time  too  stormy  for  such  timor- 
ous souls.  Their  withdrawal  from  the  Chamber  was  the 
prelude  of  a more  serious  defection.  The  Pope  was  longing 
to  escape  from  a city  where  revolution  was  triumphant; 
a trivial  incident,  which  he  regarded  as  an  omen,  decided 
him,  and  on  the  night  of  November  24  he  fled  m disguise 

from  Rome.  . 

Whether  by  accident  or  design  he  took  refuge  in  the 
Neapolitan  Kingdom,  where  the  border-fortress  of  Gaeta  was 

1 Galletti,  op.  cit.,  57  ; Pianciani,  Rome  des  papes,  II.  424;  contra,  Farini, 
op.  cit.,  II.  427. 


THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER  283 

assigned  to  his  court.  For  a few  weeks  he  was  more  or  less 
under  the  influence  of  the  Moderates,  and  though  he  refused 
to  recognize  the  new  Cabinet,  and  repulsed  the  approaches 
of  the  Chamber,  he  indignantly  denied  any  desire  to  repeal 
the  Statute.  Had  he  persevered  in  this  middle  course,  his 
victory  might  have  been  swift.  The  city  felt  that  his  absence 
maimed  its  prestige ; the  pathos  of  exile  doubled  affections 
and  softened  animosities ; he  had  only  to  wait,  and  Rome 
might  have  opened  her  gates  to  him.  But  unhappily  for 
himself  and  the  Papacy,  Pius  gave  himself  into  evil  keeping. 
In  vain  the  Moderates  and  the  French  Government,  fearing 
the  atmosphere  of  Gaeta,  tried  to  attract  him  to  Bologna  or 
Marseilles.  The  Pope  became  the  “ prisoner  and  pupil  of 
Ferdinand,”  and  fell  under  the  ever  more  present  and  evil 
influence  of  Cardinal  Antonelli.  The  materials  are  not  pub- 
lished, perhaps  do  not  exist,  to  make  a complete  appreciation 
of  Antonelli  possible.  This  dark,  mysterious,  sinister  figure, 
who  for  twenty  years  was  Pope  in  all  but  name,  has  now  no 
apologist.  Catholic  or  Liberal.^  Of  discreditable  parentage, 
himself  of  dubious  antecedents,  Antonelli  had  come  to  the 
front  as  the  leader  of  the  constitutional  ecclesiastics.  Per- 
haps he  had  wished  to  make  his  peace  with  the  new  spirit, 
perhaps  he  hoped  to  paralyze  it  with  his  alliance.  More 
probably  this  man,  who  now  a brief  half-year  later  became 
the  uncompromising  champion  of  ecclesiastical  rule,  who  in 
after  years  affected  at  intervals  a love  of  Italian  nationality,^ 
and  was  ready  to  sell  the  Temporal  Power  for  a bribe, ^ owed 
his  changes  to  a downright  unscrupulousness,  that  sought 
power  for  itself  or  its  riches.  His  sinister  face  and  fascinat- 
ing manners  hid  a heartless,  imperious,  cunning  intellect, 
that  climbed  to  wealth  on  his  country’s  misery,  and  degraded 
the  Papacy,  that  he  might  be  its  master.'^  Though  Pius 

^ Perhaps  I should  except  La  Gorce,  Second  Empire,  III.  361-362. 

^ Aguglia,  Questione  Romana,  12  ; Liverani,  II  papato,  120  ; Isaia,  Nego- 
ziato,  28. 

^ See  below,  Vol.  II.,  p.  209. 

^ Salvagni,  Corte  romana,  III.  315-327;  Liverani,  op.  cit.,  18,  44-47,  301  ; 
Curci,  Nuova  Italia,  51,  196;  D’Ideville,  Journal,  II.  209;  Tommasoni,  Epoca 
seconda  in  II  Cimento,  V.  1090-1098  ; Tivaroni,  L' Italia,  III.  284 ; Niccolini, 
Pontificate,  124;  Gaiani,  Roman  Exile,  143. 


2 84  A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

esteemed  him  little,  and  loved  him  less,  he  won  a ready 
ascendancy  over  the  Pope’s  feeble  nature ; and  his  conde- 
scension to  the  susceptibilities  and  prejudices  of  the  prelates 
made  him  all  powerful  in  the  Papal  court.  His  own  greed 
and  doubtful  morality,  his  patronage  of  corruption,  his  degra- 
dation of  the  cardinalate  weighed  for  nothing  against  his 
championship  of  their  dearest  belief.  It  was  easy  for  him  to 
pledge  them  to  a policy  of  blind,  uncompromising  reaction. 

Pius  put  under  ban  the  Provisional  Junta  that  had  been 
formed  at  Kome,  and  drifted  daily  farther  from  the  Mode- 
rates. To  some  extent  he  was  hardly  a free  agent;  for 
Antonelli  had  hedged  him  with  precautions,  that  allowed 
him  little  free  intercourse  with  the  outer  world.  But  this 
immunity  from  unwelcome  counsels  pleased  him.  It  left 
him  free  to  “ meditate  on  spiritual  things  ” ; he  liked  to  pose 
as  the  martyr,  and  receive  tokens  of  devotion  from  the 
Catholic  world.  From  France  and  Belgium,  from  Ireland 
and  Switzerland  addresses  of  sympathy  and  promises  of 
help  poured  in.  Diplomacy  was  forced  to  follow,  and  the 
Pope’s  position  suddenly  became  not  only  the  all-absorbing 
problem  of  Italy,  but  an  European  question  of  first  magni- 
tude. The  Pope  saw  that  his  hopes  lay  in  an  appeal  to  his 
Catholic  position;  he  was  “more  than  the  father  of  his 
Roman  subjects,”  and  easily  he  was  prepared  to  sacrifice 
them  to  the  fancied  interests  of  the  church.  But  there  was 
little  harmony  among  the  ambassadors,  who  met  at  Gaeta. 
Catholic  Europe  was  ranged  in  two  camps.  Spain  laid  down 
the  thesis,  that  the  Pope  as  spiritual  prince  was  under  the 
natural  protection  of  all  Catholic  nations,^  and  proposed  a 
Congress  of  the  Powers  to  deliberate  on  the  Papal  question 
(December).  Naples  and  Austria  assented,  hardly  veiling 
their  intention  to  restore  the  Pope  to  absolute  rule,^  Austria 
hoping  to  make  him  at  least  a passive  ally  against  Piedmont. 
Gioberti  realized  the  full  import  of  the  question,  and  put 
out  an  ingenious  and  novel  doctrine.  Piedmont,  he  pro- 
claimed, would  not  allow  the  temporal  affairs  of  an  Italian 
state  to  be  settled  by  foreign  governments.  Herself,  as 
another  Italian  state,  had  a right  to  intervene,  and  he  tried 

1 Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  VI.  22-29  ; Correspondence— Italy,  IV.  38,  43- 


THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER 


285 

to  reconcile  the  Pope  to  the  Romans  and  draw  him  into  the 
Italian  League,  offering  an  asylum  at  Nice  and,  if  necessary, 
armed  intervention  to  restore  him  to  his  states. 

In  his  struggle  with  the  Austro-Spanish  clique  Gioberti 
had  the  vigorous  support  of  the  French  government.  France 
had  a double  interest  in  the  Roman  question.  She  regarded 
herself  as  the  traditional  defender  of  the  Papal  power ; the 
hostility  of  centuries  and  her  new  championship  of  democracy 
made  her  earnest  to  check  Austrian  influence  in  Italy.  The 
statesmen  of  the  Revolution  could  not  but  encourage  the 
Roman  Liberals,  and  so  long  as  the  Pope  was  in  sympathy 
with  his  people  and  shared  their  hostility  to  Austria,  the 
course  of  France  had  been  clear.  Even  when  the  Pope 
began  to  break  with  the  Liberals,  and  asked  Cavaignac  to 
defend  him  both  from  Austrians  without  and  democracy  at 
home  (August),^  the  government  refused  to  interfere  between 
him  and  his  people,  though  it  promised  to  protect  him  from 
Austria,  and  was  prepared,  if  she  occupied  the  Legations,  to 
make  it  a casus  helli.  But  when  the  Pope  finally  deserted 
the  nationalists  and  courted  the  reactionary  Powers,  France 
could  no  longer  pose  as  his  champion  against  Austria.  So 
long,  however,  as  the  Pope’s  person  was  safe,  both  Cavaignac 
and  Louis  Napoleon  refused  to  interfere ; ^ and  now  for  want 
of  a better  policy,  the  latter  supported  Gioberti,  though  his 
scheme  was  opposed  to  all  traditions  of  French  influence. 
But  their  representations  were  wasted  on  Pius ; his  policy 
was  to  return,  under  the  protection  of  Austria  and  Spain,  free 
from  constitutional  trammels,  and  in  December  he  wrote  to 
his  “ very  dear  son,”  the  Emperor,  to  bespeak  his  help. 

The  Papal  question  added  a new  knot  to  the  tangle  of 
Italian  politics,  ravelling  every  effort  to  knit  the  states 
together.  The  problem  still  for  Moderates  and  Democrats 
was  how  to  concentrate  the  national  forces  for  another  fight 
for  Independence.  The  Moderates,  careful  to  preserve  the 

^ See  above,  p.  277. 

2 Bastide,  Re'publique  fran<^aise,  199,  201,  207,  213  ; De  Gaillard,  Expedition, 
84-89 ; La  Gorce,  Seconde  Repuhlique,  II.  73  ; Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  VI.  19-20 ; 
Planat  de  la  Faye,  Documents,  11.  64. 


2 86  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

autonomy  of  each  state  and  tender  to  the  susceptibilities  of 
the  princes,  were  trying  to  pick  up  the  half-dropped  negotia- 
tions for  a League.  But  there  was  little  inclination  anywhere 
to  sink  differences  for  the  common  cause.  So  long  as  Pareto 
remained  in  power,  his  anxiety  to  keep  Piedmont  unfettered 
by  engagements  to  the  other  states  had  repulsed  all  appro  aches; 

“ the  God  Terminus,”  he  was  reported  to  have  said,  “ has  not 
yet  marked  the  bounds  of  Piedmont.”  And  though  Tuscany 
had  secured  Massa-Carrara  and  the  Lunigiana,  Corsini  s 
imagination  saw  Piedmontese  intrigue  at  work  in  all  the 
borderland.  When  Casati  came  into  office,  Gioberti’ s influ- 
ence sent  his  old  philosophical  antagonist  Rosmini  to  renew 
negotiations  at  Rome  (July).  Rosmini  was  empowered  to 
offer  the  Pope  in  exchange  for  his  adherence  to  the  League 
wide  liberties,  such  as  the  Church  had  never  enjoyed  in 
Piedmont,  and  which  almost  amounted  to  Cavour  s “ free 
church  ” scheme  of  thirteen  years  later ; ^ the  Tuscan  govern- 
ment had  already  offered  in  the  summer  to  relax  the 
Leopoldine  laws  that  tied  the  Church.  It  was  a heavy 
bribe  to  Pius;  and  he  welcomed  as  before  proposals  which 
would  take  questions  of  peace  and  war  out  of  his  own  hands. 
He  had  already  promised  Gioberti,  that  if  Charles  Albert 
proved  victorious,  he  would  crown  him  King  of  Northern 
Italy ; and  despite  the  Encyclical,  despite  his  suspicions  of 
Piedmontese  ambition,  he  was  at  this  time  still  sufficiently 
good  Italian  to  wish  to  see  Austria  expelled,  so  long  as  it 
could  not  be  charged  to  him  that  he  had  declared  war  against 
a Catholic  state.  Both  Rome  and  Florence  were  ready  to  sign 
a scheme,  which  would  have  secured  not  only  a Federal  army, 
but  a customs-league  and  common  codes  of  law.  But  Pinelli 
had  succeeded  to  Casati,  and  he  harked  back  to  the  old  tradi- 
tions of  Piedmontese  isolation,  and  insisted  on  the  conclusion 
of  a military  convention  as  the  prelude  to  any  fuller  treaty. 
He  was  perhaps  afraid  that  the  Diet  of  the  League  might 
pronounce  against  war ; he  may  have  dimly  foreseen  that  it 
would  safeguard  the  Temporal  Power,  and  stay  indefinitely 
the  onward  march  of  Piedmont.  Rossi,  too,  was  now  in 
power  at  Rome,  and  he  had  little  liking  for  a scheme  which 
1 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  VI.  6.  See  below,  Vol.  11. , p.  207. 


THE  DEMOCKATS  IN  POWER  287 

had  something  of  a popular  ring  in  it,  and  which,  by  exclud- 
ing Naples,  promised  to  leave  Piedmont  predominant  in  the 
Diet.^  And  fascinating  indeed,  as  was  at  this  dark  time  the 
schekne  of  an  Italian  Federation,  it  must  have  contained  the 
germs  of  eventual  failure.  However  much  Pinelli  and  Rossi 
wrecked  the  negotiations  by  their  obstinacy,  nothing  could 
have  permanently  reconciled  the  conflicting  ideals  of  Pied- 
mont and  Rome.  The  immediate  gain,  it  is  true,  might 
have  been  great ; had  the  League  been  formed,  the  national 
war  of  the  coming  spring  might  have  had  another  issue ; 
there  would  have  been  no  republic  and  no  reaction  at 
Florence,  no  French  occupation  of  Rome.  The  constitu- 
tions would  have  been  saved  in  Tuscany,  in  the  Papal  States, 
perhaps  at  Naples.  But  the  Federal  Diet  would  inevitably 
have  become  sooner  or  later  the  cock-pit  of  a struggle  for 
mastery  between  Naples  and  Piedmont,  in  which  one  or  the 
other  would  have  sought  the  help  of  the  Unitarians;  it 
would  have  seen  eC  still  flercer  fight  to  reduce  the  Temporal 
Power  to  a shadow.  It  is  difiicult  to  believe  that  it  would 
have  largely  altered  the  subsequent  history  of  Italy,  but  it 
might  have  retarded  its  Unity.  And  the  statesmen  at  Turin, 
selfish  and  narrow  as  their  policy  seemed,  were,  not  uncon- 
sciously perhaps,  helping  on  the  future  of  Italy  more  than 
did  all  the  well-meant  efibrts  of  the  men  who  sought  to 
create  the  League. 

But  at  that  time  Pinelli  and  Rossi  seemed  to  be  playing 
a factious  part ; and  a section  of  the  less  extreme  Democrats, 
with  Mamiani  and  Gioberti  (while  still  in  opposition)  at 
their  head,  hoped  to  repair  the  mischief  by  forcing  the 
governments  into  an  alliance,  which  would  gather  forces  for 
the  war  and  safeguard  the  tottering  constitutions  at  Rome 
and  Naples.  But  the  “ Federative  Congress,”  which  they 
organized  at  Turin  (October  10),  was  too  academic  and 
wanting  in  seriousness  either  to  draw  together  the  radicals, 
or  quicken  the  pace  of  the  governments.  The  Tuscan 
Democrats,  who  were  now  in  power,  fell  back  on  Montanelli’s 

^ Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  VI.  5-15  ; Farini,  op.  cit.,  II.  372-382  ; Cantu,  Cronistoria^ 
11.  1128-1132;  Cordova,  Discorsi,  I.  78;  Gioheiti,  Rinnovamento,  I.  356-361, 
548;  Capponi,  Scritti,  11.  82-91,  182-198  ; Id,,  Lettere,  III.  251. 


288  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

project  of  an  Italian  Constituent.  The  conception  came 
from  the  French  Constituent  of  1793.  It  was  a nebulous, 
protean  scheme,  which  could  on  occasion  be  whittled  down 
till  it  meant  little  more  than  the  League,  or  expanded  into 
an  expression  of  the  sovereign  people,  as  democratic  as  its 
protot3rpe.  It  generally  appeared  in  its  latter  shape,  and  as 
formulated  by  Montanelli,  it  meant  an  Assembly  sitting  at 
Rome,  elected  by  universal  suffrage  from  all  the  free  states 
of  Italy.  Until  the  Austrians  were  driven  out,  its  sole 
business  was  to  be  to  prepare  for  war;  but  when  the  war  was 
over,  it  would  decide  on  the  political  future  of  the  country,  j 
and  by  implication  could  choose  between  monarchy  and  the  j 
republic,  between  unity  and  federalism.  Theoretically  it  j 
was  unassailable  from  the  democratic  standpoint , its  prac- 
ticability was  more  doubtful.  Montanelli  indeed  could 
adduce  arguments  of  present  utility,  for  only  the  strong 
pressure  of  popular  forces  could  bring  Piedmont  and  Naples, 
Tuscany  and  Rome  into  line,  and  these  forces  needed  some 
centre  more  democratic  and  vigorous  than  a Diet  of  com- 
missioners. But  he  forgot  that  the  Democrats  were  at  present 
too  weak  and  disorganized  to  impose  their  will  on  the 
governments  except  perhaps  in  Tuscany  and  at  Rome, 
that  the  Piedmontese  democracy  cared  little  for  Unity,  that 
the  princes  were  too  suspicious  of  an  omnipotent  Constituent 
to  come  into  it  except  under  irresistible  pressure.  Montanelli 
indeed  seems  to  have  anticipated  only  a strong  federal 
government,  with  large  autonomy  for  each  component  state , 
but  there  was  no  security  to  prevent  the  Constituent  from 
becoming  republican  and  Unitarian,  and  Ferdinand  and 
Charles  Albert  felt  that  to  accede  to  it  was  to  sign  a 
potential  death-warrant  for  their  thrones. 

The  difficulties  of  the  scheme  became  apparent,  as  soon 
as  Montanelli  made  overtures  for  co-operation.  ^ Perhaps 
both  he  and  Guerrazzi  were  willing  sometimes  to  bribe  Pied- 
mont and  Naples  by  a triple  partition  of  the  Papal  States. 
But  Piedmont  refused  to  hand  over  to  any  external  or 
superior  body  her  freedom  of  action  either  as  to  the  North 
Italian  Kingdom  or  the  war  ; it  was  glad  rather  than  other- 
wise, if  the  other  states,  whether  under  League  or  Constituent 


THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER  289 

or  neither,  took  little  part  in  the  struggle,  and  allowed  her- 
self to  monopolize  the  fruits  of  victory.  She  still  had  her 
petty  bickerings  with  Tuscany  over  the  Lunigiana  frontier, 
and  Montanelli  was  playing  a despicable  game  to  prevent 
Lombardy  from  going  to  her  under  the  Anglo-French  media- 
tion.^ Pinelli  replied  that  “ it  was  a time  to  think  of  war  and 
not  of  Constituents,”  and  Gioberti,  when  the  negotiations 
had  dragged  wearily  on  for  some  months,  made  a counter- 
proposal of  simple  alliance  on  terms  that  Tuscany  could 
not  accept.  Montanelli  probably  recognized  from  the  first 
how  unlikely  it  was  that  Piedmont  would  be  won  to  his 
scheme;  and  while  negotiating  and  quarrelling  with  Gioberti, 
he  had  been  working  for  a Constituent  to  be  elected  at  once 
by  Tuscany  and  Rome,  without  waiting  for  the  other  states. 
Both  he  and  Guerrazzi  had  hopes  that  the  two  countries 
might  fuse  into  a strong  Central  State  of  more  unselfish 
patriotism  than  that  of  Piedmont  or  Naples. 

He  found  the  Romans  ready  to  listen  to  his  overtures. 
While  Piedmont  was  still  staunchly  monarchical,  with  the 
Moderate  and  Democratic  elements  fairly  balanced,  at  Rome 
as  in  Tuscany,  the  Moderates  had  collapsed,  and  the  Demo- 
crats were  triumphant.  The  Popes  flight  had  struck  the 
state  with  paralysis ; and  Rome,  with  no  strong  or  respected 
executive  to  curb  the  perennial  elements  of  disorder,  headed 
inevitably  for  the  republic,  as  the  only  alternative  to  anarchy. 
But  at  first,  despite  the  precedent  of  the  Napoleonic  captivity, 
Rome  without  a Pope  seemed  portentous ; the  exodus  of  the 
rich,  the  absence  of  pontifical  ceremonial  robbed  the  city  of 
its  pride,  and  filled  men  with  vague  uneasiness  and  alarm. 
The  people  were  apathetic ; Garibaldi,  arriving  in  December, 
was  ill-received ; a portion  of  the  citizen  guard  was  ready  to 
declare  for  the  Pope,  if  he  would  guarantee  the  constitution.; 
But  there  was  a determined  section  opposed  to  any  compro- 
mise; the  Radical  press,  the  police,  a large  section  of  the 
citizen  guard  were  on  their  side,  and  their  persistent  pro- 
pagandism,  helped  by  the  triumph  of  the  reactionaries  at 
Gaeta,  gradually  leavened  the  people  with  a new  spirit  of 

^ Bianchi,  (yp.  cit.,  V.  366;  Gemelli,  Sicilia,  84;  Gxxeixdizzi,  Appendice  102 

VOL.  I.  , T ’ 


290  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

independence  and  defiance.  It  was  better,  they  thought 
with  Sterbini,  that  Rome  should  be  the  capital  of  Italy 
than  of  Catholicism.  In  the  Clubs  Montanelh’s  agents  and 
Garibaldi  were  vigorously  agitating  for  the  Popes  forma 
deposition.  There  was  the  same  order  and  good-humour  as 
usual,  and  less  crime  in  spite  of  the  distress.  But  it  came 
of  the  new  glory  and  pride  of  freedom;  and  Ventura  found 
a responsive  audience,  when  preaching  on  the  Libera,ls  who 
had  fallen  in  the  streets  of  Vienna,  he  attacked  absolute 
monarchy  in  the  name  of  the  Gospel.  Somewhat  fear- 
fully indeed  but  of  set  resolve,  the  city  was  plunging  into 
the  future,  so  strange,  so  hopeful,  of  the  Rome  of  the 

The  Chamber  and  the  Government  reflected  the  change. 
At  first  the  deputies,  undiscouraged  by  Antonelh’s  rude  re- 
buffs, had  done  their  best  to  compromise  with  the  Pope,  ihe 
real  leader  of  the  Chamber  was  Mamiani,  and  though  he 
insisted  now  as  before  on  the  separation  of  the  temporal  , 
and  spiritual  powers,  he  would  be  party  to  no  schenie  to 
upset  the  Pope’s  authority.  The  leaders  of  the  opposition, 
Sterbini  and  Carlo  Bonaparte,  however  unstatesmanlike, 
were  patriots  and  not  extremists.  The  Chamber  itself  was 
a Bump,  without  confidence  in  itself  or  credit  in  the  coun- 
try The  Provisional  Junta  was  no  more  than  a stop-gap, 
the  passive  resistance  of  officials  and  priests  paralyzed  the 
executive,  and  it  was  daily  more  evident  that  at  any  cost  a 
strong  government  must  be  formed.  The  outlook  was  indeed 
black ; for  the  Pope’s  partisans  only  awaited  the  opportunity 
to  revolt,  Austria  was  threatening  on  the  north,  and  already 
the  Romans  were  uncertain  whether  to  regard  France  as 
friend  or  foe.  It  was  essential  to  put  an  end  to^  the  un- 
certainty. Till  the  political  future  had  been  decided,  the 
unrest  was  not  likely  to  quiet  down ; and  Romagna,  finding 
that  Charles  Albert  would  not  encourage  annexation  to 
Piedmont,  was  calling  loudly  for  a government  that  would 
settle  the  country  and  protect  it  from  clericals  and  Aus- 
trians. A conference  of  Romagnuol  Clubs  declared  tor 
the  election  by  universal  suffrage  of  a Roman  Constituent 
Assembly,  which  would  decide  the  future  of  the  state,  ibe 


THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER  291 

Democrats  took  up  the  cry  at  Rome ; the  Junta  declared  in 
favour  of  the  proposal,  and  when  the  Rump  seemed  inclined 
to  vote  against  it,  they  dissolved  the  unregretted  Chamber 
(December  26).  Mamiani  resigned,  and  a new  ministry  was 
formed  under  the  democratic  prelate  Muzzarelli.  Without 
waiting  for  the  Constituent,  the  new  cabinet  plunged  into  a 
big  programme  of  reform.  Mamianis  local  government 
bill,  granting  very  wide  liberties  to  the  communes,  became 
law.  Entails  were  abolished,  the  civil  code  was  reformed, 
the  grist-tax  repealed.  Rome  was  kept  quiet  by  employing 
large  numbers  on  the  public  works.  The  appointment  of  a 
military  court  to  try  cases  of  high  treason  showed  that  the 
government  realized  partially  at  least  the  dangers  that  sur- 
rounded it.  It  had  to  face  the  imminent  prospect  of  civil 
war.  The  Moderates  of  Romagna  since  the  secession  of 
their  deputies  had  never  cordially  accepted  the  Roman 
government;  they  wished  to  return  to  the  position  of  the 
summer,  to  preserve  the  constitution  and  the  national  pro- 
gramme without  the  later  democratic  developments.  When 
their  schemes  to  entice  the  Pope  to  Bologna  broke  down, 
the  wiser  heads  of  the  party  accepted  the  situation,  and  pre- 
pared to  act  as  a modifying  influence  within  the  constitu- 
tion. But  there  were  fatal  tendencies  within  the  Moderate 
ranks.  Disappointment  and  unpopularity  embittered  them; 
and  the  uneasy  sense  that,  though  Liberals,  they  were  siding 
with  reaction,  unbalanced  their  political  judgment.  There 
were  hot-heads  who  refused  to  temporize,  and  Zucchi,  defy- 
ing the  government,  tried  to  take  the  garrison  of  Bologna 
with  him  to  Gaeta.  But  less  than  one  hundred  men  followed 
him  across  the  frontier ; and  when  Latour,  the  commander 
of  the  Swiss  troops,  attempted  to  follow  his  example,  he 
found  that  he  would  have  to  cut  his  way  through  the  loyal 
regiments,  and  disbanded  his  troops  rather  than  provoke 
civil  war. 

The  elections,  that  took  place  in  January,  proved  how 
little  following  the  Moderates  had.  Though  the  Pope 
excommunicated  in  advance  both  electors  and  elected,  and 
the  straiter  Moderates  retired  from  the  contest,  about  one 
half  voted  of  those  whose  names  were  on  the  hastily  com- 


292  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

piled  registers.!  xhe  polls  were  taken  in  perfect  order,  and 
though  there  was  perhaps  slight  pressure  put  on  civil  ser- 
vants to  vote,  there  was  no  intimidation.  The  elected  depu- 
ties came  almost  exclusively  from  the  landed  and  professional 
classes;  all  but  Mazzini,  Garibaldi,  and  five  others  were 
natives  of  the  Roman  state.  They  met  on  February  5,  and 
plunged  at  once  into  the  constitutional  question.  It  was 
very  doubtful  for  what  form  of  government  they  would 
decide.  Few  had  been  elected  on  a republican^  platform  ; - 
the  ministry  was  still  ready  to  recall  the  Pope,  if  he  would 
dismiss  Antonelli  and  guarantee  the  constitution.®  Mamiani 
opposed  the  republic  both  on  constitutional  grounds,  and  as  | 
throwing  fresh  difficulties  in  the  way  of  federation;  while  ] 
Montanelli  used  his  influence  to  hinder  any  settlement  that 
forestalled  the  vote  of  the  whole  nation.  There  seemed 
little  enthusiasm  in  Italy  for  a republic ; _ Tuscany  was 
uncertain.  Piedmont  was  monarchical,  Venice  and  Sicily 
were  distrustful  of  the  Roman  alliance;  and  the  royalist  j 
reaction  seemed  triumphant  in  Europe.  But  the  enthusiasts 
hoped  that  the  proclamation  of  the  Republic  on  the  Capitol 
would  send  a thrill  through  Italy,  rousing  the  nation  to  a 
supreme  eftort,  and  bringing  down  other  thrones.  Many, 
who  were  no  republicans  on  principle,  were  ready  to  vote  for 
it  from  hatred  of  the  Temporal  Power.  And  in  fact,  in 
face  of  the  Pope’s  refusal  to  compromise,  there  was  no  alter- 
native between  it  and  anarchy.  Fom'  days  after  the  meeting 
of  the  Assembly  the  Republic  was  decreed  by  120  votes  in 
a full  house  of  142.  The  Chamber  declared  the  Temporal 
Power  abolished,  but  offered  the  Pope  guarantees  for  the 
exercise  of  his  spiritual  prerogatives. 

Tuscan  politics  inevitably  obeyed  unpulses  from  Rome. 
But  though  the  government  was  even  weaker  at  Florence 
and  the  elements  of  disorder  stronger,  for  a time  there  was 

1 The  estimates  varv  considerably  ; Rusconi,  RepuUica,  I.  68,  74 ; Beg- 
helli,  RrpaStZicc,  I.  I27,'253  ; H.  120;  Correspondence-Rome,  2 ; Pasolini, 
Memoirs,  122;  Spada,  Rivoluzione,  III.  103,  m. 

2 Beghelli,  op.  cit.,  I.  155  ; Gabussi,  op.  cit.,  II.  333- 

3 Correspondence — Rome,  i. 

* See  below,  p.  340,  and  Vol.  II.,  pp.  207-8,  3S0. 


THE  DEMOCEATS  IN  POWER 


293 

no  anxiety  to  precipitate  change.  The  Montanelli-Guerrazzi 
ministry  had  been  generally  accepted.  The  best  of  the 
Moderates,  anxious  above  all  for  quiet  and  applauding  the 
new  vigour  thrown  into  the  government,  were  willing  to 
give  it  a fair  trial.  The  ministry  tried  to  steer  between  the 
extreme  parties;  its  programme  was  a practical  one, — to 
restore  financial  credit,  remodel  the  army  and  citizen  guard, 
purge  the  discredited  civil  service,  and  preserve  public  order. 
Guerrazzi  attempted  to  create  a police,  to  suppress  sturdy 
beggars,  and  check  the  disorderly  and  importunate  volun- 
teers. But  the  difficulties  were  very  great.  The  more 
factious  Moderates  tried  to  hamper  the  government  by 
resigning  office;  confident  that  the  Tuscan  temperament 
would  never  lapse  into  violence,  they  thought  they  might 
safely  leave  the  ministry  to  gradual  shipwreck.  The  local 
authorities  were  apathetic,  the  citizen  guard  unreliable. 
There  was  much  want  of  employment,  which  Guerrazzi  tried 
in  vain  to  remedy  by  starting  public  works.  The  beggars 
infested  the  roads ; there  were  faction  fights  at  Lucca ; the 
Empoli  and  Arezzo  districts  were  disturbed  by  constant 
petty  riots.  At  Florence  the  extreme  democrats,  in  protest 
against  the  narrow  franchise,  broke  the  ballot-boxes  at  the 
new  elections  (November  20),  and  the  rival  factions  burnt 
each  other’s  printing-presses.  Guerrazzi,  irritated  more  and 
more  by  the  disorder,  tried  earnestly  to  punish  the  rioters, 
and  showered  telegrams  on  the  reluctant  authorities.  But 
he  had  no  force  behind  him,  and  the  government  had  little 
cohesion  in  itself.  In  spite  of  its  fair  start  it  soon  offended 
every  party  more  or  less.  The  Democrats  regarded  it  as 
false  to  its  professions ; the  Moderates  pointed  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  disorder  as  justifying  their  suspicions.  Guerrazzi, 
energetic  and  industrious  as  he  was,  sometimes  well-nigh 
despaired,  and  thought  of  retiring. 

At  this  moment  (January  10,  1849),  the  Assembly  met, 
with  a diminished  but  sufficient  majority  of  Moderates.  The 
speech  from  the  throne  promised  a Constituent  for  Tuscany ; 
but  eleven  days  later  came  the  news  that  the  parliament 
about  to  meet  at  Rome  had  been  proclaimed  a Constituent 
for  all  Italy.  The  nationalist  democrats  saw  the  germ  of  an 


294  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Italian  Parliament,  and  the  chance  at  all  events  of  uniting 
Tuscany  and  Rome  into  one  state.  They  knew,  moreover, 
that  the  Roman  deputies  would  give  them  a Democratic 
majority,  which  they  could  not  hope  for  at  home.  They  de- 
manded that  Tuscany  should  send  representatives  to  Rome, 
and  the  government  willingly  or  unwillingly  went  with  the 
stream.  Guerrazzi,  with  the  aid  of  the  British  ministers 
brother,  overcame  the  Grand  Duke’s  strong  repugnance  ; the 
Moderates  professed  to  applaud  the  idea;  the  Assembly, 
much  puzzled  about  the  real  bearings  of  the  question,  per- 
haps intimidated,  was  easily  persuaded  into  voting  for  it ; 
and  the  Senate,  sheltering  itself  behind  the  Grand  Duke’s 
approval,  acquiesced  with  effusion.  But  Leopold’s  repent- 
ance was  rapid.  Though  with  a feeble  kind  of  abnegation 
he  was  willing  to  submit  his  own  crown  to  the  vote  of  the 
Constituent,  he  would  be  no  party  to  a scheme  which  claimed 
to  dispose  of  the  Pope’s  temporal  throne.  To  escape  from 
the  pressure  of  Florentine  opinion,  and  give  time  to  hear 
from  the  Pope,  he  put  off  signing  the  law,  and  on  January 
3 I left  Florence  under  a flimsy  pretext  for  Siena.  He  still 
however  disclaimed  any  intention  of  severing  himself  from 
his  ministers ; and  when  Montanelli  followed  him,  he  pro- 
fessed his  satisfaction  with  them  and  intention  to  return. 
But  on  the  day  of  Montanelli’s  arrival  at  Siena  (February  5), 
he  had  received  a letter  from  the  Pope,  urging  him  to  leave 
the  country ; and  Radetzky  had  promised  that  on  this  con- 
dition he  would  “fly  to  his  help  as  soon  as  he  had  put  down 
the  demagogues  of  Piedmont.”  Two  days  later  he  suddenly 
fled  to  the  little  port  of  Santo  Stefano  on  the  southern 
confines  of  the  state,  pleading  to  his  “ good  Tuscans  ” that 
he  had  gone  to  avoid  consenting  to  a law,  which  might  draw 
excommunication  on  their  heads.  The  news  reached  Flor- 
ence next  day  (February  8).  A mass  meeting  by  Orcagnas 
Loggia  passed  resolutions,  which  declared  Leopold  deposed 
from  the  throne,  and  called  on  the  Assembly,  sitting  in  the 
Palazzo  Vecchio  hard  by,  to  appoint  a Provisional  Govern- 
ment. The  deputies  dreaded  mob  violence,  and  the  Mode- 
rates saw  that  it  was  the  only  alternative  to  an  immediate 
proclamation  of  the  Republic.  Led  by  Capponi  and  Ricasoli, 


THE  DEMOCRATS  IN  POWER 


295 

the  two  Houses  by  an  unanimous  vote  elected  Guerrazzi, 
Montanelli,  and  Mazzoni  to  form  a Provisional  Government. 

The  Triumvirate  was  avowedly  a temporary  expedient. 
The  Democrats  had  voted  for  it  as  a step  towards  the  re- 
public ; the  Moderates  as  the  one  possible  means  of  avoiding 
it.  The  same  ambiguity  appeared  in  the  action  of  the 
government  itself.  Guerrazzi  telegraphed  to  Leghorn  that 
Leopold  was  deposed ; but  laws  passed  a few  days  later  re- 
ferred the  whole  future  of  the  country  to  the  Constituent. 
The  circulars  of  the  government  were  issued  sometimes  in 
the  name  of  the  Tuscan  Republic,  sometimes  in  the  name  of 
the  Provisional  Government.  Emissaries  were  sent  to  the 
provinces  to  enrol  volunteers  and  cooperate  with  the  clubs ; 
and  Guerrazzi  ordered  an  expedition  to  the  Maremna,  where 
in  his  theatrical  language  “ Leopold  of  Austria  was  creating 
a Vendee.”  ^ But  the  600  soldiers,  whom  he  brought  up  from 
Leghorn,  were  probably  intended  to  overawe  the  clubs  as 
much  as  the  loyalists.  And  however  unwilling  Guerrazzi 
may  have  been  to  commit  himself,  at  all  events  his  strong 
hand  saved  the  country  from  civil  war.  The  democrats  in 
the  towns  were  indignant  at  the  Grand  Duke’s  flight,  and 
stung  by  the  loyalist  demonstrations  at  Siena  into  a frenzy 
of  suspicion.  The  Grand-ducal  arms  were  pulled  down 
almost  everywhere;  and  Mazzini,  who  had  just  landed  at 
Leghorn,  with  difiiculty  dissuaded  the  city  from  proclaiming 
the  republic  on  its  own  account.  On  the  other  hand  the 
Grand  Duke’s  presence  at  Santo  Stefano  encouraged  the 
loyalists  and  all  the  elements  of  disorder,  that  sheltered 
themselves  under  his  name.  Labourers  and  drivers,  who 
had  lost  their  occupation  through  the  railway,  burnt  the 
station  at  Empoli ; the  peasants  of  the  country  round  Flor- 
ence tried  to  break  into  the  city,  and  had  to  be  repulsed  by 
force.  It  is  to  Guerrazzi’s  lasting  credit,  that  in  all  the 
turmoil  of  those  days  he  saved  Tuscany  from  civil  bloodshed. 

The  danger  thickened.  In  the  Lunigiana  De  Laugier,  act- 
ing probably  in  collusion  with  Leopold  and  the  Piedmontese, 

^ Guerrazzi,  Apologia,  359,  365,  398  ; Corsi  e Menichetti,  Collezione,  484- 
485,  492,  507  ; Pigli,  Risposta,  198-199,  202,  230-233  ; Beghelli,  op.  cit.,  I.  194 ; 
La  Cecilia,  Cenno,  174. 


296  A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

defied  the  Triumvirate  in  the  Grand  Duke’s  name.  The 
news  of  his  defection  fired  the  tinder  at  Florence.  Mazzini 
addressed  another  great  meeting  by  Orcagna’s  Loggia  (Feb- 
ruary 18),  and  the  crowd  clamoured  for  the  Republic  and 
union  with  Rome.  Guerrazzi  in  the  name  of  the  Provisional 
Government  accepted  the  republic,  though  he  had  hot  words 
with  Mazzini,  and  with  characteristic  subterfuge  left  himself 
a loophole  by  making  a condition  that  the  Florentines 
should  forthwith  find  2000  armed  men.^  Next  day  a notice 
of  the  Triumvirs  spoke  of  the  “ republic  returning  to  its 
home  after  318  years,”  and  its  formal  proclamation  was  only 
delayed  at  the  instance  of  Peruzzi,  the  Gonfaloniere  of  the 
city.  Meanwhile  the  Grand  Duke  was  at  Santo  Stefano, 
exhausted  by  sheer  cowardice,  sorely  perplexed  whether  to 
throw  himself  on  the  support  of  Piedmont,  or  abjure  the 
national  cause  and  return  a penitent  to  the  Hapsburg  fold. 
At  first  he  protested  that  it  was  far  from  his  thoughts  to 
leave  the  state,  he  accepted  with  effusive  gratitude  Gio- 
berti’s  offers  of  help,  and  discussed  plans  for  the  entry  of 
Piedmontese  troops.  But  the  coterie  at  Gaeta  was  drawing 
its  toils  round  him;  and  the  Pope  and  Ferdinand  sent  him 
pressing  messages  to  throw  over  Piedmont  and  fly  to  Naples. 
Their  letters  decided  him ; and  a few  days  later  he  sailed  to 
Gaeta  (February  21).  Meanwhile  De  Laugier’s  movement 
collapsed  ignominiously ; he  found  no  support  from  the  in- 
habitants, his  men  melted  away,  and  before  Guerrazzi, 
with  a force  of  volunteers  and  regulars  approached  him,  he 
fled  across  the  frontier  into  Piedmont.  The  whole  of  Tus- 
cany, willingly  or  perforce,  accepted  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment. 


1 Guerrazzi,  op.  cit,  241,  413  ; Komanelli,  Memorie,  97. 

2 Bosio,  Villamarina,  102-117;  Gennarelli,  Sventure,  11-22. 


CHAPTEE  XYI 


NOVARA 

DECEMBER  1848 MARCH  I 849 

Piedmont  under  Gioberti  ; the  Democratic  opposition  ; Gioberti  and 
Tuscany  ; he  resigns.  The  Austrians  in  Lombardy.  Italy  and  war  ; 
the  war  fever  in  Piedmont.  The  truce  denounced  ; La  Cava  ; Mor- 
tara  ; Novara  ; Charles  Albert  abdicates. 

Piedmont  meanwliile  stood  almost  angrily  aloof  from  the 
republican  movement  of  Central  Italy.  Public  opinion,  even 
among  some  of  the  Democrats,  was  anxious  that  the  country 
should  dissociate  itself  from  the  new  order  at  Florence  and 
Rome.  The  Liberals  thought,  not  without  ground,  that  the 
Tuscans  and  Romans  were  neglecting  the  national  cause  for 
the  sake  of  their  political  theories.  With  true  Piedmontese 
narrowness,  they  could  not  realise  the  different  circumstances 
of  the  Central  States,  or  see  how  much  of  noble  aspiration 
underlay  the  republican  movement.  Their  leader  had  never 
been  a democrat  at  heart,  and  his  altered  attitude  to  the 
Constituent  was  part  of  the  gradual  change  to  Conservatism, 
that  marked  his  policy  since  he  came  into  office.  Gioberti, 
after  his  roving  mission  in  the  summer,  had  settled  down  to 
play  at  statesmanship  at  Turin.  He  was  still  the  pompous, 
fussy  ecclesiastic,  domineering  over  his  friends,  bitter  and 
unfair  to  his  rivals,  not  disdaining  to  play  the  demagogue  if 
it  served  his  ends.  His  discursiveness  and  inconsistencies, 
his  sheer  love  of  polemics,  his  ill-ordered  omniscience  were 
reflected  in  his  political  career.  He  was  an  opportunist  on 
principle,  and  he  had  the  opportunist  s strength  and  weak- 
ness. He  saw  that  as  Italy  stood  now,  discipline  needed 
strengthening  as  much  as  liberty ; that  the  monarchy  held 

297 


298  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

the  field  in  Piedmont ; that  a republican  agitation  only  divided 
the  country  in  face  of  the  enemy.  It  was  his  merit,  at  all 
events,  that  he  was  the  first  Piedmontese  statesman  of  the 
century,  who  seriously  cared  for  the  condition  of  the  people. 

He  was  no  socialist,  but  he  sympathised  with  the  socialist 
attack  on  the  orthodox  economy,  and  the  programme  of  the 
“ democratic  ” ministry  promised  to  occupy  itself  especially 
with  the  problems  of  “ the  labouring  and  less  fortunate  class,” 
to  promote  education  and  protect  the  poor,  apparently  by 
labour  laws.  But  profound  thinker  as  Gioberti  was  in  some 
respects,  he  had  the  opportunist’s  want  of  faith.  Sheltering 
himself  under  the  axiom  that  it  was  useless  to  reform  beyond 
the  capacity  and  habits  of  the  masses,  he  did  nothing  to 
bring  out  the  latent  enthusiasm  and  patriotism  which  would  | 
have  raised  them  to  a higher  plane.  Vain,  egotistic,  a 
controversialist  by  instinct,  he  wasted  his  enormous  prestige, 
and  did  his  full  share  to  quench  the  patriotism  of  the  war 
in  factious  party  strife. 

His  political  theories  had  radically  changed  since  he  wrote 
the  Primacy ; the  Encyclical  had  convinced  him  that  national 
regeneration  could  never  come  from  the  Papacy,  and  he  had 
learnt  to  look  for  salvation  to  Piedmont  alone.  But  he  had 
lost  the  belief  in  Piedmontese  expansion,  which  he  had  half 
held  in  the  summer ; his  experience  of  the  strong  anti- 
Albertist  feeling  in  Central  Italy  had  convinced  him  that 
federation  was  the  only  possible  step  at  the  moment 
towards  the  consolidation  of  the  country.  But  the  same 
theory  of  nationality,  which  forbade  the  foreigner  to  inter- 
fere in  the  temporal  concerns  of  the  Papacy  or  control  the 
destinies  of  Italy,  permitted  each  Italian  state  to  interfere 
in  its  neighbour’s  affairs.  It  was  the  special  function  of 
Piedmont  to  act  as  a mediating  influence  between  rival 
parties  in  the  other  states,  and,  if  necessary,  interfere  with 
arms.^  A Constituent  Assembly,  but  on  far  other  than  the 
democratic  lines  of  Montanelli,  was  to  direct  the  forces  of  the 
nation,  and  keep  the  component  states  abreast  in  their  refoims. 

“ Gioberti  would  be  a great  man,”  wrote  Cavour,  “ if  he  had 
common  sense;”  and  none  but  a pedant  would  have  dreamed 

1 Gioberti,  Rinnovamcnto,  I.  31 5>  548- 


NOVARA ' 


299 

that  the  republic  in  all  but  name  at  Rome  and  the  reaction 
at  Naples  could  be  brought  to  a peaceful  compromise. 

His  popularity  soon  began  to  wane.  Gioberti  confessed 
in  private,  that  he  called  his  government  “ democratic  ” 
merely  “ as  a concession  to  the  spirit  of  the  times  ” ; ^ his 
critics  complained  that  its  democracy  did  not  go  beyond 
its  name,  and  dimly  realised  that  office  was  fast  changing 
the  premier  to  a Conservative.  The  new  elections  in  January 
were  fought  with  great  bitterness.  Savoy  sent  a solid 
phalanx  of  ultra-Conservatives,  but  elsewhere  the  Moderates 
were  routed.  Most  of  the  Democratic  majority  were  new 
men,  small  country  lawyers,  refugees  from  Lombardy,  radical 
priests,  eager  to  resume  the  war  on  the  earliest  occasion,  and 
ready  to  range  themselves  under  Gioberti.  But  estrange- 
ment soon  came;  the  premier  at  once  declared  that  he 
would  take  no  part  in  the  Roman  Constituent,  and  sent 
hectoring  despatches  to  the  Junta ; his  relations  with  Tus- 
cany were  more  than  strained,  and  the  broader  Democrats, 
despite  their  dislike  of  the  politics  of  Central  Italy,  saw  with 
dismay  the  widening  gulf  between  it  and  Piedmont.  Gio- 
berti took  up  a line  of  the  shallowest  opportunism.  Unity 
was  impossible ; further  reform  was  dangerous ; the  country 
had  enough  to  do  with  consolidating  constitutional  govern- 
ment and  the  federation.  He  protested  vigorously  indeed 
against  the  Austrian  government’s  outrages  in  Lombardy 
and  its  delay  in  sending  representatives  to  the  abortive 
conference,  which  was  to  meet  at  Brussels.  It  was  his 
attitude  on  the  question  of  the  Constituent,  which  marked 
his  final  severance  from  the  Democrats.  He  would  never 
accede  to  it,  he  declared,  because  it  might  alienate  the 
princes  and  the  Pope,  and  his  rupture  with  the  Roman 
Republic  wrecked  all  hopes  of  an  alliance  with  Central  Italy. 
The  Democrats  were  now  frankly  hostile,  especially  at  Genoa ; 
the  city  was  loyal  to  the  King,  but  it  was  fiercely  democratic 
and  unsettled,  and  three  times  in  the  past  summer  and 
autumn  had  been  on  the  brink  of  civil  war.  Gioberti  had 
appeased  it  when  he  came  into  office,  but  now  it  readily 
joined  in  the  revolt  against  his  new  tendencies.  The  govern- 

^ Id.,  Ojperette,  I.  164. 


300  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

ment  took  up  the  challenge ; General  La  Marmora,  who  had 
entered  the  cabinet,  publicly  repudiated  any  S3niipathy  with 
the  Democrats,  though  the  avowal  cost  him  his  office ; the 
ministry  illegally  closed  a club  at  Genoa,  and  by  a sordid 
trick  got  Brofferio  expelled  from  the  Chamber.  But  Gioberti, 
however  perverse  and  tactless,  was  a patriot ; and  his  theory 
of  Piedmontese  intervention  was  intended  to  hush  the  inter- 
nal dissensions  of  Italy  before  war  came.  If  the  Grand 
Duke  were  restored  by  Piedmontese  arms,  the  strength  of 
Tuscany,  he  thought,  would  be  concentrated  on  the  war,  and 
its  frontier  would  form  an  useful  base  for  operating  against 
the  Austrian  flank.  For  this  he  was  prepared  to  ride  rough- 
shod over  the  feelings  of  the  Tuscans,  and  appeal  against 
them  to  the  “natural  laws  of  nationahty.”  Unknown  to 
the  King  and  probably  to  his  colleagues,  he  wrote  to  the 
Grand  Duke,  offering  to  restore  him  by  arms.  Whether  or 
not  he  afterwards  won  the  momentary  assent  of  the  cabinet 
(he  and  his  colleagues  gave  each  other  the  lie  in  after  con- 
troversy),^ at  all  events  they  soon  rejected  the  scheme. 
Gioberti  appealed  against  them  to  the  King,  but  Charles 
Albert,  either  from  constitutional  scruples,  or  because  he 
believed  the  scheme  would  prejudice  the  war,  was  glad  to 
throw  over  a minister  whom  he  had  always  disliked;  and 
Gioberti,  after  desperate  clutchings  at  office,  foimd  himself 
compelled  to  resign  (February  21). 

Gioberti’s  erratic  policy  and  fall  were  the  natural  conse- 
quences of  a restiveness  that  could  only  end  in  war.  Settled 
government  was  impossible  in  Piedmont,  while  the  presence 
of  the  Austrians  in  Lombardy  kept  excitement  at  fever-heat.  ^ 
While  even  Francis  of  Modena  was  governing  with  modera- 
tion and  at  present  with  some  show  of  Liberahsm,  the 
Austrians  seemed  resolved  to  provoke  nationalist  sentiment 
past  endurance.  After  the  reconquest  of  the  coimtry  in 
August,  the  Lombard  discontent  was  wider  and  deeper  than 
ever  before.  Thousands  had  migrated  to  Piedmont  or 
Switzerland ; those  who  remained,  engaged  in  a silent 

struo-o-le  with  the  authorities,  and  even  the  Provincial  Con- 

00 

1 Gioberti,  Rinnovarnento,  I.  578-587  ; Id.,  Operette,  I.  239  ; Tavallmi,  Lanza, 

I,  75-76;  Correspondence — Italy,  IV.  141. 


NOVARA 


301 

gregations,  with  one  exception,  refused  to  send  deputies  to 
the  Imperial  Diet,  about  to  meet  at  Vienna.  The  large 
garrisons  kept  a show  of  order ; but  the  generals,  who  were 
the  real  government,  knew  on  what  a volcano  they  were 
living,  and  hoped  to  cow  the  Lombards  by  terrorism. 
Radetzky  quietly  shelved  the  civil  governors,  and  suspended 
the  promised  constitution.  Taxes  were  piled  up  to  support 
the  army  of  occupation,  and  the  country  was  made  to  feel 
that  it  was  in  the  grip  of  a ruthless  military  power.  Sen- 
tence of  death  was  threatened  against  any  at  Milan  found 
in  possession  of  arms,  and  under  the  savage  edict  men  were 
shot  or  bastinadoed  without  pity.  Trade  was  almost  sus- 
pended, and  though  many  of  the  refugees  returned,  the 
streets  of  Milan  had  few  passengers  except  soldiers  and 
beggars.  Radetzky’s  favourite  scheme  was  to  signal  out 
the  rich  for  punishment,  and  try  to  win  the  masses  by 
enlisting  them  in  the  plunder  of  the  propertied.  To  terrify 
or  exasperate  the  Milanese  aristocracy,  he  imposed  a fine  of 
20  million  lire  on  200  of  their  leaders,  and  when  the  fines 
were  not  paid,  sequestrated  many  of  their  houses  and  estates. 
But  he  only  succeeded  in  maddening  all  classes  alike ; and 
though  their  seeming  helplessness  dispirited  them,  and  all 
seemed  quiet  on  the  surface,  there  was  but  one  resolve 
through  Lombardy  to  rise  at  the  first  occasion  that  their 
Italian  brothers  gave  them. 

Throughout  all  Italy  ruled  the  same  passionate  desire 
to  end  the  Austrian  domination  for  ever.  Nobles  and  ple- 
beians, Moderates  and  Democrats,  none  but  were  bitterly 
incensed  by  Radetzky’s  brutal  t3Tanny.  But  the  hopeful- 
ness and  unanimity  of  1848  had  gone.  The  memory  of 
recent  defeat,  the  overthrow  of  all  that  splendid  confidence, 
the  present  sense  of  Austrian  power  made  timid  men  shrink 
back  and  cautious  men  pause.  And  the  deep  divisions  of 
classes  and  parties,  which  had  come  to  light  during  the 
winter,  paralyzed  much  of  the  energy  which  should  have 
gone  out  against  the  Austrian.  The  cosmopolitan  strife 
between  rich  and  poor,  between  privilege  and  democracy, 
was  always  tending  to  overshadow  the  national  quarrel  with 
Austria.  The  Democrats  obscured  their  patriotism  by  their 


302  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

want  of  resoluteness  and  capacity ; differences,  part  real  part 
fictitious,  made  it  diflicult  for  them  to  cooperate  with  the 
Moderates.  And  though  the  great  majority  of  the  nation 
was  sincerely  nationalist  as  in  the  past  year,  it  no  longer 
gave  a single  mind  to  the  cause  of  Independence.  The 
jealousies  of  the  different  states,  the  fears  of  Piedmontese 
expansion,  the  alienation  of  the  Church  hindered  the  massing 
of  the  national  forces.  The  long  negotiations  for  a League 
had  ended  in  nothing ; the  Constituent  had  failed  to  unite 
even  Tuscany  and  Rome;  since  the  breakdown  of  Rossi’s 
negotiations  in  the  autumn,  Naples  had  stood  entirely  aloof; 
Siody  was  more  intent  on  its  own  autonomy  than  on  Italian 
Unity ; Venice  was  absorbed  in  her  own  struggle,  and  equaUy 
distrustful  of  Piedmont  and  the  Constituent.  In  Piedmont 
there  was  a strong  inclination  to  neglect  the  alliances  of  the 
other  states ; the^Right  was  unwilling  to  have  any  dealmgs 
ivith  the  democracies  of  Central  Italy,  and  even  the  Left 
feared  the  taint  of  republican  connections.  When  Rome, 
despite  her  absorption  in  her  'own  problems,  promised  to 
place  15,000  men  under  Charles  Albert’s  orders,  the  Pied- 
montese' government  in  its  fatuous  isolation  rejected  the 
alHance,^  and  gave  no  notice  of  approaching  hostilities  either 
to  her  or  Sicily  or  Venice.  Hence,  save  for  such  diversion 
as  Venice  might  make,  and  for  the  conspiracy  that  was 
spreading  its  meshes  through  Lombardy,  Piedmont  could 
rely  on  no  Itahan  help  for  the  coming  war. 

Nor  was  there  hope  of  assistance  from  abroad.  Louis 
Napoleon  wished  to  fight  on  the  side  of  Piedmont,  but  could 
not  find  one  of  his  ministers  to  support  him.  Bastide  and 
Palmerston  alike  were  angry  at  her  refusal  to  comproimse 
■\ntli  Vienna ; and  even  when  Austria  flatly  declined  to  yield 
a foot  of  territory,  she  was  made  to  understand  that  she 
must  expect  no  more  than  a feeble  sympathy  from  either  of 
the  Western  Powers  for  what  they  regarded  as  a troublesome 
chimera.2  it  was  clear  that  Piedmont  must  meet  the  great 

1 Farini,  Roman  State,  III.  147  ; Planat  de  la  Faye,  Documents,  II.  163  ; 

Rusconi,  itfpaWica,  I.  141.  . , . n-  i • 1-  • Pnr 

2 Bontadini.  Arose,  95-102;  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  t.  ^56,  j76-jS4  , Cor- 
respondence-Italy,  IV.  55,  91 : Bastide,  RSpublique  frar^aise,  109,  113.  120. 


NOVARA 


303 

Empire  alone,  and  it  showed  the  high  courage  that  inspired 
her,  that,  the  hope  of  an  honourable  peace  once  gone,  she 
never  seriously  faltered  in  her  purpose  to  renew  the  war. 
Gioberti  had  been  succeeded  by  General  Chiodo ; the 
cabinet  otherwise  remained  unaltered,  but  his  dismissal 
helped  to  precipitate  the  struggle,  for  it  removed  the  last 
barrier  that  held  back  the  war  party  in  the  Chamber. 
Rattazzi  represented  them  in  the  ministry,  where  he  was 
the  controlling  spirit ; and  quite  outside  the  democratic  party 
which  he  led,  there  was  a considerable  section  of  Conserva- 
tive opinion  that  was  impatient  for  a final  struggle.  Rad- 
etzky  s vengeance  on  the  Milanese  nobles  had  stirred  the 
anger  of  the  aristocracy,  and  Gioberti’s  later  Conservatism  had 
gone  far  to  reconcile  them  to  the  new  constitutional  order. 
Men,  who  dreaded  the  social  changes  that  were  threatening 
at  home,  thought  that  war  alone  could  give  the  government 
the  strength  it  lacked  to  cope  with  them.  The  King  was 
eager  to  escape  from  the  intolerable  position,  and  burning 
to  recover  honour  and  prestige  in  a new  campaign.  Success, 
he  believed,  was  decreed  by  heaven,  and  his  patriotic  enthu- 
siasm had  reconciled  him  to  the  democrats,  who  at  all 
events  shared  most  completely  his  hopes  for  Italy.  “ Better 
the  cap  of  liberty,"  he  said,  “than  humiliation  before 
Austria."  Genoa  was  tossing  with  the  war-fever;  Nice 
was  as  Italian  in  feeling  as  Piedmont.  Alone  in  the  Cham- 
ber the  deputies  of  Savoy  ostentatiously  severed  themselves 
from  the  hopes  of  Italian  nationality. 

Still  not  even  in  Piedmont  was  there  the  same  universal 
passion  that  had  roused  the  country  a year  ago.  Many, 
who  would  have  welcomed  hostilities  under  other  auspices, 
utterly  distrusted  the  Democrats  in  power  and  their  capacity 
to  prepare  for  a campaign.  The  priests,  who  as  a body 
had  followed  the  Pope’s  defection,  influenced  the  peasants 
and  the  poorer  classes  in  some  of  the  towns ; and  reaction- 
ary, and  perhaps  democratic,  intrigues  had  been  busy  among 
the  troops.i  In  numbers  the  army  was  superior  to  that  of 
the  summer;  and,  besides  the  garrisons,  there  were  80,000 
men  under  arms.  But  morally  and  physically  they  were 
1 Gabussi,  Memorie,  III.  241 ; Minghetti,  Ricordi,  II.  71. 


304  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

inferior ; discipline  was  bad ; whole  regiments  were  com- 
posed of  raw  recruits  or  married  men,  all  eager  to  return 
home.  And  yet  in  spite  of  its  shortcomings  the  army 
kept  its  old  tenacity,  its  zeal  for  the  national  honour ; 
even  the  Savoyard  regiments  had  lost  none  of  their  loyalty 
to  the  King ; and  under  an  able  commander  it  was  still 
capable  of  great  and  heroic  action.^  But  again  it  was  fated 
to  see  its  bravery  wasted  by  bad  generalship.  ^ Exaggerated 
criticism  of  the  last  campaign  had  made  it  impossible  for 
the  King  or  any  of  the  generals  to  take  the  command,  and 
after  a failure  to  secure  a French  general,  the  government, 
almost  in  default  of  any  alternative,  appointed  the  Polish 
officer  Chrzanowsky,^  a soldier  who  had  fought  under  many 
flags,  and  whose  military  honour  and  loyalty  to  Liberalism 
were  equally  tarnished. 

The  truce  was  denounced  on  March  1 2,  and  according 
to  its  terms  hostilities  would  recommence  on  the  eighth 
day.  Chrzanowsky  s troops  were  scattered  along  the  long 
line  of  the  Ticino  from  Oleggio  to  the  Po,  while  La  Mar- 
mora’s division  of  9000  men  was  crossing  the  Cisa  Pass 
from  Sarzana  to  spread  the  revolution  in  the  Duchies^ 
The  main  body  was  stationed  between  Novara  and  Mortar  a. 
Chrzanowsky  had  a choice  of  strategy;  he  might  stake 
everything  on  a dash  on  Milan ; he  might  with  greater 
prudence  advance  south  of  the  Po,  rouse  the  Duchies,  and 
take  the  Austrians  on  the  flank;  or  he  might  assume  a 
strong  defensive  position  and  wear  out  the  enemy.  ^ He 
carried  out  no  plan  thoroughly.  The  key  of  his  position 
was  at  La  Cava,  opposite  Pavia,  in  the  angle  between  the 
Ticino  and  the  Po,  covering  the  road  from  Pavia  to 
Alessandria ; but  he  entrusted  it  to  the  weak  and  unreliable 
Lombard  division  under  Ramorino,  the  villain  of  the  plot 
of  1833,  now  by  strange  irony  the  hero  of  the  democrats. 
When  the  truce  terminated  on  the  20th,  Chrzanowsky 
seems  to  have  half  projected  a dash  from  Buffalora  on 
Milan,  and  Charles  Albert  rode  at  the  head  of  his  troops 

1 La  Marmora  thought  that  there  was  a good  chance  of  success  : Cavour, 
Nouvelles  lettres,  264  ; Bonfadini,  op.  cit.,  97. 

2 Pronounce  Shanofsky.  ' See  map  in  Vol.  11. , p.  69. 


NOVARA  305 

across  the  river  to  Magenta.  But  while  the  Piedmontese 
wasted  their  strength  in  irresolute  and  divided  movements, 
Radetzky  was  preparing  one  strong  staggering  blow.  Leav- 
ing Milan  feebly  garrisoned,  he  had  collected  75,000  men 
at  Pavia,  and  began  to  cross  the  Ticino  at  noon  on  the  20th. 
Ramorino  s instructions  were  to  hold  La  Cava  in  force,  and 
if  the  enemy  attempted  a crossing,  to  resist  as  long  as 
possible.  But  in  deliberate  defiance  of  his  orders,  he  had 
left  most  of  his  men  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Po,  and  the 
few  Lombards,  who  were  left  at  La  Cava,  could  do  no  more 
than  make  a show  of  resistance.  His  reckless  disobedience 
allowed  Radetzky  to  move  on  the  Piedmontese  main  body 
before  it  was  prepared.  His  right  wing  came  upon  part  of 
it  next  day  (March  21)  at  Sforzesca,  to  the  east  of  Mortara. 
The  Piedmontese  were  inferior  in  numbers,  but  even  the 
raw  recruits  fought  finely,  and  the  Austrians  were  only 
saved  from  rout  because  the  victors  were  too  hungry  and 
exhausted  to  pursue.  But  on  the  same  afternoon  the 
Piedmontese  right  had  met  a terrible  reverse  at  Mortara. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  D’Aspre  attacked  Giovanni  Durando’s 
brigade  in  front  of  the  city.  Durando’s  men  showed  little 
of  the  spirit  that  won  Sforzesca,  and  an  hour’s  fighting  was 
enough  to  break  his  lines,  Italians  and  Austrians  entering 
the  town  pell-mell.  The  fighting  went  on  in  the  streets 
till  after  nightfall,  and  1700  Piedmontese  were  surrounded 
and  surrendered.  Even  now  there  was  time  to  redeem  the 
situation ; the  whole  reserve  was  only  two  miles  distant,  and 
there  were  30,000  men  at  Sforzesca  flushed  with  victory. 
Chrzanowsky  wished  to  throw  himself  on  D’Aspre’s  flank* 
and  his  superiority  of  numbers  must  have  made  victory 
almost  certain;!  but  by  some  fatuity  he  was  dissuaded, 
and  the  Austrians  were  left  in  quiet  possession  of  the 
positions  they  had  won.  Retreat  was  now  inevitable,  and 
Chrzanowsky  decided  to  retire  northwards  and  offer  battle 
m front  of  Novara.  Before  the  city,  with  its  sinister 
memories  of  ’21,  he  drew  up  his  force,  still  50,000  strong, 
on  the  morning  of  the  23  rd.  Radetzky  had  been  moving 
cautiously  in  pursuit,  uncertain  whether  the  Piedmontese 

^ Dino,  Souvenirs,  314;  Ufficiale  Piemontese,  Memorie, 

VOL.  I. 


3o6  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Rad  retreated  on  Vercelli  or  Novara.  But  D’Aspre,  wRo 
commanded  tRe  van,  elated  witR  Ris  victory  at  Mortara, 
and  tRinking  Re  Rad  only  a division  in  front  of  Rim, 
precipitated  tRe  attack  before  noon.  He  Rad  only  20,000 
men  witR  Rim,  and  tRougR  four  times  Re  took  and  lost  tRe 
key  of  tRe  position  at  tRe  Bicocca,  at  last,  outnumbered  and 
unsupported,  Re  found  Rimself  Rard  pressed.^  _ TRe  royal 
Dukes  were  preparing  for  tRe  final  and  victorious  cRarge, 
wRen  CRrzanowsky  by  one  supreme  act  of  fatuity  stopped 
tReir  advance,  and  tRe  victory,  wRicR  D’Aspre’s  foolRardi- 
ness  Rad  offered,  was  snatcRed  from  tReir  Rands.  It  was 
soon  too  late.  At  3.0  tRe  enemy’s  reinforcements  began_  to 
stream  up.  TRe  Piedmontese  were  starving,  tReir  left  wing 
weary  witR  its  long  struggle;  but  they  made  a brave 
resistance  against  tRe  mounting  odds,  and  it  was  not  till 
a fresR  division  of  tRe  enemy  came  up  at  5.30,  tRat  tRey 
despaired.  TRe  King,  wRo  Rad  all  day  been  in  tRe  Rottest 
of  tRe  figRt,  wRo,  Rad  Re  Rad  tRe  resolution  to  oppose 
CRrzanow“sky,  migRt  Rave  secured  tRe  victory  Ris  sons  Rad 
all  but  won,  now  only  Rugged  deatR.  But  Re  Rad  yet  to 
drink  tRe  cup  to  the  dregs.  “Even  deatR,”  Re  said,  “Ras 
east  me  off ; ” Re  saw  Ris  famisRed  soldiers  Rardly  restramed 
from  sacking  tRe  city,  and  Ris  final  Rumiliation  came  at 
nigRt  wRen  Ris  generals  refused  to  continue  tRe  struggle, 
and  Re  found  Rimself  compelled  to  beg  a truce.  WRen 
Radetzky  asked  for  terms  tRat  Ris  pride  could  not  consent 
to  Re  abdicated,  as  Re  Rad  always  intended  to  do  in  the 
event  of  defeat,  passed  in  disguise  tRe  Austrian  lines,  ^d 
made  Ris  way  to  lonely  exile  and  an  early  deatR.  His 
long  tortuous  career  Rad  closed  in  noble  failure.  TRe  cold 
scReming  absolutist,  the  traitor  of  ’21,  the  tyrant  of  33, 
the  blundering  general  of  ’48  were  all  forgotten.  And  Ris 
country’s  love  enshrined  Rim  the  mai-tyr  of  the  national 
war,  the  patriot  King,  who  Rad  risked  crown  and  life  for  a 
great  Italian  hope,  the  royal  democrat,  who  had  cast 
away  the  prejudices  of  a lifetime  to  rally  Ris  country  to 
one  last  ill-starred  but  splendid  venture. 

1 Schonhals,  Campagnes,  358. 

2 Cibrario,  Missione,  82. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


NAPLES  AND  SICILY 

FEBRUARY  I 848 MAY  I 849 


Naples  : Bozzelli  ministry  ; Calabrian  revolt  / parliamentary  oj)position  j 
the  reaction  unmasks  ; Ferdinand  at  Gaeta ; parliament  dissolved! 
Sicily  : Sicilian  independence  ; negotiations  with  Naples  ; forfeiture 
of  the  throne  ; royalists  and  republicans  ; Sicily  and  Italy  ; Duke  of 
Genoa  elected  king  ; bombardment  of  Messina  ; the  reaction  begins  ; 
the  national  guard  ; Ultimatum  of  Gaeta  ; the  war  ; the  last  struggle 
at  Palermo. 

Naples,  meanwhile,  had  for  the  past  year  ostracized  itself 
from  the  national  movement.  Cariati,  the  nominal  head  of 
the  ministry  which  came  into  power  after  the  counter-revo- 
lution, was  a well-intentioned  but  exceedingly  feeble  man, 
and  Bozzelli  was  still  all-powerful  in  the  cabinet.  He  pro- 
fessed to  steer  between  the  camarilla  and  parliament ; but  his 
first  object  was  at  all  costs  to  retain  office,  which  had  lifted 
him  from  poverty  to  ostentatious  wealth,  and  gratified  his 
faith  in  his  own  pedantic  statecraft.  Partly  for  this,  partly 
because  his  vanity  hoodwinked  him,  he  played  at  governing, 
while  he  was  really  the  tool  of  the  King.  Not  that  the  cama- 
rilla was  allowed  a free  hand.  The  country  was  too  angry  to 
be  trifled  with  too  far ; and  while  Charles  Albert  s army  was 
victorious  in  the  north,  full-sailed  reaction  was  impossible. 
The  King  again  protested  hisToyalty  to  the  constitution,  and 
though  the  Chamber  was  dissolved  before  it  met,  fresh  elec- 
tions were  ordered.  There  was  no  tyranny, i though  the 
spirit  of  the  government  had  changed.  The  press  was  left 
fairly  free;  but  the  Jesuits  returned,  the  old  police  re- 
appeared, public  meetings  were  forbidden.  It  was  evident 

^ Correspondence — Italy,  IT.  596. 

307 


3-0  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

that  want  of  courage,  not  want  of  will,  held  the  government 
from  extremer  measures. 

The  country  had  been  taken  by  surprise  on  May  15, 
and  the  great  mass  of  the  people  were  too  bewildered  for 
action.  Angry  as  they  were  at  the  events  of  Naples  aim 
Pepe’s  recall,  they  were  still  inclined  to  trust  the  King’s  oath, 
and  Imew  well  that  so  long  as  Charles  Albert  was  undefeated, 
the  court  would  not  dare  to  repeal  the  constitution.  Butin 
some  districts  there  was  a more  impatient  movement.  The 
southern  provinces  were  practically  independent  of  Naples, 
and  there  and  in  the  Abruzzi  an  insurrection  was  in^  tram, 
which,  had  it  been  wisely  captained,  might  have  anticipated 
i860.  But  want  of  arms  or  mutual  suspicions  kept  the 
provinces  from  common  action ; and  the  ^ insurrectionary 
Committee  at  Potenza  wasted  its  chances,  till  the  fire  went 
out  of  the  movement.^  Calabria  was  left  alone  to  raise  the  flag 
of  revolt.  Here  the  insurrection  started  with  fair  prospects  ; 
thousands  came  in  to  join  the  insurgent  amy,  and  officials 
high  and  low  gave  in  adhesion.  The  diminution  of  crime, 
the  readiness  to  pay  the  taxes  showed  how  fully  the  country 
accepted  the  revolutionary  government.  But  the  rising 
needed  a Garibaldi.  There  was  no  directing  energy  to  over- 
bear the  suspicions  and  jealousies  that  soon  sprang  up.  The 
contingent  of  600  men,  whom  the  Sicilians  sent,  refused  to 
work  with  the  Calabrians.  Ferdinand  poured  8000  men 
into  the  province,  and  their  atrocities  cowed  the  people. 
Harvest  was  beginning,  and  the  peasants  wanted  to  be  at 
home  to  reap  their  crops.  And  bravely  as  some  of  the 
Calabrians  fought,  bad  generalship  made  an  effective  defence 
impossible.  General  Nunziante  harried  the  wretched  pro- 
vince, egged  on  loyalist  peasants  to  loot  the  property  ot 
Liberals,  and  sent  the  captured  leaders  to  languish  in  the 
dungeons  of  Gaeta  till  i860  (July). 

The  new  elections  had  taken  place  meanwhile  (June  i 5). 
Though  the  franchise  had  been  narrowed  again,  the  Liberals 
were  returned  triumphantly  almost  everywhere,  and  the  new 
Chamber  was  practically  composed  of  the  same  men  as  the 

1 Lacava,  Basilicata,  i,  15-20;  D’Ayala,  Memorie,  144-145;  Tivaroni,  Do- 
minio  austriaco,  III.  217—220. 


NAPLES  AND  SICILY 


309 

old.  The  papers,  which  had  suspended  their  issues  after 
May  15,  started  again  with  greater  wisdom  and  self-restraint. 
Naples  reflected  the  sullen  and  angry  feeling  of  the  country; 
no  patriot  smoked,  the  theatres  and  cafes  were  deserted, 
the  officers  were  rigorously  ostracized.  There  were  begin- 
nings too  of  more  resolute  conspiracy.  A few  men,  ten 
years  in  advance  of  their  time,  aimed  at  uniting  the  South 
to  the  North  under  the  House  of  Savoy.  They  had  already 
saluted  Charles  Albert  King  of  Italy ; they  now  formed  the 
secret  Society  of  United  Italy,  to  overthrow  the  Bourbons 
and  offer  Naples  to  him,  and  there  is  some  evidence  that 
the  Turin  government  was  not  altogether  deaf  to  their 
overtures.^  But  parliament  repeated  the  feebleness  of  the 
spring.  The  peers  steadily  supported  the  government; 
many  of  the  deputies  were  afraid  to  vote  against  it;  the 
majority,  especially  Poerio  and  his  following,  were  anxious 
to  come  to  terms  with  the  King,  and  offered  to  support  the 
ministry,  if  it  would  send  troops  to  the  war.  They  repudi- 
ated the  Calabrian  rising,  and  tacitly  connived  at  the  King’s 
aims  to  reconquer  Sicily.  Their  readiness  to  compromise 
was  wasted;  Bozzelli  showed  his  contempt  by  studiously 
absenting  himself  from  the  Chamber,  and  its  addresses  to 
the  King  had  no  replies.  The  government  did  not  dare  as 
yet  to  dissolve  it,  but  it  allowed  no  fresh  elections  for  the 
many  vacant  seats,  and  when  the  catastrophe  of  Custozza 
gave  it  courage  to  attack  Sicily  again,  it  prorogued  parlia- 
ment on  the  eve  of  the  bombardment  of  Messina.  To 
anticipate  any  resistance  from  the  middle  classes,  police 
agents  roused  Santa  Lucia  to  a demonstration  against  the 
Chamber ; and  when  the  exasperated  artisans  of  Monte- 
calvario  met  the  mob  and  routed  it  (September  5),  the 
scuffle  gave  the  court  its  excuse.  The  camarilla  could 
unmask,  now  that  the  victory  of  the  Austrians  seemed  to 
usher  in  the  triumph  of  reaction.  While  Bozzelli  still 
professed  himself  a Liberal,  the  camarilla,  whether  he  liked 
it  or  not,  had  its  will.  The  national  guard  of  the  capital 
was  reduced  to  a fragment ; Liberal  intendants  and  prefects 

^ La  Farina,  Epistolario,  I.  317  ; Nisco,  Ferdinando  II.,  199-200  ; Leopardi, 
Narrazioni,  350. 


310 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

were  persecuted  or  dismissed,  and  the  Bench  was  purged 
till  it  became  the  humble  instrument  of  the  police.  ^ The 
army  grew  more  and  more  uncontrollable,  till  the  life  of 
every  citizen  was  at  the  mercy  of  any  rabid  officer,  and  men 
were  beaten  and  killed  by  soldiers  in  the  streets.  For  a 
moment  Rossi’s  influence  with  the  ministry  stayed  the 
reaction,  but  his  death  removed  the  last  barrier.  Ferdi- 
nand, proud  at  having  curbed  the  revolution  and  saluted 
as  “ the  first  to  restore  order  in  Europe,”  made  Gaeta  the 
refuge  of  the  princes,  whose  weakness  and  credulity  were 
responsible,  so  he  held,  for  the  brief  triumph  of  Liberalism , 
and  from  Gaeta  he  hoped  to  prepare  its  overthrow  in 
Central  Italy.  But  he  was  willing  for  the  time  to  allow 
the  constitution  to  survive  in  name,  and  still  authorized  his 
agents  to  protest  his  unshaken  loyalty.^  The  temper  of  the 
country,  he  knew,  though  it  had  acquiesced  in  so  much, 
might  again  be  dangerous,  if  he  showed  his  hand  too 
plainly.  The  Neapolitans  had  threatened  more  than  once, 
and  when  at  Rossi’s  advice  bye-elections  were  ordered  to 
fill  the  vacant  seats  (November),  nine  out  of  ten  con- 
stituencies still  returned  Liberals.  The  ministers  thought 
it  prudent  to  temporize,  and  though  taxes  were  collected 
without  consent  of  parliament,  the  Chambers  were  sum- 
moned to  meet  in  February.  Parliament  was  willing  to 
pass  an  indemnity,  to  consent  in  fact  to  almost  anything, 
if  the  King  would  dismiss  Bozzelli.  But  they  were  fighting 
a hopeless  cause;  brave,  honest,  eloquent  as  they  were, 
nothing  but  a Piedmontese  victory  could  save  them  now. 
The  government,  which  had  already  broken  off  relations 
with  Turin  and  Florence,  discounted  the  possibility  of  this, 
and  made  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  the  north  the 
signal  for  action.  On  March  1 3 it  recalled  the  Austrian 
minister,  recommenced  hostilities  with  Sicily,  and  dissolved 
parliament.  When  the  news  of  Novara  came,  Bozzelli  and 
the  camarilla  knew  that  their  hands  were  free.  Most  of 
the  deputies  were  imprisoned  or  had  to  fly,  the  press  was 
attacked,  schools  were  closed,  the  J esuits  ostentatiously 
patronized.  For  a moment  the  disgraceful  retreat  from 

1 Correspondence — Naples,  633. 


NAPLES  AND  SICILY 


311 

the  Roman  forces  at  Velletri^  cowed  the  court,  and  had 
it  been  vigorously  followed  up,  the  Liberals  might  have 
raised  their  heads  again,  and  perhaps  even  overthrown  the 
government.  But  it  was  a momentary  gleam.  The  officers, 
who  ran  away  at  Velletri,  were  masters  of  the  government. 
Bozzelli  had  been  the  catspaw  of  the  camarilla,  and  now 
that  his  use  was  gone,  he  was  ignominiously  dismissed. 
Naples  returned  to  frank  absolutism  and  the  brutalities  of 
a military  rule. 

While  Naples  was  sinking  into  the  servitude  that  its 
faint-heartedness  deserved,  Sicily  had  had  its  nobler  drama  of 
fierce  patriotism,  of  heroic  resistance,  of  courage  that  only 
quailed  when  the  odds  were  desperate ; it  had  had  its  more 
than  share  of  blunders,  the  same  want  of  statesmanship,  the 
same  incapacity  to  sink  differences,  at  last  the  same  cowardice 
of  a section  of  the  propertied  classes,  which  had  helped  to 
wreck  the  popular  cause  in  the  other  states.  At  first  no 
province  of  Italy  seemed  to  have  a safer  future.  It  appeared 
unlikely  that  Naples  would  ever  try  to  reconquer  it ; Eng- 
land, France,  Russia  vied  in  extending  their  patronage. 
Sicily  was  the  only  Italian  state  that  had  a constitutional 
past  to  build  on ; the  elements  of  reaction  were  almost  non- 
existent, for  the  question  of  independence  dwarfed  all  others, 
and  in  their  zeal  to  keep  the  island  free,  nobles  and  high 
ecclesiastics,  Jesuits  and  lawyers,  shopkeepers  and  peasants 
were  at  one. 

But  to  the  Neapolitans  it  seemed  the  sheer  obstinacy  of 
faction.  At  Naples  there  was  little  sympathy  for  or  under- 
standing of  the  Sicilian  position,  whether  among  royalists  or 
moderates  or  democrats.  It  was  easy  for  the  ministry,  men 
who  themselves  had  little  sympathy  with  the  nationalist 
movement,  to  defend  the  refusal  of  the  Sicilian  demands  as 
necessary  to  the  Italian  cause.  They  had  indeed  asked  Minto 
to  negotiate  a compromise  (February  12,  1848),  and  offered 
a separate  parliament  for  purely  Sicilian  affairs ; but  they 
firmly  declined  to  give  the  Constitution  of  1812,  or  even 

^ See  below,  p.  336.  This  was  the  occasion  on  which  Ferdinand  brevetted 
Ignatius  Loyola  a Field-Marshal. 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


312 

listen  to  the  reasonable  conditions,  for  which  the  Sicilians 
would  have  waived  their  beloved  palladium^  The  first 
constitutional  cabinet  fell  (March  2),  and  its  successors  were 
ready  to  practically  acknowledge  the  Constitution  of  1812. 
But  the  surrender  came  just  too  late.  The  news  of  the 
French  Revolution  had  reached  Sicily  and  raised  the  people’s 
hopes ; they  reflected  that  even  now  there  was  no  guarantee 
that  the  Neapolitan  army  might  not  be  sent  to  crush  them. 
They  were  no  longer  satisfied  even  with  the  old  charter,  and 
though  they  still  accepted  the  nominal  sovereignty  of  the 
Bourbon  crown,  they  demanded  terms  that  would  have  re- 
duced its  authority  to  a shadow.  When  the  Neapolitans 
refused  the  new  proposals,  the  parliament  at  Palermo 
solemnly  resolved  that  the  Bourbons  had  forfeited  the 
crown  of  Sicily  (April  13);  and  such  few  scruples  as  there 
were,  were  silent  before  the  enthusiasm,  perhaps  the  threats, 
of  the  great  majority  of  the  people.  Ruggiero  Settimo,  who 
was  appointed  President  pending  the  election  of  a king, 
typified  the  unity  of  the  country ; his  years,  his  honourable 
past,  which  recalled  the  struggles  of  1812  and  1820,  his 
progressive  Liberalism  always  ready  to  sacrifice  its  own  pre- 
judices, placed  him  beyond  reach  of  cavil,  a figurehead  but 
an  honoured  one. 

But  behind  the  unanimity  on  the  question  of  indepen- 
dence, divisions  inevitably  grew  up.  The  ministry  and  the 
majority  of  parliament,  lawyers  mainly  and  men  of  letters 
with  a sprinkling  of  nobles,  desired  a constitutional  mon- 
archy, based  on  a broad  Liberalism,  but  stopping  short  of  a 
thorough  democracy ; they  had  small  active  interest  in 
Italian  politics,  and  trusted  to  the  sympathies  of  England 
and  France  to  protect  them  from  Bourbon  attack.  But 
there  was  a strong  minority  in  parliament,  whose  sympathies 
were  republican,  though  they  realized  the  practical  difficul- 
ties of  a republic,  and  made  no  attempt  to  resist  the  tide 
that  procured  an  unanimous  vote  for  the  election  of  an 
Italian  prince  as  king.  They  were  more  keenly  interested 
than  the  majority  in  the  Italian  question,  fairly  eager  to 
help  the  Liberals  of  Naples  and  the  army  in  the  north,  and 

1 Correspondence — Naples,  80-189. 


NAPLES  AND  SICILY  313 

above  all  anxious  for  the  formation  of  a strong  army,  which 
would  make  the  island  independent  of  English  or  French 
support.  They  had  abundant  material  for  attacking  the 
ministry.  Little  had  been  done  to  raise  an  army ; there  was 
no  police ; the  peace  of  the  island  was  threatened  by  bands 
of  convicts,  whom  the  Neapolitans  had  released  before  their 
departure,  and  the  criminal  squadre}  which  Palermo,  true  to 
its  traditions,  had  employed  to  help  the  revolution,  were 
waiting  for  their  loot.  Already  the  discovery  of  corpses  in 
the  dungeons  of  the  police  ^ had  given  them  a pretext  to 
massacre  every  sUrro  that  they  laid  hands  on.  There  had 
been  organized  highway  robbery  near  Palermo,  organized 
outrage  at  Catania  and  Marsala;  and  though  the  danger  of 
anarchy  was  probably  exaggerated,  the  Sicilians  might  well 
fear  a repetition  of  the  horrors  of  1820. 

But  everything  else  was  overshadowed  by  the  election  of 
a king.  The  vote  of  forfeiture  had  enacted  that  an  Italian 
prince  should  be  elected  to  the  throne,  so  soon  as  the  statute 
of  1812  had  been  reformed.  Everything  urged  a speedy 
settlement.  The  suspense  of  an  interregnum  hindered  the 
return  of  settled  order ; England  and  France  would  not  recog- 
nize the  new  government  till  a king  had  been  chosen.  Above 
all,  Sicily  must  settle  her  affairs  that  she  might  enter  the 
Italian  League  as  an  independent  state.  Hitherto  she  had 
been  the  one  gap  in  the  chain  that  linked  the  nationalists 
through  the  peninsula.  The  struggle  with  Naples  had  kept 
the  islanders  from  coming  into  line  with  the  Liberals  of  the 
mainland ; the  constitution  of  1812  seemed  the  triumph  of 
Sicilian  autonomy,  a step  backward  from  the  movement,  which 
till  now  had  advanced  so  bravely,  for  consolidating  Italy.  The 
traditional  hatred  of  Naples  burnt  fiercely  as  ever;  the 
Sicilians  urged  that  constitutional  guarantees  were  worthless 
without  a separate  parliament,  that  their  deputies,  like  the 
Irish,  would  be  powerless  as  a small  minority  in  an  united 
Chamber.  They  protested  indeed  that  antagonism  to  Naples 
did  not  mean  antagonism  to  Italy,  that  they  wished  to  have 
Naples  ‘‘  as  sister  not  as  mistress,”  that  they  were  eager  to  take 

^ See  above,  p.  26. 

^ Mortillaro,  Legendes^  289  ; La  Masa,  Documenti,  I.  168. 


314  A HISTOHY  0"  A*- .lAN  UNITY 

their  place  in  an  Itali?"  T j.  None  the  less  the  Liberals 
of  the  mainland  kn  tne  spirit  of  a wider  nationality 

had  barely  reached  - masses  of  the  island,  that  alike 
among  nobles  and  pjpulace  there  was  a powerful  section, 
with  whom  the  old  traditional  passion  for  independence 
overruled  Italian  sentiment.  There  was  perhaps  for  a 
moment  a real  danger  that  Sicily  would  try  to  become  an 
independent  state  under  an  English  protectorate. 

Nothing  was  more  calculated  to  counteract  these  ten- 
dencies th^n  the  filling  of  the  throne.  As  soon  as  a king 
was  chosen,  Sicily  would  probably  be  recognized  by  every 
Itahan  state  except  Naples,  and  inevitably  brought  into 
closer  relations  with  them.  There  were  only  two  serious 
candidates,  the  Duke  of  Genoa  and  a minor  son  of  the 
Grand  Duke.  Leopold  was  ready  to  accept  the  throne  for 
his  son,  and  he  had  the  support  of  France  and  of^  all 
who  dreaded  that  the  growing  power  of  Piectaont  might 
threaten  the  independence  of  the  other  states."  ^ But  there 
was  danger  in  the  weak  rule  of  a minor ; and  in  addition 
to  England’s  somewhat  lukewarm  patronage  of  the  Pied- 
montese prince,  his  election  meant  the  support  of  Charles 
Albert’s  as  yet  unconquered  army.  The  question  kept 
simmering  through  May  and  June,  while  the  reform  of  the 
statute  dragged  slowly  along  with  large  democratic  changes. 
A manhood  literate  suffrage  took  the  place  of  the  old  pro- 
perty vote;  the  land-laws  were  reformed  in  the  teeth  of  the 
Peers,  and  their  House  was  made  elective,  though  the 
bishops  retained  their  seats;  the  crown  was  allowed  a 
suspensive  veto  only,  and  its  prerogative  was  cut  down. 
But  while  parliament  was  occupied  with  the  long  constitu- 
tional debates,  the  public  outside  was  growing  impatient 
for  the  election  of  a king,  and  the  Duke  of  Genoa  s fame 
in  the  war  and  the  obvious  advantages  of  a strong  and 
soldierly  ruler  left  him  the  only  candidate  in  the  field. 

1 Ricciardi,  Cenni,  82;  Correspondence— Naples,  80.  116.  Palmerston 
declined  to  listen  to  anything  of  the  kind  : Ib.,  81. 

3 D’Ancona,  Amari,  1.  250-255  ; Correspondence— Naples,  331,  335  ; na 
Farina,  Jstoria,  I.  236  ; Bianchi,  Biplomazui,  V.  212  ; G^melli,  Sicilia,  76. 

3 The  constitution  in  Correspondence— Naple'  '60;  there  was  per- 

missive payment  of  members  : La  Farina,  op.  cit.,  i 


NAPLES  AND  SICILY 


315 

The  formal  declaration  of  the  English  Government,  that  it 
would  recognize  Sicilian  independence  so  soon  as  he  was 
chosen,  hastened  matters  to  an  issued  The  national  guard 
threatened  force,  if  there  was  more  delay ; and  the  Chamber, 
always  liable  in  the  absence  of  organized  parties  to  be 
swayed  by  the  sentiment  of  the  moment,  hurried  in  one 
night  through  the  remaining  clauses  of  the  statute,  and  by 
the  unanimous  vote  of  both  Houses  the  Duke  was  chosen 
King  (July  10).  Once  again  in  the  delight  and  enthusiasm 
of  the  people  all  fear  for  the  future  vanished;  doubts 
whether  the  Duke  would  accept  the  throne,  the  danger  of 
invasion  from  Naples,  both  were  forgotten.  Sicily  breathed 
freely  in  the  confidence  that  she  had  freed  herself  for  ever 
from  the  hated  Bourbons,  and  placed  her  destinies  in  the 
hands  of  a nobler  line. 

But  the  first  enthusiasm  was  soon  overclouded.  The 
government  had  done  little  to  place  the  island  in  a state  of 
defence.  Public  opinion  would  not  allow  any  officers,  who 
had  worn  the  Bourbon  uniform,  to  serve,  and  the  difficulties 
of  organizing  an  army  were  great  enough  in  themselves  to 
daunt  a more  resolute  government.  The  Duke  of  Genoa 
delayed  his  answer,  and  the  ministry,  weakened  by  their 
failure  to  secure  his  consent,  resigned  (August).  Torrearsa, 
who  formed  the  new  cabinet,  was  a noble  and  a conserva- 
tive, but  his  colleagues  were  more  democratic  than  the 
retiring  ministers,  and  they  included  La  Farina  and  Cor- 
dova, two  of  the  ablest  men  that  Sicily  possessed. 

The  new  ministry  needed  strong  men.  It  had  hardly 
been  in  office  three  weeks  when  the  blow  from  Naples  fell. 
The  Sicilian  victories  in  January  had  left  the  Neapolitans 
in  possession  only  of  the  citadel  of  Messina,  and  during  the 
summer  Ferdinand  had  been  too  occupied  with  troubles  at 
home  to  attempt  to  regain  lost  ground.  But  with  the 
collapse  of  the  Calabrian  rising  and  the  defeat  of  the 
Piedmontese  and  the  growing  security  of  the  reactionary 
party  in  Naples,  he  resolved  to  throw  one  more  cast  for  the 

^ La  Masa,  Documenti,  I.  286 ; La  Farina,  op.  cit.,  I.  233  ; Correspondence 
—Naples,  344-345*  349;  Walpole,  Russell,  II.  50.  Some  of  the  English 
cabinet  were  in  favour  of  defending  Sicily  by  arms. 


3i6  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY  j 

I 

island.  A powerful  expedition  under  Filangieri,  son  of  the 
famous  statist,  was  prepared  with  all  secrecy,  and  on  the 
last  day  of  August  the  fleet  set  sail  from  Naples,  while 
10,000  men  were  mustering  on  the  Calabrian  shore.  To 
oppose  them,  the  Sicilians  had  only  6000  men,  raw  recruits 
or  half- criminal  squadre  from  Palermo  or  undisciplined 
national  guards  of  Messina.  The  Neapolitans,  having  the 
command  of  the  sea,  threw  large  reinforcements  into  the 
citadel  (September  1-2),  and  for  five  days  their  batteries 
rained  a terrible  fire  on  the  helpless  city.  On  the  morning 
of  September  6 Filangieri  landed  a strong  force  south  of 
the  city,  and  sending  away  his  transports,  left  his  troops  to 
choose  between  victory  and  destruction.  But  it  was  slowly 
and  painfully  that  they  could  make  head  against  the 
desperate  resistance,  and  had  the  Sicilians  not  been  hope- 
lessly outnumbered,  the  enemy  must  have  temporarily  at 
least  retreated.  But  though  the  Neapolitans  ever  poured 
up  fresh  troops,  and  the  Sicilian  batteries  were  silenced,  and 
the  squadre  of  Palermo  dispersed  to  the  mountains,  the  brave 
defence  never  flagged.  Monks  and  priests  fought  by  the 
side  of  laymen ; women  and  children  were  in  the  thick  of 
the  fight.  But  steadily  the  enemy  advanced,  and  with  his 
advance  Messina  felt  his  savage  vengeance.  Streets  of 
burning  houses  marked  the  progress  of  the  King  s troops ; 
women  were  violated  and  murdered  in  the  churches,  chil- 
dren were  hacked  to  pieces,  old  men  slaughtered  in  their 
beds.  The  sacred  plate  was  plundered  from  the  altars, 
the  pledges  of  the  poor  were  stolen  from  the  Monti  di 
Pietk.  At  length  at  midday  on  the  7th  Messina  capitu- 
lated, barely  in  time  to  save  itself  from  total  wreck. 
Two-thirds  of  the  city  and  all  its  suburbs  were  destroyed, 
and  the  long  lines  of  smoking  ruins  remained  to  mark  the 
hideous  savagery  of  Filangieri’s  soldiers,  and  give  the  name 
of  Bomha  to  the  crowned  barbarian,  by  whose  orders  the 
second  city  of  Sicily  had  been  wantonly  bombarded.^ 

1 Correspondence — Naples,  491-492,  501-503,  546,  554,  591-592  ; La 
Farina,  op.  eit,  I.  356;  Nisco,  op.  cit.,  224;  VWoa,,  Fatts  de  Messine ; Hervey- 
Saint-Denys,  Eistoire,  318;  Villari,  Cospirazioni,  94-96;  Hansard’s  Debates, 
CII.  212.  According  to  Captain  Robb  (Correspondence— Naples,  503,  513) 
the  bombardment  went  on  eight  hours  after  the  defence  had  ceased ; but| 


NAPLES  AND  SICILY 


317 

But  the  horrors  of  Messina  failed  to  dismay  the  Sicilians, 
and  the  exasperated  island  vowed  to  resist  the  destroyer  to 
the  death.  An  armistice,  imposed  by  the  French  and 
English  admirals  to  stay  the  barbarities  (September  ii), 
gave  the  country  time  to  breathe.  The  Messinese,  scorning 
Ferdinand's  mild  efforts  at  atonement,  tore  down  Filangieri’s 
promises  of  reforms,  and  paid  their  taxes  to  the  government 
at  Palermo.  Parliament  took  a solemn  oath  to  make  no 
terms  with  the  enemy;  conscription  was  decreed,  and  an 
attempt  was  made  to  secure  Garibaldi’s  services.  Cordova 
carried  into  law  a great  scheme  for  selling  national  and 
ecclesiastical  property,  which,  had  it  been  executed,  might 
have  revolutionized  the  land  system  of  Sicily;  and  the 
“treasure-finder,”  who  may  take  high  rank  as  a revolu- 
tionary financier,  filled  the  state’s  coffers,  while  he  abolished 
taxes.  But  Cordova  could  not  save  the  government  from 
the  troubles  that  thickened  round  it.  The  general  condi- 
tion of  the  island  was  indeed  greatly  improved,  and  except 
for  some  agrarian  troubles  and  the  chronic  brigandage  of 
the  neighbourhood  of  Palermo,  there  was  no  serious  dis- 
turbance of  the  peace.  The  squadre  had  been  largely 
purged ; trade  was  improving ; the  taxes  were  regularly 
paid;  the  law-courts  resumed  their  ordinary  course.  The 
army,  the  populace  of  the  capital,  perhaps  the  great  mass 
of  opinion  outside  Palermo  supported  the  ministry.  But 
slowly  the  forces  of  reaction  were  gathering.  Cordova’s 
financial  reforms  had  roused  the  hostility  of  the  corrupt 
excise  service ; his  land-law  alienated  the  higher  clergy  and 
the  large  farmers  on  demesne  land,  who  were  in  danger  of 
being  evicted  by  new  owners.  His  negotiations  for  a loan 
at  Paris  broke  down,  and  he  was  obliged  in  his  own  despite 
to  propose  a forced  loan,  which  irritated  the  capitalist 
classes.  The  Duke  of  Genoa,  after  playing  for  some  time 
with  the  offer  of  the  crown,  at  last  declined  it,  when  he 
found  that  England  would  not  guarantee  it;  and  Sicily 
seemed  more  than  ever  cut  off  from  the  nationalist  move- 

! this  is  not  borne  out  by  the  other  authorities,  who  speak  of  the  desperate 
' resistance  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  ; Eobb  was  probably  deceived  by  the 
Sicilian  batteries  ceasing  fire.  There  were  apparently  some  counter  atrocities 
on  the  part  of  the  Messinese  : Villari,  op.  cit.,  64,  70. 


3i8  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

ment.  The  Peers  hampered  legislation ; the  Lower  House 
trifled  away  its  time,  and  a strong  Centre  party  was  forming 
of  men  who  shared  the  common  hatred  of  the  Bourbons, 
but  dreaded  war  and  the  sacrifices  of  a revolution.  The 
national  guard  of  the  capital,  officered  by  nobles,  and  com- 
posed almost  exclusively  of  shopkeepers,  had  been  given  a 
legal  status  partly  independent  of  the  executive,  and  even 
with  a certain  control  over  the  army.  Presuming  on  its 
position,  it  tried  to  extend  its  control  to  the  government 
itself,  and  though  foiled  in  its  audacious  plan,  it  forced 
Cordova  and  a few  weeks  later  the  rest  of  the  ministry  to 
resign  (January-February  1849). 

With  its  triumph  the  Sicilian  cause  was  doomed.  The 
new  ministry  was  mainly  composed  of  nominees  of  the  vic- 
torious faction,  though  it  professed  its  resolution  to  defend 
the  island  s independence.  The  final  struggle  with  Naples 
was  rapidly  becoming  inevitable.  Ever  since  the  French 
and  English  admirals  had  imposed  the  armistice,  Palmerston, 
while  secretly  supplying  the  Sicilians  with  arms,  had  been 
working  for  peace  in  concert  with  the  French  government 
on  the  basis  of  thorough  Home  Rule  under  the  nominal 
suzerainty  of  the  Neapolitan  crown.^  But  though  Ferdinand 
was  disposed  at  first  to  cede  a separate  parliament  and  ad- 
ministration, he  refused  to  consent  to  a separate  army,  and 
insisted  that  some  at  least  of  the  Sicilian  fortresses  should 
be  garrisoned  by  Neapolitan  troops.  Compromise  was  in 
fact  impossible.  Though  Palmerston  had  abandoned  his 
support  of  Sicilian  independence,  and  the  French  govern- 
ment was  less  and  less  friendly,  the  Sicilians  were  unani- 
mous to  have  not  even  the  shadow  of  Bourbon  sovereignty. 
Ferdinand  on  his  side  had  resolved  to  offer  no  new  con- 
cessions, and  reconquer  the  island.  In  the  middle  of 
January  he  finally  rejected  the  Anglo-French  proposals,  and 
at  the  end  of  February  issued  an  Ultimatum  from  his  resi- 
dence at  Gaeta,  embodying  his  final  terms.  On  the  face  of 
it,  it  seemed  a not  ungenerous  proposal,  for  it  offered  the 

1 Correspondence— Naples,  516,  528;  La  Farina,  op.  cit,  II.  175-176; 
D’ Ancona,  op.  cit,  1.  292,  297  ; Walpole,  op.  cit,  II.  51  5 OrevUle  Memoirs,  VI. 
278.  So  the  Grafton  ministry  secretly  supplied  arms  to  Paoli  in  1768. 


NAPLES  AND  SICILY  319 

constitution  of  1812,  with  its  separate  parliament  and 
administration  and  native  civil  service.  But  the  new  clauses, 
which  gave  the  crown  the  right  to  dissolve  parliament  and 
direct  the  army  independently  of  parliamentary  control, 
deprived  it  of  all  guarantee.  And  though  the  King  waived 
the  schedule,  which  excluded  the  revolutionary  leaders  from 
amnesty,  he  insisted  that  every  act  of  the  parliament 
should  be  null  and  void.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  pro- 
posals were  not  purposely  made  unacceptable;  and  the 
memory  of  Bourbon  perjuries,  and  the  absence  of  all 
security  even  for  the  maimed  constitution  that  was  offered, 
took  from  the  Ultimatum  any  chance  of  acceptance.  Parties 
hushed  their  feuds,  and  united  in  the  cry  for  war.  A levy 
of  10,000  men  was  decreed.  Private  business,  family  cares 
were  forgotten ; crime  disappeared,  stolen  goods  were 
restored,  brigands  sent  home  rich  citizens  whom  they 
had  captured.  At  Palermo  great  crowds  went  out  every 
day  to  help  in  throwing  up  defences ; noblemen  and  their 
wives,  priests  and  lawyers,  mechanics  and  artisans  took  their 
turn,  while  the  neighbouring  villagers  brought  their  carts 
laden  with  food  for  the  improvised  engineers.  At  Catania, 
Girgenti,  Marsala,  all  through  the  island,  the  enthusiasm  was 
hardly  less. 

Unluckily  it  was  too  late  to  make  up  for  the  arrears  of 
the  winter.  When  the  armistice  expired  on  March  29,  and 
the  Neapolitans  were  free  to  advance,  there  were  only  7000 
regulars  to  meet  them.  But  in  spite  of  the  blunders  of 
Mieroslawsky,  the  Polish  commander,  the  enemy’s  advance 
was  met  by  a stubborn  resistance,  which  crowned  itself  by 
the  heroic  defence  of  Catania.  But  the  city’s  fall  broke 
the  resistance  on  the  eastern  coast,  and  Agosta  and 
Syracuse  surrendered  without  firing  a gun.  Still  the 
cause  was  not  yet  hopeless.  Much  of  the  army  was  in- 
tact ; Palermo,  Girgenti,  Termini  were  capable  of  defence ; 
the  Neapolitans  could  only  advance  through  a moun- 
tainous^ country,  well  fitted  for  guerilla  fighting.  Had 
the  Sicilians  shown  an  united  front,  they  might  have  pro- 
longed the  resistance  till  they  forced  Europe  to  intervene. 
But  their  chances  were  wrecked  by  the  timid  faction,  that 


320  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

centred  round  the  national  guard  of  the  capital.^  The 
enthusiasm  of  the  first  days  of  March  had  soon  vanished ; 
the  collapse  of  Mieroslawsky’s  campaign,  the  neirs  of  Aovara, 
the  probability  of  a long  and  costly  struggle  scared  the  nobles 
and  middle  classes,  and  parliament  decided  to  accept  the 
French  admiral  Baudin’s  offer  of  mediation  (April  14)- 
Baudin  could  only  promise  the  terms  of  the  Ultimatum  ; 
but  the  reaction  had  resolved  that  the  offer,  once  so  soorn^, 
should  be  accepted.  The  troops  were  recalled  froni  the 
front,  the  war  party  at  Palermo  was  rigorously  held  down, 
and  its  leaders  compelled  to  leave  the  island  ; 1 and  though 
parliament  for  very  shame  hesitated  to  accept  the  terrns, 
capitulation  was  practically  decided  on.  On  the  26th  the 
Neapolitan  fleet  arrived  ; then,  all  too  late,  the  revulsion 
came.  The  populace,  puzzled  and  leaderless,  had  acquiesced 
till  now,  hoping  against  hope  for  a settlement  that  would 
save  them  from  the  Bourbons.  The  arrival  of  the  fleet  , 
undeceived  them,  and  with  a cry  for  vengeance  on  the 
traitors,  they  seized  the  city,  the  national  guard  going  '«nt 
the  tide.  They  had  little  organization  or  ammunition,  but 
for  two  days  (May  8-9)  their  splendid  heroism  kept  the 
invaders  at  bay.  But  it  was  impossible  to  prolong  the 
resistance,  and  on  May  1 1 the  people,  weary  and  hopeless  of 
success,  surrendered.  The  invaders  did  not  dare  to  enter 
the  walls,  but  the  struggle  was  over,  and  on  the  anniversary 
of  the  barricades  at  Naples  the  Bourbon  flag  floated  once 
more  at  Palermo. 

1 La  Farina,  op.  cit.,  II.,  295-296. 


CHAPTEE  XVIII 

THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS 

JANUARY JULY  I 849 

Tuscany  : Guerrazzi ; the  republicans  and  the  government ; question  of 
union  with  Eome  ; the  reaction  ; Guerrazzi  dictator  ; the  Counter- 
Revolution. 

Rome  : the  Executive  Committee ; Mazzini  ; the  Triumvirate ; the 
Republic  and  the  Church ; tolerance  of  the  government ; its  weakness ; 
outrages  at  Rome  and  Ancona  ; the  people  and  the  republic.  Policy 
of  Gaeta  ; French  policy  ; Oudinot’s  expedition  ; fight  of  April  30  ; 
De  Lesseps’  negotiations  ; Austrian  invasion  of  Romagna  ; negotia- 
tions broken  off ; the  siege  ; fall  of  the  city.  Garibaldi’s  retreat. 

The  battle  of  Novara  seemed  to  lay  Central  Italy  open  to 
the  Austrian  army.  But  the  national  colours  still  floated 
at  Florence  and  Kome ; and  though  their  own  forces  could 
not  permanently  hinder  the  Austrian  advance,  the  French 
veto,  which  had  stopped  Eadetzky  from  advancing  on 
Turin,^  might  check  the  victorious  armies  from  pouring 
into  Komagna  and  Tuscany.  It  seemed  as  if  a third  of 
Italy  might  still  preserve  its  liberties. 

The  events  of  February  i8  had  left  Tuscan  politics  in 
an  ambiguous  position.  The  Triumvirs  had  accepted  the 
Republic  at  the  dictation  of  the  meeting  at  Orcagna’s 
Loggia,  but  in  spite  of  Montanelli,  it  had  not  been  formally 
oroclaimed.  Mazzoni,  the  third  Triumvir,  wished  to  refer 
jhe  whole  question  to  the  Constituent ; Guerrazzi,  as  soon 
IS  De  Tangier  had  fled  and  immediate  danger  of  reaction 
3assed  away,  was  inclining  to  the  Moderates.  What  was 
lis  policy  at  this  time,  it  is  hard  to  say.  In  after  days  he 
)rotested  that  his  republican  utterances  and  actions  were 
nade  under  compulsion,  and  that  if  he  passed  strong  laws 

^ See  below,  p.  357. 

321 


VOL.  I. 


X 


322 


A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


against  the  loyalists,  he  took  care  that  they  were  inopera- 
tive. The  plea  of  compulsion  at  all  events  was  exaggerated^, 
and  whatever  his  motives,  his  conduct  was  uncertain  an 
tortuous.  On  the  one  hand  he  hated  disorder ; he  despised 
the  republican  hangers-on,  who  “planted  trees  of  liberty  but 
would  not  shoulder  guns”;  he  saw  more  and  more  clearly 
the  probability  that  reaction  would  be  triumphant,  and 
wished  to  secure  his  own  retreat.  But  with  all  this,  he 
was  a democrat  with  such  sincerity  as  he  was  capable  ot, 
and  he  could  not  fling  all  professions  to  the  wind.  So  to 
Gioberti  he  wi-ote  that  the  government  would  never  pro- 
claim the  republic,  till  it  had  been  voted  by  fepi’®- 
sentatives  of  the  people;  to  Mazzmi  he  professed  himself 
a friend  of  unity  with  Rome,  spoke  of  the  republic  as 
existing  in  fact,  and  protested  that  he  only  held  back  from 
declaring  it,  because  he  had  no  soldiers  to  rely  on.^ 
and  contemptuous  of  his  fellow-Triumvhs,  conscious  of  his 
own  energy  and  mastery  of  details,  he  probably  believed 
that  he  could  bring  all  right  in  the  end,  or  thought  not, 
without  cause  that  his  fall  would  be  succeeded  by  fiareny. 
He  loved  statecraft  and  rejoiced  in  the  finesse,  which  mig^  I 
pilot  his  country  through  the  shoals,  or  at  worst  put  her  m; 
a position  to  secure  good  terms.  If  nothing  were  decided, 
for^the  present,  it  would  leave  the  road  open  whateveri 

eventuality  befell.  p ! 

As  a matter  of  fact  it  was  ill-fighting  for  the  re-, 
public.  Its  party  was  numerically  weak ; at  Florence  it  was 
dominated  by  the  Lombard  refugees,  a noisy  impractica, 
crew,  who  tried  to  copy  the  French  Revolution  m mmia 
ture  calling  for  fines  on  emigris,  and  planning  missions  o 
men  “of  pure  republican  blood”  to  stamp  out  reaction  ii 
the  provinces.  Even  in  the  Clubs  the  genuine  republican- 
were  probably  few.  Place-hunters  abounded;  reactionaries 
who  hoped  to  drive  things  to  extremes,  egged  them  on 
there  was  all  the  fringe  of  the  excitable  idle  crowd,  wh 
followed  Liberalism  and  the  Republic,  while  they  were  i 


■ Corsi  e Menichetti,  Cdlezione,  1090  ; Guerrazzi,  Letter^  53  55-  Ttie  da. 
of  the  iX  letters  must  be  the  end  ot  March.  See  also  P.gh,  29^ 


Beghelli,  Repubhlica,  I.  23-24. 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS  323 

the  ascendant  and  meant  festivals  and  doles,  and  who  were 
soon  to  shout  with  as  eager  ardour  on  the  side  of  reaction. 
Against  such  a state  of  things  the  government  could  make 
little  headway.  It  is  not  true  that  it  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  Clubs,  but  it  was  obliged  to  compromise  with  them,  and 
give  them  semi-official  recognition.  A stronger  government 
might  have  turned  their  energies  into  useful  channels,  but 
the  Triumvirate  won  neither  their  respect  nor  their  love, 
and  Guerrazzi  was  too  crooked  and  irritable  to  guide  a 
turbulent  democracy.  The  position  of  the  government 
indeed  was  very  difficult.  The  Moderates  gave  no  help  in 
preserving  order;  they  had  never  foreseen  the  inevitable 
result  of  ignorance  and  poverty,  and  were  startled  by  the 
collapse  of  the  harmony  of  classes,  which  they  had  so  fondly 
believed  in.  There  was  much  distress  among  the  poor, 
which  the  bread-doles  of  the  government  had  done  nothing 
to  relieve ; there  was  a corresponding  increase  of  crime,  and 
the  prisons  were  full  to  overflowing.  At  times  Florence 
wore  something  of  a sanscullottic  face;  but  though  the 
wilder  sort  of  republicans  made  domiciliary  visits,  and 
threatened  the  Moderates  in  life  and  property,  even  they 
were  infected  with  Tuscan  mildness.  Guerrazzi  threatened 
that  “ who  broke,  should  pay  ” ; and  when  the  first  excite- 
ment had  cooled  down,  the  government  picked  up  the  reins, 
and  by  March  was  able  to  secure  some  obedience  to  its 
Drders. 

The  elections  to  the  Tuscan  Constituent  had  been 
Drdered  for  March  5?  and  on  the  same  day  representatives 
wove  to  be  elected  to  sit  in  the  “ Italian  Constituent  ” at 
Rome.  The  order  for  the  elections  left  it  ambiguous 
vhich  Constituent  was  to  decide  the  future  government  of 
fusc^ny.  The  Moderates,  confident  of  a victory  at  the 
)olls,  pleaded  that  it  should  be  left  to  the  Tuscan  Chamber ; 
he  Republicans,  knowing  that  they  would  have  a majority 
it  Rome,  claimed  that  union  with  Rome  had  been  practi- 
tally  accepted,  and  that  the  common  parliament  of  the 
inited  country  must  decide.  But  though  Guerrazzi  had 
lompleted,  at  least  on  paper,  the  long-projected  customs  and 
liplomatic  union,  both  he  and  Mazzoni  were  determined  to 


324  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

defer  a completed  fusion  as  long  as  possible.  It  was  easy 
to  enlist  Tuscan  prejudice  and  self-interest ; Florence  ^^uld 
lose  its  metropolitan  honours,  Leghorn  might  be  sacrihced 
to  Civita  Vecchia,  and  above  all  Tuscany  wished  to  keep 
clear  of  the  complications  of  the  Papal  question.  Con- 
siderations like  these  enabled  Guerrazzi  in  Montanelh’s 
absence  to  pass  a law  referring  the  form  of  government 

to  the  Tuscan  Constituent.  ^ 

The  reaction  was  now  fast  threatening  to  swamp  both 
republicans  and  Triumvirate.  The  peasants,  as  Capponi 
said,  were  “the  sovereign  people  of  Tuscany,”  and  the 
peasants  were  bitterly  opposed  to  any  government  that 
wanted  war.  It  required  little  effort  for  the  country  gentry 
and  clergy  to  incite  them  to  a crusade  against  a govern- 
ment, which  not  only  banished  the  Grand  Duke  and  watched 
the  priests,  but  threatened  to  tax  themselves  and  send  their 
sons  to  fight  for  such  a far-off  thing  as  Italian  Indepen- 
dence. A few  days  after  De  Laugier’s  defection  bands  of 
armed  peasants  attacked  Florence  and  Prato ; and  though 
the  towns  had  little  liking  for  loyalist  mobs,  they  were 
themselves  becoming  almost  as  hostile  to  the  government. 
The  petty  despotism  of  the  Clubs  hritated  them ; priests 
refused  absolution  to  those  who  voted  for  the  Constituent ; 
time-servers  wished  to  secure  themselves  in  the  event  of  a 
counter-revolution.  The  peasants  broke  out  again  in  riots 
and  agitated  against  war.  Some  w'ere  ready  to  wel- 
come an  Austrian  occupation,  and  the  disaffected  priests 
were  deep  in  treasonable  practices.  So  dangerous  was  the 
outlook  in  the  Val  di  Chiana,  that  towards  the  end  of 
March  the  government  passed  a Coercion  Act  for  the  pro- 
vince of  Ai-ezzo,  and  brought  it  to  submission  by  a mild 

display  of  force.  ^ , rx 

The  Triumvus  delayed  the  meeting  of  the  Constitueni 

as  long  as  possible.  Comparatively  few  had  voted  at  thi 
polls  probably  not  one-fifth  of  the  enlarged  electorate  ; 
the  voting  for  the  Italian  Constituent  had  been  entueb 
neo-lected.'"  Neither  Moderates  nor  reactionaries  made  mud 

0 

1 The  population  was  about  1,600,000 ; the  number  of  votes  given  wa 
78,000 : Guerrazzi,  Apologia,  617-618.  The  voting  was  by  baUot. 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS  325 

effort  to  return  their  candidates,  and  the  government  had 
a majority  of  two  to  one.  Two  days  after  the  opening  of 
the  Assembly  came  the  news  of  Novara ; Guerrazzi  declared 
frankly  against  the  Republic,  and  Montanelli,  unwilling  to 
weaken  the  government  for  a hopeless  cause,  carried  a 
vote  for  making  Guerrazzi  Dictator  and  left  the  country. 
Guerrazzi’s  one  object  now  was  to  save  Tuscany  from 
invasion.  He  asked  that  political  questions  should  he 
dropped,  and  all  the  energies  of  parliament  employed  to 
arm  the  country  for  defence ; on  these  terms  the  few  real 
patriots  among  the  Moderates  had  promised  cooperation. 
The  Piedmontese  government  might  take  up  arms  again ; 
France  might  pour  an  army  across  the  Alps,  and  an 
imposing  show  of  force  in  Tuscany  and  Romagna  might 
make  Radetzky  pause.  As  a last  resource,  he  was  probably, 
in  spite  of  public  disavowals,  intending  to  restore  the  Grand 
Duke,  and  through  him  make  peace  with  Austria.^  Alike 
from  private  and  patriotic  motives,  he  was  clinging  despe- 
rately to  power,  and  therefore  anxious  to  conciliate  the 
Moderates.  He  persuaded  the  Constituent  to  defer  the 
question  of  union  with  Rome,  and  prorogue  itself  for  twelve 
days  (April  3).  Guerrazzi  was  now  autocrat.  With  all  his 
rugged  energy  he  appealed  to  the  jarring  factions  to  sink 
their  differences  and  unite  to  save  the  country.  A resolute 
effort  was  made  to  put  down  disorder,  and  the  Arezzo 
Coercion  Act  was  extended  to  all  districts  where  the  public 
peace  was  endangered.  But,  except  at  Florence  and  Leg- 
horn, there  was  no  response  to  his  appeal  for  volunteers, 
and  Guerrazzi  felt  the  ground  fast  slipping  from  under  his 
feet.  Mutual  suspicion  and  want  of  frankness  made  it 
impossible  for  the  Moderates  to  cooperate  with  him ; they 
threw  over  the  man,  whom  they  had  always  disliked  and 
distrusted,  and  were  preparing  to  recall  the  Grand  Duke  by 
a partisan  appeal.  If  Leopold  returned  under  their  sole 
auspices,  they  hoped  to  propitiate  Austria,  secure  the  con- 

^ ^ Guerrazzi,  Apologia,  648,  650,  662 ; Giusti,  Memorie,  145  ; Tabbarrini, 
'^apponi,  277  ; contra,  Guerrazzi,  op.  cit.,  589  ; Id.,  Lettere,  56-57  ; Corsi  e Meni- 
jhetti,  op.  cit.,  954-  The  date  of  the  incident  referred  to  by  Giusti  is  fixed 
ly  internal  evidence  for  the  last  days  of  March.  The  letters  to  Mazzini  are 
jonclusive  as  to  Guerrazzi’s  double  game. 


326  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


stitution,  and  put  themselves  in  power.  Then-  schemes, 
from  which  Capponi  held  aloof,  were  maturing,  when  a 
riot  at  Florence  precipitated  the  crisis.  Some  Leghorn 
regiments  had  been  brought  there,  either,  as  Guerrazzi 
asLted,  to  be  equipped  and  trained,^  or  more  probably  to 
be  used  as  a political  weapon.  Then  rough  and  insolen 
ways  roused  the  temper  of  the  Florentines,  and  a segment 
was  attacked  in  the  Piazza  di  Santa  Maria  Novella  (April 
il).  The  riot  was  probably  premeditated,  but  though  in- 
trigue had  been  busy,  the  attack  was  more  prompted  by 
exasperation  against  the  Livornese  than  by  any  wish  to 
overthrow  the  government.'  The  Moderates,  however,  saw 
their  opportunity;  their  agents  won  the  crowd  to  the 
reaction,  while  the  loyalist  peasants_  poured  into  the  city 
and  frightened  the  Democrats  into  hiding.  The  Mumcipa 
Council,  led  by  Rioasoli  and  Serristori,  declared  itself  a 
Provisional  Government  in  the  Grand  Duke’s  name,  seized 
the  Palazzo  Vecohio,  and  ejected  the  Assembly.  Guerrazzi 
might  still  have  made  a fight  from  Pistoia  and  Leghorn , 
but  he  despahed,  and  to  escape  from  the  mob  that  howle 
for  his  life,  surrendered  himself  to  Capponi. 


Fortunately  for  Italian  fame,  Rome  had  leaders  and 
people  made  of  stronger  stuff.  The  supreme  authority  in 
the  Republic  was  entrusted  to  an  “ Executive  Committee, 
whose  chief  was  Armellini,  a cautious,  honourable  lawyer. 
In  the  ministry  were  Muzzarelli.  a Liberal  prelate  who  ha 
left  his  books  to  serve  his  country,  and  Saffi,  the  leader  of 
the  advanced  Romagnuol  Liberals.  And  when  Sterbmi  left 
the  cabinet,  finding  office  an  unwelcome  curb  on  criticism, 
the  new  government,  though  it  contained  no  man  ot  grea 
ability,  showed  a collective  statesmanship,  which  under  a 
happier  star  might  have  launched  the  Roman  state  on  a 
path  of  ordered  progress.  The  country,  they  recognized. 
Leded  above  all  things  freedom.  The  ecclesiastical  incubus 
had  gone,  and  the  people  needed  liberty  to  teach,  liberty  to 
organize,  liberty  to  develop  the  resources  of  the  state ; but 
a restrained  and  ordered  liberty,  that  could  not  be  perverted 
1 Corsi,  1844- 1 86g,  167. 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS 


327 


into  a new  instrument  of  tyranny  over  the  poor.  Honest 
finance,  legal  and  municipal  reform,  liberty  of  worship,  lay 
control  of  education  and  justice  and  charities,  the  nationali- 
zation of  church  property;  such  was  the  embracing  pro- 
gramme of  Armellini  and  his  colleagues,  and  strongly  and 
wisely  they  began  on  it.^ 

The  man,  whose  teaching  inspired  many  of  these  re- 
forms, was  a plain  deputy.  Mazzini’s  imagination  saw  his  ideal 
of  “holy  eternal  Rome”  already  half  realized.  The  theo- 
cracy had  seduced  her  from  her  mission,  but  republican 
Rome,  with  “ God  and  the  People  ” for  her  watchword,  would 
preach  again  the  gospel  of  social  sympathy,  and  infuse  the 
politics  of  Europe  with  a new  spirit.  But  Mazzini  was 
in  no  hurry  to  push  on  his  social  schemes.  He  criticized 
the  Chamber  for  squandering  its  time  in  party  struggles, 
while  Austria  was  threatening,  and  Haynau  had  set  his  heel 
on  Ferrara  and  sent  the  Pope  the  fines  he  had  wrung  from 
its  citizens.  It  would  be  time  enough  to  manufacture  consti- 
tutions, when  Italy  was  free.  The  first  thing  was  to  fight 
Austria,  and  republican  Rome  must  range  herself  by  the 
side  of  monarchical  Piedmont.  And  though  the  Right  and 
Centre  defeated  his  proposal  that  the  deputies  should  dis- 
perse to  the  provinces  and  rouse  the  people,  and  the  Left 
were  more  inclined  to  carry  a propagandist  invasion  across 
the  Neapolitan  frontier,  something  was  done  to  prepare  for 
war,  and  the  troops  were  on  their  march  to  the  frontier,  when 
the  news  of  Novara  reached  them.  All  turned  to  Mazzini 
as  the  one  possible  leader  in  the  crisis.  Muzzarelli  retired, 
and  Mazzini  with  Saffi  and  Armellini  were  created  a Trium- 
virate with  unlimited  powers  for  carrying  on  the  war  and 
preserving  the'  republic.  Mazzini  hurried  on  the  troops,  but 
before  they  reached  the  Po,  the  news  of  the  armistice  dashed 
the  last  hopes  of  a war  in  Lombardy.  For  the  time  at  all 
events  the  day  for  saving  North  Italy  had  set,  and  the 
Triumvirs  turned  to  reform  at  home.  They  needed  only  to 
follow  on  the  lines  of  the  Executive  Committee ; to  restore 
the  credit  of  the  state,  to  purify  the  civil  service  by  intro- 

^ Rusconi,  Republica,  I.  97-102  ; Beghelli,  Repubblica,  I.  240-247  ; Bolletino 
della  repubblica,  59,  95-101,  135;  Actes  officielles,  15,  21,  31. 


328  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

ducing  competitive  examinations,  to  promote  a “ steady 
movement  for  raising  the  material  condition  of  the  less  for- 
tunate classes.”  The  salt  and  tobacco  monopolies  were 
abandoned,  the  tax  on  industries  repealed,  a gradual  diminu- 
tion of  import  duties  projected.  A charity  commission  was 
appointed ; the  offices  of  the  Inquisition  were  converted  into 
tenement  dwellings;  the  Universities  were  made  free,  and 
money  was  lavishly  spent  on  the  encouragement  of  art. 
And  a great  essay  was  made  in  constructive  legislation  by 
a scheme  to  partition  ecclesiastical  estates  into  small  hold- 
ings, to  be  leased  in  perpetuity  to  the  cultivators  at  nominal 
rents.^ 

The  last  reform  was  part  of  the  thornier  problem  of 
the  relations  between  church  and  state.  The  clergy 
had  not  been  unanimous  in  their  hostility  to  the  republic. 
Muzzarelli  unfrocked  himself,  and  Ventura,  after  vainly 
working  for  reconciliation  between  the  Pope  and  the 
Romans,  declared  frankly  for  the  latter.  There  were  a few 
priests  and  friars  like  Ugo  Bassi,  who  shared  Mazzinis 
religious  conception  of  the  republic ; some  of  the^  monas- 
teries and  many  of  the  parish  priests,  whose  stipends  Maz- 
zini’s  legislation  promised  to  raise,  repaid  him  with 
support.  And  though  the  mass  of  the  clergy  naturally  felt 
little  liking  for  the  new  order,  the  majority  accepted  it,  and 
took  no  heed  when  the  Pope  excommunicated  the  electors. 
But  in  parts  of  the  rural  districts  the  priests  had  refused  to 
absolve  or  marry  any  who  went  to  the  polls,  and  clerical 
portents  and  celestial  visions  grew  rank  to  scare  the  super- 
stitious peasants.  The  disaffection  was  stimulated  by  the 
government’s  ecclesiastical  policy.  In  no  state  of  Em  ope 
was  such  drastic  reform  needed  to  bring  the  church  to  the 
level  of  modern  requirements.  Not  only  had  its  temporal 
position  to  be  modified  to  meet  social  and  economic  needs, 
but  Rome  alone  among  European  states  had  no  bureaucracy 
to  curb  the  clerical  power.  For  centuries  the  church  had 
absorbed  the  state,  and  now  that  a lay  government  had 
sprung  up  outside  the  church,  it  had  to  carry  out  in  a 

^ Actes  officielles,  46,  79  5 Mazzini,  Opere,  VII.  I7>  20-21,  25. 

2 Ranalli,  Jstorie,  IV.  34-35  ; Torre,  Storia,  I.  167,  I75- 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS  329 

moment  what  in  other  countries  had  been  the  work  of 
generations.  The  Triumvirs  had  to  roll  into  one  the  work 
of  Louis  XIV.  and  1791.  There  was  no  idea  indeed  of  doc- 
trinal change.  Whatever  may  have  been  Mazzini’s  ulterior 
hopes/  he_was  too  wise  and  too  tolerant  to  attempt  to  force 
^ of  belief.  But  he  and  the  republicans  were  deter- 

mined  tl^t  the  church  should  be  subordinate  to  the  state. 
Already  under  the  Executive  Committee  the  first  steps  had 
been  taken  towards  the  nationalization  of  church  property, 
and  the  government  had  undertaken  to  pay  fixed  stipends 
to  the  beneficed  clergy  and  monastic  orders.  The  Triumvirs 
developed  their  predecessors’  policy  by  passing  a law  for  the 
partial  equalization  of  clerical  incomes,^  by  forbidding  fees 
for  religious  offices,  by  refusing  to  recognize  perpetual  vows. 

^Qyever  much  the  government  might  insist  on  the  sub- 
jection  of  the  clergy  to  the  state,  it  resolutely  set  its  face 
against  , persecution.  Libels  on  priests  were  suppressed ; 
conforming  prelates  remained  unmolested  not  only  at  Rome 
but  in  the  most  disturbed  districts;  the  bishop  of  Civita 
Vecchia  was  allowed  to  plot  with  Gaeta,  and  a brother  of 
the  Pope,  found  preaching  treason,  was  sent  unhurt  across 
the  frontier ; and  whatever  danger  seditious  priests  may 
have  incurred  in  the  latter  days  of  the  republic,  they  owed 
it  to  the  hatred  of  the  people,  not  to  the  intolerance  or 
indifference  of  the  government. 

The  same  generous  leniency  marked  its  policy  towards 
its  lay  opponents.  Papalist  papers  circulated  freely;  Mer- 
cier,  the  French  agent,  was  allowed  to  conspire  without  let; 
and  though  afterwards  on  the  eve  of  the  French  attack  the 
Triumvirs  obtained  authority  to  suspend  journals  and  try 
seditious  persons  by  military  tribunals,  they  never  put  their 
powers  into  practice.  Stiffness  in  principles,  tolerance  to 
individuals  was  Mazzini’s  maxim.  The  persons  and  pro- 
perty of  the  Papalists  were  put  under  the  guardianship  of 
the  Republic,  to  protect  them  from  outrage ; though  the 

^ De  Lesseps,  Mission,  39 ; Rusconi,  op.  cit,  11.  90. 

2 Actes  officielles,  9,  12-13,  3i,  76;  Spada,  Rivoluzione,  III.  289;  Bolletino 
della  repubhlica,  504.  Parish  priests  were  to  have  180  scudi,  unbeneficed  clergy 
108  sc.,  monks  and  friars  72  sc. 


330 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


Executive  Committee  had  obtained  pwers  to  raise  a forced 
loan  on  a severely  graduated  scale,  it  was  never  serious  y 
collected ; ^ and  when  the  exigencies  of  the  siege  compeUe 
the  sequestration  of  arms  and  horses  and  spcie,  they  were 
well  paid  for  in  assignats.  But  noble  as  this  tolerance  was, 
it  was  closely  allied  to  a woeful  laxity  of  admmistration. 
The  civil  service  was  left  crowded  with  enemies  of  the 
republic.  Armellini  was  a cipher,  Saffi  “all  mildness^  and 
philosophy”;  Mazzini  had  little  financial  or  administra- 
tive capacity.  Generosity  was  lost  on  the  unscrupulous 
schemers  of  Gaeta;  and  philosophic  maxims  were  wasted  on 
a people  destitute  of  the  cohesiveness  and  control  whicli 
comes  of  self-government.  It  is  not  surprising  that,  with  a 
paralyzed  executive,  the  government  found  itself  poweiless 
to  keep  the  country  free  from  crime.  There  was  indeed  no 
general  lawlessness  as  in  Tuscany ; the  mezzedria  districts  were 
quiet,  and  indeed  in  the  gi-eater  part  of  the  country  there 
was  no  serious  disorder.  But  the  old  animosities  of  Gregory  s i 
reign  were  ready  to  break  out  at  every  opportunity the  voist 
of  the  officials  retained  the  traditional  complicity  with  crime  , 
the  Radicals,  indignant  at  the  slackness  of  the  government, 
were  disposed  to  take  the  law  into  then-  own  hands,  and 
there  were  men  on  both  sides  trying  to  push  thrngs  to 
extremes.  Some  of  Garibaldi’s  volunteers  were  disorderly 
and  out-of-hand;  and  though  they  committed  few  or  no 
serious  outrages,  they  ransacked  monasteries  and  ma  e 
merry  over  monastic  love-letters  that  came  to  light.  At 
Rome  hatred  of  the  priests,  and  the  real  or  supposed  dis- 
covery of  skeletons  in  the  dungeons  of  the  Inquisition  le 
to  a few  sporadic  outrages;  but  except  for  one  fortmght  the 
government,  well  supported  on  the  whole  by  the  citizen 
guard,  was  able  to  keep  order  without  difficulty. 
only  at  the  beginning  of  May,  during  the  strain  of  the  pro- 


1 .5,  53  1 Kusconi,  cA.  I.  bondfw 

varied  from  ith  to  trds  on  incomes  of  2000  soudi  and  upwards,  the  non 

bear  interest  at  5 per  cent. 

s lra^°Ip  r;<”lll.  299;  Correspondence-Rome,  l6;  Senior,  Journoh, 

II.  137 ; Clough,  Pros,  njoins.  153.  >57.  See  Ib.,  155.  foi  the  ‘awful  lies 
of  the  Tivies  and  Dehats. 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS 


331 

longed  negotiations  with  De  Lesseps,  that  anything  like  sys- 
tematic outrage  took  place.  The  unrest  that  attends  long 
and  secret  negotiations,  the  knowledge  of  conspiracy  within 
the  city,  the  open  provocation  of  a few  fanatical  priests 
broke  down  the  precautions  of  the  government,  and  a small 
band  of  ruffians,  mainly  belonging  to  the  old  armed  excise, 
terrorized  for  a time  a part  of  Rome.  Eight  priests,  some 
of  whom  had  fired  unprovoked  at  soldiers,  and  three  peasants 
mistaken  for  spies  were  murdered;  and  a portion  of  the 
population,  in  protest  against  Mazzini’s  leniency  to  the 
priests,  trampled  down  the  Pope’s  gardens,  and  dragged 
some  confessionals  from  the  churches  to  make  barricades. 
But  though  the  government  refused  to  cure  the  disease  by 
the  worse  remedy  of  grapeshot,  the  watchfulness  of  the 
police  and  a few  severe  sentences  restored  order  by  the 
middle  of  May.^  Worse  however  was  happening  in  three 
cities  of  Romagna  and  the  Marches.  The  traditions  of 
political  outrage  were  remembered  only  too  well,  and  the 
terrorism  of  the  Sanfedists  had  its  local  imitators  in  the 
opposite  faction.  There  had  been  outrages  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Imola  since  the  spring  of  1848,  and  in  the 
summer  they  had  spread  to  Ancona.  The  leniency  of  the 
government  gave  the  assassins  a new  pretext,  and  under 
plea  of  extirpating  the  Centurions  small  bands  at  Imola  and 
Sinigaglia  murdered  officials  and  levied  fines  on  foreigners. 
At  Ancona  the  terrorism  took  a larger  scale,  and  twenty- 
eight  Sanfedists  were  assassinated,  till  an  energetic  officer, 
Felice  Orsini,  crushed  the  gang  with  a few  soldiers  and  his 
own  audacity. 

The  work  of  the  government  was  made  easier  by  the 
increasing  support  given  to  the  Republic.  At  first  the 
republicans  on  principle  were  few;  fewer  still  understood 
Mazzini’s  idealism.  The  majority  were  indifferent,  weary  of 
political  change,  only  glad  that  they  had  escaped  from  the 

1 Actes  officielles,  114  ; Spada,  op.  cit.,  III.  450-456,  576  ; Torre,  op.  cit.,  I. 
176,  188-190,  332-333  ; Kusconi,  op.  cit.,  II.  108  ; Gabussi,  Memorie,  III.  456  ; 
Mazzini,  (Jpere,  VII.  41  ; Garibaldi,  Memorie,  234  ; Niccolini,  Pontificate,  143  ; 
TJltimi  69  giorni,  9.  Some  evidence  of  minor  outrages  in  D’Azeglio  e 
Pantaleoni,  Carteggio,  193.  There  was  apparently  some  slight  pilfering  from 
churches  and  museums,  but  some  of  the  charges  at  all  events  were  unfounded. 


332  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

government  of  priests.  “ You  are  a weak  minority  now,” 
the  Venetian  agent  told  the  republicans;  “be  brave 
and  work,  and  perhaps  to-morrow  you  will  be  the  nation.” 
And  passive  acceptance  of  the  republic  was  fast  turning  to 
enthusiasm.  The  bulk  of  the  people,  weary  of  the  feeble- 
ness and  vacillations  of  the  Moderates,  and  determmed  to 
have  done  at  all  cost  with  the  clerical  government,  readily 
turned  to  the  Republic  as  the  one  possible  alternative. 
Democratic  [and  mildly  socialistic  as  it  was,  it  had  steadily 
declared  for  order ; there  had  been  weakness  but  no  palter- 
ing with  crime,  and  after  the  suppression  of  terrorism  at 
Ancona,  there  were  no  democratic  elements  of  disorder  except 
Garibaldi’s  men  and  the  Club  supporters  of  Sterbini ; and 
with  them  the  national  guard  could  easily  cope._  The  new 
Municipal  Councils,  elected  on  heavy  polls,  sent  in  with  two 
exceptions  spontaneous  adhesion  to  the  Republic.  In  some 
country  districts  indeed  the  priests  kept  discontent  simmer- 
ing ; the  army  was  uneasy ; the  civil  service  was  corroded 
with  disloyalty ; some  of  the  Moderates  were  busily  plotting. 
But  the  bulk  of  the  peasants  accepted  with  gratitude  a 
government,  which  freed  them  from  Sanfedist  terrorism , 
the  professional  classes  and  middling  landed  proprietors, 
from  whose  ranks  came  most  of  the  Deputies,  gave  loyal 
support ; the  great  majority  of  the  national  guard,  the  shop- 
keepers from  whom  it  was  draivn,  the  artisans  of  Romagna 
loved  the  Republic  for  its  own  sake ; and  the  proud  popu- 
lace of  Rome,  possessed  with  a new  and  fierce  hatred  of  the 
priests,  became  the  warmest  enthusiasts  for  a rule  which 
saved  them  from  the  Pope. 

But  while  the  Republic  was  winning  the  love  of  the 
Romans,  the  European  Powers  were  preparing  its  doom. 
The  Pope  was  resolved  to  return  as  absolute  a sovereign  as 
any  of  his  predecessors.  Antonelli  was  counting  on  reac- 
tion at  Rome,  and  with  more  reason  on  the  efforts  of  his 
agents  in  some  of  the  rural  districts.  Savage  circukrs  were 
distributed,  urging  the  extermination  of  the  Liberals; 
risings  at  Orvieto  and  Cesena  were  easily  put  down  by  the 
1 Torre,  op.  cit.,  I.  172,  299  : Beghelli,  op.  cit.,  II.  65.  According  to  Farini, 
Jioman  State,  III.  392,  its  authenticity  was  denied,  but  it  has  a strong  resem- 
blance to  the  earlier  Sanfedist  circulars. 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS  333 

national  guard,  but  there  was  more  serious  trouble  round 
Ascoli,  where  the  inventory  of  the  monasteries  for  the 
nationalization  law  stirred  the  fanaticism  of  the  peasants, 
and  a priest  preached  a sacred  war  of  plunder  and  arson, 
that  anticipated  the  brigandage  of  1861.  Antonelli’s  chief 
reliance  however  was  on  the  foreign  Papalists.  His  policy  was 
to  place  the  Papacy  under  the  protection  of  the  monarchical 
Powers,  and  avoid  any  pressure  from  France,  that  might 
constrain  the  Pope  to  some  decent  show  of  civilized  rule. 
But  France  could  not  be  left  out  altogether,  and  he 
proposed  (February  18)  a joint  occupation  of  the  Papal 
States  by  Austria,  Spain,  Naples,  and  France.  The  three 
monarchical  Powers  readily  responded;  Spain  was  already 
preparing  an  expedition;  Neapolitan  troops  were  hovering 
on  the  southern  frontier  and  encouraging  the  insurgents 
round  Ascoli;  Haynau  had  occupied  Ferrara,  and  was  at 
this  moment  planning  an  advance  on  Bologna. 

It  was  more  doubtful  what  answer  France  would  make. 
Hitherto  the  Republic  had  supported  the  Piedmontese  pro- 
test against  foreign  intervention,  but  the  Conservative 
reaction  was  forcing  the  government’s  -hand.  Falloux,  the 
representative  of  the  ultra-Catholics  in  the  ministry,  laughed 
at  “ a giant  skulking  behind  a blade  of  grass  ” ; and  though 
the  Mountain  sent  its  salutations  to  the  new  republic, 
Falloux  had  the  active  public  opinion  of  the  country  behind 
him.  But,  if  French  sentiment  supported  the  Temporal 
Power,  it  was  none  the  less  hostile  to  Austria,  and  the  news 
of  Novara  precipitated  its  action.  Louis  Napoleon  wished 
to  declare  war  at  once,  and  he  had  the  support  of  the  Moun- 
tain and  Centre.^  But  Thiers  skilfully  diverted  the  cry 
for  war  by  persuading  the  Chamber  to  give  the  government 
authority  to  occupy  some  point  in  Italy  (March  31).  The 
vote  was  intended  by  the  Chamber  to  be  at  least  as  much  a 
menace  to  Austria  as  an  earnest  of  help  to  the  Pope;  but  the 
Papalists  in  the  ministry  saw  how  it  could  be  twisted  to  their 
own  ends.  Louis  Napoleon,  however  little  he  loved  the 
lemporal  Power,^  cared  more  to  serve  his  own  ambitions. 

La  Gorce,  Seconde  republique,  II.  83  ; De  Gaillard,  Expedition,  140-143  ; 
Bianchi,  Diplomzia,  VI.  225.  2 pianat  de  la  Faye,  Documents,  II.  64. 


334 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


and  was  bidding  for  the  Catholic  vote.  The  ministers  played 
on  the  popular  anxiety  to  forestall  Austria,  and  equivocating 
as  to  the  Pope’s  restoration,^  decided  to  occupy  Civita 
Vecchia. 

It  was  the  beginning  of  the  long  chapter  of  fraud  and 
insolence,  for  which  the  French  Catholics  are  more  respon- 
sible than  Napoleon,  which,  beginning  in  a kind  of  perverted 
national  pride,  ended  by  sacrificing  the  nation  to  the  Papacy, 
and  had  its  pay  at  Sedan.  Already,  no  doubt,  in  spite  of 
professions,  the  ministers  had  determined  to  force  the  Pope 
on  the  unwilling  Romans.  But  neither  at  home  nor  abroad 
did  they  dare  to  avow  an  intention  to  restore  him  in  defiance 
of  his  people.^  They  probably  believed  that  both  sides  would 
accept  a compromise,  and  they  attempted  to  extract  from 
Pius  a pronouncement  in  favour  of  the  Statute.  Assuming 
that  the  Romans  were  groaning  under  a republican  t3rranny, 
they  professed  a desire  to  give  them  a government  “ equally 
removed  from  the  old  abuses  and  the  present  anarchy.” 
The  expedition  to  carry  out  the  Chamber’s  resolution  ar- 
rived at  Civita  Vecchia  on  April  24,  commanded  by  Oudinot, 
son  of  Napoleon  I.’s  general,  a vain  ambitious  soldier,  most 
jealous  of  his  own  and  his  army’s  repute,  but  with  a faculty 
for  equivocation,  that  easily  slid  into  sheer  falsehood.  The 
Triumvirs  had  ordered  his  landing  to  be  opposed  at  all  cost, 
but  Civita  Vecchia  was  not  in  a position  to  resist,iand  Oudinot’s 
protestations  of  friendliness  won  over  its  Town  Council.  As 
soon  as  he  landed,  he  threw  off  the  mask.  His  overt  in- 
structions forbade  an  advance  to  Rome,  unless  a favourable 
reception  were  assured.  He  was  warned  even  by  men  who 
bore  the  republic  no  good-will,  that  Rome  would  rise  as  a 
man  to  dispute  his  entry;  but  the  Papalists  in  the  city 
assured  him  of  their  wish  and  power  to  help,  and  he  confi- 
dently counted  on  meeting  no  opposition.  Cajolery,  he 
hoped,  would  open  the  gates  of  Rome ; and  though  he 
refused  to  recognize  the  republic,  and  demanded  leave  to 

^ La  Gorce,  op.  cit.,  II.  88,  90;  De  Lesseps,  Reponse,  28;  Harcourt,  Drouyn 
de  Lhuys,  11-12. 

- Correspondence — Rome,  9 ; Torre,  op.  cit.,  I.  199,  201,  345  ; De  Lesseps, 
Mission,  5. 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS 


335 

occupy  the  city,  he  still,  except  in  unguarded  moments,  pro- 
tested with  iteration  that  he  would  scrupulously  respect  the 
wishes  of  the  peopled  The  Triumvirs  and  the  Assembly 
were  puzzled ; Mazzini  and  Carlo  Bonaparte  still  trusted  to 
the  loyalty  of  the  sister  republic,  and  the  deputies  were 
wavering  towards  compromise,  when  Oudinot’s  agent  in- 
genuously owned  that  his  master’s  real  object  was  to  restore 
the  Pope.  There  was  no  more  hesitation,  and  the  Assembly 
resolved  to  resist  at  all  cost.  The  temper  of  the  people  was 
too  hot  to  allow  of  further  negotiations;  not  even  if  the 
republic  were  recognized,  would  they  suffer  a French  soldier 
to  enter  the  walls  of  Rome. 

War  was  now  inevitable.  “Italians,”  Oudinot  boasted, 
“never  fight,”  and  he  counted  on  an  easy  victory.  He 
attacked  on  April  30,  intending  to  force  the  gates  on  each 
side  of  the  Vatican  and  unite  his  wings  in  its  square.  Each 
side  had  about  10,000  men;  the  French  fought  bravely, 
but  they  had  entirely  underrated  the  enemy’s  strength,  and 
found  themselves  in  front  of  men  as  brave,  and,  unlike  them- 
selves, whole-hearted  in  their  cause.  Both  their  divisions 
were  badly  beaten  with  a loss  of  1000  men,  and  they  made 
a hasty  retreat  to  avoid  being  cut  off  from  their  base  at 
Civita  Vecchia.  Garibaldi  pressed  to  be  allowed  to  pursue, 
and  his  veterans  might  have  completed  the  rout.  But  the 
Triumvirs  still  clung  to  the  hope  of  compromise,  and  feared 
to  stultify  the  efforts  which  the  Mountain  was  making  in 
their  interest  at  Paris.  Every  care  was  lavished  on  the 
French  wounded,  and  with  mingled  generosity  and  diplomacy 
the  prisoners  were  feasted  and  sent  back  with  every  honour 
to  the  French  camp.  Oudinot  wrote  home  that  “ the  recon- 
naissance had  been  gloriously  executed,”  but  his  bravado 
deceived  nobody.  A French  army  had  been  met  and  routed 
in  fair  fight  by  an  equal  number  of  Italians.  Force  and 
fraud  had  both  failed,  and  the  French  government  stood 
convicted  not  only  of  treachery  to  republican  principles, 

^ Rusconi,  op.  cit.,  II,  17,  229;  Id.,  Memorie^  160;  Torre,  op.  cit.,  I.  217,  221; 
De  Lesseps,  op.  cit.,  8;  Niccolini,  op.  cit.,  116,  Article  5 of  the  French  Con- 
stitution of  1848  laid  down  that  “the  French  Republic  . . . never  employs 
its  forces  against  the  liberties  of  any  people.” 


3 36  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

but  of  a perfidy  that  shocked  diplomatists.  But  though 
Jules  Favre  defeated  it  in  the  Chamber  (May  7),  Louis 
Napoleon  knew  that  the  new  elections  would  give  him  a 
large  Conservative  majority,  and  adroitly  making  himself 
the  champion  of  the  army’s  honour,  wrote  to  Oudinot,  defy- 
ing the  recent  vote.  But  he  was  not  yet  in  a position  to 
break  altogether  with  the  Chamber ; and  to  humour  it  he 
sent  He  Lesseps,  then  a young  diplomatist,  to  negotiate  with 
the  Roman  government.  De  Lesseps  was  the  President’s 
dupe,  but  he  went  in  good  faith  to  attempt  an  honourable 
peace  ; and  after  a fortnight’s  negotiation,  made  possible  only 
by  his  own  and  the  Triumvirs’  absolute  good  faith,  they 
agreed  (May  30)  on  the  basis  of  a compromise,  under  which 
De  Lesseps  waived  the  question  of  occupation,  but  refused 
to  recognize  the  republican  government. 

At  the  moment  when  peace  seemed  assured,  the  sub- 
terranean workings  of  the  French  government  made  war 
again  inevitable.  The  elections  had  taken  place,  and  it 
could  throw  off  the  mask.  And  though  it  still  tried  in  j 
angry  messages  to  coerce  the  Pope  into  humaner  counsels,  j 
it  was  becoming  a race  among  the  Catholic  Powers  to  be  1 
first  at  Rome,  and  France  must  not  be  behindhand  in  the 
competition  to  win  his  gratitude.  The  Spaniards  were  at 
the  point  of  landing  5000  men  at  Fiumicino.  The  Neapo-  i 
litans  had  occupied  the  country  round  Palestrina,  till  the  - 
Roman  troops  fell  on  them  at  Velletri,  and  drove  them  in  t 
ignominious  rout  across  the  frontier  (May  19).  Gorzowsky  i 
had  bombarded  Bologna  into  surrender  after  a heroic  .• 
defence  of  eight  days  (May  1 6),  and  with  its  fall  all  resist-  r 
ance  broke  down  in  Romagna;  and  though  Ancona  defied |a 
the  Austrians  for  another  month,  Wimpffen  had  already  ;1| 
commenced  the  siege,  and  Lichtenstein  was  advancing  on 
Perugia.  Had  the  Romans  been  free  to  move,  Wimpffen  i 
would  have  been  outnumbered  and  surrounded.  France  byii 
preventing  them  from  moving  had  been  Austria’s  best  ally,jf 
but  she  looked  jealously  on  any  further  advance  of  her  rival. 
Oudinot  and  his  generals  had  been  fretting  impatiently)! 
through  the  negotiations.  Some  of  his  troops,  indignant* 
at  the  ignominious  part  they  were  called  to  play,  were  eager 


THE  CENTRAL  REPUBLICS  337 

to  leave  Rome  and  meet  the  Austrians ; but  the  arrival  of 
siege  guns  showed  what  the  real  intentions  of  the  govern- 
ment were.  Oudinot,  who  had  thrown  every  difficulty  in 
the  way  of  the  negotiations,  now  in  defiance  of  De  Lesseps 
and  the  Triumvirs,  seized  the  position  of  Monte  Mario, 
which  commanded  the  northern  defences  of  the  city,  and 
repudiated  De  Lesseps.  Next  day  De  Lesseps  received 
from  Paris  letters  of  recall,  and  Oudinot  an  order  to  enter 
Rome  by  force. 

The  declaration  of  hostilities  came  as  a relief  to  the 
Romans,  overstrung  as  they  were  by  the  long  uncertainty 
of  the  negotiations.  For  the  first  and  last  time  the  govern- 
ment had  for  a few  days  lost  control  of  the  city.  Garibaldi 
returned  from  Velletri  angry  that  he  had  not  been  allowed 
to  follow  up  the  victory  by  a march  on  Naples,  and,  now 
as  ever  despising  parliamentary  government,  asked  to  be 
aiade  Dictator.  ^ He  looked  on  Mazzini  as  a talker,  and 
iespite  the  genuine  substance  of  both  men,  each  grated  on 
5omething  of  the  theatrical  in  the  other  s nature.  Both 
vere  more  or  less  unconsciously  rivals  for  popularity,  and 
here  was  sufficient  diversity  of  opinion  to  dress  their 
)ersonal  antipathy  as  an  antagonism  of  principle.  But 
low  all  jealousies  were  hushed  in  the  determination  to 
esist  to  the  last.  There  was  a hopeless  disparity  between 
he  two  forces.  While  Oudinot  had  30,000  or  40,000 
roops  and  a powerful  siege  artillery,  the  Romans  mustered 
■nly  13,000  badly  armed  men,  the  great  majority  of  them 
latives  of  the  state,  and  some  3000  national  guards  and 
rmed  citizens.  The  French  attack  was  directed  against 
he  Janiculum,  where  the  Romans  occupied  a long  line  of 
''eak  defences  and  a few  villas  and  a factory  as  outposts. 
Judinot  commenced  with  an  act  of  congenial  treachery.’ 
ie  had  promised  not  to  attack  before  the  morning  of 
une  4;  two  nights  before  that  date  he  surprised  two  of 
le  Roman  outposts.  All  through  the  night  and  following 
ay  the  fighting  went  on  in  the  gardens  and  vineyards ; the 
-omans,  m spite  of  heavy  odds,  several  times  recaptured 
le  lost  villas,  but  individual  heroism  could  not  make  up 
>r  inferior  numbers  and  Garibaldi’s  bad  generalship  and 

VOL.  I.  ^ ^ 


338 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


after  sixteen  hours’  fighting  the  positions  f ° i 

But  though  the  Romans  kept  no  v 

except  the  factory  of  II  Vascello,  they  had  saved  the  cAy 
from  surprise,  and  the  French  were  to  sit  down 

to  a regular  siege  (June  13),  with  malaria  threatenmg  to 
raise  it  if  prolonged.  An  unsparmg  bombardment,  such  as 
trCardiLs  dfsired,'  must  have  brought  the  city  to  a 
speedy  surrender,  but  it  would  have  ^ f 

to  ruins;  and  the  French,  though  their  shells  did  con- 
siderable damage  to  the  poor  Trasteverme 
careful  on  the  whole  to  spare  the  monuments  and  art 

treasures.^^  obvious  that,  failing  a diversion  from  without, 
surrender  was  only  a question  of  time.  But  though  pro- 
visions were  already  running  low,  not  a voice 
it  The  poor  bore  without  murmur  the  bombardment,  the 
increasing  scarcity,  the  depreciation  of  the  paper  money 
A fierce  hatred  of  the  priests  became  their  pasaon,  an 
the  Trasteverines,  once  so  Catholic,  blasphemed  Pope  anc 
clergy,  in  whose  name  the  French  were  killing  its  anc 
wrecking  its  homes.  “ If  the  Churchy  does  not  go  wi  h th. 
people  ” Ventura  had  warned  the  priests,  “ the  people  wi 
go  without  the  Church,  aye,  outside  it  and  agamst  it ; am 
low  the  churches  were  deserted  and  the  people  prepared  t^ 
abjure  the  Pope.^  The  enthusiasm  for  the  defence  grej 
with  its  growing  hopelessness.  To  Bassi  the  friar  and  t ..I 
who  venfrated  him,  Rome  was  Babylon  no  more  but  becom  j 
the  city  of  God.  Six  thousand  women  offered  then  servi 
for  the  hospitals,  and  as  many  as  were  needed  did  ^ob. 
service  undL  Princess  Belgiojoso.i  The  flower  of  Itah 
heroism  had  gathered  to  defend  the  capital  of  Italy : Garibafij 


1 De  Tocqueville,  Mermirs,  II.  150.  aaillard  < 

'’^■^Toue.^op.'  oil.,  II.  392-394;  Ventura  Pci  morli,  ^xv.;  Matzmi, 

VII.  1 18;  Spada,op.  «•(.,  III.  1 18,  435:  ° I 

^‘“'Apparently  the  Laura  Piaveni  of  Meredith's  Vittoria;  said  to  be  J 
heroine  oi  MusLt’s  Sur  unc  morie.  Margaret  Fuller  was  one  of  the  nurses  J 


THE  CENTKAL  REPUBLICS  339 

j with  the  cosmopolitan  lieutenants  of  his  American  battles; 
! Manara,  the  talented  young  patrician  of  Milan  with  his 
j Lombard  sharpshooters,  nobles  and  workmen  fighting  side 
j by  side,  the  heroes  of  the  Five  Days  and  of  the  volunteer 
1 campaign  in  the  Tyrol ; Mameli  the  poet,  Dandolo,  Pisacane, 

I Bixio,  Medici,  and  many  a young  hero,  who  left  their  bones 
f at  Rome,  or  lived  to  be  the  generals  and  organizers  of  the 
struggles  of  after  days.  Many  were  no  republicans,  a few 
were  aristocrats ; but  the  love  of  country  and  the  spell  of 
Rome  had  drawn  them  there  to  fight  one  last  fight  for  Italy. 

The  government  was  worthy  of  its  defenders.  It  had 
preserved  absolute  quiet  through  the  siege;  the  finances 
had  been  capably  and  honestly  managed,  and  though  there 
was  scarcity  of  food,  there  was  no  want.  Mazzini,  failing 
ithough  he  was  sometimes  in  promptitude  and  sternness, 
was  unslacking  in  energy,  fertile  in  suggestion,  inspiring 
most  who  came  near  him  with  his  hope  and  enthusiasm ; 1 
land^  save  for  some  noisy  opposition  from  Sterbini  and 
Graribaldi  he  held  unquestioned  supremacy.  To  his  faith 
iefeat  seemed  hardly  possible;  he  still  hoped  that  the 
Mountain  would  effect  a diversion  at  Paris  or  that  England 
would  intervene.  But  Palmerston  was  at  the  mercy  of  the 
pobdenites,  and  the  abortive  Parisian  revolt  of  June  13 
narked  the  last  effort  of  the  Mountain.  Eight  days  later 
;he  breach  was  surprised  almost  without  resistance  from 
fhe  worn  and  dispirited  defenders.  But  they  only  retired 
lO  the  Aurelian  Wall;  for  another  week  Medici  and  his 
ew  hundred  men  defended  the  Vascello,  till  he  lost  300 
filled  and  the  factory  was  a heap  of  ruins  (June  29).  The 
ast  struggle  was  fought  on  the  following  night  round  Villa 
Dpada ; for  twelve  hours  Manara  defended  it  against  over- 
whelming numbers,  and  the  young  heroes  fought  with 
':nives  when^  other  weapons  failed,  till  one  after  another 
hey  and  their  leaders  fell,  victims  of  Papal  vengeance  and 
Vench  duplicity.  Mazzini  still  wished  to  resist,  but 
raribaldi  told  the  Assembly  that  the  fight  was  hopeless, 
nd  the  Deputies  resolved  to  desist  from  an  useless  struggle 

1 For  the  impression  made  on  Clough  see  his  Froze  Remains  and  Amours 
; Voyage. 


340  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

(July  I).  As  the  French  soldiers  entered  the  city,  an 
angry  crowd  hooted  them  in  the  streets,  and  for  a moment 
they  hung  back,  shamefaced  amid  their  victory.  Mean- 
whde  the  repubhcan  constitution  was  being  promulgated 
from  the  Capitol;  all  through  the  bombardment  the 
Assembly  had  quietly  deliberated  on  it,  and  sti  angled 
though  it  was  at  birth,  it  remains  memorable  as  an  ultra- 
democratic  constitution  framed  by  a middle-class  Assembly 
at  a time  of  comparative  domestic  quiet.^  It  might  have  ! 
brought  a new  era  to  Rome  ; but  bravery  and  wisdom  were  : 
unavailing,  and  the  city  was  forced  back  under  priestly  i 
misrule  by  one  of  the  meanest  deeds  that  ever  disgraced  a , 
great  nation. 

Mazzini  wandered  fearlessly  about  the  streets  of  Rome,  j 
vainly  waiting  for  the  chance  of  another  struggle.  Garibaldi  ; 
asked  those,  who  disdained  surrender,  to  follow  him; 

“ hunger  and  thirst  and  vigil  ” he  promised  them,  “ but  never 
terms  with  the  enemy.”  Three  thousand  went  out  with 
him  ; for  three  weeks  they  marched,  hunted  by  F rench  and 
Spaniards  and  Austrians,  ill-treated  by  the  peasants,  their 
ranks  thinned  by  daily  desertions.  But  they  bafiSed  all, 
and  reached  San  Marino,  where  Garibaldi  obtained  terms  for 
his  men,  and  ivith  200  faithful  ones,  among  them  his  wife 
Anita,  Ciceruacchio,  and  Bassi,  he. made  his  way  to  Cesena. 
They  took  boat  for  Venice,  but  some  were  captured  by  the 
Austrian  ships,  some  driven  back  to  land.  In  the  Forest 
of  Comacchio  Anita  died;  Garibaldi  made  a wonderful 
escape  across  the  peninsula,  everywhere  sheltered^  and 
protected  despite  the  price  put  on  his  head.  Bassi  was 
taken.  Bedini,  the  Papal  Commissioner,  would  have  spared 
him,  but  Gorzowsky  would  hear  of  no  reprieve;^  and  when 
with  gruesome  hypocrisy  they  had  flayed  his  hands  and 
forehead,  where  the  sacred  oil  had  touched  him  at  hh 
ordination,  the  Austrians  shot  him  on  the  anniversary  0. 
their  expulsion  from  Bologna. 

1 Text  in  Tivaroni,  Dominio  austriaco,  II.  439“443*  promised  the  Pop 
“all  necessary  guarantees  for  the  independent  exercise  of  his  spiritual 

authority.”  See  above,  p.  292.  . • d j 

2 Helena,  Garibaldi,  77  ; but  the  converse  is  stated  by  Pianciani,  Romtot^ 

Papes,  III.  401-402.  I 


CHAPTER  XIX 

VENICE  UNDER  MAN  IN 

AUGUST  1848 AUGUST  I 849 

Venice  : fusion  repealed ; Venice  and  France  ; the  blockade  ; Manin’s 
government ; the  bombardment ; the  surrender,  Manin. 

The  causes  of  failure  ; provincial  jealousies  ; political  divisions  ; want 
of  statesmen  ; defects  in  national  character.  The  spirit  of  the  'move- 
ment ; Ugo  Bassi. 

Sicily,  Tuscany , Rome  Lad  fallen  * in  one  city  alone  outside 
Piedmont  the  flag  of  Italian  freedom  still  floated.  Venice, 
the  pauperized,  the  careless,  the  self-indulgent,  had  redeemed 
herself  by  a defence  of  patient  heroism,  that  won  her  the 
admiration  of  Europe.  Since  the  previous  August  she  had 
defied,  almost  unaided,  the  power  of  the  Austrian  Empire. 
She  was  soon  thrown  again  on  her  own  resources;  the 
interregnum  of  semi-Piedmontese  rule,  which  was  introduced 
by  the  Act  of  Fusion  in  July,  barely  lasted  a month.  The 
Piedmontese  Commissioners  had  only  arrived  five  days, 
when  the  news  of  the  Salasco  armistice  upset  their  brief 
reign  (August  ii,  1848).  A strong  public  agitation  com- 
pelled them  to  resign  and  made  Manin  practically  dictator 
igain.  He  held  that  the  armistice,  by  its  cowardly  aban- 
ionment  of  Venice,  annulled  the  Act  of  Fusion.  He  was 
jareful  indeed  to  proclaim  that  his  government  was  pro- 
flsional,  that  the  future  of  the  city  was  left  to  an  Italian 
^Constituent  to  determine.  However  republican  his  rule 
vas  in  fact,  the  name  was  suppressed.  For  the  present 
he  all-important  question  was  to  keep  the  Austrians  out. 
Venice  angrily  repudiated  the  tame  surrender  of  her  liberty, 
ind  Austria  felt  at  liberty  to  break  the  truce  and  blockade 
he  city.  The  Piedmontese  were  bound  by  the  armistice 

341 


342  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

not  to  help,  and  reluctantly  withdrew  their  troops,  though 
their  ships  remained  for  a time  and  kept  the  blockade 
partially  open.  Manin  laid  his  hopes  in  the  friendliness 
of  England  and  France.  But  Palmerston  told  him  frankly 
that  England  would  not  go  to  war,  though  he  took  care  to 
perform  more  than  he  promised,  and  did  everything  that 
diplomacy  could  do  to  persuade  Austria  to  give  up  her 
claims  on  the  city.  The  attitude  of  France  stood  ^ in 
unpleasing  contrast;  it  was  the  same  story  of  promises 
weakly  or  falsely  made,  that  dishonoured  Lamartine’s  l 
foreign  policy.  Bastide  and  Cavaignac  quibbled  away  their  ! 
professions  of  devotion,  and  while  they  pledged  themselves  ; 
never  to  abandon  Venice,  they  were  negotiating  with  Austria 
for  a peace,  that  would  leave  the  city  nothing^  hut  Home  i. 
Rule.^  Manin,  puzzled  but  unable  to  believe  in  Bastide  s 
perfidy,  still  trusted  to  France,  and  refused  any  solution  that 
left  Venice  a member  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  It  was  not 
till  February,  when  Louis  Napoleon  abandoned  Bastide’s 
subterfuges,  and  told  him  plainly  that  France  ^ had  too 
much  trouble  at  home  to  go  to  war,  that  he  realized  that 
Venice  must  rely  on  herself,  and  that  only  an  Italian  or 
Hungarian  victory  could  save  her. 

But  no  disappointment  daunted  the  Venetians.  All 
through  the  winter  the  blockade  had  been  tolerably  com- 
plete. Long  since,  the  Austrians  had  overrun  all  the  main- 
land except  the  Ute-du-pont  of  Malghera  at  the  end  of  the 
railway  bridge ; and  though  Mestre  had  been  captured  by 
a brilliant  sortie  in  October,  it  was  not  held.  Despite  the 
presence  of  French  or  Piedmontese  ships,  the  blockade  grew 
closer,  and  for  half  a year  the  city  was  almost  shut  from 
sight  of  the  outside  world.  Still  her  position  was  strong,: 
the  lagunes  seemed  an  impregnable  defence;  the  govern- 
ment had  been  diligent  in  storing  provisions,  and  the  waters 
and  islands  supplied  vegetables  and  fish.  The  arsenal  I 
contained  vast  stores  of  munitions,  and  Pepe,  who  was  m 
command  of  the  forces,  inspired  them  with  his  own  un- 
conquerable enthusiasm.  He  was  perhaps  too  old  foi 

1 Correspondence-Italy,  III.  6i,  123:  Planat  de  la  Faye,  Document:,  I 

401,  409;  II.  3-4.  29-30,  45. 


VENICE  UNDER  MANIN  343 

his  task,  he  was  vain  and  self-assertive.  But  he  had 
the  qualifications  of  a popular  military  leader,  pride  in 
his  men,  and  unflinching  discipline.  His  orders  of  the 
day,  stirring  as  Manin’s  own,  were  his  “war-horse,”  that 
won  their  devotion  and  roused  their  courage,  and  he  could 
face  mutineers  prepared  to  shoot  him  and  leave  them 
cheering  and  obedient.  He  had  brought  an  excellent  staff 
with  him,  and  though  he  lost  his  Neapolitan  rank-and-file, 
who  returned  home  after  the  Salasco  armistice,  he  had 
20,000  men.  under  his  command,  of  whom  14,000  were 
Venetian  levies,  and  the  remainder  volunteers  from  Rome 
and  Northern  Italy.  Despite  their  ill-discipline  they  were 
fine  material,  and  in  Pepe’s  hands  the  “ vagabond  set  of 
youths  ” learnt  to  meet  the  best  troops  of  Austria.  There 
was  a small  fleet  too,  which  under  better  handling  might 
have  kept  the  blockade  more  or  less  open. 

It  was  a time  to  test  the  mettle  of  government  and 
people.  Manin  and  his  fellow-Triumvirs  had  to  overlook 
the  commissariat  for  100,000  mouths,  to  embark  on  the 
troubled  waters  of  revolutionary  finance,  and,  harder  task, 
to  keep  in  good  temper  an  undisciplined,  excitable  popula- 
tion, watching  the  toils  grow  closer  round  the  crowded  city. 
It  needed  the  firmest  and  gentlest  of  hands,  but  the  Vene- 
tians were  worthy  of  their  leaders.  The  grave  financial 
difficulties  were  eased  by  the  splendid  temper  of  the  people. 
In  their  eyes  it  was  half  a war  for  religion,  and  in  answer  to 
Gavazzi  s and  Bassi  s appeals  voluntary  offerings  kept  flowing 
in.  Loans  were  readily  taken  up  by  the  richer  citizens,  and 
they  cheerfully  responded  when  the  government  called  on 
them  to  bring  their  plate  in  to  be  melted  down  for  coin. 
Pepe  gave  up  his  salary ; the  theatres  contributed  their 
takings  to  buy  a steamer ; schoolboys  stinted  themselves  of 
food.  Placards  were  posted  with  the  appeal : “ Venice  asks 
silver  from  the  churches,  gold  from  the  women,  bronze  from 
the  bells,  copper  from  the  kitchens,  iron  from  the  enemy’s 
balls  ; anything  rather  than  Croats.”  ^ 

But  no  enthusiasm  could  dispel  the  gathering  danger. 
Save  for  small  hopes  from  Hungary,  the  last  chance  of  relief 

^ Flagg,  Venice,  II.  149,  216  ; Pepe,  Events,  II.  250. 


344  A HISTOKY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

died  at  Novara.  But  still  there  was  no  thought  of  sur- 
render. When  the  news  of  Novara  arrived,  the  Assembly 
passed  a resolution  to  resist  at  all  costs,  and  gave  Manin 
unlimited  powers.  But  the  Austrians  were  now  free  to 
make  the  attack  a serious  one.  The  works  round  the 
Malghera  Fort  drew  nearer,  and  late  in  May,  alter  a heroic 
resistance  of  three  days,  when  the  little  garrison  had  lost  one 
in  six,  and  the  fort  was  a heap  of  ruins,  the  brave  defenders 
retired  before  a foe  ten  times  their  number  (May  26). 
Though  most  of  the  officers  were  Neapolitans,  the  bulk  of 
the  rank-and-file  were  Venetians,  and  the  volunteers  of  the 
Bandiera-Moro  artillery  company,  men  of  high  birth  and 
dainty  life,  had  served  their  guns  with  the  coolness  of 
veterans.  Again,  resistance  at  all  costs  was  decreed.  The 
farthest  arches  of  the  railway  bridge  were  blown  up,  and 
the  bridge  itself  became  the  scene  of  another  desperate 
defence.  But  on  a bright  summer  night  in  June  (June  13) 
the  Venetians  found  the  bombs  raining  on  the  western  por- 
tion of  the  city.  The  Austrians  had  learnt  to  fire  at  a high 
angle,  and  for  the  first  time  in  her  history  Venice  was 
reached  by  an  enemy’s  guns.  Before  the  end  of  the  siege 
two-thirds  of  the  city  were  under  fire,  and  several  wards 
had  to  be  evacuated ; but  though  the  red-hot  balls  caused  1 
many  fires,  and  the  shells  crashed  into  churches  and  hos- 
pitals and  through  priceless  frescoes,^  the  loss  of  life  was 
small.  There  was  bread,  but  it  was  of  poor  quality,  and 
meat  was  at  prohibitory  prices.  Typhus  and  cholera  reached  ^ 
the  city,  and  4000  died  of  the  epidemics.  But  the  people  ! 
made  little  murmur,  and  to  the  last  never  ceased  to  hope. 
Though  one  after  another  all  her  friends.  Piedmont,  France, 
Hungary,  Rome,  proved  false  or  were  defeated,  V enice  never 
lost  heart.  Throughout  the  bombardment  processions  and 
festivals  went  on  uninterrupted ; there  were  performances  at 
the  theatres,  while  a rare  ball  dropped  through  the  roof.  The 
boatmen  showed  innumerable  small  heroisms  in  smuggling 
in  provisions  and  intelligence  through  the  enemy  s lines ; the  f 
boys  would  chase  the  half-spent  cannon-balls,  and  bring! 
them  to  replenish  the  arsenal.  As  the  bombs  rained  on  ' 

1 E.g.,  at  the  Scuola  di  S.  Rocco. 


VENICE  UNDER  MANIN  345 

the  quarter  of  Canarreggio,  the  inhabitants  said,  “Better 
bombs  than  Croats ; let  the  old  houses  go  ” ; and  when 
the  Patriarch  talked  of  capitulation,  they  half  sacked  his 
palace.  Through  all  the  desperate  fighting  and  bombard- 
ment, the  half  rations  and  the  cholera,  the  Venetians,  with 
hardly  an  exception,  were  gentle,  good-tempered,  scornful 
of  danger. 

Even  under  the  terrible  stress  of  the  last  days  there  was 
little  trouble,  though  Manin  s hold  was  shaken,  and  the 
government  had  to  close  the  Clubs.  But  Manin  knew  that 
all  hope  had  gone.  Already  in  June  he  would  have  agreed 
to  an  effective  system  of  Home  Rule,  but  the  Austrian  terms 
were  too  indefinite,  and  the  Assembly  almost  unanimously 
supported  him  in  rejecting  them.  Now,  with  the  bombard- 
ment, the  cholera,  the  dearth  of  food  and  powder,  Venice 
could  not  sue  for  favours.  Manin  knew  that  provisions 
could  only  last  to  the  end  of  August,  and  he  dreaded  the 
brutalities  of  Austrian  vengeance,  if  the  city  had  to  yield  at 
discretion.  Still  the  feeling  against  surrender  was  so  strong 
as  to  threaten  his  hold  on  the  city.  Tommaseo,  always 
meddlesome  and  factious,  headed  a party  of  irreconcilables, 
who  believed  that  there  were  hidden  stores  of  food,  and 
called  for  a sortie  in  mass.  But  Pepe  vehemently  supported 
Manin,  and  the  Assembly  by  a small  majority  conferred  on 
hina  powers  to  treat  (August  6).  On  August  22  the  city 
capitulated.  It  had  cost  the  Austrians  dear;  at  least  8000 
of  their  men  had  fallen  in  fighting  or  of  disease.  And 
though  “ the  damned  Croat  ” ' was  in  her  streets,  the  heroic 
city  had  won  back  her  title  to  respect,  and  clothed  herself 
with  something  of  her  ancient  glory. 

She  had  been  fortunate  in  her  leader.  Manin  seems 
the  presentment  in  modern  politics  of  Wordsworth’s  “ Happy 
Warrior.”  On  his  little  stage  he  showed  an  union  of  long- 
headed wisdom  and  passionate  enthusiasm,  that  should 
make  him  rank  high  among  statesmen.  Few  have  com- 
bined as  he  did  the  purity  and  affection  of  a good  man 
with  the  shrewdness  and  daring  of  the  man  of  action. 

^ 1 Clough’s  Dipsychus.  It  is  interesting  to  contrast  Clough’s  enthusiasm 
with  Ruskin’s  querulous  abuse  of  the  Italian  movement. 


346  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Physically  weak  and  liable  to  great  exhaustion,  his  life  was 
not  a radiant  one.  “ From  my  childhood  it  has  always 
been  a painful  effort  to  me ; I am  always  weary.”  But  it 
was  sedately  calm.  His  home-life  was  very  happy,  his 
private  character  blameless.  “ Unquestioned  purity  of 
morals,”  he  held,  “ makes  the  true  and  vital  strength  of  the 
patriotism  which  is  a religion  to  us.”  To  his  frankness  and 
abhorrence  of  mystery  he  owed  much  of  his  power.  The 
daring  and  self-reliance  of  his  public  actions  were  built  on 
strictest  discipline  of  self.  His  orderly  and  methodical 
ways  allowed  him  to  carry  on  his  work  through  the  hom's 
of  gloom,  though,  when  excitement  failed,  he  felt  “ inferior 
to  the  commonest  man.” 

His  hold  of  the  people  was  absolute.  With  a few  pas- 
sionate words  he  could  sway  them  to  his  will.  The  fusing 
power  of  his  enthusiasm  identified  him  with  them  and  made 
command  natural.  I know  that  you  love  me,  he  told 
them  once,  “ and  by  that  love  I command  order.”  “ Go 
back  to  your  work,  and  give  your  country  your  spare  time 
and  money.”  His  great  and  daring  ideals  bound  the  people 
to  him ; his  love  for  them  drew  out  all  the  good  in  their 
nature,  and  his  faith  in  the  unpromising  Venetians  pro- 
duced its  own  justification.  But  his  faith  was  of  love,  not 
of  unreason.  He  could  coolly  take  the  measure  of  the 
people ; he  knew  the  latent  ferocity  of  great  masses  ; he 
expected  unpopularity,  and  the  duration  of  his  influence 
astonished  and  overwhelmed  him.”  ^ Resolute  as  he  was 
in  public,  he  was  overburdened  with  anxiety  and  thought  at 
home;  but  his  enthusiasm  seldom  deceived  him,  and  he 
could  wait  patiently  for  years,  then  at  a moment  strike.  If 
he  appeared  quixotic,  he  had  carefully  measured  his  forces, 
and  he  seldom  failed.  All  his  instincts  were  practical.  For 
disorderliness  he  had  “ an  instinctive  repulsion,  as  for  a 
discord  or  a deformed  face.”  “Foreigners  call  us  chatterers,” 
he  said,  “ my  ambition  is  that  they  may  never  again  be 
able  to  say  this  of  Venice.”  Fearless  and  stainless,  he 
lifted  her  to  his  own  height ; then  went  almost  a pauper 


La  Forge,  Manin,  II.  165  ; Flagg,  op.  cit.,  II.  29,  45. 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  347 

into  exile,  to  play  as  thinker  as  great  a part  as  he  had 
played  in  actiond 

With  the  fall  of  Venice  all  was  over.  The  power  of 
Austria  seemed  only  the  greater  for  its  momentary  shaking. 
All  Italy  save  Piedmont,  had  plunged  after  the  brief  day 
into  a darker  night,  under  a frightened  and  cruel  reaction 
which  saw  its  only  safety  in  revenge  and  proscription.  A 
year  had  withered  the  splendid  promise  that  had  seemed  so 
certain  of  fulfilment,  and  one  seeks  the  reasons  for  the  ter- 
rible overthrow.  No  doubt  the  strength  of  the  enemy  had 
proved  greater  than  could  have  been  expected.  After  the 
Five  Days,  so  cool  an  observer  as  Palmerston  thought 
that  the  Austrian  rule  was  ended  for  ever;  and  no  one 
could  have  foreseen  that  the  grim  tenacity  and  discipline 
of  the  Austrian  army  could  have  recovered  a seemingly 
hopeless  position,  or  that  the  French  Republic  would  so 
soon  prove  traitor  to  its  own  principles,  and  send  an  army 
to  crush  a sister  democracy.  But  the  main  reasons  of  defeat 
must  be  found  within.  Some  were  accidental : had  Pied- 
mont possessed  a capable  general,  or  an  honest  man  sat  on 
the  throne  of  Naples,  not  all  the  staying  power  of  Radetzky’s 
army  would  have  availed.  In  the  early  summer  of  1848 
there  were  80,000  regulars  and  perhaps  12,000  volunteers 
in  Lombardy  and  Venetia  against  60,000  Austrians,  and 
the  Neapolitans  could  have  added  another  40,000.  Even 
in  the  March  of  1849  Piedmontese  and  Romans  and  Vene- 
tians had  110,000  men  in  arms,  or  35,000  more  than 
Radetzky  counted  under  his  command. 

But  there  were  more  potent  sources  of  failure  in  the 
very  character  of  the  Revolution.  The  movement  of  1 846-49 
aimed  only  at  Independence ; so  far  from  making  for  Unity, 
it  had  hardly  been  federalist.  The  Unitarians  were  a mere 
handful.  Mazzini’s  indivisible  republic  went  half-ashamed 
into  the  background.  The  few  who  aimed  at  monarchical 
Unity  under  Charles  Albert  proved  by  their  impotence  how 

1 The  most  important  authority  on  Manin  is  Planat  de  la  Faye’s  collection 
of  documents  ; the  works  of  La  Forge,  Martin,  Flagg,  Errera  and  Finzi  are 
all  valuable  and  trustworthy. 


348  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

unsupported  they  were.  The  Albertists  proper  never  aimed 
at  the  annexation  of  Naples,  hardly  of  the  Centre ; the  for- 
ward school  of  Piedmontese  statesmen,  except  for  glimpses 
of  a wider  vision,  stretched  only  to  the  absorption  of  the 
Po  valley  or  at  best  of  Romagna,  and  refused  Sicily  when 
it  was  ready  to  drop  into  their  lap.  And  .even  so  the  fears 
of  Piedmontese  advance  had  roused  strong  feelings  of  sus- 
picion and  resentment,  which  were  often  nursed  as  strongly 
by  the  democrats  as  by  the  courts.  Montanelli  had  in- 
trigued against  even  the  union  of  Lombardy  and  Piedmont ; 
in  Lombardy  itself  democrats  and  republicans  had  fought 
bitterly  against  fusion;  in  Naples  the  Liberal  statesmen  had 
projected  additions  to  Ferdinand’s  dominions,  which  would 
have  enabled  him  to  check  effectually  the  Piedmontese 
hegemony.  They  were  few  perhaps  who  showed  the  insane 
partisanship  of  Cattaneo  or  Rossi ; but  the  love  of  state 
autonomy,  the  reluctance  to  be  absorbed  in  a bigger  nation 
took  half  the  force  and  logic  out  of  the  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence. 

These  difficulties  were  intensified  by  the  division 
between  Moderates  and  Democrats.  At  first  almost  the 
whole  nation,  except  large  sections  of  the  peasants,  had  been 
swept  into  the  struggle.  But  the  Encyclical  cooled  the 
priests  and  the  devotees  ; a ridiculous  fear  of  socialism  pro- 
duced a stampede  from  the  party,  which  was  thought  with- 
out ground  to  be  in  league  with  the  Reds  of  Paris.  The 
time  was  most  inopportune  for  war,  for  it  was  impossible  for 
a country,  newly  plunged  into  constitutional  liberty,  and 
eager  to  make  up  for  all  the  long  arrears  of  legislation,  to 
concentrate  its  strength  on  the  war  of  Liberation.  A thousand 
social  and  political  schemes  crowded  up  for  attention ; power 
went  into  parliament  that  should  have  been  devoted  to  the 
struggle  in  Lombardy;  time  and  energy  were  wasted  in 
endless  ministerial  crises  and  fruitless  party  struggles,  while 
the  enemy  was  at  their  gates.  It  was  impossible,  while  the 
Chambers  were  sitting,  to  hush  up  the  deep  difterences  on 
social  policy,  and  the  quarrels  transferred  themselves  to  the 
seat  of  war.  Fear  of  a republican  movement  in  his  rear 
had  been  partly  responsible  for  Charles  Albert’s  slow  advance 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  349 

after  the  Five  Hays.  The  loss  of  Venetia  began  the  cry  of 
royal  treachery,  so  exaggerated  and  unjust,  which  helped  to 
disperse  the  volunteers,  and  kept  the  less  responsible  demo- 
crats at  fever-heat.  The  democratic  press  did  much  to 
demoralize  the  soldiers  by  its  shameless  libels  on  the  generals, 
and  all  Genoa’s  loyalty  to  the  King  did  not  save  it  from  a 
bitter  feud  with  the  army. 

Had  Italy  possessed  more  capable  leaders,  many  of  these 
obstacles  might  have  been  overcome.  But  a country,  newly 
born  to  freedom,  could  not  raise  up  popular  statesmen  in  a 
day.  Public  opinion  would  not  allow  the  ministers  of  the 
absolutism  to  remain  in  office,  and  turned  inevitably  to  the 
literary  men,  who  had  led  the  nationalist  movement.  The 
prime  ministers  of  1848-49  were  almost  without  exception 
men  who  had  come  into  fame  through  their  writings,  but 
had  had  no  opportunity  of  a political  training  in  days  when 
the  governments  ostracized  every  original  thinker.  Balbo, 
Gioberti,  Mamiani,  Guerrazzi,  Montanelli,  Carlo  Troya  were 
essentially  men  of  speculation  not  of  action.  It  says  much 
perhaps  for  Italian  power,  that  there  were  such  brilliant 
exceptions  as  Manin’s  rule  at  Venice  and  Mazzini’s  at  Rome, 
and  in  a less  degree  Rossi’s  economic  reforms  and  Cordova’s 
management  of  Sicilian  finance.  But  the  prevailing  note  of 
administration  was  its  mediocrity.  There  was  no  capacity 
to  sift  the  practicable  or  drop  small  points  to  gain  big  ones. 
Guerrazzi  complained  with  justice  that  the  leaders  were  all 
in  mezzotint.  It  is  true  that  the  difficulties  were  very  great. 
A revolution  deserted  by  the  civil  service  must  have  a stony 
road  to  travel,  and  the  bureaucracy  in  Tuscany  and  Rome 
and  Naples  was  uniformly  hostile  to  the  new  order ; it  took 
its  promptings  from  the  reactionaries,  and  was  only  too  suc- 
cessful in  stultifying  the  intentions  of  the  Liberal  cabinets. 
Hence  at  a time  when  above  all  else  government  needed  to 
be  strong  and  steady,  its  weakness  was  obtrusively  patent, 
and  every  disorderly  element  took  advantage  of  it.  But  the 
great  quiet  majority  only  desired  order  and  good  rule,  there 
was  plenty  of  readiness  to  lighten  the  difficulties  of  adminis- 
tration for  the  sake  of  the  national  cause,  and  Manin  and 
Mazzini  proved  that  strong  and  sympathetic  government 


35° 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


could  rise  superior  to  aU  the  obstacles  that  faced  it.  Cavour  s 
boast  was  true,  that  had  he  been  in  power,  he  could  have 
saved  his  country  from  the  disasters  that  mcompetent  states- 
manship had  brought  upon  it.  _ i • 

All  pointed  to  defects  in  Italian  training.  Exclusion 
from  political  life  had  as  its  inevitable  consequence,  that 
Italians  lacked  the  political  common -sense,  which  only 
comes  in  a land  of  free  institutions,  that  they  had  small 
sense  of  proportion,  small  sense  of  compromise,  small 
capacity  to  measure  the  odds  against  them.  It  was  the 
light  easy,  picturesque  side  of  the  movement,  that  caught 
the  majority.  They  had  “ too  many  songs  about  freeing 
Italy”  as  Cavour  complained  even  at  a later  date,  too  little 
strenuousness  for  the  grim  silent  work  of  drmng  out  the 
enemy  too  little  of  the  self-restraint  and  discipline  that 
were  needed  to  build  up  a rule  of  ordered  liberty.  Mazzmi 
had  taught  them  to  rely  more  on  enthusiasm  than  on 
organization;  the  Pius  cult  had  encouraged  a fanciful 
sentimentalism,  that  wasted  itself  in  empty  emotion  ; the 
easy  victory  of  the  Five  Days  had  seemed  to  prove  that 
a little  fierce  courage  and  enthusiasm  could  storm  heaven. 
And  indeed  within  the  cities  again  and  again  undisciplined 
ardour  proved  victorious  over  heavy  odds.  But  the  Italians 
had  to  learn  that  the  masses  of  men  will  not  fight  even  in 
the  noblest  of  causes,  save  perhaps  for  a week  at  their  own 
doors,  that  to  take  men  and  keep  them  in  the  field  means 
long  training  and  strictest  discipline.  _ Mazzmi  s twenty 
millions  of  men  reduced  themselves  in  effect  to  a few 
thousands.  So  too  in  their  parliamentary  life,  too  much 
hurry,  too  much  oratory,  unwillingness  to  subordinate  the 
individual  to  party  made  the  legislative  work  of  1848 
disappointing  and  ineffectual.  Names  and  symbols  had 
more  weight  than  facts,  a fine  sentiment  more  than  a 
useful  practical  reform.  And  so  the  passionate  patriotism, 
the  social  seriousness,  the  faith  and  hope  went  unrewarded 
because  weak  individuality  led  to  self-asserUveness,  and 
Italy,  untrained  by  experience,  could  not  discipline  herself 

in  a moment.  , . . 

But  though  it  fell  so  short  in  grip  and  power,  the  spirit 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  351 

that  made  and  spoilt  the  revolution  had  a very  beautiful 
and  noble  side.  The  sentimentalism  had  for  its  obverse 
an  enthusiasm  and  faith,  sweet  and  pure  and  human,  that 
set  its  trust  in  righteousness,  that  refused  to  bate  one  jot 
of  its  high  ideals,  that  sent  men  to  war  with  the  crusader  s 
badge,  to  rush  on  Austrian  or  French  bayonets  with  a 
prayer  on  their  lips,  glad  to  give  their  lives  for  Italy. 
Men,  who  had  lost  their  faith  in  Pius,  but  kept  true  to 
the  religious  note  that  he  had  struck,  who  had  learnt 
Mazzini  s creed  of  social  and  moral  redemption,  trusted 
fondly  that  the  new  reign  of  liberty  could  not  fail,  and 
hoped  on  to  the  last,  while  Austrians  and  French  and  foes 
of  their  own  household  drew  ever  closer  round  them  the 
toils  of  a conspiracy  of  brute  iniquity. 

Type  and  hero  of  this  spirit  was  the  Barnabite  friar 
Ugo  Bassi.  Driven  to  the  cloister  by  the  death  of  a girl 
he  loved,  he  had  soared  far  outside  a narrow  clerical 
education.  He  had  fed  his  mind  on  the  Bible  and  Dante, 
on  Shakespeare  and  Mazzini ; he  was  poet,  artist,  composer 
of  some  small  merit.  But  for  all  his  many-sidedness  he 
was  possessed  by  a devotion  to  humanity,  a passion  for 
purity  and  righteousness,  that  made  him  the  consolation  of 
the  Palermitans  in  the  cholera  panic,  and  sent  him  through 
Italy  as  a revivalist  preacher,  as  forward  to  denounce  the 
corruption  of  the  Church  as  he  was  insistent  on  personal 
holiness.  The  war  drew  him  from  the  seclusion  into  which 
the  suspicions  of  the  governments  had  driven  him,  and  his 
own  great  bravery  made  him  the  idol  of  the  volunteers. 
Like  many  another  patriot  he  came  to  Rome,  and  Mazzinfs 
government  seemed  the  realization  of  his  ideal,  the  union 
of  pure  religion  and  liberty,  the  rule  of  Christian  equality 
and  religious  democracy,  “ where  all  classes  existed  for  one 
another.”  He  became  Garibaldi’s  chaplain,  and  exchanged 
his  Barnabite  robe  for  the  red  shirt ; the  friend  and  inspirer 
of  the  heroes  who  defended  Rome.  His  last  words,  when 
the  Austrians  shot  him  at  Bologna,  were  of  warning  to  the 
great  and  sympathy  for  the  poor.  It  was  Bassi  and  the  men 
who  shared  his  spirit,  who  stamped  the  Italian  Revolution 
with  their  nobleness ; whose  great  ideals  and  pure  devoted- 


3 52  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  Ux  IT 

ness  and  passion  for  moral  and  religious  growth  redeemed 
the  want  of  civic  courage  and  patience  and  common-sense, 
and  lit  the  Revolution  with  a light,  that  still  shmes  as  a 
beacon.  But  they  beat  themselves  in  vain  against  the  hard 
facts  of  European  politics  and  national  shortcomings.  It 
needed  the  more  prosaic  virtues  to  save  Italy,  discipline  and 
organization  and  self-repression,  a more  patient  and  far- 
seeing  statesmanship.  It  is  perhaps  fortunate  for  ta  y, 
that  she  was  given  time  to  learn  the  lessons  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, that  she  had  to  pass  through  ten  more  years  of  waiting 
and  silent  fortitude  and  strenuous  preparation,  before  she 
could  attain.  “ The  days  of  artistic  Italy,”  said  Manm,  “ are 
past ; let  us  see  another  Italy.” 


CHAPTER  XX 

PIEDMONT  AFTER  NOVARA.  THE  REACTION 

1849-1850 


Piedmont;  after  Novara;  revolt  of  Genoa;  question  of  prolonging  the 
war;  the  Gonstitdtion  saved  ; D’Azeglio  premier;  the  terms  of 
peace  ; the  Proclamation  of  Moncalieri.  The  Hegemony  of  Pied- 
mont ; the  refugees  ; Turin. 

Restoration  ; the  French  at  Rome ; the 

Po^HcTTr  p ’ Ney ; the  Motu-proprio 

of  Porticj  ; the  Pope  returns  to  Borne  ; Ultramontanism  ^ ^ 


Novaea  had  seemed  a crushing  defeat;  but  it  was  far 
from  leaving  Piedmont  at  the  conquerors  mercy.  Her 
army,  though  discouraged  and  in  part  demoralized,  was  still 
intact;  France  was  within  an  ace  of  intervening,  and  had 
her  troops  crossed  the  Alps,  Radetzky  must  have  beaten  a 
quick  retreat  to  the  Quadrilateral.  Even  from  her  own 
resources^  Piedmont  could  prolong  a resistance  behind 
Messandria  and  Turin.  And  for  the  moment  it  seemed  as 
if  this  would  be  done;  high  above,  the  anger  and  panic  and 
suspicion  of  treachery  the  cry  of  no  surrender  rang  loudest, 
lo  lay  down  arms  after  a week’s  fighting  seemed  a pusil- 
^irnous  ending  of  hopes  that  had  been  so  high ; it  seLed 
ihameful  to  retire  from_  the  field,  while  in  Rome  and  Venice 
It  Bologna  and  Brescia  the  tricolor  still  flew.  The  mass 
)f  the  people  confidently  set  down  the  defeat  to  treachery 
ind  believed  that  with  other  generals  victory  might  return! 

1 or  a few  days  there  were  no  certain  tidings  from  the  field  ■ 
)ut  as  soon  as  the  news  of  defeat  reached  Turin  the 
chamber  decreed  a levy  in  mass,  and  the  democrats,  swing- 
ng  about  Charles  Albert’s  name,  appealed  to  the  people  to 
arry  on  the  struggle  that  the  patriot  King  began.  When 
he  terms  of  the  armistice  were  known,  involving  the  tern- 

VOL.  I.  353 


3 54  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

porary  occupation  of  Alessandria,  and  the  recall  of  the  fleet  | 
from  Venice,  the  war  party  denounced  the  capitulation,  and 
the  Chamber  branded  it  as  unconstitutional. 

At  Genoa  the  suspicions  of  treachery  broke  mto  revolt. 
The  report  won  credence  that  the  young  King  had  torn  up  , 
the  constitution  and  surrendered  the  city  to  the  Austrians. 
Panic-stricken  at  the  reported  advance  of  the  enemy  and 
wildly  surmising  treachery  in  the  commander  of  the  gar- 
rison, they  frightened  him  into  a tame  surrender  of  the 
forts.  The  Genoese  protested  their  loyalty  to  Piedmont; 
the  primary,  and  indeed  throughout  the  mam  purpose  of 
the  rising  was  to  protect  the  city  from  the  fancied  danger 
of  an  Austrian  occupation ; the  movement  was  ^ accepted  by 
the  mass  of  the  citizens,  and  men  of  responsibihty,  as  Pareto 
the  ex-minister,  took  a leading  part.  Dangerous  as  it  was  , 
in  the  inflammable  state  of  the  country,  tact  and  a recogm- 
tion  of  its  motives  would  have  quenched  it  peaceably.  But  i 
the  new  ministry,  which  had  just  come  into  office,  was 
zealous  to  prove  its  conservatism;  it  was  frightened  by  the 
spectre  of  separation,  and  the  Moderates  had  an  old  gru  ge 
against  the  turbulent  democracy  of  Genoa.  The  Genoese 
vere  declared  rebels;  La  Marmora  was  sent  to  force  the 
city  into  submission,  and  two  days’  hard  fighting,  disgraced 
by  a bombardment  and  looting  by  the  troops,  forced  the: 
city  to  a tardy  surrender  (April  i o).  It  was  a discreditable 
episode,  and  augured  ill  for  the  wisdom  or  moderation  of 

Piedmont’s  new  rulers.  ^ 

The  Genoese  revolt  was  born  of  the  panic  tear  ot 
invasion,  but  cooler  heads  than  theirs  believed  that  the  war 
might  he  prolonged.  Charles  Albert’s  first  impulse  to  fight 
on  after  Novara,  might  he  ascribed  to  his  chivalrous  disreH 
gard  of  odds  ; but  so  careful  a general  as  Fanti  thought  that 
further  resistance  might  he  successful.^  The  Piedrnontese 
losses  had  been  comparatively  small ; the  Lombard  division 
vas  intact ; La  Marmora’s  had  only  been  engaged  at  Genoa  ■ 
Casale  had  repulsed  the  enemy  from  its  gates.  A desperate 
national  resolve  might  not  improbably  have  succeeded,  ever 
had  France  remained  neutral.  But  it  would  have  mean 
I Casati,  MOanOy  536;  Carandini,  Fanti,  134-135- 


PIEDMONT  AFTER  NOVARA  355 

terrible  suffering,  crushing  taxation,  the  devastation  of  the 
country,  the  occupation  of  Turin  by  the  foreigner,  and  the 
risk  of  utter  disaster  after  all.  Piedmont  was  not  prepared 
to  face  this  ; in  truth  a large  portion  of  the  people  were 
indifferent,  weary  of  the  long  strain,  unwilling  to  see  their 
homes  wrecked  and  their  farms  trampled  down  in  a long 
devastating  campaign.  Turin  was  cold ; reactionary  intrigues 
had  long  been  busy  among  the  soldiers  and  peasants,  and  the  - 
army  was  reluctant  to  fight  again.  To  Moderates  and  Re- 
actionaries the  war  had  been  a hideous  democratic  blunder, 
which  even  Charles  Albert’s  patronage  had  failed  to  make 
respectable.  They  had  no  sympathy  with  the  republicans, 
who  were  fighting  for  Italian  honour  at  Rome  and  Venice' 
and  half  welcomed  their  imminent  defeat.  If  war  broke  out 
again,  an  appeal  to  popular  forces  was  inevitable,  and  the 
democracy,  now  discredited  by  defeat,  might  raise  its  head 
again. 

But  the  Moderates  were  as  resolute  as  the  Democrats  to 
submit  to  no  stain  on  the  national  honour.  They  shared 
she  same  belief  in  the  mission  of  Piedmont,  the  same 
ihivalry  towards  their  Lombard  allies.  The  great  mass  of 
Piedmontese  were  at  one  in  the  determination,  that  rather 
Ran  submit  to  dishonourable  conditions  or  compromise  her 
uture.  Piedmont  would  fight  to  the  bitter  end.  The  young 
Ling,  Victor  Emmanuel,  represented  the  nation’s  heroic 
esolve.^  He  disliked  the  late  war  and  the  men  who  had 
oreed  it  on ; a conservative  by  training,  he  was  unwilling 
o risk  his  crown,  unless  honour  dictated  it.  But  loyalty  to 
lis  father’s  charter  made  him  swear  fidelity  to  the  constitu- 
ion  (March  29),  and  his  word  once  given  was  never  broken, 
le  hated  Austria ; he  had  a proud  faith  in  his  own  people 
nd  Its  destinies.^  “ Give  me  40,000  good  soldiers,  and  I will 
reak  the  armistice  to-morrow,”  he  is  reported  to  have  said, 

Len  goaded  by  taunts  of  treachery.  But  his  calmer  judg- 
lent  realised  the  tremendous  risk.  If  peace  could  be  had 
'ith  honour,  he  was  resolved  to  have  peace ; his  frank  reso- 
ite  address  to  the  nation  warned  extremists  of  both  sides, 
ad  though  he  was  as  yet  far  from  popular,  it  was  felt  that 
e typified  the  common-sense  and  plain  honesty  of  the 


356  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

country.  There  'vvas  at  once  a change  of  ministry  (March  26).  1 
Rattazzi  retired,  execrated  by  the  Moderates  as  the  chief  1 
author  of  the  disastrous  war,  and  made  place  for  De  Launay, 
an  unknown  Savoyard  conservative,  who  made  no  secret  of 
his  hostility  to  the  Democrats.  But  Victor  Emmanuel  and  j 
his  ministry  would  have  no  tampering  with  the  Statute,  and  j 
though  parliament  was  dissolved,  writs  were  issued  for  new 
elections  to  be  held  in  three  months’  time.  Early  m May 
D’Azeglio  succeeded  De  Launay  as  Premier.  _ There  had 
been  dissensions  in  the  ministry,  and  much  against  his  will 
he  was  called  in  to  heal  the  breach  and  strengthen  the 
government  with  his  great  prestige.  His  maxim  was  “ no  war  1 
and  no  dishonour”  ; if  he  had  to  choose  between  the  two,  hO' 
preferred  war,  and  he  was  determined  at  no  price  to  sacrifice 
the  refugees.!  3^^  lie  was  resolved  to  restore  discipline ; he 
continued  De  Launay’s  attacks  on  the  Clubs ; he  allowed 
Ramorino  to  be  shot,  nominally  because  of  a court-martial  sj 
sentence,  more  really  to  glut  the  savage  grudge  of  his  own 
party  against  the  favourite  general  of  the  democrats. 

But  questions  of  coercion  were  overshadowed  by  the 
terms  of  peace.  The  negotiations,  which  had  followed  the 
armistice,  had  been  almost  suspended  in  consequence  ol 
Austria’s  exorbitant  demands  and  Piedmont’s  refusal  tc 
compromise  her  honour.  On  one  condition  indeed  Austria 
was  willing  to  grant  peace  on  almost  any  terms : if  Victor 
Emmanuel’s  government  would  “modify”  the  constitution: 
and  make  an  alliance  with  herself,  it  might  escape  the  wa;,. 
indemnity,  perhaps  he  allowed  to  annex  the  Duchies., 
“ Austria  only  wishes,”  said  Radetzky,  “ to  return  to  th 
happy  times  of  1842.”  But  to  his  temptings  the  King  am: 
his  ministry  turned  deaf  ears.  “ I will  hold  the  tricolor  hig.j 
and  firm,”  said  the  King  on  the  evening  of  Novara.  _ Who , 
Austria  demanded  an  indemnity  of  over  230  million  lirj 
and  the  dissolution  of  the  Lombard  Committee  at  Turin,  D 
Launay  replied  by  refusing  to  negotiate,  unless  the  Emperd 
granted  an  amnesty  to  all  his  Italian  subjects,  and  surrendere 

1 D’Azeglio,  A sua  moglie,  401  ; Id.,  ritalie,  65  ; Gennarelli,  Sventure,  35 

2 Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  VI.  136,  144;  Massari,  Vittorio  Emmanuele,  2*, 
Costa  de  Beauregard,  Dernitres  annees,  521  ; Revel,  Dal  1847,  53. 


PIEDMONT  AFTER  NOVARA 

his  claim  to  treat  on  behalf  of  the  Duchies  as  their  suzerain. 
He  even  wished  to  preface  the  treaty  by  a declaration  of 
Italian  nationality,  and  put  in  a claim  for  Parma  and  Pia- 
cenza. When  Austria  refused  to  waive  her  demands,  and 
occupied  Alessandria,  the  government  suspended  negotia- 
tions, and  asked  for  the  mediation  of  France  and  England 
(April  26).  There  was  then  no  European  Concert  to  make 
a ring  round  the  oppressor  and  his  victim ; Louis  Napoleon 
had  wanted  to  declare  war  on  the  morrow  of  Novara,  and  he 
still  intended  to  use  force,  if  necessary,  to  bring  Austria  to 
more  reasonable  terms,  offering  as  an  earnest  to  occupy  Savoy 
or  Genoa.^  The  government,  suspicious  of  French  ulterior 
aims,  or  doubtful  of  the  President’s  power  to  carry  his  min- 
istry with  him,  would  allow  no  French  troops  to  enter  Pied- 
montese territory  except  as  a last  resort.  But  the  Western 
Powers  made  strong  representations  at  Vienna,  and  Austria 
was  too  embarrassed  by  her  financial  straits  and  the  revolu- 
tion still  undefeated  in  Hungary  and  at  Venice,  to  resist 
their  pressure.  She  evacuated  Alessandria,  and  fresh  nego- 
tiations were  opened  (June  15),  not  very  dignified  in  form 
(for  D’Azeglio  went  out  of  his  way  to  rate  his  democratic 
fellow-citizens),  but  strong  and  patriotic  in  substance.  Both 
parties  were  still  obstinate,  for  D’Azeglio  would  not  have 
peace  without  security  for  the  Lombards,  and  Austria  was 
counting  on  reaction  at  Turin.  It  was  not  till  August,  that 
French  pressure  persuaded  the  Viennese  cabinet  to  grant  a 
tolerably  complete  amnesty.  The  amount  of  the  indemnity 
was  fixed  at  75  million  lire,  all  mention  of  Italian  nationality 
was^  dropped,  and  the  King  renounced  his  claims  to  any 
territory  beyond  his  present  borders,  except  his  ancient  title 
of  reversion  to  Piacenza. 

Two  days  later  the  treaty  was  read  to  the  newly-elected 
Chamber.  The  polls  (July  15)  had  been  small,  but  the 
elections  proved  how  little  the  government  represented 
the  active  political  opinion  of  the  country.  Though  the 
capital  returned  Moderates  or  Reactionaries,  the  majority  of 
the  new  deputies  were  Democrats,  who  inherited  the  war 

^ 1 La  Gorce,  Seconde  repuhlique,  II.  83  ; De  Gaillard,  Expedition,  140-143  ; see 
D’Azeglio  e Pantaleoni,  Carteggio,  191. 


3 58  A HISTOEY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

policy  of  tliG  old  parliamont,  and  tlicy  at  onco  threw  down  i 
their  gage  to  the  ministry  by  electing  Pareto  president  of 
the  Chamber.  The  peace  negotiations  overshadowed  every- 
thing. It  was  in  vain  that  the  deputies  turned  to  matters 
of  home  reform;  as  Cavour  saw,  the  Chamber  would  not 
settle  down  to  useful  work,  till  the  question  of  the  peace 
had  been  finally  decided.  All  recognized  that  the  treaty 
was  inevitable,  and  were  prepared,  with  however  ill  grace, 
to  accept  it.  But  though  there  was  no  real  deshe  to 
repudiate  it,  they  regarded  some  of  its  conditions  as  dis- 
honouring, for  though  it  saved  the  territory  of  Piedmont 
intact,  it  officially  abandoned  her  claims  to  wider  dominion.  ' 
In  vain  Balbo  asked  the  Chamber  to  pass  the  treaty  with 
the  protest  of  a silent  vote.  Nearly  a hundred  Lombard 
and  Venetian  refugees  had  been  excluded  from  the  Austrian 
amnesty,  and  it  was  feared  that,  unless  their  position  were  i 
secured  in  the  treaty,  Austria  might  demand  their  extra-  j 
dition.  A motion  to  naturalize  all  persons  of  Italian  birth 
resident  in  the  state  had  been  already  carried;  but  the 
ministry  washed  their  hands  of  it,  and  left  it  to  be  thrown 
out  in  the  Senate.  In  November  a fresh  resolution  wa^ 
carried  by  a small  majority  to  suspend  the  Chambers 
approval  of  the  treaty,  until  the  position  of  the  refugees 
had  been  permanently  secured  (November  i6).  The  minis- 
terial defeat  led  at  once  to  the  crisis,  which  had  long  been 
impending.  A compromise  on  the  question  of  the  refugees 
might  have  been  easily  arranged,  had  both  parties  desired 
it.  It  was  a difference  mainly  of  forms  and  words,  and 
there  was  a growing  impatience  in  the  Chamber  with  the 
factious  attitude  of  the  majority.  A sense  of  the  danger 
impelled  the  more  moderate  members  of  the  opposition  to 
approach  D’Azeglio,  and  offer  him  their  support  m exchange 
for  a promise  not  to  tamper  with  the  constitution.^  They 
felt  that  the  attack  on  the  ministry  had  been  overdone,  and 
they  were  men  capable  of  self-restraint,  and  ready  at  a crisis 
to  think  more  of  country  than  party.  The  scheme  hac  I 
Cavour’s  support,  and  foreshadowed  the  great  coalition  ol 

1 Pallavicino,  Memories  II.  151  ; Cavour,  Nouvellcs  lettres,  355;  Id.,  Lettert 
I.  clxxxvii.;  C.  D’Azeglio,  Souvenirs,  373. 


PIEDMONT  AFTER  NOVARA  359 

two  years  later ; and  it  says  little  for  D’Azeglio’s  wisdom 
that  the  alliance  was  declined,  and  that  he  ran  to  the 
unnecessary  strong  measures  that  mark  the  second-rate 
statesman.  Though  the  premier  refused  the  practical  sus- 
pension of  the  constitution,  which  Pinelli  and  Kevel  recom- 
mended,^ he  had  determined  to  break  with  the  Chamber. 
He  wrote  over  the  King’s  signature  a decree,  dated  from 
the  royal  castle  of  Moncalieri,  which  dissolved  the  Chamber, 
and  ordered  fresh  elections  in  the  ensuing  month  (Novem- 
ber 20).  So  far  it  was  strictly  constitutional,  but  the 
language,  in  which  it  vehemently  attacked  the  majority,  and 
threatened  stronger  measures  unless  a compliant  Chamber 
were  returned,  was  a breach  if  not  of  the  letter,  at  least  of 
the  spirit  of  the  Statute.  It  made  a bad  impression  even 
among  many  of  the  ministerialists.  The  Chamber  had 
been  petty  and  provocatory ; but  a ministerial  majority 
might  have  been  secured  with  tact,  and  the  smallness  of 
the  points  at  issue  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  govern- 
ment at  once  issued  a decree  to  naturalize  the  refugees. 
It  was  felt  that  not  only  did  the  Proclamation  of  Moncalieri 
weaken  the  chances  of  parliamentary  rule  in  the  other 
states,  but  that  by  straining  the  constitution  and  bringing 
down  the  King  into  the  field  of  party  conflict,  it  made  the 
future  more  difficult  in  Piedmont  itself. 

Still,  ill-judged  as  it  was,  the  Proclamation  deserved 
little  of  the  extravagant  praise  and  blame  that  were  given 
to  it.  If  it  was  a coup  d'dtat,  it  was  one  of  a mildness 
worthy  of  its  author,  and  the  constitutional  march  of  Pied- 
mont went  on  almost  unaffected  by  it.  And  as  the  consti- 
tutions went  down  in  Kome  and  Naples  and  Tuscany, 
Piedmont  stood  out  in  clearer  relief  as  the  one  free  government 
of  Italy.  Here  was  one  spot,  where  the  tide  of  reaction  had 
not  reached,  and  where  the  seed  of  liberty  could  be  preserved, 
to  spread  again  in  happier  days.  During  the  Revolution, 
though  Piedmont  had  been  preeminent  in  the  war,  it  had 
had  its  rivals  in  constitutional  advance.  Now  it  was  left  the 
one  hope  of  Italian  Liberals,  and  for  the  next  ten  years  the 
history  of  Piedmont  is  the  history  of  Italy.  Her  Hegemony 

^ G.  Torelli,  Ricordi,  6o ; D’Azeglio,  A sua  moglie,  414,  417. 


360  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

was  assured.  Her  resolute  stand  for  nationality  during  the 
peace  negotiations,  her  steadfastness  in  the  cause  of  consti- 
tutionalism marked  her  as  the  champion  of  the  nation. 

“ Despite  our  losses,”  wrote  the  peace  commissioners  at 
Milan,  ‘‘  the  foundations  of  free  and  independent  Italy  still 
stand  firm  in  Piedmont,  that  when  the  conditions  of  Europe  .. 
permit  us  to  claim  the  rights  of  our  common  nationality,  all 
Italy  may  turn  to  her,  as  the  natural  champion  of  this 
cause,  which,  though  brought  so  low  to-day,  stands  ever 
iust  and  sacred.”  “ Piedmont,”  said  Cavour  in  his  first  great 
speech  on  the  Siccardi  laws,  “ must  gather  round  herselt 
every  living  force  in  Italy,  and  lead  our  nation  to^  those 
high  destinies,  to  which  it  is  called.”  Already  Turin  was 
becoming  the  home  of  the  heroes  of  the  Revolution,  who, 
exiled  from  their  own  states,  had  found  a common  asylum 
here.  It  was  said  that  the  refugees  increased  the  population 
of  the  large  towns  of  Piedmont  by  one-fifth,  and  at  all  events 
their  numbers  ran  into  tens  of  thousands.  The  immigra- 
tion had  its  agitators  of  the  baser  sort ; it  had,  especially  at 
Genoa  its  factious,  querulous  element,  which  made  more 
noise  than  mischief.  But  it  brought  into  Piedmont  a new 
breadth  and  freedom,  and  enriched  her  with  some  of  the 
best  of  Italian  thought.  In  the  salons  of  the  Liberal  nobles 
of  Turin,  or  in  the  cafes  of  Genoa  met  the  politicians  and 
writers  of  every  state  in  Italy;  Farini  and  La  Farina  the 
historians,  Scialoja  the  economist,  Mamiani  and  Tommaseo 
the  metaphysicians,  high  nobles  of  Lombardy  with  democrats 
like  Cordova  and  Crispi  of  Sicily  and  Correnti  of  Milan. 
There  were  Modenese  and  Lombard  officers  in  the  army, 
Neapolitan  professors  in  the  University,  statesmen  from 
every  part  of  Italy  in  the  Chamber,  their  representatives  m 
the  ministry  itself  with  Paleocapa  of  Bergamo  and  Farini  of 
Ravenna.  Turin,  once  so  backward  in  literature  and  art, 
had  become  the  home  of  a brilliant, ^ exuberant  life. 
Both  in  the  capital  and  provinces  industrial  enterprise  was 
bursting  into  vigorous  growth,  and  showing  an  activity,  that 
threatened  to  break  up  too  rudely  the  old  easy-going  order. 
In  place  of  the  journalistic  dulness  of  Charles  Albert’s  time 
there  was  a busy  press,  often  feverish  and  ill-regulated,  and 


THE  KEACTION  361 

only  kept  alive  by  the  subsidies  of  parties  and  individuals, 
but  earnest  and  patriotic  in  the  main  and  wielding  an 
enormous  powerd  Italian  was  more  spoken,  and  though 
there  w^as  still  much  of  the  old  spirit,  that  thought  it  “ better 
to  make  a Piedmont  of  Italy  than  an  Italy  of  Piedmont,” 
the  belief  in  a common  country  had  spread  far  and  deep. 
The  Piedmontese  were  proudly  conscious  of  the  future  that 
was  reserved  for  them.  The  treaty  had  been  on  the  whole 
a moral  victory,  and  Austria  had  found  herself  powerless 
to  coerce  the  defiant  little  state.  “ I am  Premier,”  said 
D’Azeglio,  ‘‘  to  save  the  independence  of  this  fort  of  Italy.” 
Already  Victor  Emmanuels  government  was  coming  forward 
as  the  patron  of  Independence  in  the  other  states.  It  had 
revived,  though  in  vain,  Gioberti’s  schemes  of  intervention 
in  Tuscany  and  Rome;  ^ it  had  sent  Balbo  to  Gaeta  to  plead 
for  the  retention  of  the  constitution,  and  perhaps  revive 
some  plan  of  Federation.^  It  had  protested  against  the 
Milan,  and  withdrawn  its  minister  when  the 
Austrians  entered  Florence.  Throughout  Italy  the  partisans 
of  Piedmont  were  growing  day  by  day.  Moderates  and 
Radicals  alike  at  home  recognized  her  new  responsibilities, 
and  there  were  many  even  among  the  more  cautious,  who 
were  hoping  with  La  Marmora  that  she  would  “ one  day  do 
something  serious  for  Italy.” 

^ Great  indeed  was  the  contrast  of  the  savage  reaction, 
which  raged  at  Rome  and  Naples  and  to  a less  degree 
through  Italy.  The  French  had  given  Rome  to  the  Pope ; 
and  he,  believing  that  the  welfare  of  the  Church  hinged  on 
the  Temporal  Power  and  his  own  absolute  sovereignty,  his 
feeble  nature  scared  by  the  rough  nobility  of  the  Revolution, 
had  buried  his  earlier  aspirations,  prepared  to  return  to  all 

The  leading  papers  were  the  Risorgimento,  Cavour’s  paper  in  1848,  repre- 
senting the  Right  Centre  ; the  Opinione,  at  this  time  the  organ  of  the  Lombard 
refugees,  later  Cavour’s  semi-official  organ  ; the  Gazzetta  del  Popolo,  on  the 
whole  Left  Centre,  the  only  paper  that  paid  its  way ; Valerio’s  Concordia  and 
Brofferio’s  Messaggero  Torinese  ; the  clericalist  Armonia  and  Campana ; and  the 
Mazzinian  Italia  del  Popolo. 

^ 2 For  Tuscany,  see  below,  p.  371  ; for  Rome,  Menabrea,  Negociations,  47  ; 
Gioberti,  Rinnovamento,  I.  396  ; D’Azeglio,  Lettere  inedite,  I.  28. 

» Castelli,  Carteggio,  I.  45.  4 g^e  below,  p.  375. 


362  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


the  abominations  of  Gregory’s  rule,  rather  than  suffer  a y 
taint  of  the  Liberalism  that  he  had  learnt  to  hate  and  fear. 
The  bigots,  who  had  won  him  to  therr  side,  were 
for  revenge,  eager  to  sweep  away  every  trace  of  the 
last  three  years.  Antonelli  and  his  party  knew  that  they 
could  expect  no  welcome  from  the  Romans.  Not  a s^n  of 
reioicing  had  hailed  the  return  of  Papal  power  at  Rome. 
Two  hundred  and  sixty  communes,  mcludmg  almost  every 
town  of  importance  from  Rome  to  the  Po,  protested  against 
the  revival  of  the  Temporal  Power,  and  the  Papal  Commis- 
sioner in  Romagna  acknowledged  that  “ without  Austrian 
garrisons  in  every  province  it  was  useless  to  hope  lor  the 
festoration  of  the  government.”  Perugia  told  the  Austrian 
general  that  it  accepted  the  Pope’s  rule  only  in  obedience  to 
force ; sometimes  not  a workman  could  he  found  who  would 
nail  up  the  Papal  arms,  and  if  the  Austrians  left  a town,  the 
arms  of  the  Republic  were  at  once  replaced. 

The  French  were  fully  conscious  of  this  temper,  they 
were  pledged  to  preserve  Liberal  institutions,  and  for  *.he 
moment  the  more  moderate  section  of  the  mmistry  Aad  its 
way.  It  promised  the  English  government  to  make  the 
rotation  of  the  Statute  a sine  qud  non  of  the  Pope  s restora- 
tion ^ and  though  Oudinot  took  strong  measures  to  prevent 
the  republicans  from  raising  their  heads,  there  was  no  punish- 
ment.^ Moderate  men  were  put  in  oface  ; passports  jere 
freely  granted,  and  several  thousands  took  them  to  % 

Papal  ingeance.  But  the  Cardinals  at  Gaeta  were  chafing 
at  a mildness  so  alien  to  their  hopes.  They  were  angry 
that  the  French  did  not  at  once  restore  the  Papal  aims, 
appoint  their  own  favourites  to  office.  The  Pope  complained 
of^the  “ inexplicable  leniency  ” of  the  French.  Suspicious 
as  ever  of  them,  above  all  of  Louis  Napoleon,  whose  par  m 
I8-1I2  was  not  forgotten,  the  court  at  Gaeta  was  eager  to 
rid^itself  of  its  unwelcome  friends,  and  find  shelter  under 
the  more  sympathetic  patronage  of  Austria.  Ha 
French,  however,  held  firmly  in  their  first  course,  they 
would  probably  have  triumphed  ; but  the  f Pf  “ 

in  the  game  with  Austria,  and  fearful  lest  he  should  fly  t 

. Ashley,  Palmerston,  I.  .24.  ^ See  above,  p.  .20. 


THE  REACTION 


363 

their  rivals,  they  were  anxious  to  bring  him  to  Rome,  and 
have  him  under  the  constraining  protection  of  their  own 
army.  To  quiet  his  distrust,  Oudinot  proclaimed  the 
restoration  of  Papal  authority  (July  14).  Gaeta  was  molli- 
fied; the  bland  Cardinals  told  Oudinot  that  his  words 
were  dictated  by  the  spirit  of  God,  and  the  Pope  promised 
to  return  shortly  into  Roman  territory,  to  throw  a veil 
over  the  past  as  far  as  possible,  and  govern  with  moderation.” 

Their  promises  served  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  the 
French  public,  but  nothing  was  farther  from  their  intentions 
than  to  fulfil  them.  At  the  end  of  July  Oudinot  resigned 
his  civil  powers  to  a Commission  of  three  Cardinals,  the 
“Red  Triumvirate,”  whose  terrorism  stood  out  in  lurid 
contrast  to  the  fresh  memories  of  Mazzini  s mild  sway.  In 
spite  of  Oudinot  s protests,  the  Papal  police  and  Inquisition 
reappeared  ; Sanfedist  criminals  were  released ; corruption  at 
the  Exchequer  replaced  the  able  and  honest  administration 
of  the  Republic.  A commission  was  appointed  to  inquire 
into  the  conduct  of  every  civil  servant,  who  had  served  the 
Republic.  The  grist-tax  was  reimposed,  the  paper  money 
issued  by  the  republican  government  was  depreciated  by 
one-third,  to  the  cruel  loss  of  the  poor  who  largely  held  it.^ 
Meanwhile  Antonelli  had  been  unfolding  his  plans  to  the 
representatives  of  the  Catholic  Powers  at  Gaeta.  He  pro- 
mised a large  measure  of  local  government,  to  throw  open 
all  offices  to  the  laity,  to  introduce  reforms  in  the  civil 
service  and  judicature,  to  institute  a nominated  Council  of 
State,  and  a special  board  to  advise  on  financial  questions. 
But  when  Rayneval,  the  French  plenipotentiary,  pleaded 
for  representative  institutions,  or  at  least  that  the  Finance 
Board  should  have  power  to  decide  as  well  as  to  advise, 
Antonelli  promptly  replied  that  parliamentary  government 
was  incompatible  with  the  spiritual  liberty  of  the  Pope. 

Antonelli  doubtless  knew  that  he  could  count  on  the 
support  of  the  French  clericals.  But  reports  of  the  mis- 
government  at  Rome  had  reached  Paris.  The  Liberals  were 
shamed  anew  that  the  reaction  should  give  itself  full  rein 

^ Farini,  Homan  State,  IV.  240,  270-271  ; Torre,  Storia,  II.  306-308;  De 
Gaillard,  op.  cit.,  298  ; Senior,  Journals,  II.  102-105. 


364  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


under  the  protection  of  France  ; De  Tocqueville,  the  foreip 
minister,  spoke  threateningly  of  “ giving  advice  'vith  the 
sword  at  his  side,”  and  Louis  Napoleon,  more  _ far-sighted 
or  more  careful  of  his  country’s  good  name,  insisted  on 
Oudinot’s  recall,  and  voiced  the  indignation  in  a letter  to 
Edsar  Ney,  a colonel  in  the  army  of  occupation  (August  18). 

In  angry  phrases  he  attacked  the' Cardinals  for  their  mis- 
rule- “the  French  Republic  has  not  sent  an  army  to 
Rome  to  crush  Italian  liberty,  hut  to  regulate  it  and  save 
it  from  its  own  excesses.”  He  asked  for  a general  amnesty, 
a lay  administration,  and  the  Code  Napoleon,  and  spoke 
bitterly  of  the  ingratitude,  which  had  made  the  Papal 
court  forget  its  obligations  to  France.  But  the  Freshen 
had  written  the  letter  on  his  own  initiative,  and  the  cahme 
had  only  consented  to  its  despatch  in  the  belief  that  it 
would  not  be  published.  And  popular  as  the  letter  was  in 
France,  the  government  did  not  dare  to  face  the  risk  of 
rupture  with  Rome,  perhaps  war  with  Austria,  which  its 
unexpected  publication  made  imminent.  Louis  Napoleon 
made  an  easy  surrender,  and  the  Left,  who  warmly  backed 
his  letter,  were  badly  beaten  in  the  Chamber.  Antonelli, 
thouc^h  he  knew  he  might  safely  disregard  it,  made  it  a 
pretext  to  assert  liis  independence  and  suspicion  of  France. 
Drawing  back  from  his  promise  to  return  to  Papal  territory, 
the  Pope  retired  to  the  King  of  Naples’  palace  iR  Portici 
and  let  it  be  known  that  he  would  not  return  to  Rome  till 
France  forgot  Napoleon’s  letter,  and  left  him  free  to  reform 
or  not  at  his  own  pleasure.  He  issued  from  Portici  a motu- 
proprio,  which  was  to  mark  the  maximum  of  his  conces- 
sions (September  12).  The  decree  promised  an  ambiguous 
amnesty,  a Council  of  State,  a Finance  Board,  Provincial 
Councils,  large  powers  for  communal  councils,  and  reforms 
in  the  Codes.  Its  inadequacy  was  palpable;  “the  motu- 
proprio  is  derisory,  the  amnesty  is  cruel,”  said  De  Tocquevi  e. 
Even  had  the  decree  been  loyally  executed,  it  showed  little 
advance  on  the  proposals  of  the  Five  Powers  m 1831  ; and 
attenuated  as  it  was  in  the  inception,  it  shrank  under  sub- 


1 La  Gorce,  Scconde  Republique,  II.  225,  228,  232  ; see  Capponi,  LdUre, 
III.  80. 


THE  REACTION 


365 

sequent  commentaries  to  the  emptiest  simulacrum  of  reform. 
The  amnesty  was  in  fact,  as  Victor  Hugo  called  it,  a general 
proscription,  for  its  exceptions  condemned  to  punishment  or 
exile  the  whole  Constituent  Assembly,  every  member  of  the 
Provisional  and  Republican  governments,  the  higher  officers 
of  the  army,  the  amnestied  of  1846,  and  all  who  had  taken 
any  part  in  the  revolution.  And  though  only  thirty- eight  were 
actually  prosecuted,  and  the  commission  to  overhaul  the 
civil  service  broke  down  before  the  general  refusal  to  give 
evidence,  the  fear  of  proscription  drove  several  thousands  of 
honest  citizens  to  exile  and  beggary.^  The  history  of  the 
next  few  years  proved  how  unreal  were  the  other  promises 
of  reform.  Already  the  suspicion  was  general  that  the 
Pope  intended  to  do  nothing;  the  French  confessed  that  all 
their  efforts  had  failed  to  win  him  to  moderation,  and  their 
soldiers  were  still  stabbed  in  the  streets  to  avenge  the  sullen 
wrath  of  the  unhappy  populace.  Amid  the  misery  and 
despair  of  his  people,  without  an  effort  for  their  welfare,  the 
Pope  returned  to  Rome  (April  12,  1850)  under  an  escort  of 
foreign  soldiers,  with  scarce  a sign  of  popular  welcome. 

It  was  a gloomy  contrast  to  the  ovation  that  greeted 
Pius  two  brief  years  ago.  But,  as  Gioberti  wrote,  “ Gaeta 
had  raised  an  impassable  wall  between  prince  and  people.” 
National  well-being,  national  glory  were  overshadowed  by 
the  fancied  interests  of  the  church.  Morbidly  afraid  of 
Protestantism  and  socialism,  the  Pope’s  ambition  now  was  to 
have  his  court  untrammelled  by  lay  influence  at  home  or 
abroad,  to  push  forward  ultramontane  claims  in  Italy  and 
France  and  England,  to  secure  for  the  priesthood  the  control 
of  education,  to  elaborate  new  dogmas  and  strike  down  each 
manifestation  of  independent  thinking  in  the  church. 
Catholicism  had  entered  on  a new  phase.  So  long  as  the 
national  Catholic  churches  had  stood  out  against  the  abso- 
lutism of  the  Papacy,  so  long  the  Roman  court  had  been  in 
the  main  Italian.  But  Gallicanism  and  its  kindred  prin- 
ciples had  been  slowly  dying  through  the  century,  and  the 

1 Farini,  op.  cit,  IV.  296-298  ; Margotti,  Vittorie,  386,  389  ; De  Gaillard, 
op.  cit.,  336-338  ; Zini,  Storia,  Documents  /.  139  ; Balan,  Continuazione,  I.  661- 
663. 


366  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Papacy  found  itself  at  the  same  moment  discredited  in  Italy 
and  with  apower  vastly  enhanced  abroad.  Pius’  reaction  marks 
the  date  when  the  Roman  church  placed  itself  in  the  keeping 
of  the  Jesuits,  and  found  in  them  a guidance,  unscrupulous 
and  short-sighted  hut  supremely  skilful.  Flanked  by  the 
ultramontane  clergy  and  the  active  propaganda  of  St.  ym- 
cent  de  Paul  and  kindred  societies,  the  Jesuits  organized 
Catholic  opinion  in  France  and  Belgium,  in  Spain  and  South 
Germany,  and  through  it  gave  the  Papacy  a power  it  had 
not  known  for  generations.  Henceforth  the  Papacy  becomes 
a popular  absolutism;  or  rather  under  the  guise  of  a per- 
sonal autocracy,  the  church  places  itself  in  the  hands  of  a 
small  number  of  men  of  various  nationalities,  who,  through 
the  mouthpiece  of  the  Papacy,  control  its  destinies.  The 
national  and  Liberal  oppositions  within  its  borders,  though 
not  yet  silenced,  become  more  and  more  impotent  in  face  of 
the  Catholic  plebiscite,  which  at  all  events  in  the  Latin 
nations  prefers  spiritual  despotism  to  liberty  and  puts  church 
above  country.  The  Papacy  revives  claims  that  had  long 
been  dormant.  “ The  state,”  it  pronounces,  “is  the  subject 
of  the  church  ; ” “ it  belongs  to  the  Vicar  of  Christ  to  make 
laws  in  all  parts  of  the  world  for  the  church’s  welfare  and 
government.” ' And  the  new  doctrine,  which  theoreticaUy 
claimed  the  absolute  subordination  of  state  to  church,  of 
Christian  governments  to  the  Pope,  in  practice  takes  the 
shape  of  a political  Catholic  party  organized  to  secure  the 
greatest  possible  amount  of  power  for  the  church,  and,  it 
strong  enough,  to  threaten  any  government,  which  does  not 
meet  their  claims.  The  final  issue  of  the  struggle  has  yet 
to  be  seen ; but  even  at  this  early  stage  there  were  warnmg 
voices  from  loyal  Catholics,  that  told  that  Antonelli  was 
emptying  the  churches,  and  “ doing  more  harm  to  the  faith 
than  all  Voltahe  and  Rousseau.”^ 


1 A pamphlet  of  1853  by  Father  Tarquini,  and  especially  approved  by  the 

Pope  (quoted  in  Arthur,  TAe  I.  30).  i,. 

2 D’Azeglio,  L'ltalie,  72  ; C.  D’Azeglio,  Souvenirs,  76  ; Gioberti,  Rinnoia- 
^ento,  1.  620-621  ; Ricasoli.  Lettere,  11.  79-  See  the  article  on  “ Religion  in 
Italy”  (said  to  be  by  Saffi)  in  Westminster  Review,  October  1853. 


CHAPTEH  XXI 
THE  REACTION — {Continued). 
1849-1852 


Naples^  Ferdinand’s  absolutism;  the  Constitution  suspended;  the 
political  trials  ; Gladstone’s  letters.  Tuscany  : the  counter-revolu- 
tionists ; the  Grand  Duke ; the  Austrian  occupation  ; the  Grand 
Duke’s  return  ; the  Constitution  suspended.  Lombardy-Venetia  : 
military  rule;  Karl  von  Schwartzenberg ; Kadetzky  uncontrolled. 
The  Austrians  in  Komagna.  Modena.  Parma.  League  and  Con- 
cordats : position  of  Austria  ; paternal  government ; the  Catholic 
school ; the  Austrian  League  ; the  Concordats.  Strength  and  weak- 
ness of  the  reaction. 


|While  Antonellis  dexterous  finesse  was  eluding  French 
ipressure,  Ferdinand,  free  from  any  foreign  influence  that 
:made  for  decent  government,  was  marching  straight  to 
Ireckless  absolutism.  He  had  reprinted  for  the  edification 
of  his  sulyects,  and  ordered  schoolmasters  to  teach  under 
pain  of  dismissal,  a catechism,  that  laid  down  that  “ a prince 
is  not  bound  to  keep  his  oath  to  observe  a constitution,  if 
jit  is  opposed  to  the  general  interest  of  the  state,”  and  that 
a promise  of  a prince  to  limit  his  sovereignty  is  null  and 
void.”  ^ The  Czar  had  congratulated  him  as  the  “ saviour 
pf  social  order  ” ; the  Pope  was  his  compliant  guest ; Sicily 
ilay  crushed  at  his  feet,  and  had  her  savage  punishment. 
Proud  that  he  had  so  speedily  tamed  the  revolution,  he 
'made  haste  to  undo  the  Liberal  advance  of  the  past  year. 
Education  was  put  in  the  grip  of  the  clergy,  and  every 
University  student  had  to  belong  to  a “ spiritual  congrega- 
tion.” The  Jesuits  were  recalled,  though  all  their  en- 

^ Gladstone,  Two  Letters,  52-54.  One  query  of  the  catechism  was,  “ Are 
II  who  wear  beards  and  moustachoes  Liberal  philosophers  1 ” The  catechism 
>^as  first  printed  in  1837. 


367 


368  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

dGavours  failed,  to  g^t  tlie  Concordat  altered  for  tlie  worse,  | 
for  the  absolutism  embraced  clergy  as  well  as  laity Even  j 
the  Council  of  State  of  1831  was  abolished,  and  the 
ministers  became  more  than  ever  the  mere  secretaries  of 
the  King.  “ Ministers,”  said  the  premier,  “ are  bells  without 
tongues,  the  King  strikes  and  they  sound;”  and  such  of  ■ 
them  as  retained  any  vestige  of  Liberalism,  left  the  cabinet. 
Even  the  new  ministers,  however,  seem  for  a time  to  have 
believed  in  the  King’s  promise  that  the  constitution  would 
be  preserved.^  But  Ferdinand  had  pledged  himself  to 
Austria  to  have  none  of  it ; and  though  he  seems,  in  spite 
of  his  catechism,  to  have  had  scruples  about  formally  | 
annulling  it,  he  put  it  practically  on  one  side.  To  excuse  j 
the  shameless  perjury,  a stratagem  was  invented  worthy  of  i 
a Bourbon.  Agents  were  sent  into  the  provinces  to  promote 
petitions  for  the  abolition  of  the  Statute ; promises  of  local 
railways,  threats  of  police  persecution,  pressure  of  every 
kind  raked  in  the  signatures ; and  though  the  Archbishop 
of  Naples  manfully  declined  to  advise  his  clergy,  and  the 
municipal  council  of  the  capital  refused  to  sign,  the  plot 
succeeded.  It  was  the  oft-repeated  story  of  Neapolitan 
cowardice  and  fickleness.  Sufficient  petitions  came  in  to 
cover  with  some  show  of  justification  the  suspension  of  the 
constitution.  England  made  a feeble  attempt  to  save  it  in 
Sicily,  but  the  premier  replied  that  it  would  be  waste  of 
time  to  recall  its  forgotten  privileges. 

Still  however  the  camarilla  sat  uneasily.  There  had 
been  a hostile  demonstration  at  Naples,  perhaps  hatched  by 
the  police,  and  a bomb  had  exploded 'among  the  crowd 
(September  16,  1849).  The  courtiers  seized  the  opportunity 
to  organize  the  terrorism.  Eighty-two  of  the  more  pro- 
minent Liberals  were  arrested  on  the  charge  of  belonging  to 
the  revolutionary  Society  of  Italian  Unity.  The  society 
no  doubt  had  existed;^  but  its  influence  had  been  small 
and  the  chief  defendants,  as  Poerio  and  Settembrini' 

1 Balan  complains  of  the  “ Caesarism  ” of  this  “ religious  and  pious  king 
Continuazione,  II.  128. 

^ Leopardi,  Narraziont,  409-410,  417*  See  Bianchi,  Diploinazia^  VI.  326,  ancj 
D’Azeglio,  Lettere  inedite,  II.  81. 

See  above,  p.  309. 


THE  EEACTION  369 

had.  had  no  connection  with  it  or  had  been  ignorant  of  its 
existence.  The  trial,  which  dragged  on  for  eight  months 
(January-August  1850),  was  one  long  travesty  of  justice. 
The  presiding  judge  was  notoriously  prejudiced;  letters 
were  forged,  paid  agents  of  the  police  were  suborned  to  give 
evidence,  every  pressure  short  of  actual  torture  employed  to 
extort  confessions.  The  defendants  were  imprisoned  in 

fetid  holes  with  common  criminals,  and  one  was  dragged 

into  court  while  dying  of  gaol-fever.  The  high  char- 

acter of  the  accused,  the  suspicious  nature  of  the  whole 
evidence,  the  crying  scandals  of  the  court’s  procedure  went 
for  nothing.  Twenty-three,  including  Poerio  and  Settem- 
trini,  were  condemned  to  penal  servitude  for  long  terms  or 
for  life. 

The  long  trial  deeply  moved  the  public.  It  even  roused 
to  pity  the  mob  of  Santa  Lucia ; and  while  the  life  of  one  of 
the  condemned  hung  on  the  King’s  lips,  the  poor  sold  bread 
for  candles  to  offer  in  the  churches  that  the  saints  might 
win  his  pardon.  The  ambassadors  protested  against  the 
scandal  to  humanity,  and  Ferdinand  in  reply  sent  the  con- 
demned men,  loaded  with  heavy  irons,  to  the  penal  settle- 
ments of  Nisida  ^nd  Ischia.  It  chanced  that  Mr.  Gladstone 
was  in  Naples,  and  moved  by  the  rumours  of  their  sufferings, 
he  penetrated  to  the  convict  stations  in  disguise.  Here  he 
found  the  prisoners,  men  of  stainless  life,  ex-cabinet  minis- 
ters, authors,  barristers,  chained  to  common  prisoners  and 
living  in  hideous  degradation.  He  wrote  (April  1851)  an 
indignant  letter  to  the  Earl  of  Aberdeen,  and  threatened  the 
Neapolitan  government  to  publish  it,  unless  it  treated  its 
prisoners  with  more  humanity.  When  Ferdinand  seemed 
defiant,  the  letter  and  a sequel  were  published  in  London, 
and  eleven  editions  were  exhausted  in  the  year.  They  were 
a damning  indictment  of  the  tyranny : “ it  is  not  mere  im- 
perfection,^ not  corruption  in  low  quarters,  not  occasional 
severity;  it  is  incessant,  systematic,  deliberate  violation  of 
the  law  by  the  Power  appointed  to  maintain  it.”  He  en- 
dorsed the  Italian  sentiment  that  the  government  of  Naples 
was  “ the  negation  of  God.”  He  estimated  the  number  of 
political  prisoners  at  15,000  at  least;  he  showed  that  even 
VOL.  I. 


2 A 


370  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

the  old  law  prior  to  the  Statute  was  violated  on  every  hand ; 
that  thousands  were  arrested  without  warrant ; that  men 
lay  in  prison  sixteen  or  more  months  before  trial ; that 
perjury  and  forgery  were  every-day  incidents  of  the  prose- 

cutionsd  , 

The  letters  sent  a shudder  of  disgust  through  Europe,  j 
But  unabashed  by  his  utter  discredit,  the  King  flaunted  his 
contempt  for  civilized  opinion  by  a new  series  of  political 
trials.  Forty-six  artisans  were  arrested  for  resisting  the 
loyalist  mob  at  the  famous  demonstration  more  than  three 
years  before  (December  1851);  and  more  than  half  the 
accused  were  sentenced  to  eighteen  years  in  irons.  Another 
batch  of  over  300  prisoners,  including  a score  of  ex-deputies,  j 
were  charged  with  various  oflences  dating  from  the  Counter-  1 
revolutiom  The  same  farce  of  justice  was  acted  again; 
the  judges  were  submissive,  for  nearly  half  had  been  re- 
moved for  refusing  to  obey  the  King’s  orders ; the  informa- 
tion was  laid  by  a man  five  times  sentenced  for  fraud,  and 
on  his  e^ddence  twenty-five  of  the  defendants  were  condemned. 
During  the  four  years  that  followed  the  Counter-revolution 
the  victims  of  the  government  must  be  reckoned  by  ten^  of 
thousands.  Even  the  apologists  of  the  government  did  not 
attempt  to  deny  that  the  number  of  political  prisoners  at 
a time  ranged  from  2000  to  4^^^-  There  is  reason  to 
believe  that  Mr.  Gladstone  understated  the  number,  and 
that  some  40,000  were  brought  before  various  courts  on 
pohtical  charges.^ 

The  Tuscan  reaction  had  nothing  of  the  savagery  which 
followed  the  return  of  the  Pope  and  Ferdinand.  But  it 
repeated  even  to  excess  the  feebleness  and  meanness  and 
indecision,  which  had  characterized  the  policy  of  Tuscany 
for  the  past  thirty-five  years.  The  Counter-revolution  had 

1 Gladstone,  Two  Letter z,  1-14 ; Nisco,  Ferdiwindo  II.,  302  ; see  Gondon, 

De  Vetat  des  chases,  98-99.  x ^ r. 

2 Leopardi,  op.  cit.,  425,  428  ; Gladstone,  op.  cit.,  lo-ii,  42  ; Id.,  Examina-. 
tion,  26-31  ; De  Cesare,  Scialoja,  92;  Lacava,  Basilicata,  2;  Senior,  Journals,^ 
II.  17  ; Detailed  Expoyare,  31-36  ; Tivaroni,  V Italia,  I.  232-234.  The  govern- 
ment’s figures  may  be  found  in  Un  italiano,  Risposta,  10,  12  Rassegna  deg  i 
errori,  24;  and  a contradictory  estimate  in  Baillie-Cochrane,  Young  Italy,  226. 


THE  REACTION 


371 


been  popular ; partly  because  the  peasants  had  been  lashed 
into  an  unreasoning  fanaticism  of  loyalty,  partly  because  the 
moderate  Liberals  hoped  that  the  Grand  Duke’s  return 
would  save  the  country  alike  from  rough  radicalism  and  an 
Austrian  occupation.  The  Tuscan  Liberals  were,  as  Ricasoli 
called  them,  “ boys  without  sense  or  character  or  tact  ” • 
they  had  miserably  failed  to  play  their  part;  they  had 
allowed  the  Revolution  to  end  in  feeble  collapse,  and  cared 
more  for  their  own  persons  and  property  than  for  leaving 
any  noble  example  and  seed  of  future  effort.  The  notables 
who  had  formed  the  Commission  of  Government,  found  them- 
selves fronted  by  a republican  revolt  at  Leghorn  and  the 
more  serious  danger  of  imminent  Austrian  invasion  They 
were  still  sanguine  that  they  could  stave  off  the  latter,  if 
they  could  bring  Leghorn  to  heel,  and  rob  the  Austrians'  of 
their  most  specious  pretext  for  intervention.  They  begged 
France  and  England  to  send  ships  to  tame  the  insur- 
rection, and  France  might  have  acceded  but  for  the  Grand 
Dukes  opposition.  They  turned  to  Piedmont,  but  except 
to  punish  some  insults  to  its  own  flag,  the  Turin  govern- 
ment refused  to  intervene,  unless  Naples  cooperated  and 
Leopold  gave  his  sanction.^  The  Grand  Duke  was  already 
pledged  to  Austria;  papers  found  after  his  flight  ten  years 
later  juove  that  he  had  already  concerted  plans  of  invasion 
with  Radetzky.2  This  however  was  carefully  masked- 
and  when  the  deputies  of  the  obsequious  Commission  reached 
him  at  Gaeta,  he  promised  to  restore  the  constitution  in 
the  mam,  and  tacitly  suggested  that  the  Austrian  invasion 
had  no  countenance  from  himself.  But  Serristori,  a weak 
disinpnuous  coward,  whom  he  had  sent  as  his  Commissioner 
DO  hlorence,  knew  that  the  Austrian  occupation  had  been 
lecided  on.  D’Aspre’s  brigade,  which  had  already  occupied 
.he  Lumgiana  and  restored  it  to  the  Duke  of  Modena 
irossed  the  frontier  (April  5),  and  occupying  Lucca,  advanced 
*^.1  TV  republican  city  made  but  brief  resistance, 

md  D Aspre  allowed  his  men  to  plunder  and  murder,  and 


Jticordi,  ,59-178 ; Gennarelli, 
venture,  26,  37,  40-45  ; Menabrea,  mgociations,  46. 

Gennarelli,  op.  dt.,  56,  61,  95. 


372 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


levied  taxes  as  in  a conquered  country.  The 
ancrered  and  frightened  the  Tuscans;  even  the  expiring 
Commission  made  a tardy  atonement  hy  ^ 

test.  Serristori,  backing  the  Grand  Duke  s dupRcity  de 
1 arl  flint  the  Austrians  came  uninvited,  and  DAspre, 
Settled  by  the  falsehood,  proclaimed  that  he  had  marched 
S rfsponle  to  the  Grand  Duke’s  summons.  Even  Leopo  d 
himself  was  uneasy  at  the  steady  Austrian  advance , m va 
he  h^ed  D’Aspre  not  to  occupy  Florence  and  confine  his 
he  Deggeu  districts.  He  was  afraid  of  the 

p^ed  complfmt-  .»d 

L howed  submissively  to  their  orders.  DAspre  entere 

pCre  on  m“,  as,  U-  »Ui«*  “ 

" ‘ o”n  ihTaamo  Loopold'a  no.  ““‘'J J>»‘ 

Sool t o„o  th.  C«n.utn.i.n,  if  .k.,  odd  do  » n* » 
friction  with  the  Grand  Duke.  They  were  afraid  to  let  the 
Austrian  garrison  go,  but  they  tried  to  uce  J ° . j 
troops  as  possible.  Though  they 

undCT  pressure  from  D’Aspre,  they  promised,  Leopold  con 
rnting  to  restore  the  national  guard  and  eventually  summom 
parliament.  They  made  what  resistance 
T)’A«>r)re’s  hectoring  demands,  and  saved 

that  he  wished  to  impose.  At  the  end_of  _ July  Leopoia 
returned  welcomed  with  enthusiastic  rejoicings  a n 
and  Pisa  and  Florence.  He  still  clung  to  the  «ame  “ 
ous  uncertain  policy;  he  was  hr 

subjLtt^'The  oM  patdaicM  rations,  that  had  jjarec 

£ SlUneTt^^^^ 

falLned  peasants.  He  shrank  from  unpopular  measures 

ITT  rCr- 


1 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  VI.  185. 


THE  REACTION  373 

his  mildness  showed  itself  in  a comprehensive  amnesty ; and 
though  he  restricted  the  freedom  of  the  press  and  withdrew 
political  offences  from  the  ordinary  courts,  journalism  and 
literature  were  still  allowed  considerable  freedom,  and  the  new 
laws  were  issued  subject  to  the  approval  of  parliament.  He 
would,  have  liked  to  wait  on  events,  but  his  engagements  to 
Austria  forced  his  hands.  He  dared  not  alienate  her ; he 
had  been  taunted  with  disloyalty  to  the  Hapsburgs ; D’Aspre 
had  treated  him  with  scant  ceremony,  and  worried  the 
timid  man  of  peace  into  appearing  in  the  uniform  of  an 
Austrian  general.  He  had  meekly  accepted  the  loss  of  the 
Lunigiana;  he  concluded  a military  convention  with  Austria, 
which  bound  him  to  maintain  an  army  of  occupation,  and 
meant  the  practical  reduction  of  the  Grand  Duchy  to  a 
dependant  state.  And  though  he  was  still  reluctant  to 
repeal  the  constitution,  in  deference  to  Francis  Joseph’s 
reproaches  he  indefinitely  suspended  it  and  dissolved  the 
Chamber.  Had  there  been  any  strenuous  affection  for  the 
Statute,  he  might  have  hesitated.  But  the  peasants  in 
their  hatred  of  the  Liberals  had  welcomed  the  Austrians,  and 
even  Florence  had  given  Radetzky  an  enthusiastic  welcome. 
In  the  cities  indeed  the  Liberals  were  still  strong ; and  the 
Municipal  Councils  boldly  protested  against  the  suspension 
of  the  Statute.  But  the  old  divisions  in  their  ranks  made 
united  action  impossible ; and  Ricasoli  himself  accepted  a 
medal  to  commemorate  the  downfall  of  the  republic.  Con- 
scious that  they  were  a minority,  the  Tuscan  Liberals 
showed  even  more  than  their  wonted  feebleness,  and  were 
readier  to  cringe  for  the  Grand  Duke’s  favours  than  strive 
for  the  liberties  they  had  deserved  so  little  and  lost  so 
Hghtly, 

The  suspension  of  the  Statute  introduced  a rule  of 
severity,  such  as  Tuscany  had  rarely  known.  It  was  indeed 
still  mild  in  comparison  with  that  of  Rome  or  Naples  or 
Milan ; but  it  was  yet  farther  removed  from  the  old  Tuscan 
tolerance.  Ultramontanism  for  the  first  time  gained  a 
footing  in  the  state.  The  government  promised  the  Pope 
to  suppress  any  Protestant  propagandism,^  and  Count  Giiicci- 

1 Gennarelli,  Capitoli,  xlvi. 


374  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

ardini,  descendant  of  the  historian  and  brother-in-law  of 
Ridolfi,  was  imprisoned  for  meeting  with  others  to  read  an 
unauthorized  translation  of  the  Bible.  A husband  and  wife 
named  Madiai,  were  severely  sentenced  for  proselytismg 
Protestantism,  and  it  was  only  the  repeated  protests  o 
England,  France,  and  Prussia,  that  got 

commuted  into  exile.  The  government  could  “^ed  boast 
that  no  one  except  Guerrazzi  suffered  for  the  troubles  of 
1849;  hut  Guerrazzi’s  trial  was  sufficient  scandal  m m 
Tuscany.  Harshly,  perhaps  treacherously,  treated  by  t 
CommiLion  of  Go^rnment,  he  had  been  taken  to  Vo  terra, 
to  save  him  from  the  Austrians.  The  trial  long  delaye  , 
was  an  act  of  supremest  folly;  for  Guerrazzi s able  defence 
was  a damning  exposure  of  the  Grand  Dukes  cowar 
and  treachery  in  1849-  The  sentence 
till  July  1853,  and  Guerrazzi  was  rewarded  by  exile  tor 
life  for  Ling  the  country  from  anarchy.  Meanwhile  every 
manifestation  of  patriotism  was  suppressed.  But  tor  Pied- 
montese protests,  the  government  would  made  a festiva 

of  the  anniversary  of  Novara.  In  1851,  when  the  i^nnua 
service  for  the  dead  of  Curtatone  was  bemg  celebrated  at 
Santa  Croce,  it  was  interrupted  by  an  attack  of  Austrian 
soldiers  and  Tuscan  police,  who  fired  on 
arrested  hundreds,  even  threatenmg  the  venerable  Cappom 
But  there  was  no  persistent  repression;  and  though  at  last 
the  constitutional  farce  was  concluded,  and  the  Statute 
formally  repealed  (May  1852),  the  government  was  still 
comparatively  Liberal  for  those  days  of  reaction.  T 
abolition  of  the  last  remnants  of  protectim,  soine  care 
education,  the  despatch  of  products  to 

marked  an  absence  of  the  darkness  that  obscured  the  South 
of  Italy. 


Lombardy  and  Venetia  were  under  a relentless  pretorian 
rule  The  war  had  had  one  heroic  sequel  here:  Brescia 
rose  as  soon  as  the  Austrians  invaded  Piedmont  and  made 
a noble  resistance  of  ten  days,  till  Haynau  crushed  it  with 
atrocities,  whose  horror  rang  through  Europe.  Haynau  wa^ 
only  the  worst  example  of  the  brutal  generals,  who  ground 


THE  KEACTION  375 

the  provinces  under  their  heel.  The  army  had  saved  the 
Empire;  it  was  an  easy  transition  for  Kadetzky’s  staff  to 
think  that  the  army  was  the  Empire.  The  Marshal  was 
practically  dictator,  and  he  looked  on  the  Lombards  as  a 
conquered  race  to  be  crushed  and  plundered.  Men  were 
shot  in  batches  for  possessing  arms;  prisoners  under  ex- 
amination were  bastinadoed,  and  a professor  of  Padua  died 
under  the  lash ; when  the  Milanese  hissed  a garrison 
prostitute  for  flaunting  the  Austrian  colokirs  on  her  balcony, 
Radetzky  flogged  fifteen  of  the  demonstrators,  including  two 
young  girls.  In  the  two  years  1848-49  it  was  estimated 
that  nearly  4000  prisoners  were  sentenced  for  political 
offences.  The  common  crime,  that  dogged  the  Austrian 
occupation  everywhere,  was  punished  with  a severity  that 
brought  disrepute  on  justice;  and  over  a hundred  were 
shot  for  one  outbreak  of  brigandage.  And  while  Radetzky 
flogged  and  shot  the  populace,  he  attacked  the  aristocracy, 
who  boycotted  his  officers.  In  defiance  of  the  amnesty  of 
September  1848,  in  defiance  of  the  promises  to  the  Pied- 
montese government  in  the  following  summer,  eighty-six 
refugees  were  forbidden  to  return.  Even  the  priests  were 
struck  at,  and  the  bishops  had  orders  to  deprive  of  their 
cures  any  who  were  suspected  of  disloyal  sentiments. 

But  Radetzky’s  brutality  was  too  intolerable  even  for 
the  government  at  Vienna,  which  still  professed  a constitu- 
tional policy;  and  though  it  did  not  dare  to  break  with 
him,  it  tried  to  curb  him.  Karl  von  Schwarzenberg, 
brother  of  the  Austrian  premier,  was  appointed  Lieutenant 
of  Lombardy  (October  1849),  with  instructions  that  were 
themselves  a condemnation  of  the  military  rule.  The  press 
was  allowed  some  freedom,  and  von  Schwarzenberg  had  an 
organ  of  his  own,  which  mercilessly  criticized  the  Marshal’s 
iniquitous  despotism.  He  succeeded  in  checking  the  mili- 
tary courts,  and  thwarted  Radetzky’s  monstrous  intention  to 
sequestrate  the  estates  of  the  refugees.  But  the  Lieutenant 
was  no  match  for  Radetzky’s  persistency,  and  after  a 
fifteen  months’  struggle,  he  resigned.  Henceforward  the 
Marshal  was  left  unchecked;  his  nominee  and  puppet, 
Strassoldo,  succeeded  to  von  Schwarzenberg’s  post ; another 


376  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

partisan  was  made  Lieutenant  of  Venetia;  the  press  was 
worried,  till  one  paper  after  another  dropped  out  of  exis- 
tence; and  again  men  were  shot  by  court-martial  for 
circulating  revolutionary  literature.  Lombardy  did  what  it 
could  to  protest  against  the  wanton  barbarian  who  scourged 
her.  When  the  young  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  visited 
Venice  and  Milan,  the  theatres  were  deserted  and  the  whole 
population  held  indignantly  aloof.  The  Town  Council  of 
Como  refused  to  render  homage,  and  Radetzky  had  its 
Clerk  hung  on  a trivial  pretext.  Never  had  the  gulf 
between  government  and  governed  been  so  wide.  Down 
to  1848  the  Austrian  rule  had  been  hard  and  un- 
sympathetic, but  it  had  a stern  justice,  that  contrasted 
well  with  the  other  Italian  governments.  Now  it  had 
become  wantonly,  brutally  cruel,  with  a semi-barbarian 
delight  in  ignoring  its  subjects’  barest  rights.  And  thus 
it  sealed  its  doom.  It  was  the  sullen  anger  of  a trampled 
race  even  more  than  the  memories  of  1848,  that  umted  the 
people  in  one  strong  resentment,  that  roused  the  apathetic 
peasants,  that  kept  conspiracy  alive  through  all  the  fierce 
repression,  and  when  wiser  counsels  at  last  ruled  the 
Austrian  government,  made  repentance  come  too  late. 

Romagna  had  practically  become  an  Austrian  province. 
Though  Bedini,  the  Papal  Commissioner,  was  nominally  in 
power,  Gorzowsky  and  his  generals,  who  commanded  the 
Austrian  garrisons,  paid  small  attention  either  to  him  or 
to  the  ministers  at  Rome.  They  rated  the  Papal  authorities, 
assuming  not  without  reason  that  they  spoke  from  a higher 
plane  of  civilization ; and  Bedini  and  his  officials,  knowing 
well  that  their  power  would  not  live  a day  if  the 
Austrians  went,  were,  except  for  brief  fits  of  restiveness, 
ever  ready  to  abate  their  dignity.^  But  there  was  no 
difference  between  Bedini  and  Gorzowsky  in  thinking  a : 
reign  of  terror  necessary.  The  state  of  siege  was  every-' 
where  in  force ; men  were  sent  to  prison  for  “ being  ill- . 
affected  in  politics,”  for  “ appearing  inclined  to  novelty,  for 
“ being  too  loquacious.”  The  peasants,  smarting  under  the 

^ Gennarelli,  Govemo  pontificio,  I.  597  ! Farini,  Roman  State,  IV.  269. 


THE  REACTION  3;; 

tyranny,^  made  common  cause  with  the  brigands,  who  had 
started  into  active  life  under  the  misrule,  and  became  in 
turn  their  prey,  when  Gorzowsky's  disarmament  of  the 
population  put  the  scattered  farmers  at  their  mercy.  The 
brigands’  terrorism  rivalled  the  government’s ; they  sacked 
a town,  they  caught  an  audience  at  a theatre  and  emptied 
every  pocket.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Austrian  courts  shot 
men  by  the  score  for  possession  of  arms  or  petty  theft. 
Brigandage  was  the  fatal  symptom  of  the  rottenness  with 
which  all  the  fabric  of  Papal  government  was  struck. 

The  Duchies  of  the  Po  valley  were  more  than  ever 
satellites  of  Austria.  Francis  V.  of  Modena  and  Charles  Louis 
of  Parma  had  been  brought  back  by  Austrian  troops  and 
ruled  by  virtue  of  their  swords.  Austrian  generals  com- 
manded their  forces,  Austrians  sat  in  their  courts-martial; 
and  though  Francis  might  fidget  under  their  constraint,' 
Radetzky  could  always  bring  the  Dukes  to  heel  by  holding 
up  the  spectre  of  revolution.  Francis  was  no  tyrant  as  his 
father;  less  able  than  he,  he  was  less  cruel  and  ambitious. 
He  was  a small-minded,  impatient,  restless  prince;  like 
Ferdinand  of  Naples,  the  despair  of  his  ministers,  who 
found  the  whole  order  of  the  administration  turned  out  of 
its  course  by  the  meddlesomeness  of  the  not  ill-meaning 
but  supremely  foolish  man,  who  believed  himself  a pro- 
vidence on  earth  to  his  little  state;  who  attempted  to 
cheeky  immorality  by  sentences  that  brought  discredit  on 
morality;  whose  chirografi  overrode  the  decisions  of  his 
courts,  and  attempted  to  do  impossible  justice  between 
subject  and  subject  on  the  dictates  of  the  moment’s  whim.^ 
There  was  little  wanton  cruelty  in  Francis’  nature;  and 
though  the  sentences  on  the  Liberals  were  many  and  severe, 
though  the  Duke  took  ruthless  vengeance  on  the  peasants, 
who  had  made  merry  in  the  ducal  preserves,  there  was  no 
capital  punishment  for  political  offences,  and  compared  with 
Austrian  savagery  in  Lombardy  and  Romagna,  the  reaction 
was  mild  at  Modena. 

In  Parma,  on  the  other  hand,  the  tyranny  broke  all 

^ Any  barrister,  who  lost  three  cases,  was  suspended : Tivaroni,  op.  eit.,  I.  124. 


378  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

bonds  of  decency.  Charles  Louis,  after  declaring  void 
every  act  of  the  Provisional  Government,  abdicated  in 
favour  of  his  son,  Charles  III.  (March  14,  1849).  The 
young  Duke  was  a brutish  shameless  rake,  without^  his 
father’s  varnish  of  artistic  taste,  who  regarded  his  subjects 
as  the  puppets  of  his  capriciousness  and  cruelty.  The 
promised  constitution  was  forgotten ; Parma  was  placed 
permanently  in  a state  of  siege,  the  Universities  were 
closed,  the  members  of  the  Provisional  Government  mulcted 
in  heavy  fines.  These  measures  however  had  their  analogies 
in  other  states ; the  speciality  of  Charles  HP’s  reaction  lay 
in  its  oriental  wantonness.  Civil  servants,  professors,  trades- 
men, lawyers  were  compelled  to  shave  beards  and  musta- 
choes  and  wear  their  hair  short ; magistrates  had  to  appear 
in  fantastic  uniforms ; law}^ers  and  doctors  ^ might  not 
practise  without  certificates  of  satisfactory  political  conduct. 
All  minerals  were  declared  state  property  and  leased  to 
Ward.  To  punish  the  farmers,  who  as  a body  had  sided 
with  the  revolution,  they  were  forbidden  to  dismiss  a 
labourer  without  licence  from  an  oflicial.^  Two  rich 
monastic  houses  were  dissolved  for  suspected  Liberalism, 
and  Rome,  which  placed  Piedmont  under  ban  for  sup- 
pressing its  monasteries,  had  no  words  of  reproof  for  the 
faithful  profligate.  But  most  maddening  incident  of  the 
tyranny  was  the  reign  of  the  lash,  beside  which  the 
brutalities  of  Radetzky’s  officers  are  pale.  Three  hundred 
men  were  pubhcly  whipped  in  the  first  five  months  of  the 
prince’s  rule ; they  were  flogged  for  singing  patriotic  songs, 
for  “persuading  an  Austrian  officer  to  get  drunk,”  for 
criticizing  the  Duke’s  decrees,  for  possessing  a Liberal  pam- 
phlet or  a Turin  newspaper.  A servant  at  court  was 
whipped  to  death  for  a jest  on  Charles’  baby  son.  The 
ducal  hands  themselves  caned  in  the  face  passers-by,  who 
did  not  raise  their  hats.  It  is  httle  wonder,  if  in  after  days 
the  Parmesans  took  the  savage  revenge  of  goaded  men. 

To  a superficial  observer  the  position  of  Austria  seemed 
stronger  than  ever.  She  had  recovered  from  seemingly; 

1 Borhoni  di  Parma,  IV.  19-28,  52-55  ; VIII.  passim. 


THE  REACTION 


379 

i hopeless  disruption,  she  had  crushed  rebellion  in  Hungary 
and  Italy,  and  stood  at  her  old  borders.  The  champion  of 
, triumphant  reaction,  she  had  the  prestige  of  victory,  while 
her  foes  were  dispirited  by  the  disillusionings  and  the 
wrecked  hopes  of  the  last  two  years.  In  Germany  she 
had  humiliated  Prussia ; in  Italy  her  influence  was  pre- 
dominant through  half  the  peninsula.  Common  danger 
had  rallied  the  princes  to  her  side,  and  made  them  half 
forget  their  old  suspicions.  They  were  ready  to  be  her 
satellites,  if  only  they  could  count  on  her  armies  to  cow 
their  own  subjects  down.  Naples  indeed  held  aloof.  But 
; Modena  and  Parma  were  practically  Austrian  provinces ; 
i Tuscany  was  almost  a dependant  state,  and  though  the 
Pope  s writ  ran  in  Romagna,  the  real  governor  was  the 
I Austrian  general  Gorzowsky.  Towards  Rome,  her  policy 
I had  radically  changed,  and  though  the  Papal  court  still 
i feared  her  designs  on  Romagna,  its  interests  were  too  much 
: identified  with  hers  to  allow  of  serious  umbrage,  and  it  was 
1 glad  to  play  her  off  against  the  hated  patronage  of  France. 

I Alike  at  Rome  and  Florence  and  Modena  the  statesmen  of 
: the  reaction  were  conscious  of  their  weakness.  They  knew 
that  the  revolution  had  been  tamed  for  the  moment,  only 
to  show  its  head  again,  and  that  the  only  hope  of  successful 
resistance  lay  in  union.  Tuscany  and  Modena  must  no 
longer  quarrel  over  the  Lunigiana,  Naples  must  abandon 
I its  ambition  to  absorb  the  Marches.  The  old  rivalries,  the 
old  jealousy  of  Austria,  the  rival  bids  for  popularity  must 
be  forgotten;  and  Austrian  arms  must  save  the  princes 
from  their  subjects’  constraining  pressure. 

I The  Italians,  Felix  von  Schwarzenberg  argued,  were 
junfit  for  representative  institutions,  which  led  to  attacks 
bn  Austria  and  what  the  statesmen  of  the  reaction  were 
•ipleased  to  call  anarchy.  Municipal  and  provincial  liber- 
ties on  a narrow  franchise  were  better  suited  to  the  needs 
.md  traditions  of  Italy,  as  they  interpreted  them.  But  the 
I lew  scheme  of  government  was  not  to  be  purely  obscuran- 
list.  Councils  of  State  and  an  independent  Bench  might 
)e  tolerated.  While  the  democracy  was  kept  in  bonds  by 
I he.  twofold  chain  of  police  severity  and  clerical  education, 


380  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

paternal  government  would  promote  the  moral  and  material 
welfare  of  the  people.  But  the  red  spectre  of  socialism  and 
scepticism  had  a ridiculous  terror  for  the  statesmen  of  a 
country,  where  both  were  practically  unknown.  The  very 
foundations  of  society,  so  they  believed  or  professed  to 
believe,  were  endangered.^  Much  of  it  was  fear  of  con- 
stitutional government,  masked  under  a rehgious  show, 
much  of  it  was  care  for  loaves  and  fishes.  But  between 
the  Liberals  and  Catholics  ran  at  bottom  the  fundamental 
cleavage.  To  the  devotees  Liberalism  meant  the  loosening 
of  religion;  and  though  often  scandalized  by  the  corrup- 
tion of  the  Roman  court,  they  feared  that  any  blow  to 
the  Papacy  might  be  a blow  to  the  church  and  all  that 
the  church  safeguarded.  Between  the  two  schools  lay 
deep  difference  of  creed  as  to  the  sanction  of  morality ; 
Catholics,  who  believed  that  authority  and  tradition  were 
its  only  bulwarks,  thought  that  if  once  men  ceased  to 
walk  in  the  strait  path  of  the  church,  they  might  be 
tempted  to  the  abyss  where  walked  unclean  things.  They 
dreaded  free  inquiry,  the  contempt  of  forms,  the  ques- 
tioning of  institutions  indissolubly,  so  they  believed, 
bound  up  with  more  precious  things.  Only  the  strict 
exercise  of  paternal  authority  could  guard  the  young  from 
wilful  and  hurtful  ways ; education  might  be  a curse,  unless 
the  clergy  controlled  religious  teaching  and  forced  the 
pupils  into  religious  conformity ; civil  marriage  meant  the 
possibility  of  divorce,  and  divorce  the  unhallowing  of  wed- 
lock. They  had  rather  that  immorality  should  be  punished 
by  sentences  that  revolted  common  feeling,  than  that  erring 
human  nature  should  be  left  to  correct  itself.  Virtue 
must  be  nursed  in  swathing  bands  by  the  jealous  protectior 
of  the  state ; and  above  all,  the  Papacy  must  be  held^  ir 
its  high  preeminence,  as  the  fountain-head  of  authority 
Behind  the  men  and  women,  who  thought  thus,  lay  th( 
enthusiasm  of  Catholic  devotees  throughout  the  world,  t(| 
whom  the  Papacy  was  Catholic  rather  than  Italian,  whd 

1 Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  VI.  303-308;  VII.  9-17;  Gennarelli,  Missiom 
60-70;  Baldasseroni,  Leopoldo  II.,  444-449;  Bayard  de  Volo,  Francetco  V 
I.  416. 


THE  REACTION  381 

cared  nothing  for  Italian  aspirations  but  much  for  the  glory 
of  the  tiara,  and  felt  a chivalrous  desire  to  defend  a vener- 
able and  splendid  name,  whose  own  resources  of  defence  had 
proved  so  feeble. 

The  statesmen  of  the  Reaction  endorsed  these  theories 
with  a zeal  that  was  half-sincere,  half-inspired  by  a sense 
of  its  usefulness.^  The  outward  sign  of  the  Catholic- 
monarchical  union  was  to  be  a new  League.  Already  in 
the  summer  of  1850  the  Duchies  had  renewed  their 
commercial  treaties  with  Austria,  who  had  coerced  them 
into  a reluctant  acceptance  of  an  one-sided  union  by  the 
threat  of  losing  her  potection.  Felix  von  Schwarzenberg 
wished  to  expand  this  into  a political  League,  to  embrace 
all  the  reactionary  states  of  Italy,  Austria  entering  in 
respect  of  her  Italian  provinces.  The  programme  of  the 
League  was  to  be  common  action  against  Liberals  and  the 
press,  the  creation  of  a federal  army,  a pledge  from  the 
contracting  parties  to  concede  neither  national  guard  nor 
right  of  public  meeting,  and  make  no  reform  unless  it  were 
given  pari  passu  in  all  the  federated  states.  The  scheme 
was  warmly  espoused  by  Baldasseroni,  the  Tuscan  premier ; 
and  Parma  and  Rome  were  ready  to  fall  into  line  (October- 
December  1850).  But  Francis  of  Modena  looked  askance 
on  its  more  progressive  provisions,  and  the  King  of  Naples, 
suspicious  of  the  Austrian  influence,  and  scorning  what  he 
regarded  as  a truckling  to  Liberalism,  steadfastly  refused 
to  come  in.  His  opposition  took  the  strength  out  of  the 
project,  and  though  the  informal  understanding  between 
Austria  and  the  Dukes  remained  strong  as  ever,  the  League 
remained  an  abortive  scheme.  The  only  fragments  that 
came  to  maturity,  besides  the  commercial  union,  were  a 
postal  convention,  which  gave  Austria  opportunities  of  opening 
the  correspondence  of  the  nationalists,  and  a railway  treaty 
to  connect  the  trunk  lines  of  Tuscany  and  Romagna  with 
those  of  Lombardy. 

In  spiritual  matters  the  theories,  that  underlay  the 
League,  had  more  positive  results.  The  cooperation  of  the 

^ Baldasseroni  thought  the  Papacy  “ a kind  of  galvanized  corpse” : Bianchi, 
Matteucci,  417. 


382  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


Catholic  church  was  indispensable  to  the  statesmen,  who 
recognized  what  a mighty  bulwark  the  Pope’s  authority, 
reaching  through  the  priesthood  to  every  corner  of  the  land, 
would  be.  To  win  its  protection,  Austria  and  Tuscany  were 
ready  to  surrender  their  cherished  ecclesiastical  indepen- 
dence and  undo  the  work  of  Joseph  II.  and  Leopold. 
Tuscany  was  the  first  to  capitulate.  Negotiations  for  a 
concordat  had  been  proceeding  since  the  days  of  Pius 
early  glory,  and  Ridolfi  had  been  prepared  to  make  large 
concessions  as  the  price  of  winning  him  to  the  I^i^eral 
League.  The  Grand  Duke,  when  at  Gaeta,  had  placed  his 
feeble  conscience  in  the  Pope’s  keeping,  and  proba,bly  returned 
to  Florence  under  pledge  to  change  his  ecclesiastical  laws. 
He  would  even,  had  his  ministers  allowed  him,  have  for- 
bidden the  exercise  of  Protestant  and  Jewish  worship._  ^ His 
cabinet  were  not  so  forward  to  surrender  the  traditional 
Tuscan  tolerance,  but  they  were  willing  to  give  very 
much  to  draw  Rome  into  the  reactionary  League,  and, 
outflanked  by  Leopold’s  defection,  Baldasserom  signed  a 
Concordat,  which  gave  Rome  most  of  what  she  asked  for 
(April  25  1851).  Bishops  were  left  free  in  their  corre- 

spondence with  the  Holy  See;  they  were  given  the  censor- 
ship over  all  religious  publications;  ecclesiastical  courts 
were  established  to  take  cognizance  of  heresy  and  sacrilege, 
of  cases  relating  to  marriages  and  betrothals.  But  the 
surrender  was  not  complete;  clericals  were  still  amenable 
to  the  common  law,  the  ordinary  censorship  remamed  m 
the  hands  of  the  civil  power,  and  Tuscan  traditions  were 
too  strong  to  allow  even  the  conceded  points  to  be  loyally 

observed.^  i 

Austria  followed  suit.  It  was  impossible  for  the  champion 

of  temporal  reaction  to  have  the  church’s  finger  pointed  at 
her  as  the  enemy  of  its  claims.  Though  she  still  remamed 
the  irritating  patroness  of  the  Papacy,  and  showed  no  mch- 
nation  to  relax  her  hold  on  Romagna,  the  support  of  the 
clergy  was  necessary  to  the  government,  and  this  support 
must  he  purchased  by  surrendering  the  old  subordmation 


1 Baldasseronl,  op.  cit,  428.  592  ; Ranalli,  Utorie,  IV.  319-321  ; Biancbi, 
op.  cit.,  VI.  384-390;  VII.  31-41  ; Balan,  Continuazione,  I.  777- 


! THE  REACTION  383 

j of  church  to  state.  Already  in  1850  the  government  had 
I given  the  bishops  freedom  to  correspond  with  Rome,  and 
j promised  under  certain  circumstances  to  lend  the  civil  arm 
j in  support  of  ecclesiastical  discipline.  The  Concordat  of 
I 1 8 5 5 marked  the  complete  surrender  of  the  government, 
lit  recognized  canon  law;  it  permitted  the  meeting  of 
I synods ; it  provided  for  Catholic  teaching  under  the  super- 
I vision  of  the  bishops  in  all  elementary  and  secondary 
I schools  ; it  gave  them  the  censorship  of  theological  literature 
I and  jurisdiction  in  matrimonial  cases;  it  allowed  ecclesiastical 
j courts  to  take  cognizance  of  all  civil  and  some  criminal 
leases,  to  which  a cleric  was  a party.  The  official  opposi- 
tion to  the  surrender  no  doubt  was  strong,  and  much  of  the 
concordat,  as  in  Tuscany,  remained  a dead-letter,  but  it 
showed  none  the  less  how  completely  the  ecclesiastical 
traditions  of  the  Empire  were  reversed. 

The  church  next  captured  Modena  in  its  triumphal 
progress.  Marriage  was  made  a purely  religious  rite,  the 
civil  act  being  abolished;  charities  were  placed  under  the 
i control  of  the  clergy,  gifts  in  mortmain  were  legalised,  sacri- 
lege was  made  a capital  offence.  Naples  was  the  last  to 
capitulate.  In  the  early  days  of  the  reaction  Ferdinand 
had  shown  little  disposition  to  bate  his  prerogative  to  the 
clergy,  and  his  ministers  had  warmly  supported  his  refusal 
jto  modify  the  relations  of  church  and  state.  But  he  could 
not  stand  alone  against  the  current,  and  in  1857  Naples 
jrestored  to  its  clergy  the  privileges,  of  which  Tannucci’s 
concordat  had  deprived  them.  In  the  repeal  of  the  mort- 
imain  laws,  in  the  holding  of  synods,  in  the  marriage  law, 
in  the  censorship  and  the  inspection  of  schools  ^ the  clergy 
won  the  powers  they  had  already  gained  through  all  Italy 
except  in  Parma  and  Piedmont. 

I Thus  was  launched  with  partial  success  the  great 
Ischeme  of  the  reactionary  alliance.  The  League,  had  it 
answered  to  Baldasseroni  s project,  had  its  elements  of 
|3trength.  Steady  government  and  the  destruction  of 
customs-barriers  would  have  given  an  impetus  to  trade, 

^ Nisco,  op.  cit,,  359~3^^*  Cookery  teachers  had  to  pass  an  examination 
n the  church  catechism. 


384  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

that  would  have  gone  far  to  content  the  country.  The 
tradesmen,  the  politically  careless,  the  rich  scared  by  the 
dread  of  socialism,  the  great  crowd  that  cared  for  quiet 
above  all  things  would  have  rallied  even  to  a tyranny, 
if  a strong  one.  The  Concordats  had  ranged  the  mighty 
organization  of  the  church  upon  its  side.  _ The  priests  had 
with  few  exceptions  shed  theh  brief  Liberalism  of  Fius 
early  days,  and  their  vast  influence  controlled  the  mass_  ot 
the  peasants  and  large  numbers  in  the  towns.  The  Austrian 
troops,  aided  by  Papal  mercenaries  and  the  Duke  ot 
Modena’s  peasant  volunteers,  were  able  to  put  down  mternal 
disturbances.  But  Baldasseroni  had  attempted  the  im- 
possible. The  Revolution  had  left  ideas  and  aspirations, 
which  might  come  in  time  to  break  even  the  church  s vast 
strength.  The  jealousies  of  the  different  states  tore  through 
the  reactionary  federation,  as  through  the  Liberal  Leagues 
of  two  years  before.  The  governments  were  too  rotten  for 
good  rule,  and  the  ideal  of  a benevolent  absolutism  vanished 
into  mockery  at  Rome  or  Parma  or  Milan.  And  between 
the  Ticino  and  the  Alps  Piedmont  was  gathering  her  forces 
for  the  inevitable  struggle,  where  victory  meant  annihilation 
alike  for  Austrian  domination  and  the  Temporal  Power. 


CHAPTER  XXII 
CA  VO  UR 
1850-51 

Diffi^lties  of  Piedmont;  the  Conservative  reaction;  parties  in  the 
Chamber ; Eattazzi.  D’Azeglio’s  policy  ; the  struggle  with  Eome  • 
the  Siccardi  Laws  ; Fransoni’s  defiance ; more  anti-clerical  mea- 
sures. Cavour  ; becomes  minister  ; his  financial  policy  ; Free  Trade. 

Baldassekoni  had  hoped  to  see  Piedmont  give  her  adhe- 
sion to  the  League.  It  indeed  seemed  doubtful,  whether 
she  could  be  true  to  her  free  institutions  with  reaction 
triumphant  all  around  her.  The  little  state  of  five  millions 
population  might  find  the  thirty-two  millions  of  Austria 
md  the  governmental  forces  of  all  Italy  arrayed  against 
ler.  Again  and  again  the  Viennese  statesmen  were 
.empted  to  cross  the  Ticino,  and  coerce  her  into  a 
>urrender  of  her  constitution.  She  had  her  own  elements 
)f  weakness  and  disunion,  for  at  Turin  and  in  some  of  the 
'Ountry  districts  the  clergy  swayed  large  numbers  of  the 
ilectors,  and  had  their  cue  from  Rome  to  raise  every 
iifficulty,  that  could  help  the  party  of  Austria  and  re- 
action. The  three  and  a half  million  illiterates  made  a 
hr  field  for  priestly  influence,  and  the  unteachahle  section 
f the  nobles  loved  Austria  and  Rome  more  than  their  own 
ountry.  All  the  trouble  and  unsettlement  of  a transitional 
me  was  on  the  nation.  The  problem  of  grafting  the  spirit 
f the  Statute  on  the  institutions  of  the  old  absolutism 
eeded  the  cunningest  of  hands.  The  authority  of  govern- 
lent  had  had  a shock  at  Novara,  from  which  it  could  not 
)on  recover ; the  baser  kind  of  refugees  brought  with  them 
1 alien  but  contagious  restlessness,  and  but  for  the  law- 
fiding  traditions  of  the  country,  the  danger  of  social  dis- 


386  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

orders  might  have  been  very  great.  The  harvests  were  had. 
and  though  there  was  an  outburst  of  commercial  activity, 
the  Austrian  League  threatened  to  place  Piedmontese  trade 
at  a disadvantage  in  the  markets  of  half  Italy.  Abroad 
there  was  little  practical  sympathy  for  Piedmont,  even  m 
France  and  England;  Prussia  and  Russia  lost  no  oppor- 
tunity to  parade  their  unfriendliness,  and  the  reactionaries 
of  all  Europe  pointed  the  finger  at  her,  as  a nest  of  turbu- 
lent demagogues,  that  menaced  the  peace  of  the  continent. 

The  policy  of  the  government  had  difficulties  enough  of  i 
its  own.  The  cabinet,  no  less  than  the  governments  of| 
Vienna  and  Naples,  had  made  its  boast  of  hostility  to  the 
Revolution,  had  noisily  dissociated  itself  from  Novara,  had 
recognized  all  the  limitations  and  conventionalities  that 
hound  a member  of  the  legitimate  governments  of  Europe, 
professing  scrupulous  respect  for  its  neighbours  frontiers 
and  forswearing  aggressive  schemes.  D’Azegho  had  indeed 
no  alternative ; it  was  impossible  to  maintam  the  policy  of 
1848-49  without  the  countenance  of  France,  and  the  whole- 
influence  of  the  French  government  was  being  exerted  tcj 
keep  Piedmont  quiet  and  discourage  her  aspirations.  But  il 
was  not  a very  noble  policy,  and  it  involved  ceaseless  mconf 
sistencies  and  contradictions.  Piedmont  might  be  willing, 
to  rest,  might  accept  Balbo’s  phrase  that  the  peace  was  , 
ten  years’  truce  ; but  the  government  knew  well,  that  whei 
the  chance  came  to  march  forward,  the  respect  for  he 
neighbour’s  frontiers  would  prove  mere  words.  At  present 
however  the  opposition  could  only  criticize  D Azegho  s prc 
gramme.  Before  the  Proclamation  of  Moncalieri,  parhamer 
had  stood  out  for  a franker  policy,  had  opposed  all  overture 
to  Austria,  had  wished  to  hold  high  the  flag  of  Ital;' 
regardless  of  the  outcry  of  diplomacy,  and  never  for 
moment  bate  the  claims  of  nationality.  But  the  democrail 
probably  never  represented  the  feelings  of  the  real  majorit; 
of  the  country;  hitherto  the  polls,  though  on  what  wil 
practically  a household  suffrage,  had  been  small,  and  tl; 
more  active  political  elements,  though  m a minority,  hr 
carried  their  own  way.  They  had  been  strong  in  the  midd» 
class— the  shopkeepers,  the  professional  men,  the  communil 


CAVOUR  3g7 

officials— but  there  was  a great  reserve  of  voters,  who  were 
conservative  because  of  priestly  influence  or  indifference  to 
the  democratic  ideal.  These  reserves  came  into  play  at  the 
election  of  December  1849,  and  the  Proclamation  of  Mon- 
caheri  was  only  one  of  many  influences,  that  contributed  to 
make  a Conservative  ^ majority  in  the  new  parliament. 

The  204  members  of  the  Piedmontese  Chamber  were  a 
standing  answer  to  the  taunt  that  Italians  were  not  fit  for 
representative  institutions.  They  were  grave,  hard-headed, 
patriotic.  Though  their  speeches  were  often  prolix  and 
pedantic,  mere  rhetoric  had  little  weight.  Except  for  rare 
coquettings  of  the  Extreme  Right  and  Extreme  Left,  there 
wa,s  too  much  political  sincerity  to  allow  of  mere  partisan- 
ship, and  a sense  of  their  country’s  difficulties  and  a 
common  faith  in  her  destiny  brought  all  sections  more  or 
less  together.  There  were  indeed  no  crystallized  parties; 
men  changed  rapidly  from  one  group  to  another,  some- 
times with  real  inconsistency.  The  ministerial  majority 
was  composed  of  sections  without  any  permanent  bond  of 
union. 

On  the  Extreme  Right  there  were  a few  reactionaries 
returned  almost  exclusively  from  Savoy;  in  the  Senate  they 
were  rather  stronger.  The  " codini”  would  willingly  have 
seen  the  Statute  overthrown ; they  held  that  “ the  duty  of  a 
Catholic  government  is  to  obey  and  protect  the  church  ” • 
they  bitterly  opposed  a forward  policy,  and  therefore  tried  to 
leep  the  army  small.  “ If  the  Piedmontese  are  Italians,” 
-he  Savoyards  threatened,  “ the  Alps  may  become  the  fron- 
;ier  between  Prance  and  Italy.”  ^ Though  they  supported 
he  ministry,  so  long  as  it  attacked  the  democrats,  they  took 
heir  orders  froin  Rome,  sometimes  from  Vienna.  Outside 
he^  Chamber  their  violent  press,  the  support  of  the  priests, 
heir  intrigues  among  the  peasants  gave  them  a consider- 
hle  followmg,  and  in  the  coming  quarrel  with  Rome  they 
eeruited  their  numbers  among  the  timid  devotees. 

The  majority  of  the  Right  were  moderate  constitution- 
lists,  who  had  loyally  accepted  the  Statute,  had  taken  part 

^ See  Vol.  II.,  Appendix  G. 

’ Brofferio,  Parlamento,  V.  707  ; Della  Margherita,  Avvedimenti,  273. 


388  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

in  the  war,  and  were  not  alien  to  the  hopes  of  Italian  Inde- 
pendence. But  they  were  ready  to  resist  any  movement, 
that  threatened  to  impah  Piedmontese  autonomy  or  transfer 
the  capital  from  Turin.^  They  were  a true  Conservative 
party,  dreading  the  democracy,  very  tender  to  the  preroga- 
tives of  the  church  and  the  rights  of  property,  for  the  most 
part  protectionists  in  fiscal  policy.  On  the  whole,  D’Azeglio  i 
belonged  to  them,  so  did  Balbo  and  Pinelli ; Cavour  was 
their  most  powerful  champion,  till  he  found  it  impossible  to 
0-0  with  them  on  ecclesiastical  or  fiscal  questions ; but  their 
real  leader  was  Revel,  a noble  of  Nice,  who  had  been  Finance 
Minister  from  1844  to  1848,  and  was  a capable,  patriotic, 
but  ultra-Conservative  statesman  of  the  old  school. 

The  Left  had  had  a considerable  majority  in  the  earlier 
parliaments,  and  still  were  sufficiently  strong  to  occasionally 
force  the  hands  of  the  government.  But  they  were  hetero- 
geneous and  divided,  shading  off  from  Moderate  Libeials, 
who  outside  ecclesiastical  questions  differed  little  from  the 
Moderate  Right,  to  extreme  radicals,  and  socialists  of  a mild  I 
type.  Their  foreign  policy  was  that  of  the  war-time,  and] 
they  refused  to  alter  it  in  altered  circumstances.  Theyi 
were  the  best  supporters  of  the  government  in  its  strugglej 
with  Rome,  its  unsparing  critics  when  it  leaned  to  com-i 
promise.  Their  social  programme  was  commonplace,  but 
none  the  less  valuable.  The  resolutions  that  were  passed 
by  the  Chamber  on  their  initiative  were  supremely  wise  and 
practical ; for  the  influences,  that  since  then  have  eater 
into  the  heart  of  Italian  politics,  were  already  nascent.  Ii 
the  days  of  their  power  they  pledged  the  Chamber  t( 
the  exclusion  of  salaried  officials,  to  the  reduction  of  civi^ 
pensions,  to  trial  by  jury;  they  nearly  carried  a Bill  fo  J 
payment  of  members.^  But  the  executive  shelved  their  re 
solutions;  some  were  left  for  the  next  generation  to  carru 
into  law,  others  are  still  unrealised,  and  for  lack  of  then; 
Italy  is  suffering  to-day.  But  however  much  they  migh' 
criticize  the  government,  they  were  never  thoroughly  hostile, 
they  were  unwilling  to  overthrow  it,  for  they  were  too  wea. 

1 Pallavicino,  Memorie,  II.  519  ; Tavallini,  Lanza,  I.  119. 

* Brofiferio,  op.  cit.,  I.  79,  169. 


CAVOUR  389 

to  take  office  themselves,  and  a ministerial  defeat  would 
I mean  a Revel  ministry.  The  Extreme  Left,  a small  group 
i of  thirty  members,  refused  to  go  beyond  this  partial  tolera- 
I tion  of  the  government ; but  their  doctrinaire  theories  and 
I inconsistent  practices,  the  suspicions  and  factiousness  of 
their  leaders  alienated  the  more  temperate  majority  of  the 
Left,  who  regarded  Valerio  s and  Brofferio  s policy  of  mere 
criticism  as  inopportune  and  unpatriotic.  The  common 
danger  was  too  great,  to  allow  strength  to  be  wasted  in 
disputes  with  men,  who  were  divided  from  them  by  a hair  s 
breadth.  They  had  been  partly  won  by  D’Azeglio’s  and  the 
King’s  loyalty  to  the  constitution ; and  as  they  slowly  came 
to  recognize  Cavour’s  real  Liberalism,  and  when  his  acces- 
sion to  the  ministry  became  a guarantee  for  its  progressive- 
I ness,  their  friendliness  grew  into  loyal  support.  Thus  was 
gradually  evolved  the  Left  Centre,  sharing  many  of  the 
opinions  of  the  Left,  but  parting  from  it  on  grounds  of  oppor- 
tunism. They  were  weak  numerically,  barely  more  than 
a score  of  deputies,  but  they  counted  in  their  ranks  some 
of  the  most  capable  men  in  the  Chamber. 

Their  leader  was  Rattazzi.  The  odium  of  Novara  still 
clung  to  him,  but  unprejudiced  observers  were  learning  that 
he  was  far  from  being  the  extremist,  whose  name  sounded 
so  ill  in  conservative  Europe.  In  fact  there  was  nothing 
of  the  democrat  in  him.  His  legalist  view,  his  belief  in 
order  and  authority,  his  suspicion  of  untried  paths  and 
dove  of  small  steps  and  administrative  detail  kept  him  at 
heart  a Moderate  Liberal.  He  was  a thin,  pedantic,  some- 
what acrid  man,  one  round  whom  lukewarm  friendships 
clustered  thick,  but  whose  sensitiveness  brooded  over  in- 
juries and  made  it  difficult  to  heal  old  grievances ; a man 
neither  firm  nor  strong,  who  often  surrendered  his  conscience 
to  his  party,  with  no  passions,  no  high  courage,  no  deep 
convictions,  with  an  instinct  for  partisanship  and  intrigue, 
which  revelled  in  small  falsehoods  and  by-paths,  that  came 
more  of  cowardice  and  indecision  than  of  trickery.  He  was 
always  too  much  the  lawyer  to  be  a great  statesman ; 
his  cold  logical  oratory  appealed  to  the  reason,  but  had 
no  power  to  sway.  He  had  the  narrow  practicality  of  the 


390  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

sceptic,  but  little  imagination,'  no  divining  eye  for_  ^eat 
facts,  more  care  for  the  forms  of  liberty  than  tbe  spirit ; a 
born  courtier,  witb  a facile  acquiescence  in  royal  vices,  that 
made  him  tbe  King’s  confidant  and  friend,  but  helped  m 
later  days  to  mar  Victor  Emmanuel’s  hold  on  the  nation. 
He  was  a sincere  patriot  after  his  light;  he  shared  the 
hopes  of  the  narrower  school  of  nationalists;  but  at  this  ( 
time  and  for  several  years  after  he  had  no  faith  in  any  j 
expansion  of  Piedmont  beyond  the  Po  valley,  still  less  in  i 
an  united  Italy.’-  His  whole  bent  of  interests  was  Pied-  j 
montese;  “he  knew  Piedmont  thoroughly,  Italy  a httle,  | 
Europe  not  at  all ; ” Turin  and  its  politics  and  parties  were 
more  to  him  than  all  the  common  creed  of  Italian  aspira- 
tion. But  he  had  a sense  of  responsibility,  that  the  Extreme 
Left  lacked.  He  saw  the  need  of  a strong  government,  and 
knew  that  it  was  impossible  without  a disciplined  majority 
in  the  Chamber.  He  had  the  instinct  of  a parliamentarian, 
and  he  was  prepared  to  compromise  and  surrender  some  of 
his  own  political  articles  for  the  sake  of  securing  a steady 
policy  of  moderate  liberahsm.  It  was  to  his  and  Cavours 
conviction  of  the  paramount  need  of  this  policy,  much  more 
than  to  the  Proclamation  of  Moncalieri,  that  Piedmont 
owed  the  sober  working  of  her  constitution  during  its  years 
of  trial. 

After  tlie  elections  at  the  close  of  1849  DAzeglio,  with 
a large  majority  in  the  Chamber,  was  free  to  carry  out  his 
policy.  He  had  a great  reputation  through  Italy,  a greater 
one  abroad,  where  he  personified  the  survival  of  constitu- 
tional government  in  Piedmont.  His  influence  at  court 
was  strong,  and  on  the  whole  he  succeeded  in  managing 
the  King  ^ spite  of  occasional  restiveness.^  He  was  still  the 
dilettante,  the  “ languid  doctrinaire,”  destitute  of  all  arith- 
metical capacity,  “ an  artist  to  the  marrow  and  vain  as 

a hundred  artists”;  he  was  scrupulously  straightforward 

and  honest,  but  it  was  a “ stagnant  honesty,”  for  he  was  too 

1 He  never  read  history  or  poetry  or  novels,  and  had  no  taste  for  pictures 
or  music : Castelli,  Ricordi,  200. 

2 Mme.  Rattazzi,  Rattazzi,  I.  338. 


CAVOUR 


391 

indolent  to  be  a leader,  and  though  he  had  a firmness  that 
was  apt  to  be  obstinacy,  it  was  utterly  lacking  in  vigour. 
He  was  full  of  excellent  sentiments  that  were  quite  beside 
jthe  point;  and  though  he  prided  himself  on  his  positive 
bent,  his  statesmanship  was  often  limited  to  genial  common- 
'places  and  gentlemanly  aphorisms.  The  events  of  1848-49 
had  given  him  a fanatical  dread  of  democracy,  and  brought 
out  the  patrician,  that  always  underlay  his  nature,  and  made 
him  quite  unconsciously  incapable  of  meting  the  same 
measure  to  nobles  and  to  democrats.  He  was  justly 
attacked  for  his  callous  indifference  to  the  fate  of  Rome 
and  Venice,  for  his  ostentatious  disclaimers  of  the  policy 
that  led  to  Novara,  for  his  exaggerated  deference  to  the 
opinion  of  respectability.  Though  he  would  fight  to  the 
death,  if  Austria  attacked,  though  he  had  a strong  sense  of 
Piedmont’s  Italian  position  ^ and  some  vague  idea  of  another 
struggle  to  assert  it,  he  took  no  forward  step  to  prepare  for 
a new  advance.  His  policy  was  a passive  one,  to  preserve 
the  national  dignity,  to  show  that  constitutional  government 
was  compatible  with  order,  to  win  the  respect  of  other 
nations.  It  was  not  a great  policy,  but  just  then  it  was 
successful.  Quiet  consolidation  was  what  Piedmont  needed 
at  the  moment,  and  he  fulfilled  his  own  prophecy,  that 
“ the  time  is  near,  when  the  race  will  be  not  to  the  strongest 
or  cunningest,  but  to  the  honestest.”  He  brought  his 
country  through  a terrible  crisis,  and  it  was  not  without 
cause  that  he  made  his  boast  that  he  had  survived. 

It  is  in  his  home  policy  that  D’Azeglio  shows  worst. 
His  breadth  of  sympathy  existed  in  his  own  imagination 
only,  and  nobody  was  more  intolerant  of  democratic  crudities. 
While  the  abusive  clerical  press  was  allowed  considerable 
impunity,  at  all  events  till  after  the  passing  of  the  Siccardi 
Laws,  the  police  harried  the  radical  journals,  and  officers, 
who  had  attacked  a newspaper  office  and  threatened  “ to 
oppose  the  free  press  with  the  free  sword,”  were  left  to  go 
unpunished.  Public  meetings  were  forbidden,  and  D’Azeglio 
would  gladly  have  expelled  the  more  turbulent  refugees. 
Much  of  his  action  was  due  to  his  intense  anxiety  to 

^ D’Azeglio,  Scritti  postumi,  174-175,  184;  Id.,  Letter e inedite,  I.  no,  200. 


392  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  j 

conciliate  Rome  and  the  reactionary  party,  for  he  feared 
that,  if  pushed  too  far,  they  might  make  a dangerous 
struggle  for  mastery.  But  his  petty  tyranny  only  offended 
the  Liberals,  without  winning  the  clericals.  Apart  from 
ecclesiastical  matters,  he  showed  small  desire  to  bring  the 
institutions  of  the  coimtry  into  conformity  with  the  spirit 
of  the  Statute,  to  raise  the  condition  of  the  masses,  or 
cleanse  the  civil  service  from  corruption.  He  used  his  j 
great  influence  against  social  progress,  and  set  the  evil  ; 
tradition,  that  has  too  often  since  been  followed  with  such  ' 

sad  fidelity.  ^ ^ ' 

Anxious  however  as  D’Azeglio  was  for  peace,  it  was  j 
impossible  for  him  to  avoid  a struggle  with  Rome.  In  j 
ecclesiastical  legislation  Piedmont  was  fifty  years  in  arrears ; i 
the  church  had  privileges  there,  which  she  had  long  ceased 
to  possess  in  Naples  or  Tuscany  or  Modena  or  the  Austrian 
Emphe.  The  ecclesiastical  courts  took  cognizance  of  cases, 
civil  and  criminal,  where  clerics  were  concerned,  of  all 
cases  relating  to  marriages  and  betrothals,  to  tithes  and 
heresy  and  blasphemy.  Many  churches  had  rights  of 
asylum,  and  the  criminal,  who  escaped  to  their  precincts, 
was  beyond  the  arm  of  the  law.  The  bishops  controlled 
the  charities  and  in  part  the  schools.  Even  the  Statute 
had  confirmed  them  in  their  power  to  prevent  the  circula- 
tion of  unauthorized  Bibles  and  books  of  devotion  or 
theology.  No  marriage  could  be  celebrated  except  by  a priest. 
Acts  of  mortmain  existed  in  part  only  of  the  state,  and  the 
civil  law  facilitated  the  acquisition  of  property  by  eccle- 
siastical bodies.^  And  in  spite  of  the  vast  estates  of  the 
church,  many  of  the  parochial  clergy  had  stipends  so  small, 
that  the  state  contributed  nearly  a million  lire  annually  to 
give  them  a bare  living. 

It  was  impossible  after  the  passing  of  the  Statute  to 
permit  the  retention  of  privileges,  that  clashed  with  its 
fundamental  provisions.  The  ecclesiastical  courts  were 
perhaps  no  serious  practical  grievance,  but  they  were  in 
direct  conflict  with  the  clause,  that  promised  equal  law  to 
all.  The  first  constitutional  ministry  had  recognized  that 
1 Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  VI.  353~354- 


CAVOUR 


393 

the  concordat  with  Rome,  which  fixed  the  privileges  of  the 
church,  must  be  modified,  and  Rosmini  had  been  sent  to 
negotiate  in  vain  for  better  terms.  Since  1848  the  aspect 
of  the  question  had  radically  changed,  for  neo-Guelfism  was 
dead,  and  Rome  was  given  over  again  to  principles  that  were 
incompatible  with  social  or  intellectual  liberty.  The  anti- 
clerical movement,  that  was  now  forced  into  life  by  the  attitude 
of  Rome,  was  not  an  irreligious  one ; the  Liberals  boasted  that 
they  “ lived  in  an  age  of  faith,”  and  much  of  the  attack  on 
the  church  was  prompted  by  the  desire,  which  Gioberti  voiced, 
to  purify  it  from  its  abuses.  But  neither  was  it  mainly  a 
religious  movement ; it  was  more  the  outcome  of  national 
pride,  of  the  resolve  not  to  humiliate  the  country  to  Rome, 
mixed  with  anger  at  the  embittered  opposition  of  the  bishops 
to  constitutional  government,  at  the  relentless  and  un- 
I scrupulous  attacks  of  the  clerical  press,  at  the  misrule 
at  Rome  and  in  Romagna,  and  the  ignominious  propping 
of  the  Papal  throne  by  foreign  bayonets.  The  reformers 
had  two  possible  policies.  Cavour  would  have  left  the 
church  unmolested  in  its  property  and  internal  discipline, 
would  have  met  intolerance  by  tolerance,  and  abolished  the 
partial  state  control,  which  the  old  concordat  gave.  The 
church,  he  believed,  when  free  from  irritating  trammels, 
would  leave  politics  alone.  But  the  majority  of  Liberals 
hardly  stopped  to  consider  an  experiment,  which  appeared 
so  hazardous  among  a people  with  little  education  or 
spiritual  independence,  where  the  church  threatened  to 
become  a great  political  machine,  that  might  sap  the  fabric 
of  the  constitution,  and  be  a standing  menace  to  free  govern- 
ment. Both  parties  however  were  agreed  in  the  necessity  of 
abolishing  the  ecclesiastical  courts.  D’Azeglio  was  too  good 
a patriot,  and  knew  the  Roman  court  too  well,  to  wish  to 
shirk  the  issue,  when  once  it  had  been  raised.  Had  he  wished 
it,  the  intemperance  of  the  Piedmontese  bishops,  and  the 
anger  of  Right  and  Left  alike  at  their  intrigues  would  have 
forced  his  hand.  Fransoni,  the  Archbishop  of  Turin,  was  as 
bitterly  opposed  to  reform  as  he  had  been  in  Charles 
Albert’s  later  years,^  and  his  passionate  hatred  of  the  new 

^ See  above,  p.  i68. 


394  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

institutions  had  grown  to  a monomania.  His  brother-prelate 
of  Asti  had  been  accused  of  immorality,  and  fled  before  the 
threats  of  the  populace.  Late  in  1849  D’Azeglio  had  sent  to 
Rome  an  honest  Moderate  lawyer,  Siccardi,  to  ask  for  the 
removal  of  Fransoni  and  the  Bishop  of  Asti,  and  effect  some 
working  compromise  as  to  the  concordat.  Siccardi  soon 
returned,  hopeless  of  securing  concession;  Antonelli  put 
forward  counter-claims,  which  it  was  impossible  to  accept, 
and  the  Pope  had  spoken  of  the  pending  reforms  as  “ wounds 
to  his  own  heart  and  the  church.”  ^ Siccardi’s  failure  and 
the  bitterness  of  the  extreme  press  on  both  sides  made  it 
impossible  for  the  ministry  to  delay  legislation,  and  early 
in  the  session  of  1850  Siccardi,  who  was  now  in  the  cabinet, 
brought  forward  his  famous  resolutions  (February  27). 
They  proposed  to  abolish  the  ecclesiastical  courts  and  the 
right  of  asylum,  to  equalize  the  punishments  of  lay  and 
clerical  criminals,  to  make  a general  mortmain  law,  to 
repeal  the  temporal  penalties  for  the  non-observance  of 
holidays,  retaining  them  for  Sundays  and  the  great  festivals 
of  the  church ; and  they  pledged  the  government  to  intro- 
duce a Bill  to  legalize  civil  marriage.  The  deputies  of  the 
pure  Right  opposed  the  resolutions  on  the  ground  that 
the  consent  of  Rome  was  essential  to  any  modification 
of  the  ecclesiastical  law,  and  harped  on  the  scandal  to  the 
consciences  of  the  faithful.  The  resolutions,  it  is  true,  tore 
up  the  Concordat,  but  it  was  impossible  to  maintain 
conventions  made  for  other  times  and  alien  to  the  new 
constitutional  order.  The  government  had  to  choose  between 
the  Concordat  and  the  Statute,  and  they  were  bound  to 
abide  by  the  latter.  They  had  the  support  of  the  more 
moderate  section  of  the  Right  and  of  the  entire  Left. 
Public  opinion  had  been  intensely  stirred,  and  the  feeling 
against  the  priests  at  Turin  was  so  hostile,  that  the  govern- 
ment had  to  put  down  a demonstration  with  the  help  of  the 
military.  Siccardi’s  main  Bill  passed  the  Chamber  by  130 
votes  to  26  (April  9),  and  the  Senate  by  a majority  of 
nearly  two  to  one.  ^ 

1 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  VI.  356  ; Boggio,  Chiesa  e stato,  299 ; according  to 
Dupanlonp,  SouveraineU,  302,  quoting  from  Expos6  des  nigociations  etc.,  the: 
King  still  promised  on  February  25  to  reopen  negotiations. 


CAVOUR 


395 

Rome  refused  to  accept  its  defeat.  Illogical  as  was  the 
Pope’s  position  in  refusing  to  Piedmont  what  had  long  been 
accepted  in  almost  every  Catholic  country,  he  disliked  and 
feared  too  much  the  one  free  state  of  Italy,  to  make  an  easy 
peace  with  her.  The  Nuncio  left  Turin,  the  bishops  saw 
phantoms  of  the  Red  Revolution,  and  Fransoni  issued  a 
pastoral,  ordering  the  clergy  to  defy  the  new  laws  and 
appear  before  the  lay  courts  only  on  compulsion.  When 
indicted  for  inciting  to  disobedience  of  the  law,  he  refused 
bo  appear,  and  was  condemned  in  contumacy  to  a month’s 
limprisonment.  The  sentence  roused  the  passion  of  the 
iclericals  to  fever-heat,  and  Fransoni’s  suffragans  threatened 
iexcommunication  to  all  who  had  any  part  in  making  the 
new  law.  At  the  moment  Santa  Rosa,  the  Minister  of 
Agriculture,  was  on  his  death-bed ; devout  Catholic  though 
ibie  was,  the  Servite  friar,  who  attended  him,  refused  him 
3xtreme  unction,  as  being  ijpso  facto  excommunicate,  unless 
be  retracted  his  share  of  responsibility  for  the  Siccardi 
Laws ; and  when  Santa  Rosa  died  unabsolved,  the  clergy 
it  Fransoni’s  instigation  threatened  to  deny  him  rights  of 
3urial,  till  the  archbishop  was  intimidated  into  a reluctant 
3onsent.^  The  tale  of  the  heartless  refusal,  of  the  wife’s 
Drayers  spurned,  of  the  indecofous  intrigues  round  the 
leath-bed  fired  Turin  to  fury.  Santa  Rosa’s  funeral  was 
nade  the  occasion  of  a great  demonstration  (August  3),  the 
5ervites  were  only  saved  from  outrage  by  being  banished 
rom  the  city,  and  Fransoni  was  illegally  arrested  and  sent 
■o  an  epicurean  martyrdom  in  the  fortress  of  Fenestrelle. 
U the  same  moment  the  government  came  into  sharp 
lonflict  with  the  Sardinian  clergy  on  the  question  of  tithes ; 
t was  the  only  province  of  the  state  where  they  still 
existed,  and  the  ministers  appointed  a Commission  to  make 
-n  inventory  of  church  property  as  a preliminary  to  their 
ommutation.  The  Archbishop  of  Cagliari  defied  the  Com- 
aissioners,  and  excommunicated  them,  when  they  seized  his 
►apers.  It  was  impossible  for  the  government  to  overlook 
he  affront,  and  the  Sardinian  courts  condemned  him  to  exile. 

‘ ^ Saraceno,  Santa  Rosa,  229-236  ; Cavour,  Lcttcre,  I.  164;  Boggio,  op.  cit., 

321  ; Balan,  Continuazione,  I.  723-729. 


396  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

The  government  had  done  the  least  that  was  possible 
to  save  its  dignity.  Even  now  D’Azeglio’s  patience  was  not 
exhausted.  He  felt  very  acutely  the  danger  of  alienating 
the  clergy ; France  was  putting  strong  pressure  on  him  to 
surrender  to  Rome,  and  he  had  twice  during  the  summer 
made  essays  for  reconciliation.  But  Antonelli  took  his 
stand  on  the  principle  that  the  concordat  was  a contract, 
which  could  not  lawfully  be  broken  except  by  the  consent 
of  both  parties ; he  told  D’Azeglio’s  agent  that  compromise 
was  impossible,^  and  the  Pope  ostentatiously  patronized 
Fransoni  and  even  refused  to  remove  the  Bishop  of  Asti. 
While  D’Azeglio  was  thus  faced  by  frank  hostility  at  Rome, 
public  opinion  in  Piedmont  was  urging  him  to  fresh 
measures  against  the  church.  The  Sardinian  tithes  were 
abolished  with  compensation,  and  so  strong  was  the  feeling 
in  the  Chamber  that  it  was  sometimes  able  to  force  the 
hands  of  the  government.  The  Christian  Brothers  were 
made  liable  to  conscription,  and  the  teaching  of  theology 
in  the  seminaries  became  matter  of  hot  debate.  By 
a law  of  1848  the  government  had  obtained  certain 
powers  of  control  over  them  in  exchange  for  subsidies 
to  the  theological  chairs,  and  the  Left  insisted  that  itj 
should  enforce  its  rights  to  check  professorial  attacks  on'l 
the  constitution.  Cavour  opposed  any  interference  with 
liberty  of  teaching,  and  his  influence  secured  the  postpone- 
ment of  legislation ; but  the  Pope  seized  the  opportunity  tc 
retaliate  on  the  broader  doctrines  of  Turin  University,  anc 
excommunicated  Nuytz,  its  professor  of  theology  (August 
1851).  Nuytz  lectures,  foreshadowing  in  some  respectJ 
the  Liberal  Catholic  school  of  ten  years  later,  upheld  th( 
rights  of  the  state  in  matters  ecclesiastical,  threw  doubts  01 
the  Temporal  Power,  and  distinguished  the  contract  0 
marriage  from  the  sacrament.  And  though  his  theses  hac, 
been  approved  by  the  church,  and  he  had  professed  hi:' 
readiness  to  vrithdraw  anything  contrary  to  its  teaching, |i 

1 D’Azeglio,  Lettere  inedite,  II.  204;  Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  "SI.  3715  Balari 
op.  cit.,  1.  738. 

2 Boggio,  op.  cit.,  I.  346 ; Dupanloup,  op.  cit.,  298.  A summary  01  n. 
theses  in  II  Piemonte,  163. 


CAVOUR 


397 

his  obsequiousness  could  not  shield  him.  And  despite  the 
. anxiety  of  the  government  to  compromise  on  this  and  other 
. controversies,  the  bigger  questions  of  civil  marriage  and  the 
: ecclesiastical  budget  were  only  suspended,  and  it  was  clear 
that  a more  terrible  conflict  must  come  soon,  whose  issues 
: none  could  foretell. 

It  was  felt  on  all  sides  that  it  needed  stronger  hands 
than  D’Azeglio’s  for  the  crisis,  and  every  month  the 
' Premier  was  more  eclipsed  by  the  rising  reputation  of 
Cavour.  Cavour’s  early  parliamentary  career  had  not 
■ been  successful ; his  arrogant,  sarcastic  public  manner,  his 
aristocratic  associations,  his  supposed  reactionary  views  had 
made  him  even  more  unpopular  than  he  was  in  1847. 

I But  he  was  bound  to  make  his  influence  felt;  he  had  shown 
i a masterful  insistency,  an  iron  resolution  which  conquered 
f more  than  it  persuaded,  a hardihood  which  prompted  him 
i to  read  criticism  but  never  a word  of  praise,  a prodigious 
' memory,  a great  capacity  for  work  and  grasp  of  details. 
His  speeches  always  commanded  the  Chamber,  not  for  their 
oratory,  for  he  was  a halting  speaker  and  spoke  French 
better  than  Italian,  but  from  their  lucidity  and  precision 
and  capacity  of  making  telling  points.  And  while  with  his 
fine  eye  for  political  facts,  he  brushed  aside  the  sophistry 
i alike  of  democrats  and  reactionaries,  and  was  merciless  to 
; their  cant  and  vulgarity,  he  was  an  open-minded  oppor- 
i tunist,  always  ready  for  fresh  light  ^ and  indifferent  to 
I charges  of  inconsistency.  He  was  no  saint  or  hero,  but 
I perfectly  composed  to  win  the  confidence  of  average  human 
nature.  He  generally  followed  public  opinion ; he  had  his 
ideals,  but  he  kept  them  to  himself,  and  though,  as  Manzoni 
said,  he  had  the  imprudence  as  well  as  the  prudence  of  the 
true  statesman,  he  rarely  allowed  himself  to  be  drawn  a 
; step  beyond  what  the  practical  opportunities  of  the  moment 
warranted.  His  object  was  to  make  the  constitution  march  ; 
he  had  no  liking  for  D’Azeglio’s  policy  of  beating  time, 
f “ Modern  history,”  he  said,  “ shows  a steady  tendency  to  the 
} widening  of  political  rights,  to  the  improvement  of  the  con- 
} dition  of  the  poor  and  the  better  distribution  of  wealth.” 

1 “ Whenever  I have  time,  I will  make  a list  of  my  political  mistakes.” 


398  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

His  policy  was  one  of  pure  Liberalism;  “Italy,”  he  said, 
must  make  herself  by  means  of  liberty,  or  we  must  give 
up  trying  to  make  her.”  He  had  an  absolute  trust  that 
people  would  always  come  sooner  or  later  to  the  truth. 
Hence  his  anxiety  to  decentralize,  his  steady  refusal  to 
tamper  in  all  essentials  with  the  liberty  of  the  press,  his 
unwillingness  to  subsidize  governmental  organs.  He  was  i 
no  hard  economist,  moral  considerations  always  weighed  < 
most  vdth  him,  but  he  had  an  unswerving  faith  in  liberty  t 
of  industry  and  commerce.  He  had  felt  the  fascination  of  i 
socialism,  but  he  thought  it  as  dangerous  as  its  near  ally! 
^ protection ; and  though  at  times  he  was  almost  an  enthu- 
jsiast  for  social  legislation,  he  seems  to  have  thought  more 
often  that  the  state  should  go  no  farther  than  to  encourage 
I private  initiative  and  make  taxation  fall  lightly  on  the  poor. 

I He  applied  the  same  principles  of  freedom  to  the 
-problems  of  church  and  state.  Cavour  had  no  deep 
religious  instinct;  but  he  had  a real  belief  that  a church,; 
untrammelled  by  state  control,  would  have  a fruitful  parti 
to  play  in  social  evolution.  Clerical  intolerance  he  hoped  i 
to  cure  by  undiscouraged  tolerance  on  the  other  side ; he ; 
would  have  left  the  church  in  full  possession  of  her  pro-f 
perty,  mistress  of  her  own  discipline  and  ritual,  “ a free  ^ 
church  in  a free  state,”  which  should  learn  responsibility^ 
from  freedom,  and  exist  in  independent  amity  with  the 
civil  government.^  It  is  more  difficult  to  say  what  was 
his  exact  position  at  this  time  as  to  the  future  of  Pied- 
mont and  Italy.  He  hoped  to  see  the  Austrians  expelled, 
and  some  day  the  Temporal  Power  destroyed;  theoretically,; 
no  doubt,  he  always  believed  in  a free  and  united  Italy .3 
But  here  as  in  all  else  he  was  an  opportunist,  and  refused 
to  tie  his  hands  by  any  system.  His  present  object  was 

1 'Cavour,  Lettere,  V.  178  ; Id.,  Nouvelles  lettres,  247,  374  ; Id.,  Nuove  lettere, 
160;  Castelli,  Ricordi,  374;  La  Kive,  Cavour,  230;  Artom  e Blanc,  Cavour, 
322.  He  thought  a progressive  income-tax  impracticable,  but  did  not  object!  | 
to  it  in  principle. 

2 So  as  early  as  1833  : Berti,  Cavour,  311-315  1 see  also  Nigra,  Catwr,  44  ij 
Cavour,  Nuove  Icttcre,  361  ; Saraceno,  Santa  Rosa,  1 31-133  ; Castelli,  Cavour,  13.1 
See  below,  Vol.  11.  p.  207. 

3 Cavour,  Lettere,  1.  127;  Id.,  Nuove  lettere,  69;  La  Faiiua,  Rpistolarw,  II.| 
426 ; Cordova,  Discorsi,  I.  74. 


CAVOUR 


399 


I to  make  Piedmont  prosperous,  and  when  the  chance  came 
V for  her  to  use  her  influence,  to  make  the  best  possible 
t terms  for  the  rest  of  Italy.  He  was  probably  too  busy  to 
5;  concern  his  thoughts  much  with  what  seemed  so  distant 
5 an  Utopia  as  her  Unity ; he  was  certainly  too  prudent  a 
man  to  express  himself  about  it. 

So  far  he  had  hardly  belonged  to  any  party.  Under 
; the  influence  of  the  enthusiasm  of  1848  he  had  moved 
fast  in  a Liberal  direction;  the  excesses  of  the  following 
f winter  had  turned  him  back  towards  Conservatism  ; but  with 
i the  reaction  after  Novara  he  came  to  believe  that  absolutism 
i was  more  dangerous  than  demagogy,  and  his  irritation  at 
;■  D’Azeglio’s  feebleness  helped  to  force  his  dormant  Liberalism 
slowly  to  the  front  again.  Like  Rattazzi,  though  perhaps 
^ not  so  strongly,  he  saw  the  necessity  of  forming  a strong 
|[  ministerial  party.  “ You  cannot  govern  on  the  point  of  a 
I needle,  was  his  criticism  of  the  parliamentary  groups, 

! which  made  a^  stable  majority  impossible.  He  had  tried 
f hard  to  reconcile  parties  before  the  Proclamation  of  Mon- 
|i  calieri.  He  would  have  liked  to  work  with  the  Right,  but 
E he  found  it  impossible  to  agree  with  the  straiter  section 
.<  in  religious  and  commercial  questions.  He  had  made  his 
; first  great  speech  in  the  debate  on  the  Siccardi  Laws,  and 
: his  success  encouraged  him  to  take  a line  of  his  own. 
He  began  to  gently  threaten  the  ministry,  and  warn  them 
against  homoeopathic  doses  of  reform.”  They  were  pro- 
bably conscious  how  much  they  needed  strong  men,  and 
I La  Marmora  s and  the  King’s  influence  persuaded  the  re- 
) luctant  cabinet  to  appoint  Cavour  to  the  vacant  ministry 
of  trade  and  agriculture  (October  ii,  1850).  will 

jsoon  rule  you  all,”  the  King  foretold,  “he  will  turn  yoiU 
I out  and  be  premier  himself ; ” and  Cavour  at  once  began 
to  verify  the  prophecy  by  insisting  on  the  resignation  of 
one  of  his  weaker  colleagues. 

His  appointment  pleased  the  Liberals  as  seeming  to 
pledge  the  cabinet  to  further  ecclesiastical  reforms.  But 
his  main  cares  for  the  present  were  economic,  and  even 
before  he  became  Finance  Minister  in  the  following  April,  he 
was  able  to  carry  much  of  his  Free  Trade  policy  into  practice. 


400 


A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


In  some  respects  his  legislation  was  merely  in  oontinuation  of 
earlier  proieots.  The  laws  to  regulate  jomt-stock  companies 
and  agricultural  loans,  the  schemes  of  agricultural  education 
of  postal  reform,  of  covering  Piedmont  with  a network  of 
railways  were  part  of  the  policy  for  developing  Piedmontese 
trade,  which  had  obtained  since  Novara.  The  feudal  dues, 
which  still  lingered  in  some  districts,  were  abolished  and  p 
Cavour’s  first  measure  was  to  repeal  the  bread-assize  of  the- 
municipalities.  But  these  were  minor  matters  compared 
with  the  position  of  the  Exchequer.  Cavour  believed  that 
finance  was  matter  of  life  or  death  to  the  country  T e 
indemnity  to  Austria,  the  expenses  of  the  army, 
sidies  to  the  new  railways  were  a cripphng  burden,  and  the 
spectre  of  bankruptcy  frightened  men  who  were  no  alarm- 
ists The  budget  of  1851  showed  a deficiency  of  sixty 
million  lire,  taxes  had  risen  30  per  cent.,  and  the  mterest 
on  the  debt  had  mounted  from  less  than  two  millions  lire 
in  1847  to  thirty  millions  in  1852.  Prudence  recoim 
mended  a policy  of  retrenchment,  and  it  needed  a bol 
financier  to  ask  the  country  to  add  to  its  debt.  But  il 
Piedmont  was  to  prepare  for  a new  war,  it  was  essential  to 
keep  up  the  army,  rebuild  the  fleet,  expend  large  sums  or 
fortifications.  And  for  the  development  of  her  industry  i1 
was  equally  necessary  to  open  new  railways  and  tunnel  th( 
Alps.  The  trunk  line  across  the  Apennines  from  Genoa  t( 
Turin  had  already  made  good  progress,  and  the  governmen 
included  in  their  scheme  a continuation  to  Arona,  a con 
nection  with  the  Lombard  lines  at  Magenta,  a line  unde:. 
Mont  Cenis  to  Savoy  and  France,  and  the  old  project  oj 
another  Alpine  line  under  the  Lukmanier.  It  ^ad  thou  J 
it  necessary  to  find  a large  portion  of  the  capital,  and  thong  , 
the  expenditure  promised  to  be  a remunerative  one,  it  en^ 
tailed  at  the  time  an  increasing  debt  and  increasing  ta^atiop 
Cavour  saw  that  the  country  must  strengthen  itsMf  for  it: 
new  burdens  by  increasing  its  resources  and  he  hoped  bj 
introducing  more  or  less  of  Free  Trade  to  ^ ' 

stimulus  to  industry  and  commerce,  that  it  would  learn  t^ 
support  its  new  expenses  without  suffermg.^ 

There  had  already  been  certain  steps  m that  directioi^ 


CAVOUR 


401 

In  Charles  Albert’s  later  years  the  duty  on  corn  had  been 
very  largely  reduced,  and  in  1850  differential  navigation 
duties  had  been  abolished.  Cavour  would  have  liked  to 
bring  in  Free  Trade  at  one  stroke.^  But  he  knew  that 
public  opinion  was  not  ripe  for  this,  and  all  that  he  could 
accomplish  at  present  was  to  conclude  a series  of  com- 
mercial treaties,  providing  for  reciprocal  reduction  of  duties 
1 realties  with  France  (November  1850),  with  Belgium  and 
England  (January-February  1851),  with  Switzerland,  with 
the  German  Zollverein,  even  with  Austria  made  Cavour 
able  to  boast  a few  years  later  that  the  Piedmontese  tariff 
was  the  most  liberal  on  the  Continent.  The  economic 
results  were  instantaneous ; contraband  almost  disappeared, 
md  the  customs’  revenue  showed  no  loss,  so  great  was  the 
Jnpetus  to  trade.  Piedmont  was  launched  on  a career  of 
•apid  commercial  progress,  and  bid  fair  to  become,  as  Cavour 
lesu-ed  it  to  be,  the  silk-factory  of  Italy.  But  the  political 
ispect  of  the  treaties  was  even  more  prominent.  Cavour’s 
nsion  looked  to  an  alliance  of  Piedmont  with  the  Western 
mwers,  as  a counterblast  to  the  informal  league  of  the 
tastern  despotisms.  And  though  he  spoke  of  securing  the 
pod- will  of  France  for  defensive  purposes  only,  he  doubtless 
egarded  it  as  the  first  step  to  an  alliance,  which  should 
Ting  her  armies  into  the  plains  of  Lombardy. 

^ Massari,  Cavour,  65. 


2 C 


VOL.  I. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 
THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 
1851-1853 

tt  P^pflmont  • Victor  Emmanuel  II. ; Piedmont  am 

A^tfrr'^Louis  ^-apoleon’;  the  coupd’^lat ; the  Detoresta  Press 

The  cori««6io;  “ ^lazzini 

?lmterdv,T8f^53  ; the  republican  conspiracy;  the  Milan  plot 
the  sequestrations  ; Cavour’s  protest. 

The  conclusion  of  Cavour’s  treaties  was  only  one  mstance  c 
Si  bS-t  success  that  attended  all  that  Piedmont  die 
i Gallant  little  Piedmont”  had  become  the  cynosure 
Europe  D’Azeglio  set  the  example,  which  Cavour.  whe 
his  tSn  came,  followed,  of  winnmg  for  her  the  sympathy  ( 
European  opinion.  Radicals  were  pleased  at  her  defiance  t 
Austria,  Liberals  and  Moderate  Conservatives  at  the  chec 
given  to  the  democrats,  Protestants  and  anti-clencals  at 
liccardi  Laws.  The  country  was  no 

iS/tQ  D’Azeo-lio’s  own  loyal  nature  won  confidence,  Ea 
mlt^n  had  expressed  his  warm  admiration ; English  trave 
tes  Sadstone,  Lord  Minto,  Nassau  Senmr,  had  spread  1 
fame  of  the  progressive  orderly  state,  which  showed  m su 

S.nt  — » .h.  r..t 

„ SoatLwulf  h.d  mobtoi  md  i,f21 

when  “the  butcher  of  Brescia  paid  tLein  an  dl-sj* 
visit  (September  1850).  In  itself  a proud  c 

sciousness  of  deserved  success  had  made  Novara  half-f( 
gotten.  Gioberti,  whose  influence  still  ^^s  gi^^,  ^ 
published  from  his  retreat  at  Pans 

\egeneration  of  Italy  (1851),  m which  he  recanted 
1 At  what  was  once  Johnsonian  Thrale’s  brewery. 

402 


THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT  403 

hopes  of  a reformed  Papacy,  and  argued  that  the  hegemony 
I of  Italy  had  passed  to  Piedmont,  that  it  was  for  Piedmont 
I with,  the  help  of  France  to  accomplish  the  national  redemp- 
I tion,  and  make  Italy  one  with  her  capital  at  Romed  The 
j mass  of  the  Piedmontese  lagged  behind  Gioberti  s ideal  of 
I Unity , the  narrower  aspirations  of  1848  were  as  far  ahead 
as  most  politicians  cared  to  look ; it  seemed  too  much  of 
an  Utopia  to  hope  for  Rome,  and  “ Piedmontism  ” was  still 
strong  with  its  half-contempt  for  the  rest  of  Italy,  its  dis- 
like to  move  the  capital  from  Turin,  or  admit  the  other 
I provinces  to  equal  terms. 

But  all  the  best  life  of  the  nation  was  thirsting  for 
i another  war  with  Austria,  which  would  leave  her  no 
footing  south  of  the  Alps,  and  be  a death-blow  to  tyranny 
I through  Italy.  And  it  was  to  Victor  Emmanuel  that 
I nationalists  of  almost  every  colour  began  to  look  for  leader- 
iship.  Little  loved  though  he  was  at  first,  his  popularity 
had  been  growing  steadily.  It  is  not  easy  at  first  sight  to 
understand  why  he  should  in  after  years  have  won  so  much 
I of  what  was  almost  veneration.  He  revenged  himself  on  the 
i almost  cruel  strictness,  in  which  he  had  been  brought  up, 
by  an  unabashed  licentiousness.  His  private  life  was  divided 
ibetween  vulgar  profligacy  and  sport.  He  installed  his 
favourite  mistress  in  the  royal  park,  while  his  wife  was 
istill  alive  ; in  later  years  he  married  her  morganatically, 
Rut  he  was  not  faithful  even  to  her,  and  made  no  attempt 
Ito  conceal  his  many  infidelities.  A hardy,  daring  sportsman, 
he  was  at  his  happiest  when  stalking  steinbock  in  the  Cogne 
^mountains.  He  was  a rough,  good-natured,  bad-tempered 
'man,  of  phenomenal  ugliness,  plain,  almost  boorish,  in  his 
'bastes,^  without  a trace  of  genius,  but  with  a certain  robust, 
jlirect  common-sense;  absolutely  fearless,  as  excellent  a 
cavalry  officer  as  he  was  a bad  general,  exposing  himself 
!*ecklessly  in  battle,  not  from  bravado,  but  to  give  his  soldiers 

1 Gioberti,  Rinnovamento,  esp.  II.  219,  273  ; from  II  Piemonte,  156,  it 
ippears  that  Gioberti  was  expressing  Pallavicino’s  thought  rather  than  his  own. 

The  King  of  Sardinia,  who  is  here,  is  as  vulgar  and  coarse  as  possible,” 
Malmesbury,  Memoirs,  1.  37  ; “ he  has  the  tone  and  manners  of  a sous-officier  ” ; 
YielCastel,  M^moires,  III.  186.  See  Greville  Memoirs,  VII.  308.  He  startled 
he  English  court  on  his  visit  in  1855. 


404 


HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 


a leadins.^  There  was  a certain  democratic  fibre  m him ; he 
deaUy  loved  popularity,  though  he 
manifestations  ; his  comprehensive  gaUantey 
into  relations  with  all  classes  ; he  hated  etiquette,  tisy^rd 
rX  was  notoriously  ill-furnished,^  and  after  the  death  o 
the  queen  in  1855.  lie  practically  put  an  end  to  comt 
ceremonial.  But  with  the  mass  of  Italians  it  as  e 

one  constitutional  prince  of  Italy,  the  “ 

aalantiiomof  who  had  kept  his  oath  to  his  people,  the  soldier 
who  had  fight  Austria  and  longed  to  fight  her  again,  that  | 
he  won  loyahy  and  devotion.  He  had  accepted  the  post  of 
constitutional  King,  and  as  long  as  Cavour  lived,  he  abode  y 
it  always  in  the  letter  generally  in  the  spirit,  partly  because 
he  liked  it,  more  because  he  was  sensitively  careful  of 
his  honest  name  and  felt  an  honourable  mans  disgust 
at  the  perjuries  of  the  other  Italian  prmces  But  he 
always  iafed  at  control,  and  under  the  weak  premiers 
thatiollowed  Cavour  the  constitutional  bands  became  very 
dastic  though  perhaps  in  the  strict  letter  he  never  wholly 
burst  ’them.  He  liked  to  be  in  touch  with  men  of  all 
narties  and  to  the  republicans,  who  talked  to  him,  he 
Lemed  more  republican  than  themselves.  Though  natur- 
ally superstitious,  with  a real  reverence  for  ^ 

imilled  by  his  own  inclinations  and  family  influence, 
towards  the  church,  his  pride  forbade  him 
the  clericals.  He  knew  that  they  intrigued  against  him  a. 
they  had  intrigued  against  his  father,  and  he  mherited  th 
tractions  of  a race,  that  had  maintained  its  independenc* 

E.me.  «.  IE  -Eh  •« 

ciliate  the  Pope,  he  was  strong  man  enough  to  be  p 
against  the  insidious  influences  that  pushed  him  to  surrender  I 
Zee  and  twice  only  he  nearly  yielded.  For  Austria  h, 
had  nothing  but  hate,  and  both  as  King 
longed  for  another  war,  which  slmuld  avenge  his  father 
memory  and  blot  out  Novara.  He  was  incensed  at  he, 

= “Tu  “ and  yet  they  can’t  aUow  Victor  a ne  . 

honest  kings  that  it  wouid  be  a fine  thing  to  begin  the  senes. 


THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 


405 

intrigues  with  the  reactionaries ; “ I will  be  master  in  my 
own  house,”  he  told  Appony,  the  Austrian  minister ; and  he 
hated  the  codini  more  than  the  republicans,  for  he  knew 
how  bitterly  they  attacked  himd  His  nationalist  ambitions 
went  further,  it  was  probable,  than  his  ministers’ ; he  had 
read  and  marked  Gioberti’s  last  book,  and  declared  his  inten- 
ii  tion  to  fulfil  the  destiny  it  foretold  for  him.  He  longed  for 
ij  action  and  military  fame ; the  “ idle  life  ” of  peace  was  “ in- 
^ tolerable  ” to  him.  “ The  crown  of  Sardinia,”  he  said,  “ has 
;j  fallen  very  low;  we  need  glory,  much  glory,  to  raise  it  up  again.” 
i Putting  aside  the  reactionaries,  it  was  becoming  a 
i|  principle  above  party  to  prepare  for  the  coming  struggle. 
5 The  Hesse  and  Schleswig-Holstein  troubles  had  made  an 
5 European  war  seem  imminent,  and  Piedmont  hoped  to  get 
I her  chance.  The  Left  had  preached  in  season  and  out  of 

[season  hostility  to  Austria  and  generosity  to  the  refugees ; 

Valerio’s  organ  had  offered  the  ministers  a free  hand,  on 
K condition  that  they  would  strengthen  the  army  and  navy ; 
|j  Pallavicino  was  already  urging  a Piedmontese  propaganda  in 
' the  Centre  and  South.  The  Eight  was  almost  equally 
I insistent ; D’Azeglio  felt  the  movement  in  his  academic  way, 
I spoke  of  “ the  future  destinies  of  Piedmont,”  and  boldly 
r taxed  Appony  with  encouraging  sedition.  La  Marmora  had 
i remodelled  the  army,  and  could  put  at  least  90,000  men 
y into  the  field.  The  revival  of  terrorism  in  Lombardy  after 
I Karl  von  Schwarzenberg’s  resignation  made  Piedmont  feel 
X that  she  could  be  proud  of  her  strength  and  progress  and 
li  order,  while  Austria  was  vainly  attempting  to  justify  her 
S rule,  and  sinking  lower  month  by  month  in  the  opinion  of 
\ civilized  Europe.  Morally  Piedmont  had  already  triumphed. 

The  Conservatives,  however,  perhaps  many  others  too, 
thad  no  confidence  that  Piedmont  could  defeat  Austria  in 
i the  field  unaided.  The  corner-stone  of  D’Azeglio’s  foreign 
:» policy  had  been  to  secure  respect  for  Piedmont  in  France 
::  and  England,  and  though  it  is  more  than  doubtful  whether 
1 he  looked  forward  to  an  offensive  alliance  with  them,  others 
i certainly  did.  There  was  no  serious  hope,  though,  that  apart 
I' from  an  European  conflict,  England  would  lend  her  arms. 

^ Pallavicino,  Memorie,  II.  254;  II  Piemonte,  142. 


4o6  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

Valuable  as  was  Palmerston’s  strong  friendship,  he  was 
pledged  to  a policy  of  peace;  and  it  was  recognized  that 
no  sympathy  was  to  he  expected  from  the  Tories.  It  was 
otherwise  with  France.  The  Roman  expedition  had  won 
Louis  Napoleon  the  hatred  of  the  democrats,  but  his  letter 
to  Edgar  Ney  had  helped  to  redeem  him  with  all  sections 
of  Italians.  They  recollected  his  own  youthful  attacks  on 
the  Temporal  Power,  his  uncle’s  Italian  blood  and  Italian 
policy,  and  surmised  that  his  ambitions  would  some  day 
change  the  map  of  Europe. 

Henceforward  for  nearly  twenty  years  Napoleon  plays 
an  all-important  part  in  Italian  politics,  an  unseen  power 
behind  the  scenes,  breathing  an  influence  sometimes  be- 
nignant, sometimes  malign,  now  and  again  stepping  forward 
as  the  deus  ex  machind,  and  expecting  all  to  answer  to 
his  nod.  His  policy  was  a compound  of  high  ideals  and 
shameless  means,  of  magnificent  designs  and  cowardly 
surrenders,  of  intellectual  rightness  and  utter  moral  wrong- 
ness. He  “ conducted  complicated  intrigues  like  a pupil  of 
Macchiavelli,  then  nursed  humanitarian  utopias  as  if  his 
model  were  Don  Quixote.”  In  spite  of  his  fears,  he  never 
quite  forgot  the  Liberalism  of  his  youth;  as  heir  of  the 
Napoleonic  tradition,  he  aimed  at  playing  a great  constructive 
part  in  Modern  Europe.  Nationality,  he  was  shrewd  to  see, 
was  the  moving  force  of  the  age  in  international  politics, 
and  as  champion  of  nationality,  France  might  settle  Europe 
on  a lasting  basis,  and  bring  in  a new  age  of  peace.  An 
united  Italy,  an  united  Germany,  a resuscitated  Poland,  the 
emancipation  of  the  Slavs  would  allow  Europe  to  settle 
down  to  commercial  progress  and  free-trade  and  a cautious,  i 
conservative  solution  of  social  problems.  The  programme  i 
had  its  selfish  side;  France  would  regain  her  “natural! 
frontiers,”  and  become  the  predominant  partner  in  a great  i 
confederation  of  the  Latin  nations  of  the  Old  and  New 
Worlds.  But  it  was  a great  and  wise  programme;  and 
Napoleon  at  all  events  aimed  at  lifting  French  foreign 
politics  out  of  the  slough,  in  which  they  have  lain  before 
and  since.  But  it  needed  a greater  man  to  overcome  the 
tremendous  difficulties ; and  while  Napoleon’s  theories  were 


THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 


407 


1 immeasurably  in  advance  of  French  public  opinion,  he  had 
! already  given  hostages  to  the  clericals,  and,  as  Cavour 
j recognized  even  now,^  his  danger  lay  in  the  temptation  to 
play  for  their  support.  He  knew  how  little  sympathy  he 
, had  at  home  for  his  world -shaking  schemes ; and  there- 
: fore,  while  he  officially  professed  the  diplomatic  convention- 
: alities,  he  had  his  secret  policy,  working  in  subterranean 
: channels,  trying  to  defeat  his  own  ministers,  and  reach  his 
1 own  more  generous  ends  by  dark  and  doubtful  paths.  As 
fe  Montalembert  said  of  him,  he  was  “ a conspirator  by  profes- 
fi  sion  ” ; though  he  had  a fatalist  belief  in  his  own  “ nebulous 
p star,”  which  made  him  physically  fearless,  he  was  a moral 
I coward,  always  hesitating  and  trying  to  shirk  responsibility, 

Ij  unable  to  resist  pressure  and  loving  compromises  and  half 
I measures.^  But  taking  his  work  at  its  worst,  Napoleon  was, 
i at  all  events  after  the  coup  d’6tat,  more  weak  than  wicked. 

I From  the  splendour  of  his  earlier  reign,  lit  with  his  great 
! designs  above,  phosphorescent  with  corruption  below,  down 
t'  to  the  failures  and  ignominies  and  rottenness  of  his  later 
\-  years,  Napoleon  III.’s  spoilt  grandeur  had  two  fatal  foes, 
[]  its  own  obliquity  and  weakness,  and  the  throttling  alliance 
of  French  clericalism. 

' At  present  Napoleon’s  mind  was,  as  Palmerston  said  of 
I it  at  a later  date,  as  full  of  schemes  as  a warren  of  rabbits. 
Poland  and  Italy  were  the  chief  subjects  of  his  dreams,  and 
: Italy  claimed  his  first  regard.^  The  Piedmontese  statesmen 
I instinctively  recognized  this,  and  the  French  alliance  had 
i been  already  thought  of,  when  Cavour  entered  the  cabinet.^ 
They  were  waiting  till  the  President  was  in  a position  to 
show  his  hand.  At  the  end  of  1851  the  long-expected 
I crisis  came  at  Paris,  and  Napoleon  ended  his  clever  un- 
! scrupulous  fencing  with  the  Assembly  by  the  coup  d’Stat 

^ Castelli,  Carteggio,  I.  102. 

^ Louis  Napoleon,  Idees  Napoleoniennes  ; La  Gorce,  Second  Empire,  I.  iv,-v.  ; 
l Sorel,  Guerre  franco-allemande,  I.  4-6;  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  VIII.  155  > 

I Gu^ronniere,  Napoleon  III.  et  Vltalie;  Maupas,  Memoires,  II.  81,  loi  ; Cantu, 
Cronistoria,  III,  282-288.  It  may  be  hoped  that  the  work  of  recent  French 
‘ historians  will  dispel  misconceptions  of  Napoleon  III. 

^ Louis  Napoleon,  op.  cit.,  149;  Martin,  Prince  Consort,  III.  119;  Ashley, 
Palmerston,  11.  179  ; Ottolenghi,  Collegno,  171  ; Bonfadini,  Arese,  129. 
D'Aze^lio,  Scritti  postumi,  189;  Massari,  La  Marmora,  112. 


408  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

(December  2,  1851),  wbich  made  him  autocrat  of  France, 
and  Emperor  in  all  but  name.  Severely  as  the  Liberal 
press  of  Turin  and  Genoa  attacked  him,  Piedmont  was 
too  much  absorbed  in  calculating  the  consequences  to 
herself,  to  brood  over  the  immorality  of  Louis  Napoleon’s 
progress  to  Empire.  While  the  coup  d^4tat  was  a blow  to 
constitutional  government  everywhere,  it  left  the  ground 
freer  for  his  personal  policy,  and  Italy  had  known  the 
Second  Republic  chiefly  by  its  treachery  to  its  own  maxims 
and'  the  nefarious  expedition  to  Rome.  For  the  moment, 
however,  the  constitutional  aspect  was  the  more  importunate. 
Napoleon  had  been  nettled  by  the  attacks  of  the  Liberal 
press ; and  he  at  once  insisted  that  D’Azeglio  should  modify 
the  Press  Law,  and  silence  the  refugees,  suggesting  that  the 
more  turbulent  should  be  transported  to  Cayenne  with  his 
own  victims.^  D’Azeglio  sturdily  refused  to  coerce  the 
mass  of  the  refugees,  or  restrict  free  discussion  on  home 
affairs;  but  he  felt  himself  obliged  to  conciliate  Napoleon, 
for  Austria  was  threatening  to  attack,  and  Palmerston’s 
impending  fall  destroyed  any  lingering  hope  of  English 
support.  A few  of  the  more  violent  democrats  were 
expelled,  and  a Bill  was  introduced  by  the  minister 
Deforesta  to  facilitate  prosecutions  for  libels  on  foreign 
potentates.  Napoleon  allowed  himself  to  be  easily  appeased, 
and  promised  the  help  of  France,  if  ever  Piedmont  needed 
it,  on  condition  that  she  preserved  order  and  kept  down  the 
revolutionaries.^ 

The  Deforesta  Law  was  a matter  of  small  moment,  but 
the  coup  diktat  produced,  or  rather  matured,  a much  more 
important  evolution  in  Piedmontese  politics.  For  some 
time  past  there  had  been  a tendency  at  work  among  the  | 
moderate  men  of  both  Right  and  Left  to  draw  together  into  j 
a Central  party.^  The  commercial  treaties  had  made  a j 
definite  rupture  between  the  protectionists  and  free-traders 
of  the  Right ; and  thoughtful  men  of  both  sides  recognized 

1 Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  VII.  92,  97.  It  is  not  true,  as  often  stated,  that 
D’Azeglio  forestalled  French  pressure. 

2 Ottolenghi,  op.  cit.,  148-149  ; Bonfadini,  Mezzosecolo,  368. 

3 See  above,  p.  358. 


THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 


409 

the  dangers  of  a fluctuating  majority,  which  might  at  any 
moment  precipitate  a crisis  and  bring  in  a Revel  cabinet. 
The  ministry  had  found  the  Right  a broken  reed,  and  knew 
that,  though  Revel  might  be  loyal  to  the  Statute,  behind 
him  were  others,  who  were  not.  Compared  with  the  deep 
differences,  which  parted  the  two  wings  of  the  Right,  the 
interval  between  the  Right  Centre  and  Left  Centre  was 
small ; and  they  would  form,  if  united,  a capable,  homo- 
geneous party,  which,  if  not  actually  a majority,  would  none 
the  less  control  the  Chamber.  Cavour  was  glad  to  shift 
the  ministerial  fulcrum  towards  the  Left,  for  the  cou;p  d'etat 
and  the  frank  hostility  of  some  of  Revel’s  followers  to  the 
constitution  had  convinced  him  that  the  scales  needed 
weighting  against  the  reactionaries.  He  shared  the  growing 
discontent  with  D’Azeglio’s  anxiety  to  conciliate  Rome  and 
Austria  at  too  heavy  a price.  The  Premier’s  constitutional 
indolence  irritated  his  restless,  active  spirit ; he  wished  to 
rule  events,  while  D’Azegiio  waited  on  them.  And  much 
as  he  still  disliked  the  Left,  the  persuasion  of  his  friends 
slowly  won  him  to  the  alliance.^  Rattazzi  had  long  been 
eager  for  fusion,  and  Cavour’s  conversion  was  immediately 
followed  by  an  arrangement  as  to  its  terms.  The  Deforesta 
Bill  once  passed,  Rattazzi  pledged  the  Left  Centre  to  support 
the  government,  and  Cavour  undertook  to  break  definitely 
from  the  Extreme  Right  and  commit  his  colleagues  to  a 
progressive  policy.  It  shows  Cavour’s  masterful  hardihood, 
that  the  alliance  was  mainly  a private  compact  between 
himself  and  Rattazzi ; his  friend  Farini,  the  historian,  alone 
among  his  colleagues  was  strongly  in  its  favour,  and  the 
actual  negotiations  with  Rattazzi  were,  it  seems,  carried  out 
without  the  Premier’s  privity.^  Such  was  the  famous 
‘‘  marriage  ” (connuhio)  of  the  parties,  which  Cavour  publicly 
announced  in  the  debate  on  the  Deforesta  Bill  (February  5, 
1852).  D’Azegiio  angrily  resented  Cavour’s  unauthorized 
diplomacy,  and  bitterly  complained  that  he  reigned  but 
did  not  govern.  The  long-smouldering  quarrel  came  to  a 

^ Castelli,  Cavour,  40-42;  Id.,  Ricordi,  67;  Chiala,  Tint 'page,  100. 

* Massari,  La  Marmora,  128;  D’Azegiio,  X’/toZte,  75;  Castelli,  Cavour,  47  ; 
Chiala,  op.  cit.,  124 ; Cavour,  Lettere,  1.  255  ; C.  D’Azegiio,  Souvenirs,  445  ; 
Berti,  Cavour,  344. 


410  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

head,  when  Rattazzi  in  pursuance  of  the  bargain  was 
appointed  President  of  the  Chamber,  defeating  the  minis- 
terial candidate ; and  after  a prolonged  crisis  Cavour  and 
Farini  resigned  (May).^ 

It  was  recognized  that  without  Cavour  D Azeglio  s was 
only  a stop-gap  ministry,  but  Cavour  was  unwHling  as  yet 
to  be  premier,  and  D’ Azeglio  was  tolerated,  to  avoid  a reac- 
tionary cabinet,  and  use  his  prestige  in  England  to  win 
sympathy  there.  But  he  was  weary  of  office,  harassed  by 
both  parties,  with  Cavour  increasingly  hostile  and  the  diplo- 
matic situation  made  more  difficult  by  Palmerston’s  faU. 
The  final  blow  came  from  an  unexpected  quarter.  The 
King’s  speech  had  promised  that  the  long-delayed  Bill  on 
civil  marriage  should  be  introduced  during  the  session,  and 
in  June  it  came  before  the  Chamber.  It  attempted  a com- 
promise between  the  French  law,  which  kept  the  civil 
contract  distinct  from  the  religious  bond,  the  state  recog- 
nizing the  former  only,  and  the  Italian  custom,  under  which 
the  church  both  celebrated  the  rite  and  registered  it.  The 
Bill  made  both  the  civil  and  religious  ceremony  necessary, 
but  put  registration  in  the  hands  of  the  lay  authorities, 
and  in  certain  special  cases  allowed  the  civil  ceremony  to  be 
valid  of  itself.^  Mild  as  the  proposals  were,  to  the  orthodox 
the  whole  thing  was  accursed,  because  it  seemed  to  prejudice 
the  sacramental  nature  of  the  bond  and  facihtate  divorce. 
D’ Azeglio  had  hoped  to  win  the  consent  of  Rome ; always 
patient  and  long-suffering,  he  was  ready  to  turn  his  cheek 
to  the  smiter  and  brook  Antonelli’s  insolence.  But^  it 
counted  for  nothing  that  he  delayed  the  measure  to  give 
time  for  fresh  negotiations,  that  the  Bill  itself  was  tender  to 
the  church’s  spiritual  claims,  that  civil  marriage  had  existed 
in  Austria  from  the  reign  of  Joseph  II.,  in  France  since  the 
days  of  the  Constituent,  and  had  been  legal  in  Piedmont  | 
itself  under  the  French  rule.  The  Bill  was  condemned  by 
the  Pope  before  it  had  passed  the  Chamber,  and  Antonelh 
attacked  it  with  savagest  abuse.  The  King  wrote  to  the 

1 The  precise  occasion  was  a dispute  as  to  whether  some  railway  contracts 
should  be  conceded  to  Brassey  or  an  Italian  firm. 

2 Boggio,  Chiesa  e stato,  I.  352. 


THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 


411 

Pope,  hoping  to  smooth  the  way,  and  for  reply  was  taunted 
with  introducing  concubinage  into  his  kingdom.  For  the 
first  and  nearly  the  last  time  in  his  life  Victor  Emmanuel, 
frank  scorner  of  the  marriage-tie  himself,  went  over  to  the 
clericals;  he  announced  (October  21)  that  his  conscience 
would  not  allow  him  to  sanction  the  Bill,  and  the  with- 
drawal of  his  support  made  it  certain  that  it  would  not  pass 
the  Senate.  The  rebuff  made  D’Azeglio’s  position  untenable; 
thoroughly  weary  of  his  task,  he  gladly  seized  the  opportunity 
to  resign  (October  22),  and  retired  to  his  congenial  studio, 
to  eke  out  his  private  pittance  with  his  brush. 

Cavour,  as  by  far  the  biggest  figure  in  Piedmontese 
politics,  was  his  natural  successor,  and  the  King,  much  as 
he  disliked  it,  could  not  avoid  summoning  him,  but  made  it 
a condition  of  office  that  he  should  again  attempt  reconcilia- 
tion with  Eome.  Cavour  refused  to  hamper  himself  with 
the  undertaking,  and  the  Kung,  though  he  would  have  no 
reactionary  ministry,  caught  at  the  chance  of  putting  Balbo 
and  Revel  in  office  with  a programme  of  “ the  Statute 
neither  more  nor  less,”  which  meant  a minimum  of  reform 
and  a compromise  in  favour  of  Rome.  But  apparently  the 
Right  Centre  refused  to  support  them,  and  even  Balbo,  how- 
ever averse  to  anti-clerical  legislation,  would  not  yield  in  the 
matter  of  Fransoni.  He  confessed  himself  unable  to  form  a 
cabinet,  and  the  King  was  obliged  to  give  Cavour  the  seals, 
on  his  undertaking  not  to  make  civil  marriage  a question  of 
confidence.^  Most  of  D’Azeglio’s  colleagues  kept  office,  and 
the  new  cabinet  seemed  to  follow  in  its  predecessor’s  steps. 
The  King’s  wish  to  see  Rattazzi  in  the  ministry  was  rejected, 
the  marriage  law  was  quietly  dropped,  and  the  v'olent 
attacks  of  the  bishops  were  ignored.  D’Azeglio’s  mild 
coercion  was  continued,  and  the  magistrates  were  allowed 
to  convict  Bible-colporteurs  and  imprison  men  for  polemics 
against  eternal  punishment.  There  was  no  material  change 
in  foreign  policy,  and  Cavour  hastened  to  congratulate 
Napoleon,  when  he  proclaimed  himself  Emperor  on  the 

1 Ricotti,  Balbo,  300-302 ; Bianchi,  op.  cit.,  VII.  67-68  ; Brofferio,  Parla- 
mento,  VI.  178-183.  The  Bill  was  thrown  out  in  the  Senate  on  December  20 
by  a majority  of  one. 


412  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY 

anniversary  of  tlie  coup  But  th.e  Liberals  were  rigbt 

in  their  instinct  that  Cavour’s  accession  meant  the  triumph 
of  their  policy.  It  was  not  long  before,  a new  act  of  Austrian 
aggression  made  it  possible  to  mark  how  much  the  pace  had 
quickened. 

The  quiet  progress  of  Piedmontese  pohtics  showed  how 
completely  the  constitutional  monarchy  had  been  accepted 
by  the  people.  Parliamentary  life  had  become  acclimatized, 
as  if  it  were  a growth  of  generations  rather  than  a creation 
of  yesterday.  The  complete  failure  of  the  reactionaries, 
vdth  all  the  church’s  influence  behind  them,  showed  how 
little  hold  they  had  on  the  people.  The  republicans  were 
weaker  still.  They  had  no  organized  party;  D’Azeglio 
had  shown  little  mercy  to  the  small  group  at  Genoa,  and 
public  opinion  had  supported  him  in  his  severity.  Libels, 
whose  shameful  scurrihty  distorted  Mazzini’s  noble  life, 
proved  how  hostile  public  opinion  was  to  him.  The  re- 
publicans from  the  rest  of  Italy  had  found  a scant  welcome, 
and  the  few,  who  settled  in  Piedmont,  sooner  or  later  shed 
their  repubhcanism  in  the  uncongenial  surroundings.  Most 
of  the  republican  leaders  had  settled  in  Paris  or  London. 
Mazzini  still  kept  round  him  in  London  a few,  who  loved 
him  for  his  devoted  life.  The  great  puritan  refused  to  bow 
to  defeat  or  circumstances,  and  hoped  on  for  the  day  of  the 
people’s  rising  and  the  rule  .of  abstract  righteousness.  Most 
of  his  friends  had  broken  away,  discouraged  by  his  failures 
or  chn^  under  his  dictatorial  rule;  but  his  restless 
acti  vvas  still  ever  at  work,  trying  to  build  up  the 
r .als  for  a national  rising  independently  of  the  Pied- 

utese  school,  which  he  hated  and  refused  to  understand, 
jutside  Piedmont  there  was  still  a good  deal  of  repub- 
licanism in  the  North  and  Centre ; in  every  town  there  wasj 
a remnant  of  the  republicans  of  1848,  and  the  mutual-help 
societies  among  the  artisans  were  often  repubUcan  associa- 
tions under  a social  guise.  Like  Mazzini  they  distrusted 
the  constitutional  movement  of  Piedmont,  or  were  too 
impatient  to  wait  for  the  slow  evolution  of  its  policy.  In 
Lombardy  and  at  Bologna  the  party  had  a real  strength ; 


THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 


413 

and  it  kept  a footing  at  Rome  and  Florence  and  in  Sicily, 
even  to  a small  extent  in  Piedmont. 

The  agitation  naturally  focussed  in  Lombardy.  Weakened 
though  the  Lombards  were  by  the  death  or  exile  of  so  many 
of  their  leaders,  there  was  no  slackening  of  the  national 
spirit  at  Milan  or  Brescia  or  Mantua.  The  boycot  still  shut 
out  Austrian  officers  and  civil  servants  from  Lombard 
society ; the  two  nations  sat  apart  at  the  theatres ; the 
smallest  provocation  from  an  officer  led  to  a challenge, 
and  many  an  Austrian  and  Italian  life  paid  for  the  deadly 
hostility  between  conquerors  and  conquered.  But  even  in 
Lombardy  the  republicans  were  only  a fraction  of  the 
nationalists  ; the  disillusions  of  1848-9  had  sunk  deep, 
and  many  of  the  Lombard  Liberals  had  gone  back  to  the 
waiting  non-political  school  of  the  ’qos,^  while  the  young 
nobles  continued  the  Albertist  traditions  of  their  fathers, 
and  as  “ Cavourians  ” kept  in  touch  with  the  Piedmontese 
Liberals  and  the  refugees  at  Turin.  Still  in  every  city  in 
Lombardy  and  Venetia  there  were  groups,  mainly  of  pro- 
fessional men  with  a sprinkling  of  priests  and  at  Milan  at 
all  events  with  a good  many  artisans,  who  had  picked  up 
the  threads  of  conspiracy  in  1849,  and  felt  the  smart  of 
Austrian  brutality  too  keenly  to  endure  on  in  the  hope  of 
distant  victory.  During  1850  and  1851  their  organization, 
more  or  less  in  connection  with  Mazzini’s  central  committee 
in  London,  had  grown  into  a powerful  and  wide-reaching 
conspiracy.  It  had  3000  members,  which  meant  no  doubt 
a much  larger  unorganized  following,  with  affiliates  in  Pied- 
mont and  among  the  Hungarian  regiments.  Preparations 
were  in  train  for  insurrection,  when  the  coup  d'Stat  convinced 
the  saner  heads  that  the  time  for  revolution  had  gone,  and 
the  current  set  more  strongly  than  ever  towards  Piedmont. 
But  at  the  moment,  when  the  conspirators  had  decided  to 
postpone  action  (April  1852),  an  accident  gave  the  autho- 
rities a clue,  and  three  days  under  the  lash  extracted  from 
a suspect  the  names  of  the  leaders.  The  government  struck 
at  the  centre  of  the  conspiracy  at  Mantua,  where  the  soul 
of  the  movement  was  the  priest  Tazzoli,  a man  of  singularly 
^ See  above,  p.  193. 


414  A HISTORY  OF  ITALIAN  UNITY  j 

lovable  and  resolute  nature.  Some  two  hundred,  mostly 
professional  men  and  tradesmen,  were  put  under  a horrible 
parody  of  justice,  with  judges  who  barely  knew  the  language, 
with  flogging  and  starvation  and  every  shape  of  mental 
torture  to  extort  confession.  And  though  not  another 
secret  was  betrayed,  the  government  had  sufficient  informa- 
tion to  prove  how  dangerous  and  widespread  was  the  plot, 
and  Tazzoli  and  four  others  died  on  the  scaffold  (December 
7).  The  bulk  of  the  revolutionaries  recognized  that  what- 1 
ever  chances  a popular  rising  had  had  at  a time  of  European  j 
revolution,  or  when  Austria  was  unprepared,  it  had  no  hope 
of  success  when  she  had  a large  standing  army  ready  to 
crush  the  first  symptoms  of  revolt.  But  the  Mantuan 
executions  made  the  Lombards  writhe  with  anger,  and 
there  were  eager  spirits  thirsting  to  revenge  the  victims  and 
repeat  the  Five  Days.  A small  group  of  artisans  at  Milan 
appealed  to  Mazzini  to  help  them,  and  giving  credit  as 
usual  to  their  exaggerated  prospects  of  success,  he  en- 
couraged them  to  action.'  The  rising  was  fixed  for  the 
Shrove  Tuesday  Carnival,  when  the  soldiers  would  be 
sharing  in  the  holiday.  But  the  odds  were  enormously 
against  success ; had  the  first  bloAV  not  miscarried,  there 
was  a faint  chance  that  the  populace  might  rise,  but  most 
of  the  leaders  deserted,  and  though  a few  soldiers  were 
killed,  the  insurgents  were  easily  dispersed  (February  6, 
xS^S).  The  republicans  of  Genoa  drew  back  at  the  last 
moment  from  their  promised  help,  and  faint  plans  of  rising 
in  Romagna  and  at  Rome  broke  down. 

The  Austrians  welcomed  the  rising  as  an  opportunity 
to  strike  at  the  Liberals.  Twenty-four  conspirators  died 
on  the  scaffold,  and  6000  Ticinese  of  all  ages  and  sexes 
were  driven  in  the  wintry  weather  over  the  frontier  to 
punish  Switzerland  for  giving  an  asylum  to  the  refugees. 
The  executions  might  have  passed  comparatively  unnoticed  ;| 
the  conspirators  had  taken  their  lives  in  their  hands  and) 
paid  the  forfeit  of  defeat.  But  Radetzky  was  hot  content; 
It  had  long  been  his  policy  to  make  a disreputable  bid  for^ 

1 Mazzini,  Operg,  VIII.  216-218;  Orsini,  Lettere,  112;  Salazaro,  Cenni,  5; 
Bonfadini,  Mezzotecolo,  373. 


THE  HEGEMONY  OF  PIEDMONT 


415 


popularity  by  striking  high,  and  the  old  marshal  had  a 
blind  hatred  for  the  Liberal  nobles  of  Milan.  Most  of  them 
had  taken  refuge  five  years  before  in  Turin  or  Genoa ; and 
he  hoped  to  bring  odium  on  Piedmont  by  saddling  the  guilt 
of  the  revolt  on  the  rich  refugees,  with  the  implication  that 
Piedmont  was  harbouring  men  who  plotted  rebellion  against 
her  neighbour.  An  Imperial  edict  laid  an  embargo  on 
the  properties  of  all  Lombards,  who  had  left  the  state  for 
political  reasons.  It  was  in  the  teeth  of  treaty  rights,  for 
the  victims  were  nationalized  Piedmontese,  and  a recent* 
treaty  had  secured  to  Piedmontese  subjects  the  peaceable 
possession  of  their  properties  in  Lombardy  and  Venetia.  It 
was  a challenge  thrown  down  to  Piedmont.  Cavour  had 
gone  to  the  extreme  of  compliancy ; he  had  drawn  a cordon 
of  troops  along  the  frontier  to  prevent  the  consphators  from 
receiving  help  from  Piedmont,^  he  had  illegally  seized  the 
copies  of  Mazzini’s  apology,  and  expelled  Crispi  and  other 
republicans,  who  were  suspected  of  complicity.  His  atti- 
tude made  Radetzky’s  action  the  more  wanton,  and  though 
the  victims  were  few  and  wealthy,  Cavour  saw  that  the 
national  honour  was  at  stake.  He  recalled  the  Piedmontese 
ambassador  from  Vienna,  and  published  a strong  and  solemn 
protest  against  the  Austrian  illegalities;  he  would  even,  but 
for  D’Azeglio’s  advice,  have  made  reprisals  on  the  properties 
of  Austrian  subjects  in  Piedmont,  and  was  prepared  to  go 
to  war  rather  than  surrender  his  position.  Austria  recalled 
Appony,  but  did  not  attempt  to  justify  the  sequestrations ; 
France  and  England  warmly  supported  her  rival,  and  she 
found  herself  condemned  by  the  moral  judgment  of  Europe. 

It  was  a great  victory  for  Cavour’s  diplomacy,  and  its 
brilliancy  obscured  the  inconsistency  of  his  attack  on  the 
republicans.  His  own  real  policy  was  as  much  opposed 
as  was  Mazzini’ s to  the  position  secured  to  Austria  by  treaty, 
and  his  opportunism  was  the  only  essential,  that  differen- 
tiated his  hostility  from  that  of  the  insurgents.  Pallavicino 
complained  that  he  used  the  revolution  to  weaken  Austria, 

^ Bianchi,  op.  cit,,  VII.  128;  Mario,  Mazzini,  357,  says  that  after  the  plot 
letters  were  opened  in  the  Turin  post,  and  communicated  to  the  Austrians. 
An  attempt  was  made  to  assassinate  Mazzini : Ib.,  loc.  cit. 


4i6  a history  of  ITALIAN  UNITY 

and  diplomacy  to  weaken  the  revolution;  and  it  was  no 
compRment  to  him  that  the  French  ministry  congratulated 
him  on  his  delicate  conduct  towards  Austria.  But  this  was  : 
forgotten,  while  the  protest  against  the  sequestrations  loomed 
large  as  a bold  stand  against  foreign  tyranny.  Piedmont  | 
appeared  as  the  champion  and  protectress  of  oppressed 
Italians,  not  afraid  to  indict  Austria  before  the  tribunal  | 
of  European  opinion.  How  warm  was  the  response  was  • 
proved  by  the  vote  of  the  Chamber  to  advance  a large  , 
indemnity  to  the  victims  of  the  Imperial  edict , and  the  ; 
controversy,  that  followed  the  protest,  showed  that  it  was  : 
impossible  that  Piedmont  and  Austria  should  long  continue  i 
side  by  side. 


END  OF  VOL.  I. 


Printed  by  Ballantyne,  Hanson  6"  Co. 
Edinburgh  6^  London 


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